Hosios

A SEMANTIC STUDY OF GREEK PIETY

SASKIA PEELS

MNEMOSYNE SUPPLEMENTS MONOGRAPHS ON GREEK AND LATIN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

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Hosios: A Semantic Study of Greek Piety

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By

Saskia Peels

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Preface

When Odysseus fully realizes his predicament in Polyphemus's cave, he exclaims:

> αἰαῖ, πόνους μὲν Τρωϊκοὺς ὑπεξέδυν
> θαλασσίους τε, νῦν δ' ἐς ἀνδρὸς ἀνοσίου
> ὠμὴν κατέσχον ἀλίμενόν τε καρδίαν.
>
> 'Alas, I have escaped hardships at Troy
> and on the sea, only to put in now at the fierce and
> harbourless heart of an *anhosios* man!'[1]

Polyphemus is hardly the only creature in fifth-century Greek literature who is classified as ἀνόσιος, 'impious', 'godless'. Orestes, Clytemnestra, Agamemnon, Aegisthus, Menelaus, Pylades, Oedipus, Antigone, Jocaste, Polymestor, Medea, Paris, Heracles, Odysseus himself, and many other mythological figures—with the addition of the gods Apollo and even Zeus—suffered the charge of being called ἀνόσιος at one time or another, and for very diverse reasons.

In the discussion directly preceding his lamentation, Odysseus had just asked Polyphemus not to gobble up any more of his friends. He had appealed to Polyphemus to honour the φιλία relationship that existed between them, claiming he had kept the temples of Cyclops's father Poseidon safe in the Trojan war.[2] He also asked Polyphemus to respect the rules of ξενία: Polyphemus should receive his guests and suppliants hospitably.[3] But Polyphemus is not at all impressed by Odysseus's rhetoric. 'If you are talking about gods,' he says 'then Wealth is the god to worship.'[4] And: 'I do not care about the land on which my father Poseidon's temples are built, in fact, I do not understand why you put them in your speech at all.' Polyphemus is not afraid of Zeus, nor does he accept that Zeus is superior to himself.[5] Thunder and lightning, rain and wind sent by Zeus do not affect him when he is sitting in his cave. There he eats and drinks milk and drums on his belly, making a noise that rivals Zeus's thunder.[6]

---

1 This passage is a quotation from Euripides's satyr play *Cyclops*, ll. 347–349.
2 E. *Cyc.* 288–298.
3 E. *Cyc.* 299–303.
4 E. *Cyc.* 316.
5 E. *Cyc.* 318–321.
6 E. *Cyc.* 323–328.

In fact, his belly, to which he performs cultic service, should be considered the greatest divinity of all, and guzzle and eat every day: this is Zeus in the eyes of wise men.[7] Rounding off his speech, Polyphemus assures his guest that he takes the demands of hospitality quite seriously and will give Odysseus and his men many gifts of hospitality: a bronze pot (in which they will be cooked), a fire (to warm them) and salt (to season their meat).[8]

Which part of this bold speech makes Polyphemus ἀνόσιος? Is it mainly his attitude towards Zeus, the disrespect shown to his father Poseidon, the proposed treatment of his guests and suppliants, or all of the elements in this speech combined? What exactly did Odysseus express when he wondered upon his arrival whether the island's inhabitants would be ὅσιοι?[9] And what do Polyphemus and all other individuals evaluated as ὅσιος or ἀνόσιος have in common?

---

7 E. *Cyc.* 334–337.
8 E. *Cyc.* 342–344.
9 E. *Cyc.* 125.

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Abbreviated Sources

I have used the author-date system for most of the books and articles to which I refer. These are given in the bibliography. Abbreviations of ancient authors and works follow the standard of *Liddell & Scott Greek-English* lexicon. Furthermore, I have used abbreviations for some collections or studies of epigraphical sources. I have given the references to these abbreviations below. Abbreviations were also used in references to dictionaries. These references are listed below as well.

Bailly	Bailly, A., *Le Grand Bailly dictionnaire Grec—Français*, Paris 2000 [1894].
Brodersen	Brodersen, K., W. Günther & H.H. Schmitt, *Historische Griechische Inschriften in Übersetzung. I. Der archaische und klassische Zeit* (Texte zur Forschung 59), Darmstadt 1992.
Chandezon	Chandezon, C., *L'élevage en Grèce (fin Ver-fin Ier s. a.C.). L'apport des sources épigraphiques*, Bordeaux [etc.] 2003.
CID I	Rougement, G. (ed.), *Corpus des inscriptions de Delphes. Vol. I, Lois sacrées et règlements religieux*, Paris 1977.
Syll.	Dittenberger, W. & H. von Gaertringen, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum I–IV*, Leipzig 1915–1924^3 [1884].
Helbing	Helbing, R., *Auswahl aus griechischen Inschriften*, Berlin & Leipzig 1915.
Le Guen-Pollet	Le Guen-Pollet, B., *La vie religieuse dans le monde grec du Ve au IIIe siècle avant notre ère: choix de documents épigraphiques traduits et commentés*, Toulouse 1991.
ID	Plassart, A., *Inscriptions de Délos* 6, Paris 1950.
IG	*Incriptiones Graecae (1873–).*
IGASMG III	Arena, R., *Iscrizioni greche arcaiche di Sicilia e Magna Grecia*. 3. *Iscrizioni delle colonie euboiche*, Pisa 1994.
IGSK ii	Engelmann, H. & R. Merkelbach, *Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien*. 2. *Die Inschriften von Erythrai und Klazomenai, teil 2*, Bonn 1973.
IP*Ark*	Thür, G. & H. Taeuber, *Prozessrechtliche Inschriften der griechischen Poleis: Arkadien (IPArk)* (Sitzungsberichte Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse 607), Vienna 1994.
IvO	Dittenberger, W. & K. Purgold, *Die Inschriften von Olympia* (Olympia: die Ergebnisse der von dem Deutschen Reich veranstalteten Ausgrabung 5), Berlin 1896.

Körner	Körner, R., *Inschriftliche Gesetzestexte der frühen griechischen Polis: aus dem Nachlass von Reinhard Körner* (Akten der Gesellschaft für Griechische und Hellenistische Rechtsgeschichte), hrsg. von K. Hallof, Köln 1993.
Lindos II	Blinkenberg, C., *Lindos. Fouilles et recherches, 1902–1914*. 2. *Inscriptions*, Copenhagen & Berlin 1941.
LSAM	Sokolowski, F., *Lois sacrées de l'Asie Mineure*, Paris 1955.
LSCG	Sokolowski, F., *Lois sacrées des cités grecques*, Paris 1969.
LGS	Von Prott, H. & L. Ziehen, *Leges Graecorum Sacrae 1–2 et titulis collectae*, Leipzig 1896, 1906.
LSJ	Liddell, H.G., R. Scott & H.S. Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon. With a revised supplement*, Oxford 1996^9 [1843].
LSS	Sokolowski, F., *Lois sacrées des cités grecques: supplément*, Paris 1962.
ML	Meiggs, R. & D. Lewis (eds.), *A selection of greek historical inscriptions to the end of the fifth century B.C.*, 1988^2 [1969].
Montanari	Montanari, F., *Vocabolario della lingua greca, con la collaborazione di Ivan Garofalo e Daniela Manetti, fondato su un progetto di Nino Marinone*, Genoa 2004^2 [1995].
NGSL	Lupu, E., *Greek sacred law: a collection of new documents* (*NGSL*), Leiden 2005.
Nomima I	Van Effenterre, H. & F. Ruzé, *Nomima: Recueil d'inscriptions politiques et juridiques de l'archaïsme Grec. I. Cités et institutions*, Rome, 1994.
N. Suppl. Epig. Rodio	Pugliese Carratelli, G., "Nuovo supplemento epigrafico rodio," *lAnnuario della Scuola archeologica di Atene e delle missioni italiane in Oriente* 17–18 (1955–1956), 157–181.
OED	*The Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford University Press, online edition, www.oed.com).
RO	Rhodes, P.J. & R. Osborne (eds.), *Greek historical inscriptions 404–323 BC*, Oxford 2003.
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*, Leiden, 1923–1971, New Series (ed. H.W. Pleket et al.), Amsterdam 1979–.
Schwyzer, *DGE*	Schwyzer, E., *Dialectorum Graecarum Exempla Epigraphica Potiora*, Leipzig 1923.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The aim of this book is to elucidate the semantics of the Ancient Greek adjective ὅσιος and its cognates. This term has been notoriously difficult to comprehend, for several reasons. Traditionally rendered as 'piety', ὅσιος and its cognates were key notions in classical Greek religion and reflected a core value in Athenian democracy. This study sets out to resolve the scholarly debates on various aspects of the meaning and usage of ὅσιος and its cognates. It also provides an understanding of the semantic relationship between these lexemes and their near-synonyms. Using insights from modern linguistic theory, it aims to improve the methods for researching lexical semantics in a dead language. The focus of this book is on lexical competition. Its main question is: under what semantic and pragmatic circumstances did speakers choose to employ the term ὅσιος and its cognates in contrast to other ways they had of expressing a similar message?

1 *hosios* & *cognates*[1]

Both the adjective ὅσιος and the noun ἡ ὁσία are semantically elusive lexemes, whose etymology is unknown.[2] Plato devoted a dialogue, the *Euthyphro*, to

1 When I refer to '*hosios & cognates*' I am referring to the lexeme ὅσιος (the adjective), its negations (οὐχ ὅσιος, μὴ ὅσιος), the antonym ἀνόσιος, the noun ὁσία and all attested derived denominative verbs (ὁσιόω, ἐξοσιόω, ἀφοσιόω, καθοσιόω).

2 Two theories (Brugmann 1906 and De Lamberterie 1997) currently find supporters. Brugmann 1906:401 proposed that ὅσιος is a transformation of a form *ἅτιος, deriving from PIE **sn̥t-i̯o-*, a zero-grade derivation from the participle of the verb 'to be', also the starting point of Sanskrit *satyá-* 'true'. This etymology would place ὅσιος in the domain of the ethical and religious evaluation of behaviour. In many Indo-European dialects, the participle of 'to be' is used with the meaning 'true', and has a potential religious dimension, like Sanskrit *satyá-*, which has moral connotations and is frequently associated with the concept of piety (Hinge 2007:147; Pinault 1996 e.g. 43). There are two major phonological problems with the theory. The first is the irregular vocalisation of **n̥* in ὅσιος as /*o*/ instead of /*a*/. Chantraine 1968–1980:832, Mastrelli 1985:33 and Beekes 2010:1117–1118 have rejected the etymology for this reason, but Meillet 1910–1911, Schwyzer 1939:343–344 and Hinge 2007:146 have attempted to explain the unexpected vowel. A second problem is the fact that

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the search for a definition of τὸ ὅσιον. The term seemed to have featured prominently in the evaluative terminology of fifth- and fourth-century Greeks. Especially on the dramatic stage, moral debates frequently centred around what is ὅσιον. Did Antigone 'commit a ὅσιον crime' when burying her brother in perilous defiance of Creon's decree? Was Orestes ὅσιος when he murdered his mother in revenge for Agamemnon, as instructed by Apollo? Was it ὅσιον to refuse a suppliant whose safety was in danger?[3]

A common translation of ὅσιος is 'pious'.[4] But as we can already tell from these examples, characters are referred to as ὅσιος (or the opposite) for highly divergent reasons. Sometimes the term addresses clearly religious matters. Pentheus's refusal to acknowledge the god Dionysus is a ὕβρις that is not ὁσία.[5] A chorus prays they will not ever rest from approaching the gods with offerings that are ὅσιαι.[6] But other issues are described in this way, too. Another tragic chorus of young girls prays that in matters of love, their desires will be ὅσιοι.[7] Herodotus describes how a Panionius earned his living 'by doing something most ἀνόσιον', castrating boys and selling them as slaves.[8] And a Callias was

---

the root for 'to be' has now been established as *$h_1$es- (not *es*-). This makes the type of formation assumed in Brugmann untenable, for the expected form would be *ἑόσιος (Beekes 2010:1117). Hinge 2007:155–157 suggests as a solution that a pre-consonantal laryngeal does not develop a prothetic vowel in Greek before a *closed* syllable containing a syllabic consonant, as for example in *h_1*sum.nos* > ὕμνος (contrast *h_3*li.gos* > ὀλίγος). The second theory was developed by De Lamberterie 1997:170 (based on earlier work of Meillet 1910–1911), who suggested an etymology for ὅσιος from the root **set* 'to be stable'. An *o*-grade derivation from this root, **sot-i̯o*, would be the basis of ὅσιος, but also of *satyá-* 'true' (cf. similarly, Peters 1980:185). Pinault 1996:43ff., defended this derivation, but Hinge 2007 presented linguistic objections to various aspects of De Lamberterie's theory. Willi 2008 connected the etymology of ὁσίη and ὅσιος to that of νόσος 'disease', arguing that both forms eventually derive from *h_1*ósu*, 'well-being'. This proposal should be rejected on linguistic grounds, as is argued by Beekes 2010:1024, 1118. Another crucial problem with Willi's argument is that it rests on the supposition of the existence of a noun ἡ ἀνόσια. This noun is at best attested once in a fifth-century Cypriotic inscription (Masson 1983 [1961]:235ff.), where it reads *a-no-si-ya-wo-i-ke-no-i-tu* (ἀνοσίγα ϝοι γένοιτυ), but it is more probably the neuter plural of the substantivised adjective, which frequently occurs in the fifth century.

3 Antigone: S. *Ant.* 74; Orestes: E. *Or.* 546–547; suppliants: E. *Supp.* 40, E. *Hyps.* F 757.862 *TrGF*, S. *OC* 281, Hdt. 1.157–161.

4 e.g., LSJ s.v. ὅσιος II.

5 E. *Ba.* 374.

6 A. *Pr.* 529–530.

7 E. *IA* 555.

8 Hdt. 8.105.1.

accused of being 'the most ἀνόσιος of all humans' when he tried to interpret a law, which was a prerogative of the Eumolpidae alone.[9]

In some contexts, it seems as if we should translate ὅσιος as one of its near-synonyms. For example, the boy Ion prides himself on being 'ὅσιος from the bed',[10] referring almost certainly to his chastity. Here ὅσιος apparently acquires a meaning that is otherwise commonly expressed by the term ἁγνός.[11] The chorus in *Bacchants* urges the Thebans: νάρθηκας ὁσιοῦσθε.[12] The phrase is thought to describe a process in which profane objects (rods of fennels) are consecrated, turning them into holy objects (θύρσοι) of Dionysus's cult;[13] thus ὁσιοῦν seems a synonym of ἱεροῦν.[14] In a number of passages expressing a contrast between 'good' and 'bad' behaviour, ἀνόσιος is contrasted with δίκαιος or εὐσεβής, and ὅσιος is opposed to δυσσέβεια. The juxtaposition of these terms as antonyms implies that they function as (near-) synonyms.[15]

Besides persons and actions, objects are sometimes also referred to in terms of ὅσιος. Often these objects are connected to persons in some way, when the adjective qualifies the cities in which they live, the mouths with which they speak, the feet on which they walk.[16] But ὅσιος qualifies other types of objects as well. In a famous example, a woman expresses the desire to go to a 'ὅσιον place' to give birth.[17] Money is regularly referred to as ὅσιον, too, for the first time in the accounts of the deme Ikarion (450–425 BCE).[18]

Perhaps the main reason why the noun ὁσία has caused fewer problems of understanding than the adjective ὅσιος is that it occurs much less often. ἡ ὁσία is commonly taken as referring to '(what is permitted by) divine law'.[19] Still, some individual instances of ὁσία are less evident. For example, in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes*, the god Hermes desires 'ὁσίη of the sacrificial meat' and wishes

9 And. *De Myst.* 116.

10 E. *Ion* 150.

11 LSJ s.v. ἁγνός I 2.

12 E. *Ba.* 114.

13 Roux 1972, ad loc.; Seaford 1996, ad loc.

14 Bolkestein 1936:45.

15 e.g. ὅσιος opposed to δυσσέβεια: E. *Hel.* 1021; ἀνόσιος opposed to δίκαιος and εὐσεβής: A. *Th.* 610–611.

16 cities: E. *El.* 1319, E. *Antiop.* F 223.86 *TrGF*; mouths: Emp. fr. 3.7, S. *OC* 981; feet: E. *IT* 130, E. *Hel.* 868–869.

17 Ar. *Lys.* 743.

18 IG I^3 253, l. 13 and l. 17: ἀργυρίο *h*οσίο. A recent discussion of this text is Blok 2010.

19 e.g. LSJ s.v. ὁσία I.

to 'enter upon the same ὁσίη' as his brother, Apollo.[20] The meaning of ὁσίη in these examples is rather opaque.

Being able to interpret the meaning of ὅσιος and ὁσία correctly in all of these cases is not only important to increase our understanding of these texts, but also to answer historical questions. The religious vocabulary of the Ancient Greeks is the key to understanding Greek religion and the role of religion in Greek *poleis*.[21]

2 Research Questions and Goals

At least five main research questions related to *hosios & cognates* have been posed by scholars, and my aim is to answer them in this book.

1. First of all, it is not evident what kind of evaluation ὅσιος is. With respect to the usage of *hosios & cognates* for persons and their behaviour, there is a scholarly debate about their evaluative nature and about where to place them on an evaluative scale. These questions are the main topic of Chapter 2. Given the wide range of conducts that may be described as ὅσιος or ὁσία (or the opposite), there is still controversy about whether these terms primarily express a moral, ethical evaluation, i.e. assessing the behaviour of humans amongst themselves, or a religious evaluation, i.e. judging action from the assumed perspective of the gods. The connection between these different applications was one of the most important issues in Van der Valk's seminal article on the semantics of ὅσιος.[22] According to Van der Valk, ὅσιος primarily and originally had a religious sense (like εὐσεβής), not an ethical one.[23] But from the fifth century onwards, ὅσιος is found in an enlarged sphere of meaning, used in non-religious and ethical applications. This expansion of

20 *h.Merc.* 130, 173.

21 I subscribe to the view of Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:3–6, 2008:43–44. Pirenne-Delforge 2008:31 also considered the lexical-semantic method (or at least Rudhardt's) to be one of the most promising ways in which to start to achieve such an ambition.

22 Van der Valk 1942.

23 Discussion in Van der Valk 113–117, with conclusion on p. 117: 'Angesichts dieser Tatsachen glaube ich, dass festgesetzt werden kann, dass ὅσιος dem religiösen Gebiet angehört. Die Meinung, dass es im Anfang ethische Bedeutung hatte, is [*sic*] abzuweisen.' Van der Valk's work was a response to Bolkestein (1936), who had argued that ὅσιος was in essence an ethical term. E.g. 1936:210: 'ὅσιος c.s. et εὐσεβής c.s. … ont un sens religieux mais en premier lieu un sens moral'; Stellingen no. III: 'the words ὅσιος and εὐσεβής c.s. are

the semantic range from the religious to the ethical served 'um eine Freveltat besonders grell zu beleuchten'.[24] We find such usage for example in Euripides, when Clytemnestra says that Agamemnon 'does godless things' (ἀνόσια πράσσει) by sacrificing Iphigenia,[25] and in the evaluation of Orestes's matricide as ἀνόσιον.[26]

In later scholarship the usage of *hosios & cognates* to describe conduct *among* humans has been given greater semantic importance. According to Benveniste, the usage of ὅσιος to describe interhuman behaviour is the primary application of this lexeme, as is evident from his definition: 'ce qui est prescrit, permis par la loi divine (or: ce qui est prescrit ou permis par les dieux aux hommes), mais dans les rapports *humains*'.[27] Maffi objected that Benveniste's definition does not cover the entire semantic field of ὅσιος, because the term quite often describes conduct directly aimed at the gods (e.g. in the sphere of ritual).[28]

Rudhardt's definition covered both the religious and the ethical aspect: 'les actes ὅσιοι, ou conférant la qualité de ὅσιος à qui les accomplit, établissent entre les dieux et les hommes ou entre les hommes eux-mêmes, à l'intérieur de la famille ou de la cité, des relations conformes à certaines normes et qui s'intègrent dans un ordre permanent'.[29] Rudhardt emphasised that this order is a *religious* order in a second definition found a few pages further on: 'ὅσιος … signifie … *conforme à l'ordre religieux selon lequel la puissance s'exerce normalement en assurant, dans les rapports qui les définissent, l'existence des êtres et des choses*'.[30]

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repeatedly used of the relationships between humans among themselves: the translation 'pious' is in these cases incorrect' (my translation from Dutch).

24 Van der Valk 1942:135.

25 E. *IA* 1105. Van der Valk 1942:135.

26 E. *Or*. 286, 374, 481, 546, 563. Van der Valk 1942:137.

27 Benveniste 1969:198–199 (italics in original text).

28 Maffi 1982:41.

29 Rudhardt 1992 [1958]: 31–32.

30 Rudhardt 1992 [1958]: 36 (italics in original text). In the preface to the second (unchanged) 1992 edition of his *Notions Fondamentales*, Rudhardt states that he is not changing his analysis of ὅσιον but slightly adjusting it, now preferring the notion of "règle" to "ordre". As Rudhardt explains, 'cela n'est pas sans importance. L'ordre suggère l'idée d'un état des choses définitivement acquis, tandis que la règle ne fige rien'. An unfinished manuscript of a new book by Rudhardt, *Essai sur la religion grecque*, was published posthumously by Borgeaud & Pirenne-Delforge (2008). It appears that Rudhardt

Similar definitions were given by Jay-Robert and Blok more recently. Jay-Robert, taking Benveniste's definition as a starting point, held that τὸ ὅσιον is 'ce qui est prescrit et permis par la loi divine dans les rapports que nouent les êtres humains avec les dieux et par conséquent dans ceux qu'ils nouent entre eux'.[31] Blok gave an interpretation of ὁσία along the same lines as 'a set of norms or rules of conduct either between humans sanctioned and controlled by the gods, or of humans towards the gods'.[32]

There is also a debate on where to place ὅσιος on an evaluative scale. While it is widely accepted that *οὐχ* ὅσιος and *ἀνόσιος* express censure (these terms evaluate a person or action as 'impious'), it is not certain what the antonym ὅσιος expresses. It is a matter of debate whether this term is a description of merely 'religiously neutral' ground, assessing something or someone as 'acceptable' to the gods, or conversely expresses praise. A proponent of the first view ('View A' in Figure 1 below) is Robert Parker, according to whom the lexeme describes who or what is 'religiously safe',[33] 'inoffensive to the gods',[34] denoting 'an enclave … of safe normality, between the dangerous extremes of sacredness and pollution'.[35] Likewise, Scullion describes τὸ ὅσιον as a 'religiously neutral realm',[36] while Samons paraphrases ὅσιος as 'acceptable to the gods'.[37] For Mikalson ὁσιότης is 'religious correctness', a 'neutral, passive state', as opposed to εὐσέβεια which is 'the more positive concept, indicating positive actions in the "service to the gods" '.[38] These views are based on Van der Valk 1942, who felt that a person became ὅσιος when he or she had temporally fulfilled all obligations towards the gods, and hence the gods could no longer lay a claim on this person.[39] In terms of where these lexemes should be placed on an evaluative scale, the contrast between ἀνόσιος and ὅσιος would be similar to the differences between the action of parking your car in someone else's private yard (likely to provoke censure) and parking your car on a free public parking spot on the

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had planned (or indeed wrote) a chapter on ὅσιος, but unfortunately this text was not preserved (p. 99).

31 Jay-Robert 1999:7, Jay-Robert 2009:28.

32 Blok 2014:19; cf. Blok 2011:237–238.

33 Parker 1996a [1983]:12.

34 Parker 1996a [1983]:330, 338.

35 Parker 1996a [1983]:330.

36 Scullion 2005:114.

37 Samons 2000:326, 328.

38 Mikalson 2010b:11, 169.

39 Van der Valk 1942. This view will be discussed further on in this chapter and in Chapter 7, section 1.

FIGURE 1 *Where to place ὅσιος on an evaluative scale: two different views*

Censure (referring to what is offensive, problematic, perceived by others as bad)		**Neutral** (referring to what is not offensive or problematic, but not particularly 'good' or pleasing either)		**Praise** (referring to what is pleasing to others, perceived by others as good)
		View A: censure vs. neutral		
ἀνόσιος, οὐχ ὅσιος	⟷	ὅσιος		
analogous example: parking your car in someone else's private yard		analogous example: parking your car on a free public parking spot on the street		
		View B: censure vs. praise		
ἀνόσιος, οὐχ ὅσιος			⟷	ὅσιος
analogous example: always travelling by car, thus polluting the environment				analogous example: travelling by bicycle to minimise one's ecological footprint

street (likely to be assessed as neutral). By contrast, Moulinier, Chadwick and Blok ('View B' in Figure 1 below) assume that ὅσιος has a much more positive value, signifying that an action is 'good' and 'pleasing to the gods'; referring to someone or something as ὅσιος is high praise.[40] Rudhardt emphasized the same: 'Le Grec la [i.e. the quality that ὅσιος expresses] recherche et loue ce qui la possède; il évite et blâme ce qui en est dépourvu.'[41] If we again take an analogous example to clarify this view, the contrast would be similar to the way in which a green activist might evaluate a person who always travels by car (with disapproval, because he or she pollutes the environment) and a person who travels by bicycle (with praise, because he or she minimises his/her ecological footprint). The contrast between these views is summarised in Figure 1.

40 Chadwick 1996:221: 'conduct pleasing to gods'; Moulinier 1952:286: 'quelque chose qui leur [i.e., les dieux] agrée est ὅσιον'; 288: 'ὅσιος voudrait dire que de tels gestes sont bons'. Blok: '[ὅσιος] has strong positive values' (2010:62) and is 'what is pleasing to the gods' (Blok 2009a:161). Cf. Blok 2014.

41 Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:31.

One example of how the two different views result in different interpretations of specific textual passages concerns the law on tyrannicide quoted in Andocides's *De Mysteriis*. This law stipulated that anyone who killed an enemy of democracy would be considered ὅσιος.[42] In View A, the law can be interpreted as saying that 'such a murderer need not worry: the action is inoffensive to the gods and other humans'. By contrast, in View B, the text makes a much stronger statement, telling anyone who intends to commit such a murder that the gods and humans would positively approve of such an action.

A rather complex, related problem concerns the relationship between the usage of *hosios & cognates* for persons and for objects. The fact that ὅσιος is most often used to describe persons and their behaviour invites the question of what is the significance when it qualifies an object. When objects are referred to as ὅσιος, such usage is sometimes translated as 'profane' (as in the case of ὅσια χρήματα) and sometimes as 'pure'. Solving these interpretative problems will be postponed to Chapters 3 and 7, but the problem will be explained in more detail below.

2. A second set of questions addresses the apparent polysemy of ὅσιος and the semantic relationship to its near-synonyms. Hesychius defined ὅσιος as 'καθαρός, δίκαιος, εὐσεβής, εἰρηνικός, ἁγνός'. Van der Valk took this polyvalent characterisation of ὅσιος as the starting point of his discussion. He distinguishes three semantic 'spheres' for ὅσιος—purity (καθαρός, ἁγνός), justice (δίκαιος) and piety (εὐσεβής)—while adding two other spheres: 'human' usage (as opposed to ἱερός) and the funeral.[43] A bewildering multiplicity of views on the semantic relationship between ὅσιος and these near-synonyms has been proposed both before and since Van der Valk.

Chapter 3 will compare the semantics of ὅσιος and εὐσεβής.[44] These lexemes frequently qualify the same or similar persons, behaviour, objects; they regularly evaluate the same behaviour of the same person in the same text.[45] Con-

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42 And. *De Myst.* 95–97.

43 Van der Valk 1942:113–114.

44 A more elaborate discussion of the *status quaestionis* on ὅσιος vs. εὐσεβής is provided in Chapter 3, section 2.

45 Sometimes the terms ὅσιος and εὐσεβής are used to evaluate the same behaviour of the same person within the scope of one sentence or a few subsequent sentences: Theoclymenus in E. *Hel.* 1021; Agamemnon in E. *Hec.* 1234–1235; womankind in E. *Ion* 1094; people that dishonour suppliants (*in abstracto*) in S. *OC* 279–283; a brother who fails to avenge his father in Antipho 1.5; the jury that makes the right judgment in many of Antiphon's *Tetralogies*. Sometimes ὅσιος and εὐσεβής are used to evaluate the same behaviour of the

sequently, Bolkestein saw the two notions as very-near synonyms, noting that 'these terms are used in more or less the same situations'.[46] Other authors, however, have tried to capture the semantic differences between the two. Rudhardt held that εὐσέβεια is an inner disposition, while being ὅσιος means keeping to some objective religious order.[47] Similarly, according to Mikalson, εὐσέβεια refers to an attitude (being respectful towards the gods) while ὁσιότης is about 'religious correctness' (obeying rules relating, for example, to when and where one should sacrifice).[48] Conversely, Jeanmaire, inspired by Van der Valk, held that a person could be εὐσεβής because of his or her personality, but one could only temporarily *become* ὅσιος by performing certain actions (making one temporally 'free from the gods').[49] The semantic comparison between these lexemes will also shed some light on the usage of ὅσιος for objects mentioned under 1 above.

Ancient philosophers first started discussing the semantic relationship between ὅσιος and δίκαιος, and I shall continue the debate in Chapter 4.[50] For example, it was argued in Plato's *Gorgias* that τὸ ὅσιον concerns one's duties towards the gods, whereas τὸ δίκαιον concerns one's duties towards other humans.[51] This distinction was taken up by Van der Valk.[52] But ὅσιος and δίκαιος often refer to *the same things*: actions that are evaluated in terms of ὁσιότης are also often considered δίκαιος (or the opposite, ἄδικος) and vice versa.[53] Later scholarship tried to account for these facts. According to Benveniste, ὅσιος and δίκαιος differ in meaning even when referring to the same conduct, because ὅσιος expresses what is permitted by divine law, while δίκαιος articulates what

same person within the same literary work, but further apart. For example (line numbers for attestations of ὅσιος vs. εὐσεβής): the sons of Aegyptus in A. *Supp.*: 762 vs. 9; Clytemnestra in A. *Ch.*: 378 vs. 141; Medea in E. *Med.*: 796, 850, 1305 vs. 1287, 1328, 1383; Polyphemus in E. *Cyc.*: 26, 348 vs. 310–311 vs.; Pentheus in E. *Ba.*: 374, 613 vs. 263; Lycus in E. *HF*: 255, 567 vs. 760; Oedipus in S. *OT*. 1382, 1441, vs. 353 (No such cases occur in Herodotus, Aristophanes and Thucydides).

46 Bolkestein 1936:210.

47 Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:15.

48 Mikalson 2010a:23, 2010b, esp. Ch. 4.

49 Jeanmaire 1945:74.

50 A more elaborate discussion of the *status quaestionis* on ὅσιος vs. δίκαιος is given in Chapter 4, section 1.

51 Pl. *Gorg*. 507a6–b4. A similar case is made in Pl. *Euthphr*. 11e7–12e8.

52 Van der Valk 1942:114–115, 118.

53 Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:32 (with references to examples): 'Les mots ὅσιος et δίκαιος sont très fréquemment associés, ou employés dans différents contextes de telle manière que leur étroite correspondance ne peut être mise en doute.'

is sanctioned by human law.[54] Rudhardt, Motte and Connor argue that the difference between these terms is that ὅσιος gives the utterance a strong religious connotation.[55]

The most difficult and highly debated issue is the alleged semantic paradox of ὅσιος and ὁσία; this discussion is postponed to the last chapter of this book (Chapter 7).[56] It was argued from very early on that the adjective ὅσιος should be translated as 'profane' (βέβηλος) in some particular cases, and as 'holy' or 'consecrated' (ἱερός) in other cases. In this view, ὅσιος has two opposite and contradictory meanings, 'sacred' and 'profane', as well as its core meaning of 'pious'. The most influential solution to this puzzling state of affairs was presented by Van der Valk. According to Van der Valk, the semantic link between the purported meanings 'pious' and 'profane' of ὅσιος is that they represent two points on a temporal line of a man's relationship to the gods.[57] Van der Valk argued that the man who is fulfilling his duties towards the gods is ὅσιος in the sense that he is 'pious', but he is also holy (ἱερός), because he is bound to the gods. When the worshipper has fulfilled his obligations towards the gods, he is ὅσιος in a different sense: he is free from the gods, the gods do not have any claims on him. In other words, he is 'profane'.[58] By analogy, objects or places that are ὅσια are at the free disposal of humans; they are not in the possession of the gods or dedicated to them. In a later article, Van der Valk explained how the noun ὁσία may be understood in a similar way, on the basis of the dichotomy between what is 'holy, sacred' and what is or becomes 'desacralised'.[59] Van der Valk's theory has been followed by many (e.g. Jeanmaire, Benveniste, Parker, Burkert, and to an extent, Rudhardt), but has been firmly rejected by others (e.g. Moulinier, Maffi, Connor, Chadwick and Blok).[60]

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54 Benveniste 1969:198. Cf. LSJ s.v. ὅσιος I 1: 'opp. δίκαιος, *sanctioned by divine law*'.

55 Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:30, 33; Motte 1986:167; Connor 1988:163.

56 A full discussion of the *status quaestionis* on this problem is provided in Chapter 7.

57 'points on a temporal line': Maffi's paraphrase (1982:39), not Van der Valk's words.

58 Van der Valk 1942:119–121, e.g. 119: 'ὅσιος ist der Mensch, der alle seine geforderten Pflichten den Göttern gegenüber erfüllt hat oder erfüllen will, an dem die Götter also nichts aussetzen können, einer der *frei ist den Göttern gegenüber*. … Der ὅσιος [Mensch] hat sich von seinen Pflichten den Göttern gegenüber losgemacht, er ist frei von ihnen, nicht-ἱερός.'

59 Van der Valk 1951.

60 Jeanmaire 1945, Benveniste 1969:199, Parker 1996a [1983]:330, 1996b:123, Burkert 1985:269–270, 2011:176, Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:34–36, who rejects the translation 'profane' but follows Van der Valk 1942 nevertheless, Moulinier 1952:290, Maffi 1982, Connor 1988, Chadwick 1996:226, Blok 2010. These scholars' views are discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

3. A third question, taken up in Chapter 5, concerns the usage of ὅσιος and ὁσία to refer to the behaviour of a god.[61] Such usage of ὅσιος or ὁσία is unexpected, and particularly difficult to understand, because all previously mentioned theories assume that ὅσιος and ὁσία in essence express a divine perspective on human actions. Moreover, the usages of ὅσιος or ὁσία to describe the behaviour of a god are quite rare. These cases have not received scholarly attention as a group.[62]

Besides these semantic questions, the attestations of *hosios & cognates* give rise to several historical questions.

4. How can we understand the increasing popularity of the lexeme in the fifth century BCE? The extant data invites speculation on the diachronic distribution of *hosios & cognates*. The noun ἡ ὁσία occurs twice in Homer but is completely absent in Hesiod. In other archaic literature, both ἡ ὁσία and ὅσιος are rare. In the fifth century, especially in the second half, the adjective ὅσιος becomes rather frequent in literary texts. Why did users start to choose this lexeme over others in the fifth century? What factor, if any, triggered this large increase in frequency of use? Perhaps this reflects a gradual change of mentality in Greek thought from the archaic to the classical period.[63] To test this hypothesis, we must first find out what 'mentality' is expressed by *hosios & cognates*, and then investigate whether that 'way of thinking' was absent from or unpopular in the archaic sources. These questions will be taken up in the course of Chapters 2 and 4.

5. Two final issues tie in with the larger scholarly discussions concerning the role of religion in Greek *poleis* in the Classical period and their supposed 'rationalisation'.[64] First, we may wonder about the weight of evaluations such as *hosios & cognates*. What was the persuasive value of mentioning these terms in different contexts of public or private debate? For example, in some sanctuaries the presence of foreigners and/or women was forbidden on

61 n = 7: E. *Or.* 595, E. *Alc.* 10, Pi. *P.* 9.36, E. *Heracl.* 719, *h.Merc.* 130, 173, 470. I did not include *h.Cer.* 211 in this count, which is about the goddess Demeter disguised as a human.

62 The oddity of *individual* cases is sometimes discussed in commentaries (cf. Chapter 5 of this book).

63 Jay-Robert 2009. Cf. Chapter 2, section 5.

64 e.g. Vernant 1962. Cf. Chapter 7, section 1.

the grounds that this was 'not ὁσία'.[65] How seriously would visitors to a sanctuary have taken such prohibitions? To what extent would they have cared, when they read that these things were 'not ὁσία'?[66] This problem will be the subject of Chapter 6.

Second, religion appears to have played a role in defining how an individual should relate to the *polis*, when ὅσιος appeared in the Athenian conceptualisation of citizenship in the combination ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια.[67] For example, the granting of citizenship to a mercenary is described in Demosthenes as, 'It was we, men of Athens, who made Charidemus a citizen, and by that gift bestowed upon him a share in ἱερά and in ὅσια, in our tradition (νόμιμα) and in everything in which we ourselves are entitled to have a share (πάντων ὅσων περ αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν

65 e.g. N. Suppl. Epig. Rodio 169a, Lindos II 26, ID 68.

66 As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, Parker (2004, 2005a:63) and Delli Pizzi (2011) have commented on the performative force of this terminology in this type of inscription.

67 On this particular subject, cf. also the recent work by Josine Blok. The notion of 'citizenship' is defined by modern political scientists as consisting of a legal and a communitarian element (Kymlicka 2002:28; cf. Blok 2013). With respect to the first element, an individual should meet particular criteria in order to be considered a citizen of a particular community. Having been accepted as a citizen, the person in question has a set of rights and duties belonging to this status. Regarding the second element, communities have unwritten rules outlining how their citizenship can and should be put into practice, and what citizens should *do* in order to be real, active and fully fledged members of their community. Scholarly discussions on citizenship in Ancient Greece have concentrated mostly on the first, legal aspect, investigating the criteria that should be met in order to be considered a citizen at all. In particular, scholars have focused on the rights of male citizens to actively engage in the political life of the *polis* (holding political offices, voting). Blok has focused on the second, communitarian element. When Athenians themselves explicitly articulated what citizenship entailed, they seemed not to refer to active political life. This does not suggest that the active participation of all male citizens in politics was not crucially important to the ideological underpinnings of democracy, but it does mean that the Athenians may have conceived of citizenship in a different way, too. When overtly articulating what being a citizen really meant, Athenians sometimes captured this in the fixed expression μετεῖναι or μετέχειν ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων: 'to have a share in' or 'to participate in ἱερά and ὅσια'. We find this expression alongside a vaguer, more general summary of what citizen status in Athens involved in the phrase μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως, 'to participate in the *polis*'. In order to understand Athenian citizenship, we should also study the meaning and implications of these fixed expressions (Blok 2007, esp. 316–317; Blok 2009a:146, 158–162; Blok 2009b: 264, Blok 2011, esp. 233–235, Blok 2013, 2014, *forthc.*).

ἡμῖν).'[68] Apollodorus quotes a decree of 427 BCE granting citizenship to a group of Plataeans,[69] saying it was decided '… that the Plataeans shall be Athenians from this day (Πλαταιέας εἶναι Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας),[70] valued just like the other Athenians, and that they share in everything in which the Athenians share (μετεῖναι αὐτοῖς ὧνπερ Ἀθηναίοις μέτεστι πάντων), both ἱερά and ὅσια.'[71] In these fourth-century texts, Athenian citizenship was defined as 'participating in' or 'sharing in' 'ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια'.[72] A better comprehension of the semantics of ὅσιος could help us interpret this Athenian conceptualisation of citizenship and the role of religion in political life.[73] This question will be taken up in the course of Chapter 7.

68 D. 23.65. Cp. D. 57.3, Antipho 5.62.4.

69 These Plataeans had survived the sack of their city and were granted refuge in Athens.

70 Up until 229 BCE, decrees in which a person or group is granted citizenship do not include a lexeme for 'citizenship', but state that 'it has been decided that so-and-so is now (for example) an Athenian' (Osborne 1981–1983).

71 Even though the authenticity of the fifth-century wording in this decree is debated, the very least we can say is that the expression was part of the fourth-century literary imagination of what citizenship entailed (cf. Blok 2009a:166–167 with n. 106, summarising the scholarly discussion).

72 The phrase ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια also occurred in the ephebic oath, sworn by all adolescent males when they were ritually transformed into adult citizens: 'I will not bring shame upon the sacred weapons, nor shall I desert the man beside me, wherever I stand in the line. I shall fight in defence of ἱερά and ὅσια' (SEG 21.519, *RO* 88). The oath is also quoted in Lycurg. *Leocr*. 76–77. This is a fourth-century inscription, but it has been argued that the oath goes back to the archaic age, on the basis of several words, phrases and concepts in the inscription that predate the classical period (Siewert 1977 and *RO* 88, comm., cf. the discussion in Blok 2011:244–245). The oath would have been orally transmitted, and the wording could well have changed over time. Hence, it is uncertain whether the fixed expression ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια was present in the text from the beginning, but that may have been the case. Cf. Blok 2009a:159–160, Blok 2011:244–212, Blok *forthc*.

73 The meaning of τὰ ἱερά in this expression is clear. τὰ ἱερά, 'the things of the gods', refers to possessions of the gods and things that have been dedicated to them by humans. More generally, τὰ ἱερά refers to the entire process of gift-giving in cults, festivals and other settings (cf. Blok *forthc*.). According to Parker 2005a:61, τὰ ἱερά is the Greek word that comes closest to 'religion'. Thus, 'participating in ἱερά' is taking part in the active religious life of the *polis*. The role of participation in ἱερά for *polis* membership has been explored by Sourvinou-Inwood 1990, Osborne 1993, Cole 1995, Burkert 1995, Georgoudi 1998, Parker 2005b, as Blok 2011:235 n. 12 explains.

3 A Theory of Meaning

In order to answer our research questions, we need to choose a theory of meaning. All theories of lexical semantics assume that lexical selection is competitive.[74] Whenever a speaker searches his mental lexicon for an appropriate word to express the message he intends to convey (e.g., to refer to the structure depicted in Figure 2), semantically related candidates are co-activated along with the target word.[75] Thus, a speaker's choice for a particular lexeme (in our example, ἱερόν) is made after considering (consciously or unconsciously) lexical alternatives and lexemes in the same semantic field (such as τέμενος, δώματα, ἄδυτον and βωμός).

It follows that we will learn more about the semantics of one term if we understand how it competes with its near-synonyms. Such an understanding may be gained by examining those discourse situations in which one lexeme is apparently selected over semantically related competitors, and vice versa. Based on these scholarly assumptions, the main analytical principle in this book will be lexical competition, or rivalry between words. The meaning of *hosios & cognates* is studied primarily by considering the semantic contrast between these lexemes and their near-synonyms.[76]



FIGURE 2 *Lexical selection is competitive*

74 Spalek, Damian & Bölte 2012:2.

75 All existing word production models (i.e. models about how speakers select words) assume that word production involves access to a mental dictionary (or 'encyclopaedia'). Spalek, Damian & Bölte 2012:1.

76 Most semanticists agree that a lexical semantic study should be an analysis of the lexeme in its semantic field (Fritz 2012:2632). This insight is the heritage of the earlier structuralist semantic field theory (developed by Trier 1931, among others). A semantic field is 'a set of lexemes which cover a certain semantic space'. Many aspects of this theory have been criticised (cf. Lehrer 1974:17–19, Lehrer 1985:284, Fritz 2012:2632), but the basic idea that 'the meanings of words must be understood, in part, in relation to other words that articulate a given content domain' (Lehrer & Kittay 1992:3) is undisputed. The assumption is taken for granted in modern textbooks, for example Aitchison 2012 [1987]:15.

To understand the nature of lexical competition, we should first understand the mental representation of meanings of individual words. In modern scholarship on lexical semantics, we can distinguish two types of views,[77] 'minimalist' and 'maximalist' approaches to lexical meaning.[78] Those in favour of a minimalist, or 'monosemous', approach (for instance, scholars such as Jackendoff and Pustejovsky) assume that entries in the mental lexicon are single, highly abstract, underspecified descriptions of the *meaning* of a lexeme.[79] For example, in this view the meaning of the lexeme 'clear' may be mentally represented by the underdescriptive 'somehow transparent' (cf. Figure 3). A concrete and full interpretation of 'clear' is reached online (i.e., *ad hoc*) in specific discourse contexts. Minimalist approaches do not allow for lexical polysemy (i.e., words having more than one meaning stored in the lexical entry). Instead, they view polysemy as a pragmatic phenomenon (the interpretation hinges on specific contextual information), as the result of general derivational rules for word use (for example, metaphoric use), or as homonymy (two separate lexical entries happen to have an identical phonological form).[80]

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77 All modern accounts of lexical meaning move away from the classical theory of meaning that goes back to Aristotle, and 'dominated psychology, philosophy, and linguistics … throughout much of the 20th century' (Taylor 2003 [1989]:20). According to Aristotle's model, each category (concept) can be defined in terms of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. That is, concepts can be adequately described by a number of criteria, each of which is *required* to uniquely identify the concept in question; at the same time, passing all of these criteria is enough to *guarantee* category membership. For example, one may identify 'humans' as all biped, featherless and animate beings, as opposed to, for example, four-footed or six-footed animate beings with or without feathers (Tuggy 2008:88; as Rademaker 2005:19 points out, the example derives from Arist. *Metaph.* 4.4.8). Although this view on word meaning is intuitively correct, it has been realised that such a theory only works for very simple concepts; it is unable to describe the large bulk of lexical entries in any given language.

78 Cruse 2011 [1999]:94. As we will see (n. 80 and n. 89 in this section) the distinction partly coincides with the difference between two more general theories of human language: generative and cognitive linguistics.

79 Jackendoff 1990; Pustejovsky 1995.

80 Monosemous approaches to lexical semantics fit very well into the current dominant direction in generative linguistics, Chomsky's so-called 'Minimalist Program' (1995) in which it is assumed that the mental representation of the structure of language is as elegant and parsimonious as possible. According to generative linguists, a dedicated faculty of language (FL) is innate to humans, and the goal of linguists is to model FL. The

FIGURE 3 *The minimalist approach to lexical meaning*

Entry in mental lexicon	**Interpretation**
Clear = 'somehow transparent'	(*ad hoc* deductions) → transparent 'clear water' → easy to understand 'clear instructions' → not blocked 'the road was clear' ...

By contrast, the maximalist view (Engelberg, Langacker and Taylor)[81] assumes that an entry in the mental lexicon is an inventory of situations in which one would use a lexeme. According to maximalists, language users[82] hear lexemes being employed in different ways in different contexts and remember this information: storing individual options for the interpretation of a lexeme, accumulating them (Figure 4). Such lexical encounters with a lexeme form the basis of a user's impression of 'what a word means'.[83] In other words, semantic knowledge about a lexeme is knowledge of its *distribution*: the variety of its usages. Such knowledge is influenced, naturally, by the frequencies of encounters with various usages.[84] Interpretation, then, is a matter of

working hypothesis of current research in the generative paradigm is that FL has an 'Optimal Design'. In other words, the program takes as a starting point the assumption that FL is the optimal solution for the interface (cf. Reinhart 2006:1–12). It is not *a priori* obvious what would count as an optimal design, but Chomsky interprets 'optimal' as 'elegant' and 'parsimonious', hence the term 'Minimalist Program'. We can see how minimalist approaches to lexical semantics fit into this approach: the most parsimonious description of a word's meaning in the mental lexicon seems to be a monosemous one. Note that Chomsky himself now seems to have abandoned his Minimalist Program, arguing for a different view (the so-called recursion-only hypothesis) in more recent work (e.g. Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 2002). However, many generative linguists are still working with this theory. For a readable introduction to the Minimalist Program, see Hornstein, Nunes & Grohmann 2005:1–16.

81 Engelberg 2000, Langacker 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, Taylor 2003 [1989].

82 Evans & Green 2006:109: 'a language user is a member of a particular linguistic community who, in speaking (and, indeed, in signing or writing), attempts to achieve a particular interactional goal or set of goals using particular linguistic and non-linguistic strategies.'

83 Taylor 2003 [1989]:161.

84 As Evans & Green 2006:114 explain: 'If the language system is a function of language

FIGURE 4 *The maximalist approach to lexical meaning*

Entry in mental lexicon	**Interpretation**
Clear = → transparent ('clear water') → easy to understand ('clear instructions') → not blocked ('the road was clear') …	(accessing stored meanings)

accessing stored meanings. This model convincingly explains different types of linguistic data, and has been very fruitfully applied in previous semantic studies in the field of Ancient Greek, such as Rademaker 2005. In this book, we will assume such a maximalist or 'polysemous' approach to lexical meaning.[85]

In the maximalist view, users may build up what Langacker calls a 'schema'—a more abstract idea of what all the various encountered usages of a lexeme have in common—*in addition to* the inventory of usages.[86] How-

use, then it follows that the relative frequency with which particular words or other kinds of constructions are encountered by the speaker will affect the nature of the language system. This is because cognitive linguists assume that linguistic units that are more frequently encountered become more entrenched (that is, established as a cognitive pattern or routine) in the language system. According to this view, the most entrenched linguistic units tend to shape the language system in terms of patterns of use, at the expense of less frequent and thus less well entrenched words or constructions.' Although frequency is thus part of the mental representation of a lexeme, it should be noted that 'frequency' is not a good measure of 'prototypicality', as will be discussed in the main text below.

85 Within the confines of this book, it is impossible to do justice to the linguistic debates between 'minimalist' and 'maximalist' theories of lexical meaning. Convincing arguments in favour of the cognitive approach have been summarised by, for example, Taylor 2003 [1989]:159–167 and Croft 1998. These arguments bear on the nature of language change, language acquisition and psychological aspects of meaning representation. The principal points of criticism that are often aimed at the polysemous approach are discussed in this section below. Rademaker 2005 studied the semantics of another Ancient Greek evaluative term (σωφροσύνη). Other relevant studies bearing on Ancient Greek evidence are: Allan 2003 (verbal semantics) and Koier 2013 (the semantics of particles).

86 Langacker 1987:371. In a recent paraphrase by Evans & Green 2006:216, the 'schema'

ever, it should be noted that this part of the mental representation of meaning is secondary and optional. Many users may not develop such an abstraction with respect to some or indeed any lexemes at all.[87] The cognitive view of lexical meaning entails that there is no principled distinction between 'semantics' (abstract meaning) and 'pragmatics' (concrete usages):[88] knowledge about the meaning of a word *is* knowledge about how the word is used.[89]

Information on the various usages of a lexeme is not only stored, but this combined knowledge also influences the interpretation of individual encounters with the lexeme. Experimental research has shown that when a listener recognises a word, he or she accesses the whole multiplicity of stored interpre-

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is 'a skeletal representation of meaning abstracted from recurrent experience of language use'.

87 Taylor 2003 [1989]:71–72. Indeed, speakers being asked what a word 'means' typically come up with *examples*, and adduce that 'one would use the word in such-and-such a situation …'.

88 One point of criticism that is often aimed at the polysemous approach concerns the number of 'meanings' that a user should store of an average lexeme. Since words are used in endless shades of meaning, how many 'usages' should be stored? This is indeed not immediately obvious, but the problem has been addressed by cognitive linguists (cf. Evans 2005:41 with further references, Evans & Green 2006:242–244). On the other hand, if we were to take the minimalist approach as a starting point, it is not clear that users indeed arrive at a very abstract representation of meaning. Experiments show that native speakers have trouble providing a definition for even the simplest lexemes (Johnson-Laird 1987; Taylor 2003 [1989]:162).

89 Evans & Green 2006:171. Polysemous approaches fit well with the ideas of cognitive linguists. An important claim of this approach is that knowledge of language emerges from language use: this is called the 'usage-based thesis' (e.g. Tomasello 2003). In such a view, the structure and content of individual lexical entries depend on the linguistic experience of the individual language user. However, the most minimalistic approach to lexical meaning in existence has in fact been put forward by cognitive linguists, in the so-called Construction Grammar. According to this theory, knowledge about the contexts in which an item occurs is essential to its cognitive representation. Lexical meaning itself is reduced to its bare minimum or zero: individual lexemes do not carry meaning at all, but constructions do. In view of the existence of these even more minimal approaches, Jackendoff's and Pustejovsky's theories have sometimes been referred to as 'intermediate analyses' (Dölling & Heyde-Zybatow 2007:44). Paradoxically, the minimalist approach of Construction Grammar is the extreme consequence of the cognitive linguist's maximalist approach, in which all sorts and types of information may be stored in the lexicon.

FIGURE 5 *Access to mental storage during interpretation of a lexeme*
NB: the ***grey*** *area shows the activated field*



5a. Hearing a word in a particular context in a particular usage

5b. Co-activation of all other stored senses of the word

tative options.[90] Although a listener always hears and understands a word in a specific context in a specific usage (Figure 5a), all stored senses of a word are temporarily co-activated during word recognition (Figure 5b). Thus, the understanding of a lexeme in a specific utterance is influenced by the other impressions a speaker has of the general usages of this lexeme.

Returning to the notion of competition, this view of semantics entails that two lexemes (even ones with partially overlapping semantic fields) have different 'meanings'. This is the case because individual usages of each lexeme activate the respective inventories of usage of the two lexemes, and this colours the understanding of individual instances.

How are such rich lexical representations organised? To understand the cognitive linguistic view on this, we should return briefly to the classical theory of meaning.[91] A consequence of the classical theory (category membership is defined by a set of necessary and sufficient features)[92] is that categories have clear boundaries: individual cases either belong to the category or not. It also follows that all members of a category have an equal status, and that categories lack internal structure.[93] However, experimental work in psychology has shown that this is not how humans actually conceive of categories.[94]

90 Swinney 1979, Tanenhaus, Leiman & Seidenberg 1979, Onifer & Swinney 1981.

91 Cf. n. 77.

92 Cf. n. 77.

93 For a summary of the classical approach to categorisation, see Taylor 2003 [1989]:19–40.

94 Labov 1973, Rosch 1973, 1975a, 1975b. The earliest theoretical criticism on the classical theory of meaning seems to have come from Wittgenstein 1967 [1953]:48–49 in his now

Category membership is not a yes/no question, but has various degrees. People consider some entities to be 'better' or 'more prototypical' examples of categories than others. For example, experimental subjects considered CHAIR a better example of the category 'furniture' than LAMP. Far-fetched instances such as TELEPHONE were considered as belonging to the category 'furniture' by some, but not by others. Thus, categories have fuzzy boundaries, and people can debate whether some entity should be considered as belonging to the category in question.[95] Such semantic flexibility is necessary to account for actual language use. Langacker proposes that a word's usages are stored in the user's mind in a structured manner, as a semantic *network* containing both prototypical and more marginal senses of the lexeme, that is, representing both central and more peripheral examples of the category in question.[96] In Langacker's view, this assumed mental organisation of the lexeme would reflect the way in which users actually experience word meaning.[97]

We may connect these insights to the notion of competition. Two words with partially overlapping usages may have different semantics when the internal organisation of their semantic networks is different. A usage that is 'prototypical' for one lexeme may be 'marginal' for the other lexeme.

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famous discussion of how to define the word 'game' (German: 'Spiel'). The philosopher pointed out that various things we call 'games' do not share a single set of characteristics. For example, two of the most central characteristics of a 'game' seem to be that they are 'non-serious' and 'fun'. But apparently it is not a problem to use this lexeme for events that are very serious and potentially not fun at all, like 'political games'. Moreover, although most games are played with one or more other persons and involve an element of competition, it is perfectly possible to call the play of a child on his own, counting all yellow cars, a 'game'.

95 Rosch 1975a.

96 Langacker 1991:2.

97 This absence of 'boundaries' of semantic networks in the cognitive approach to lexical semantics is a main point of criticism of the model. According to the network model, categories may be extended just as users see fit. But if categories have no boundaries, this implies that the same thing could at the same time be 'x' and 'non-x' (e.g. Croft & Cruse 2004:89). This is a problem for logic, but it does not impair a theory of language use. Indeed, it is a psychological reality that different people might consider the same thing to be 'x' or 'not-x', and that a person may convince others that something we did not see as x before is, in fact, an example of x. However, the absence of boundaries seems problematic when it has to account for 'extended' language use. I will explain and address this problem of the 'no-boundaries' hypothesis in Chapter 5, section 1.

One methodological problem for our current research arises here. Prototypical examples are those that are considered the 'best examples' of categories and, therefore, those that spring to mind first, those that experimental subjects immediately come up with. How can we find such cases in a dead language? Although lexical semantic knowledge includes an impression of the relative frequencies of types of usage, as was argued above,[98] the distinction between 'prototypical' and 'marginal' is not the same as that between 'frequent' and 'infrequent'. Prototypicality sometimes correlates with frequency of occurrence, but not necessarily so.[99] Therefore, we cannot take frequency as a measure for prototypicality. Rademaker surveyed various criteria for prototypicality and concluded that the only useful measure of it is saliency: 'a word may well be prototypical if it is easily activated, without a great deal of contextual preparations'.[100] Both Rademaker and Sluiter & Rosen remarked that the early Platonic dialogues are a good starting point for discovering what average language users considered 'prototypical cases' of categories. When asked, 'what is x?', Socrates's conversation partners initially tend to propose simply what comes to their mind first. That is, they present what is the 'best example' of x in their view. Thus, studying these replies may help us understand the internal structure of these concepts' mental representation for actual language users.[101]

Finally, cognitive linguists propose that semantic knowledge cannot be separated from other experiences, ideas and concepts associated with the lexeme ('world knowledge'). When a speaker recognises a lexeme, all this information on the word in question is activated as well.[102] One aspect of this is the fact that words have 'emotive' or 'stylistic' meaning in addition to 'referential meaning'. When a user has fully mastered the semantics of a lexeme, he or she has an insight into the register(s) the lexeme is used in (social settings) and into its affective charge. Another part of world knowledge concerns what has been referred to as the 'frame'.[103] A 'frame' is a 'structure of

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98 Cf. n. 84 of this section.

99 This was already pointed out by Rosch 1975b. Cf. the discussion in Rademaker 2005: 34.

100 Rademaker 2005:35.

101 Rademaker 2005:35, Sluiter & Rosen 2003:7–8.

102 Langacker 1987:161–164, Taylor 2003 [1989]:85–87, Evans & Green 2006:160, 207–209, 216, Geeraerts & Cuyckens 2008:5. In this sense, the mental storage of lexical meaning resembles the organisation of an encyclopaedia more than that of a dictionary.

103 Cognitive linguists usually refer to the notion of 'frame' developed by Fillmore e.g., 1976, 1982, 1987. Note that Taylor 2003 [1989]:87–93, Croft & Cruse 2004:17 and Cienki 2008:173

experience'.[104] For example, for many Athenian citizens living in the fifth century BCE, the term ἱερόν, 'sanctuary', probably conjured up not only an image of a particular type of building, but also of attending religious ceremonies, witnessing animals being slaughtered and receiving portions of the communal meal afterwards, or presenting more modest offerings to gods. The cultural frame or structure of experience to which ἱερόν belongs is that of rituals, with all associated religious and social connotations.

According to Langacker and Fillmore, it is not possible to understand a word independently of the frame(s) it belongs to.[105] Words are inextricably associated with frames. Conversely, frames may be evoked by particular lexemes or combinations of lexemes.[106] Because of these characteristics of lexical storage, clever speakers may use words to activate a frame and so influence other people's thoughts. In a law on tyrannicide, quoted for example in Andocides's *De Mysteriis*, a person who threatens the institution of democracy (i.e. by overthrowing it or attempting to do so) is referred to as an enemy (πολέμιος). Defining a fellow-citizen by means of this term evokes a frame: that of war. This frame comes with its own internal logic. The murder of an enemy is an expected event during war, and it is not a 'bad' action either. Moreover, in war an enemy may be murdered without incurring pollution. In this frame it becomes understandable and reasonable that the law considers the person who kills such a πολέμιος (the one who causes the downfall of the democracy) to be καθαρός and ὅσιος.[107]

Returning to the notion of competition, it follows that two words, even if they have a closely related or identical 'referential meaning' (that is, referring to neighbouring or identical parts of conceptual space), may have different 'semantics'. This is the case when they activate different sets of associated words, ideas and frames. Moreover, different usages of the same lexeme may fit

have pointed out that various notions of the 'frame' and other notions very similar to it were developed independently and simultaneously by different scholars. These notions bear so much resemblance to one another that we can use them interchangeably. Among them are Goffman's 'frame analysis' (1974), Langacker's 'domain' (1987) and Schank & Abelson's notion of the 'script' (1977).

104 Fillmore 1987:31.

105 e.g. Fillmore 1987:31: 'nobody can really understand the words in … [a] domain who does not understand the social institutions or the structures of experience which they presuppose.'

106 Fillmore 1982:117: 'the frame structures the word-meanings, and … the word 'evokes' the frame.'

107 And. *De Myst.* 95–97.

into different frames.[108] These insights can be connected to what we discussed previously. Although a user always interprets a lexeme in a particular usage, in a particular context, all other stored usages of a lexeme are temporally co-activated and so are the frames associated with these other usages.

4 Outline and Sources

This outline of a theory of lexical semantics shows how we may proceed to investigate *hosios and cognates* and their near-synonyms. When studying the 'semantics' of a lexeme, we should investigate:

A. its distribution across different types of discourse situations, making an inventory of the different usages of the lexeme;
B. the internal organisation of the semantic network, finding out which usages are prototypical and which are more peripheral;
C. the types of experiences and frame(s) the lexeme is and is not associated with.

The 'semantic and pragmatic differences' *between* two lexemes are found along the same lines. We do not expect two closely related words to have two distinct meanings between which we can draw a neat line. Rather, such words will differ in:

A'. Their inventories of usages (partial overlap possible);
B'. The internal organisation of their semantic networks;
C'. The experiences and frame(s) with which they are associated.

We will attempt to determine the meaning of *hosios & cognates* and the differences in meaning between *hosios & cognates* and its near-synonyms as guided by this view of semantics, and based on the sources we have. The only information we have for a user's 'linguistic experience' with *hosios & cognates* and other terms, for example in the case of a native Greek speaker born in the fifth century BCE, are the extant texts. While they are probably not a very accurate model for colloquial language input, we do not have anything else. For argument's sake, we will take our extant texts as a model for the linguistic input of the Greek

108 Fillmore 1982:124: 'for many instances of polysemy it is possible to say that a given lexical item properly fits either of two different cognitive frames.'

learner/user. We will focus on a hypothetical Greek speaker of the fifth century or early fourth century BCE and assume that his linguistic input is all the literature between Homer and the end of the fifth century. In this period we find 277 literary occurrences of *hosios & cognates*[109] and eleven inscriptions.[110]

109 All statistics were obtained by counting occurrences of *hosios & cognates* in the online database *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*. The line for the inclusion/exclusion of sources was drawn more or less arbitrarily at the death of Socrates in 399 BCE. All authors whose work was produced in this period were included. Of the orators who were active in the fifth and fourth centuries, those works produced before or in 399 were included. As an exception, the fourth-century productions of Aristophanes, *Assemblywomen* (no occurrences of *hosios & cognates, eusebês & cognates*) and *Wealth* (2 occurrences of *hosios & cognates*, 2 of *eusebês & cognates*), were included. The classification of occurrences into 'pre-classical' and 'classical' (a division used in some analyses of diachronic attestations of lexemes) was in most cases uncontroversial. Any occurrences of lexemes in the Homeric Hymns were assigned to the pre-classical period. My judgment was based on an overview of literature on the dating of the Homeric Hymns provided in Faulkner's *The Homeric Hymns: Interpretative Essays* (2011), both in the general introduction to this volume (pp. 7–16) and in discussions by individual contributors. The Hymns in which ὅσιος, εὐσεβής, θέμις, καθαρός and/or ἁγνός occur are: the Hymns to Demeter, Hermes, Apollo, Athena, Aphrodite and Ares. It is generally agreed that the *Hymn to Aphrodite* is one of the oldest. Faulkner (2011:14) places its composition between the late eighth century and the early sixth century (cf. also Brillet-Dubois 2011:105–106 with n. 3–4). The *Hymn to Demeter* was influenced by the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, providing a (relative) *terminus post quem*. Faulkner (2011:10) places the *Hymn to Demeter* between the second half of the seventh century and the mid-sixth century; Richardson (2011:49 with n. 7) argues for a date in the late seventh century and provides references to earlier scholarship. The discussion on the *Hymn to Apollo* has been complicated by a debate about its unity. Several scholars think it consists of different parts that were joined together later. In any case, the composition (and potential subsequent joining of fragments) has been placed between the first half of the seventh century and the second half of the sixth century (Faulkner 2011:12; Chappell 2011:59–81 with an overview of previous scholarship). The *Hymn to Athena*, along with other shorter hymns, can probably be dated between 700 and 500 BCE (Faulkner 2011:15). Concerning the *Hymn to Hermes*, it is generally agreed that this is the latest of the longer Homeric Hymns. The precise date, however, is debated. It should most probably be placed between the first half of the sixth century and the first half of the fifth century. Faulkner (2011:12–13) feels a date in the late sixth century is most likely. For convenience's sake I have classified the relevant occurrences in this text (ὁσίη: *h.Merc.* 130, 173, 470; ἁγνός: 187) as pre-classical along with cases in other Homeric hymns. Finally, the *Hymn to Ares* is clearly different from the other Homeric Hymns. It has been attributed to Proclus (fifth century CE); even if this attribution is wrong, the hymn does not predate the third century CE (Faulkner 2011:15, 176 with n. 4 for further references).

110 The inscriptions that can be securely dated to the fifth century or before are: 1. IG IX

The investigation will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 is a preliminary investigation into the semantics of *hosios & cognates*. This chapter is an analysis of the 'inventory of usages' (in other words: the distribution) as well as the internal structure of the semantic network, and the frames that were associated with *hosios & cognates*. In the course of the analysis, we will discuss the evaluative nature of *hosios & cognates* and the question of where to place these lexemes on an evaluative scale. Having determined what 'way of thinking' *hosios & cognates* express, we will investigate whether this mentality is present or absent in the oldest extant literary texts. Chapter 3 is a contrastive study of *hosios & cognates* and *eusebês* & *cognates*. Comparing the 'inventories of usages', i.e. the distributions of both groups of lexemes, will tell us much about the differences in their 'semantics' and helps us understand more about the usage of the adjective ὅσιος for objects. Chapter 4 contrasts *hosios & cognates* with *dikaios & cognates*, focussing on ways in which *hosios & cognates* and *dikaios & cognates* 'frame' a particular message. The analysis is based on a case study: the usage of ὅσιος and δίκαιος with respect to ancient supplication. Our study will highlight some aspects of the semantics of *hosios & cognates* that have not been previously considered and lead us to propose a tentative answer to our question regarding the diachronic distribution of *hosios & cognates*. A study of the rare usage of *hosios & cognates* for gods is the topic of Chapter 5. Here, I will suggest analysing these passages in terms of markedness, a notion that is essentially based on the idea of lexical competition. The highly un-prototypical, marginal use of lexeme A in a particular context is *marked* if there is a lexeme B that prototypically expresses the same meaning. This analysis will improve our understanding of the internal structure of the semantic networks of ὅσιος and ὁσία. In Chapter 6 we will address the question of the persuasive value of ὁσία and ὅσιος in another case study, by looking at lexical competition in a group of *leges sacrae*. Here, we will contrast the usage of ὅσιος and ὁσία not with the usage of another evaluative term, but with the *absence* of such an evaluation. That is, we will consider the circumstances under which the religious evaluations ὁσία or ὅσιος were *added* to inscriptions codifying ritual norms. This contrastive analysis of ὅσιος vs. ∅ 'zero' will help us understand the persuasive force of ὅσιος and ὁσία in a rhetorical setting better. Finally, in Chapter 7 we turn to the alleged paradox in the semantics of ὅσιος (the hypothesis that the adjective can take

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I(2) 3:718. Locris, Chaleion; 2. N. Suppl. Epig. Rodio 169a. Rhodes, Lindos; 3. Lindos II 26. Rhodes, Lindos; 4. ID 68. Delos; 5. IvO 16. Elis, Olympia; 6. IG I^3 253. Attica; 7. IG I^3 52. Attica; 8. IvO 27. Elis, Olympia; 9. SEG 43:630. Sicily, Selinus; 10. SEG 4:171. Rhodes, Lindos; 11. Schwyzer, *DGE* 679, Masson 1983 [1961]:235 ff. Cyprus.

two opposite, mutually exclusive meanings: 'sacred' and 'profane'). After a discussion of the complex *status quaestionis* on this difficult matter, we will solve this puzzle by applying the knowledge gained in the preceding chapters.

CHAPTER 2

The Semantics of ὅσιος

A Preliminary Investigation

This chapter investigates the semantics of *hosios & cognates*. Based on the view of lexical semantics set out in Chapter 1, we will examine the 'inventory of usages' (the distribution), the internal organisation of the semantic network (prototypical and less prototypical cases), and the cultural frame(s) associated with ὅσιος, ἀνόσιος and ὁσία. We will investigate the evaluative nature of *hosios & cognates* and the question of where to place ὅσιος on an evaluative scale. Then, having determined what 'way of thinking' or 'mentality' *hosios & cognates* articulate, we will discuss whether this mentality was already present in the texts of Homer and Hesiod.

1 Distribution

It has been argued that a user's understanding of the 'meaning' of a lexeme is equal to knowledge of how this lexeme is used. This means having an insight into the different situations in which the lexeme is employed and the relative frequencies of those various occurrences. Therefore, we should determine the distribution of *hosios & cognates* in more detail first.

1.1 *General Distribution*

Between Homer and the end of the fifth century BCE we find 277 literary occurrences of *hosios & cognates*.[1] They include the adjective, the corresponding adverb, forms of the comparative and superlative, and all such forms of ἀνόσιος, the noun ἡ ὁσία, the personification/goddess Ὁσία and various denominative verb forms. Forms of the adjective ὅσιος occur 245 times in literary texts until the end of the fifth century BCE. In addition, there are fifteen instances of ἡ ὁσία, three of the goddess Ὁσία, and eleven of a simplex or composite denominative verb form.[2] Finally, three cases of *hosios & cognates* appear in fragmentary passages, with an unclear grammatical category.[3] In the epigraphic material,

1 Cf. section 4, n. 109 of Chapter 1.

2 ὁσιόω (n = 3), ἀφοσιόω (n = 4), καθοσιόω (n = 3) or ἐξοσιόω (n = 1).

3 Simon. fr. 14 P. Oxy 2430 subfr. 76, E. *Hel.* 1353, E. *Hyps.* F. 752k.373 *TrGF*.

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ὅσιος is rare. Only eleven inscriptions with ὅσιος or ὁσία can be more or less securely dated to the fifth century.[4]

1.2 *Distribution: Authors*

In the archaic period *hosios & cognates* are rare. The noun ὁσίη (Ionic form of ὁσία) occurs twice in Homer and five times in the Homeric Hymns. The first instances of the adjective ὅσιος are found in Simonides and in Theognis (one occurrence in each). There are no denominative verb forms nor instances of a goddess Ὁσία. One further instance in Simonides is so fragmentary that it is unclear whether ὅσιος or ὁσία is intended.

In the fifth century, *hosios & cognates* are widespread throughout various genres, but most frequent in dramatic texts (at least in absolute terms). The adjective ὅσιος and its antonym ἀνόσιος are found in tragedy (in Aeschylus, n = 10; in Sophocles, n = 15; and often in Euripides, n = 100) as well as comedy (in Aristophanes, n = 14; the comic fragments of Eupolis, n = 1; and Epicharmus, n = 1). ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος are also found in the fifth-century work of the orators (in Andocides's *De Mysteriis*, n = 7; in Lysias's *In Eratosthenem* and *In Agoratum*, n = 5; and frequently in Antiphon, n = 49). In fifth-century historiography, ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος occur in Herodotus (n = 28) and in Thucydides (n = 8). Finally, ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος occur rarely in lyric poetry and in early philosophical and other texts.[5] The noun ὁσία remains infrequent in fifth-century texts. It occurs three times in Euripides, where we also find the only three occurrences of a personification/goddess Ὁσία. The noun is found also in Aristophanes (n = 1), Herodotus (n = 2), the fragments of Empedocles (n = 1) and Pindar (n = 1). Moreover, a very small number of instances of four denominative verbs (ὁσιόω, καθοσιόω, ἐξοσιόω and ἀφοσιόω) are noted in fifth-century texts. Again, the main occurrences are in drama: Euripides (n = 6), Sophocles (n = 1) and Aristophanes (n = 1); in addition there are three cases in Herodotus. Two occurrences in Euripides are so fragmentary that it is unclear whether ὅσιος or ὁσία is intended.

Note that the occurrences of *hosios & cognates* are not evenly spread across authors. These lexemes are relatively most common in Antiphon, followed by Euripides, as is clear from the "Top 5" in Table (1) below, showing the number of occurrences of *hosios & cognates* per 1000 words in individual authors.[6]

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4 Cf. Chapter 1, section 4, n. 110.

5 ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος occur in the fragments of the sophist Gorgias (n = 1), in Bacchylides (n = 2), in a fragment of Democritus (n = 1) and in Empedocles's fragments (n = 1). I will use *n* as a variable that represents 'number of times' (i.e., the number of times that a lexeme occurs in a particular context).

6 Showing the number of occurrences in individual authors *per 1000 words* (relative frequency)

TABLE 1 *Absolute and relative frequency of* hosios & cognates *in 5th century authors: top 5 of relative frequencies*

Author	Words in corpus[7]	*hosios & cognates*	#/1000w
1. Antiphon	19621	49	2.497
2. Euripides	193904	114	0.588
3. Andocides	19624	7	0.357
4. Sophocles	80062	16	0.200
5. Herodotus	189489	33	0.174

1.3 *Distribution: Grammatical Configuration*

In the literary sources, ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος are most often the evaluation of a *person*. In 67 % of the occurrences of adjectival and adverbial ὅσιος/ἀνόσιος in literary texts until the end of the fifth century, these lexemes refer unequivocally to a person, qualifying the person him/herself,[8] his/her behaviour[9] or

gives us a better insight into how often an author used *hosios & cognates* in comparison to other authors.

7 The total 'word count' of the production of individual authors is the sum of the word counts of their different extant works as given in *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*. Fragmentary texts were also included in the word count. Here I tried to avoid double counts, for example, in the case of Euripides, I included the collection of fragments edited by Nauck (*TrGF*, 18,087 words), but I excluded Diggle's edition of Euripides's *Phaëthon* (1,328 words), because the same fragments are part of Nauck's collection.

8 n = 61. In 60 cases the adjective (ἀν)οσιος qualifies a personal name or a pronoun (cases of the type 'Oedipus is ἀνόσιος'), or it is substantivised (cases of the type: 'do not acquit ἀνοσίους'), or it modifies a word for a person: ἀνήρ (n = 7, e.g. A. *Th.* 566), γυνή (n = 2, E. *El.* 645, E. *Or.* 518), φώς (n = 1, S. *OC* 281), πατήρ (n = 2, E. *IA* 1318, E. *Or.* 1213), μήτηρ (n = 1, E. *Or.* 24), κάρα (n = 1, E. *Or.* 481), ξένος (n = 3, E. *Hec.* 790, 852, 1235), also: θιασώτης (n = 1, Ar. *Ra.* 327), μύστης (n = 1, Ar. *Ra.* 335), κληδοῦχος (n = 1, E. *IT* 130–131), μιάστωρ (n = 2, S. *OT* 353, E. *El.* 683), κνώδαλον (n = 1, A. *Supp.* 762, referring to the sons of Aegyptus), λᾳστήριος (n = 1, Epich. fr. 44a.6). The adverb semantically qualifies a person in one case: 'those who are in a state of being ὅσιος' (τοὺς ὁσίως διακειμένους, Antipho 5.82.5).

9 n= 100. The adverb qualifies human behaviour in 22 cases, e.g. Theseus killed his child ἀνοσίως (E. *Hipp.* 1287). Another 22 cases of the adjective ὅσιος (including cases of the antonym and the comparative and superlative) describe human behaviour as '(not) ὅσιον' (etc.), e.g. it is not ὅσιον to acquit the defendant (Lys. 13.93). Furthermore, in one case praiseworthy human actions are described, then qualified in a new sentence 'for these things (ταῦτα) are ὅσια' (Antipho 6.10.9). Moreover, the substantivised plural adjective τὰ ὅσια (including cases of

a situation resulting from human behaviour.[10] It is said about someone that he or she 'is ὅσιος (or not)', that he or she acted ὁσίως or ἀνοσίως, or that the present state of affairs 'is ὅσιος' or the opposite, because of some previous action.

In those cases in which ὅσιος or ἀνόσιος qualifies an *object*, the phrase often quite obviously describes human behaviour, too (another 13% of all cases). When the human species or life, the 'course' individuals take, human actions, human emotions or other behavioural characteristics, human speech or the lack of it are referred to in terms of ὅσιος or ἀνόσιος, the whole phrase cannot be anything but an evaluation of what is expressed by that speech, emotion, action, etc.[11] For example, Medea announces that she will leave the city once she has murdered her children, having committed an ἔργον ἀνοσιώτατον. A

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the antonym and the comparative and superlative) is used as the object of a verb to qualify human speech-acts or actions expressed by a verb (n = 51). Humans do ὅσια or ἀνόσια (n = 28, for example, Antigone burying her brother, S. *Ant.* 74 or Orestes killing his mother, E. *Or.* 563), ask ὅσια or ἀνόσια (n = 2, for example, by making an appeal to receive the corpses of the Seven against Thebes back, E. *Supp.* 123), say ὅσια or ἀνόσια (n = 3, for example, by proposing to treat a corpse well, Hdt. 9.79.2), think ὅσια (n = 1, by reflecting on marriage, E. *El.* 1203), decide ὅσια (n = 2, for example by condemning a criminal, Lys. 13.96), or order ἀνόσια (n = 1, by giving instructions to burn a corpse against the custom, Hdt. 3.16.2). Τὰ ὅσια and τὰ ἀνόσια can also refer to actions of others to which one responds. Characters hear or see ὅσια (n = 2, for example, Theseus's decision to help retrieve the corpses of the Seven, E. *Supp.* 367), suffer ὅσια or ἀνόσια (n = 8, for example the actions of one's adversaries in court, Antipho 2.4.7.8), and Zeus will surely punish τὰ ἀνόσια (n = 1, the actions involved in entering the women-only festival of the Thesmophoria as a man, Ar. *Th.* 684). In all of these cases, τὰ ὅσια / ἀνόσια are human actions. The substantivised singular adjective, including cases of comparative and superlative, occurs in similar constructions (n = 5).

10 n = 3. The adverb describes such a situation or event in two cases, e.g. Agamemnon lives ἀνοσίως under the earth, E. *El.* 677; the substantivised adjective does so in one case (Antipho 5.84.2).

11 n = 31: the human species or human life: βίος (n = 1, E. *HF* 1302), γένος (n = 1, Ar. *Av.* 333); the 'course' they take: κέλευθος (n = 1, Simon. fr. 36 P. Oxy 2432 subfr. 1.12), δρόμος (n = 1, E. *HF* 1212); human actions, generically: ἔργον (n = 12, e.g. Hdt. 2.114.2), πρᾶγμα (n = 1, Hdt. 3.120.1); human emotions or other behavioural characteristics: ὕβρις (n = 1, E. *Ba.* 374), ἔρως (n = 1, E. *Hipp.* 764–765), πόθος (n = 1, E. *IA* 555), θυμός (n = 1, Bacch. *Dith.* 3.21); human speech or the lack of it: λόγος (n = 3, e.g. Ar. *Th.* 720), κόμπασμα (n = 1, A. *Th.* 551), φθέγμα (n = 1, E. *HF* 927), ἀρά (n = 2, E. *Med.* 607, E. *Ph.* 67), ἔγκλημα (n = 1, Antipho 4.2.4.6), μέλος (n = 1, Ar. *Av.* 897–898). In one case the adverb semantically qualifies humans' words, in Antipho 5.7.5 where the speaker says his 'request' is ὅσιος' (ἡ αἴτησις … ὁσίως ἔχουσα).

comic chorus warns Mnesilochus that the gods will punish him and then he will no longer laugh about his own ἀνοσίους λόγους (his plan to murder a human baby on an altar). Phaedra is anguished by οὐχ ὁσίων ἐρώτων, the sexual desire for her own son.[12] In these cases, although ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος syntactically qualify an object, they metaphorically refer to the person involved in the action (i.e. *semantically* they qualify the person).[13]

Both types of construction taken together account for the large majority of the data (80%). In these cases ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος are evaluative terms associated with and referring to human behaviour. In 17% of the remaining cases, ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος syntactically qualify an object, while it is not immediately obvious whether or how they semantically qualify the person involved.[14] One frequently quoted case in which ὅσιον has been interpreted as providing some description of the object occurs in Aristophanes's *Lysistrata*, in which an allegedly pregnant woman expresses the wish to move to a ὅσιον place (χωρίον).[15] Other famous examples are the ὅσια monies (χρήματα) that are referred to in fifth- and fourth-century inscriptions and fourth-century literary texts (fourth-century cases are not included in this corpus).[16]

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12 E. *Med.* 796, Ar. *Th.* 720, E. *Hipp.* 764–765.

13 To illustrate the difference between adjectives semantically qualifying either an object or the person involved in the action, while in both cases syntactically modifying the object, we can compare two examples in which the word κέλευθος (road, path) is syntactically modified by an adjective. Sentence (a) concerns a sea-journey: (a) Οἳ μὲν ἔπειτ' ἀναβάντες ἐπέπλεον ὑγρὰ κέλευθα (*Il.* 1.312) 'They then embarked and sailed on the watery ways.' In this example the adjective 'watery' expresses a quality of the path—ὑγρὰ κέλευθα obviously referring to the sea—and says nothing about the people who sail on it: they are not 'watery'. The statement in (b) below occurs inside a description of human morality. The narrator explains that it is granted to few people to be truly good and that humans can be overwhelmed by the desire for money, sex and feelings of revenge. A piece of advice follows: (b) [εἰ δ?]ὲ μὴ δι'αἰῶνος ὁσίαν | [ἐλ?]θεῖν κέλευθον, | [ ] ἐς τὸ δυνατόν. (Simon. fr. 36. P.Oxy.2432 subfr. 1.12) '[if? he can]not through his whole life [follow?] a ὅσιος path, [then?] as much as he can.' In the second example, the adjective ὅσιος clearly does not express a semantic quality of a physical path. Though syntactically qualifying κέλευθον, the adjective really describes *a person* on his 'path of life', trying to be as good as he can in the face of temptations (this passage is discussed in the main text below, section 1.7). A comparable example to (b) occurs in E. *HF* 1212, in which Amphitryon asks Heracles to restrain his θυμός by which he is led astray on a murderous, ἀνόσιον course (δρόμον).

14 n = 44.

15 Ar. *Lys.* 743, discussed in Chapter 7, section 2.3.

16 Cf. Chapter 7, section 3.

This group of objects can be classified into a select number of types. First of all, ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος qualify body parts,[17] the place where humans live,[18] and the Cyclops's meal of Odysseus's comrades.[19] Furthermore, ὅσιος evaluates murders[20] or deaths,[21] things that pertain to the rituals of worship,[22] marriage[23] or purity (or the opposite),[24] and sometimes other matters.[25] We will examine what kind of evaluation ὅσιος represents in these cases, taking up this question in Chapter 3, in the contrastive analysis of ὅσιος and εὐσεβής.[26] The adjective rarely appears in other configurations.[27]

The noun ὁσία occurs in only a few syntactic configurations. Sentences with ἡ ὁσία are usually evaluations or rules, stating that 'X (a particular course of action) is ὁσία' (or not). Sometimes it is said that humans should 'follow ὁσία'; or cultic actions are performed in a particular way 'because of ὁσία.'[28] Finally, in the inscriptions, ὅσιος and ὁσία occur in only a few configurations.[29]

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17 χείρ (n = 2, A. *Ch.* 378, S. *OC* 470), κάρα (n = 1, E. *HF* 255), κρᾶτα (n = 1, E. *HF* 567), νέκυς (n = 1, S. *Ant.* 1071), πούς (n = 2, E. *IT* 130, E. *Hel.* 868–869), στόμα (n = 2, Emp. fr. 3 l. 7, S. *OC* 981).

18 πόλις (n = 2, E. *El.* 1319, E. *Antiop.* F 223.115–116 *TrGF*, βασιλήϊον (n = 1, E. *Phaëth.* F 773.112–114 *TrGF*), ἕδεθλα (n = 1, A. *A.* 776–778).

19 δεῖπνον (n = 1, E. *Cyc.* 31), δαίς (n = 1, E. *Cyc.* 693).

20 φόνος (n = 3, e.g. E. *Med.* 1305), σφαγή (n = 2, E. *Tr.* 1316, E. *IA* 1318), προσφάγμα (n = 1, E. *Tr.* 628).

21 ὄλεθρος (n = 1, E. *IT* 871), μόρος (n = 1, Hdt. 3.65.5), συμφορά (n = 1, E. *Hipp.* 814–815).

22 θυσία (n = 1, E. *IT* 465), θοίνη (n = 1, A. *Pr.* 529–530), χορός (n = 1, E. *Tr.* 328).

23 γάμος (n = 5, e.g. E. *Ion* 1093), νύμφευμα (E. *El.* 1261), ὑμέναιος (n = 1, E. *Phaëth.* F 773.107 *TrGF*).

24 λουτρόν (n = 1, S. *Aj.* 1405), μίασμα (n = 1, E. *HF* 1233), καθαρμός (n = 1, E. *Ba.* 77).

25 δίκη (n = 1, Thgn. 1.132), θέα (n = 1, E. *HF* 323), νόμοι (n = 1, Antipho 6.2.3), ὀσμή (n = 1, S. *Ant.* 1083), ψῆφος (n = 1, E. *IT* 945), ὄνειδος (n = 1, Antipho 2.2.9.7–8).

26 Chapter 1, section 2.

27 In three cases the substantivised τὸ ὅσιον appears in a different construction: in Corcyra, people place their wish to take revenge above τοῦ ὁσίου (Th. 3.84.2); priestess Iphigenia wishes to present only τὸ ὅσιον to the god for sacrifice (E. *IT* 1037); and Castor and Pollux save people to whom ὅσιον is dear in their lives (E. *El.* 1351). The three remaining cases (1%) are too fragmentary to classify.

28 'X (a particular course of action) is ὁσία': *Od.* 16.423, 22.412, *h.Ap.*237, E. *Melanipp. Capt.* F 494.19–20 *TrGF*, Hdt. 2.171.2, 2.45.2; 'following ὁσία': E. *Or.* 501; 'because of ὁσία': *h.Cer.* 211, E. *IT* 1461. Moreover, worshippers in Emp. fr. 3.12 do not want to say 'more than ὁσία'. Different constructions occur in *h.Merc.* 130, 173, 470 and in Ar. *Pl.* 682. These (exceptional) cases are discussed in detail in Chapter 7, section 5.

29 In five inscriptions (IG IX I(2) 3:718, N. Suppl. Epig. Rodio 169a, Lindos II 26, ID 68 and SEG 43:630) we find the noun ἡ ὁσία, which occurs in contexts where it is discussed

Note that *hosios & cognates* almost always describe characteristics of *humans*. These terms are very rarely used in connection with the person or behaviour of a god.[30]

1.4 *Distribution: Self- and Other-Attributed*

Actions and attitudes expressed by means of the adjective ὅσιος and the noun ὁσία are other-attributed in a large majority of cases: in 79 % of the cases, speakers refer to what is ὅσιος or ἀνόσιος or (not) ὁσία about the actions, attitudes or objects belonging to someone else[31] and about their own actions, attitudes, etc. in only 19 % of the occurrences.[32]

1.5 *Distribution: Argumentative Orientation*

The antonymic pair ὅσιος—ἀνόσιος is asymmetrical in frequency. I will use Verhagen's notion of argumentative orientation to discuss these asymmetries.[33] In the following, I will assume that the statement that 'x (someone or something) is ὅσιος' has a *positive* argumentative orientation: it orients the addressee towards a positive, affirmative inference concerning the ὁσιότης of x. I will assume that both the statements 'x is not ὅσιος' and 'X is ἀνόσιος' have a *negative* argumentative orientation: they orient the addressee towards a negative inference concerning the ὁσιότης of x. I will use the terms 'positive argumentative orientation' and 'negative argumentative orientation' in this way throughout the book.[34]

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for whom it is ὁσία to do things, such as enter a sanctuary, make a sacrifice or receive part of the sacrificial meal. The other inscriptions feature the adjective ὅσιος. Three inscriptions (IvO 16, IG I³ 253 and IvO 27) refer to ὅσιον money. In IG I³ 52 a group of appointed officials needs to solve a financial issue 'as within their power and as is ὅσιον'. In SEG 4:171 generals need to collect tax from their soldiers, but if they fail to do so, 'let it be ἀνόσιον'. The Cypriotic inscription recorded in Schwyzer, *DGE* 679, Masson 1983 [1961]:235 ff. states that if someone offends against the terms set down in a law, 'let ἀνόσια happen to him'.

30 n = 7. E. *Or.* 595, E. *Alc.* 10, Pi. *P.* 9.36, E. *Heracl.* 719, *h.Merc.* 130, 173, 470. The first four cases are the topic of Chapter 5; the cases in *h.Merc.* are discussed in detail in Chapter 7, section 5.

31 n = 217.

32 n = 51. Six remaining cases (2 %) are too fragmentary to classify. I have excluded the three cases in which the text refers to the goddess Ὁσία.

33 Verhagen 2008:317–320.

34 I use these terms for disambiguation. Saying that ὅσιος is used in a 'positive way' is ambiguous because positive means 'affirmative' or 'expressing praise', negative means 'negated' or 'expressing censure'. NB: one could equally stipulate that the statement 'x is

Among the literary occurrences of ὅσιος and ὁσία, 60 % of the data (not counting verb forms) has a negative argumentative orientation,[35] while 36 % has a positive argumentative orientation.[36] Moreover, in 8 % of those cases with a positive argumentative orientation, the evaluation ὅσιος does not appear independently, but in direct juxtaposition to a question or a negation containing either (ἀν)όσιος or a semantically related term.[37] That is, in over two-thirds of all cases, ὅσιος and ὁσία have a negative argumentative orientation, or they appear in immediate contrast to a (supposed) negatively oriented alternative (60 % + 8 %). It is thus by far the less common case to simply state in the affirmative, without any expectation, actuality or contradiction of the opposite being involved, that something or someone is ὅσιος.

In a few other cases, ὅσιος or ὁσία appears in a question or conditional statement.[38] The distribution of ἡ ὁσία, when considered on its own, is notably different: two thirds of the occurrences of ὁσία have a positive argumentative orientation (10 out of 15 cases).

1.6 *Distribution across Themes*

As we saw in Chapter 1, ὅσιος and cognates may refer to very diverse issues. However, these terms in fact cluster around a small group of themes. This becomes evident when we classify all occurrences of ὅσιος and cognates thematically:[39]

ἀνόσιος' has a positive argumentative orientation, because it orients the addressee towards a positive inference concerning his ἀνοσιότης, but I will not do so.

35 n = 158.

36 n = 95.

37 n = 21. In these cases, ὅσιος with positive argumentative orientation is either (1) the answer to a question containing a semantically closely related term or idea, e.g. 'is it θέμις ...?'; or (2) appears directly juxtaposed to (a) ἀνόσιος/οὐχ ὅσιος or to (b) a semantically closely related term or idea with negative argumentative orientation or (c) a general negation: e.g. 'not ἀνόσιος/ἀσεβής, but ὅσιος,' 'not ἄδικος, but ὅσιος,' 'now ὅσιος, not before.' For example, in a legal suit the defendants claim they will suffer 'not ὅσια, but ἀνόσια' if they are condemned as murderers (Antipho 3.3.11.5). In a tragedy, a slave boldly tells a local ruler that he is in charge, but only 'to do ὅσια, not ἔκδικα' (E. *Hel.* 1638). When Electra is contemplating marriage (instead of being preoccupied with murdering her mother), the chorus tells her that 'now you are thinking thoughts which are ὅσια again, unlike before' (E. *El.* 1203). Other examples: (1) S. *Phil.* 662; (2a): E. *Tr.* 1316, E. *Or.* 547; (2b): E. *HF* 773, E. *Hel.* 1021.

38 question: n = 3, conditional statement: n = 3, together these cases account for 2 % of the data. The four remaining occurrences (2 %) are found in fragmentary texts and are impossible to classify.

39 The choice was based whenever possible on three criteria: (1a) what the speaker himself

- 24 % of all occurrences (n = 67) revolve around acknowledging gods as gods, keeping a proper relationship towards them (n = 22) and honouring them in cultic service (n = 45).
- 23 % of all cases (n = 64) have to do with honouring those who are in one's *oikos*: behaving well towards one's parents or children (n = 45), brothers and sisters (n = 6), other family members (n = 1) and spouses (n = 12).
- 13 % of all cases (n = 35) have to do with honouring the dead, burying them and providing them with the appropriate honours afterwards.
- 14 % of all occurrences (n = 38) relate to behaviour towards guests, hosts, and suppliants.
- 13 % of all occurrences (n = 37) have to do with keeping an oath.
- 5 %, a very small minority of all examined cases (n = 14), concerns a general, unspecific evaluation of behaviour.

In many cases we cannot choose *one* (primary) option. In 38 % of all occurrences speakers seem to qualify someone as ὅσιος (or the opposite) when multiple reasons to do so accumulate. Taking into account the fact that many passages belong to multiple categories, the cases listed above together account not

supplies as a reason for the evaluation or on (1b) what clues he immediately responds to. In some cases it is made explicit on what grounds a speaker considers a particular action ὅσιος or ἀνόσιος. An example is E. *Or.* 546, in which Orestes says 'I am ἀνόσιος because I have killed my mother'. In this case, Orestes's transgression of the relationship *between parent and child* is the obvious cause of the disqualification ἀνόσιος. In other cases there is no such clear and unambiguous clue. For example, when the mothers of the Seven against Thebes say they are making their supplication to Theseus 'οὐχ ὁσίως', they do not explain why (E. *Supp.* 63). In such cases, I have tried to find a clue in (2) the text of the play itself or (3) in the presumed cultural collective knowledge of contemporary listeners. In the case of *Suppliants*, it is explained elsewhere in the play that the supplication is made on a festival day. A contemporary listener would have known that supplications at altars were not allowed in Athens on festival days, because they interfered with the ritual practice. Thus, we can infer that in this particular instance the mothers consider their supplication 'not ὅσιος', because it is not in accordance with the who, what, where, when and how of *ritual practice* (cf. my discussion in section 1.7 below and in Chapter 6, section 3). A similar example occurs in E. *Or.* 1213, where Orestes refers to Menelaus as ἀνόσιος without providing any context or reason. However, in a preceding discussion in this play, Menelaus rejected Orestes as a suppliant and gave no ear to Orestes's plea to help his φίλος. I interpreted this case of ἀνόσιος as referring to Menelaus's earlier treatment of Orestes as suppliant and φίλος (cf. my discussion in Chapter 4, section 2.6). I have applied criteria (1)–(3) in this order, because I consider this to be the order of reliability of judgment.

for 92 % of the data (the total of the percentages mentioned above) but for 81 %. The remaining 19 % (n = 53) can be seen as a remainder category in which ὅσιος is used to evaluate a wide variety of actions, attitudes and objects.[40]

1.7 *Distribution within Themes*

There are not many cases in which *hosios & cognates* literally express that humans acknowledge gods as gods and keep a proper relationship towards them, refraining from hubristic statements and actions.[41] More importantly, *hosios & cognates* discuss aspects of ritual practice. Some passages refer to the maltreatment of the gods' temples, altars and images or to the action of honouring a particular god in cultic service at all.[42] But most often in this category, the noun ὁσία and the adjective ὅσιος concern the rules and customs at sanctuaries and their physical environment, describing the who, what, where, when and how of ritual practice. It is commonly stated that '[a certain action] is (not) ὁσία / ὅσιον', though more often expressing a prohibition. In other cases, human behaviour with respect to cult or sanctuary is evaluated by means of the adverb ὁσίως.

Some of these rules are specific to a particular cultic group and to a particular cult. For example, Iphigenia says it is ὅσιον for only her as priestess to touch the statue of Artemis; and a priest in Herodotus is upset when he finds out that some weapons, which are not ὅσιον for any human to touch, have been removed from a sanctuary of Delphi. Such rules relate to *who* should or must not perform particular ritual actions or who is allowed to handle particular sacred objects or obtain certain knowledge.[43] Herodotus deals with the question of *what* is a proper gift to the gods in the eyes of particular cultic groups when explaining 'it is not ὁσίη for the Egyptians to sacrifice animals other than sheep, bulls, male calves, which are ritually clean, and geese'.[44] Like-

40 Cases assigned to this rest category mention a specific, identifiable cause for the evaluation ὅσιος (or the opposite), which is not one of the topics listed above. By contrast, in cases assigned to the category of 'general, unspecific' behaviour, there seem(s) no apparent *specific* cause(s) for evaluating someone/something in terms of *hosios & cognates*, and/or the utterance has a very wide scope. In these cases, the evaluation seems to express general praise or censure of a person.

41 n = 6. For example, Pentheus is not ὅσιος for his refusal to recognise Dionysus as a true god (E. *Ba.* 374, 613); and the hubristic attitude of five of the seven warriors in Aeschylus's *Seven Against Thebes* is denounced as ἀνόσιος (A. *Th.* 551, 566).

42 e.g. Ar. *Th.* 720, Hdt. 8.109.3.

43 E. *IT* 1045, Hdt. 8.37.1; cf. Ar. *Nu.* 140, E. *Hipp.* 81, E. *Med.* 1054, Hdt. 3.37.3, 5.72.3, Ar. *Th.* 1150.

44 Hdt. 2.45.2.

wise, a tragic chorus accuses Helen of having burnt as a sacrifice 'those things of which it is not θέμις or ὁσία [to sacrifice them]'.[45] The mothers of the Seven against Thebes show a sensitivity to local temporal cultic restrictions (*when*) by admitting they are supplicating 'in a manner that is not ὅσιος', since their supplication is made during a festival.[46] Other rules about ἡ ὁσία represent customs that were shared by cultic communities across the Greek world. For example, a chorus of bacchants give the bystanders a well-known order on *how* to behave during the ritual, though in particularly fancy language, when telling them to 'make themselves completely ὅσιος with respect to a reverently silent mouth'.[47]

The second main application of *hosios & cognates* is in reference to the interaction with members of one's *oikos*: most notably, the relationship between parents and children, between brothers and sisters, and between husband and wife. Here, *hosios & cognates* are used in a rather restricted manner. Disqualifications (οὐχ ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος) are by far the most common. Moreover, the types of actions that are evaluated are rather limited. Concerning the bond between parents and children, the Greek 'cultural frame' of this relationship is elaborate, as is apparent from many discussions and reflections in archaic and classical literature. When a child is young, his parents should feed, raise and protect him and preferably leave him a profitable *oikos* and a good reputation to enjoy as an adult.[48] Then the balance of dependency turns. The grown-up child is expected to pay back his parents' long-term investment by caring for them when they are old,[49] burying them properly and continuing to honour them with religious rites for the dead.[50] Indeed, a few passages with

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45 E. *Hel.* 1353 (NB: the editions of *Helen* by Burian 2007 and OCT print ὅσια, n. pl. of ὅσιος, but I think ὁσία, f. sg. noun, is more plausible, with Allan 2008 and Dale 1978 [1967]); cf. E. *IT* 1035, Ar. *Pax* 1018.

46 E. *Supp.* 63. This passage is discussed in Chapter 6, section 3.

47 E. *Ba.* 70. Here, the phrase στόμα τ' εὔφημον ἅπας ἐξοσιούσθω is a poetical variant of the instruction to εὐφημεῖν 'speak well'. This warning to spectators to keep εὐφημία often implied that they should remain silent (in this way making sure that they would not utter any inauspicious words). Here, I have freely translated εὔφημον 'silent'. On εὐφημία, cf. Gödde 2011, who renders this term as 'die gute Rede'. This passage is discussed in Chapter 7, section 4.3, n. 151.

48 Material well-being provided for children as part of parental care: *Il.* 19.328–332, E. *Alc.* 687–688, E. *Ion* 478–480.

49 Discussions of children in terms of 'profit': when Hecuba finds out her son is dead, she calls bearing him ἀνόνητος 'unprofitable' (E. *Hec.* 766); in E. *Ion* 475 children are καρποφόροι 'fruitbearing'.

50 The parent-child relationship is telescoped in one image in Euripides's *Heracles*. Heracles

hosios & cognates describe various ways of going against this script. Amphitryon agrees to die, but not *after* his children: seeing children die is an ἀνόσιον θέαν 'sight'. What he means to say, it seems, is that this is unnatural, preventing both partners from acting ὁσίως in their future lives.[51] But *hosios & cognates* most often assess one thing, the most definite and grave transgression imaginable: the murder of the parent by the child or vice versa.[52] The same is true for the usage of *hosios & cognates* with respect to the bond between other members of an *oikos*: what is most frequently evaluated in terms of *hosios & cognates* is murder or intended murder of a spouse[53] or of sibling by sibling.[54]

Hosios & cognates evaluate the interaction between guest and host and towards suppliants. In general, the term may refer to treating a guest well or to accepting and helping a suppliant, sometimes a suppliant to whom one has given a pledge of protection. For example, Hypsipyle, when supplicating the seer Amphiaraus to help her, confidently declares, 'you will do ὅσια since you are ὅσιος'.[55] However, the majority of cases of *hosios & cognates* that deal with

compares his children to ἐφολκίδες (631), which are little boats attached to a large boat that tows it. Heracles is towing his 'ἐφολκίδες' along as they cannot 'move' on their own. But an ἐφολκίς is not just a small burden depending on the bigger ship: the word also means 'life-boat' (Griffiths 2002:654 with n. 46). In this way, the metaphor looks ahead to the moment in which the balance will shift and the children become the old man's 'lifesavers', caring for him when he is grey and helpless.

51 E. *HF* 323. Other examples: in one of Antiphon's speeches, the defendant claims that his death will mean him leaving ὀνείδη 'reasons for reproach' to his children which are ἀνόσια (Antipho 2.2.9.7–8). That is, he will die instead of being able to leave his children a good reputation or material well-being, as he was supposed to do. Harming one's parents or child by cursing them (E. *Ph.* 67) or by pressing charges against them (Pl. *Euthphr.* 4e1) is also framed as 'not ὅσιος' or ἀνόσιος.

52 The infanticides of Medea (E. *Med.* 796, 850, 1305), Heracles (E. *HF* 1212, 1233, 1282, 1302) and Agamemnon (E. *IA* 1105, 1318) are referred to as ἀνόσιος, and the Cretan king Etearchus is disqualified as such for the intended murder of his child (Hdt. 4.154.2). Orestes's matricide and Oedipus's murder of his father are repeatedly referred to in the same way (e.g. E. *Or.* 286, 374, 563, S. *OT* 353).

53 Electra says she is the daughter of a mother who is most ἀνόσια, one who killed her husband (E. *Or.* 24). Other examples of behaviour towards a lover or spouse evaluated in terms of *hosios & cognates*: A. *Ch.* 378, E. *Heracl.* 719, Antipho 1.26.8.

54 Herodotus narrates how Smerdis died by a ἀνόσιος fate, being murdered (accidently) by his own brother Cambyses (Hdt. 3.65.5). Other examples of behaviour towards a sibling evaluated in terms of *hosios & cognates*: E. *IT* 871, Hdt. 2.121ε2, E. *Hel.* 1638.

55 E. *Hyps.* F 757.862 *TrGF*. This example is discussed below in section 3.

ξενία and ἱκετεία are, again, the description of an offence. For example, it is said that Paris carried out an ἀνόσιον ἔργον (deed) when he seduced the wife of his own host (ξένος) and carried her off and also stole money.[56] Heracles wants to 'cut off the ἀνόσιον head' of Lycus, a tyrant threatening to kill his family while they are sitting as suppliants at an altar.[57]

Various aspects of conduct towards the dead are described in terms of ὅσιος and cognates. Some cases refer to the requirement to bury the dead. For example, Antigone says she will have 'committed a crime consisting of ὅσια' by having buried her brother Polynices in defiance of Creon's decree. Rules concerning funeral regulations and the cult for the dead are also described in terms of ἡ ὁσία or ὅσιον. Thus, Herodotus tells us that it is not ὅσιον for the Egyptians to be buried in woollen clothes, as it is for the initiates of the Bacchic and Orphic mysteries.[58]

Passages in which ὅσιος refers to oath-keeping (or seems to do so) are most prominent in forensic oratory. At homicide trials both the accuser and the defendant swore to speak the truth; the jurors swore, among other things, to make judgments according to the law.[59] The term ὅσιος sometimes seems to refer to these oaths. For example, in Antiphon's *De Choreuta* the defence argues that the accusers are not really convinced of his guilt but have been bribed to sue him. He wonders which oath these ἀνοσιώτατοι *would* hesitate to break (i.e. if apparently they did not give any heed to the oaths they swore in this court).[60] Sometimes ὅσιος refers to oath-keeping in other contexts.[61]

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56 Hdt. 2.114–115. Other examples of misbehaviour towards guests evaluated in terms of *hosios & cognates*: E. *Hec.* 790, E. *Cyc.* 378, 438, 693, Hdt. 2.119.2.

57 E. *HF* 773. Other examples of behaviour towards suppliants evaluated in terms of *hosios & cognates*: Hdt. 1.159, S. *OC* 281, 283, E. *Supp.* 40, *Od.* 16.423.

58 S. *Ant.* 74; Hdt. 2.81. Other examples of conduct towards the dead evaluated in terms of *hosios & cognates*: *Od.* 22.412, S. *Aj.* 1405, E. *Hel.* 1021, 1054, E. *Supp.* 123, Hdt. 3.16, 9.78–79, Th. 2.52.4 (the controversial last-mentioned case is discussed in Chapter 7, section 2.1).

59 MacDowell 1978:44, 119.

60 Antipho 6.51. Various cases of ὅσιος seem to refer more implicitly to the oath taken by accuser and defence and by the jurors. Sometimes one of the parties urge the jury to judge ὁσίως in favour of them, i.e. to honour the oath by which they are bound to decide cases in accordance with the law (e.g. Antipho 2.4.12.1). Sometimes the accused claim the accusers are 'not doing ὅσια' by prosecuting them (Antipho 4.2.2.2), which I interpret as 'not honouring the oath by which you are bound', or say they would 'undergo ἀνόσια' if they are convicted (although they are not guilty), which I interpret as a complaint that they would suffer the consequence of the ἀνόσιον action of those who falsely accuse them in defiance of the oath they swore (Antipho 2.4.7.8).

61 Ar. *Av.* 327, E. *Ph.* 493, Th. 1.71.6.

In a small group of passages ὅσιος is used generally, unspecifically or with a very wide scope to evaluate behaviour. One early case occurs in a fragment of Simonides. This text seems to say that a god gives merit to few people continuously throughout their lives. Most people are oppressed by different forces that overwhelm them against their will: the irresistible desire for profit, the powerful sting of Aphrodite and the love of victory. The idea seems to be that Greed, Lust and Pride—three 'deadly sins' *avant la lettre*—may lead one to transgressions. The fragment continues to say that '(if) a man cannot (follow) a ὅσιον course throughout life, then (he should do so as much) as he can'. Thus, the advice to the reader is not focussed on any particular interhuman relationship or field of activity. Instead the text identifies those negative influences that might harm *any* such relationship. The "ὅσιον route" seems to be quite a general ethical guideline.[62]

The category of remaining cases includes a variety of attitudes, actions and objects. Castrating young men, then selling them as slaves is assessed as ἀνόσιον.[63] The regard of one god for another is said to conform to ὁσίη.[64] Sexual behaviour is sometimes evaluated in terms of ὁσιότης.[65] Murder in general, attacking a city during a truce, and defending oneself against an attacking enemy are all discussed in terms of (failing) ὁσιότης.[66] In some passages, merely *accusing* someone of having committed a transgression in one of the above-mentioned spheres is considered ἀνόσιον.[67]

As we have seen, three-quarters of the occurrences of ὅσιος concern interaction *between* humans, mostly with a select number of themes. In the next section we will consider the connections between these various behavioural areas in more detail.

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62 Simon. fr. 36, P. Oxy 2432, subfr. 1.1–14.

63 Hdt. 8.105–106.

64 *h.Merc.* 470.

65 The positively oriented adjective ὅσιος occasionally describes a prudent and modest sexual life that is not guided by excessive desires (E. *IA* 555). The antonym ἀνόσιος sometimes evaluates problematic behaviour relating to love, marriage and sex. But most of these examples describe a seriously disturbed relationship between parents and children (S. *OC* 946, 981, S. *OT* 1289, 1360, E. *Hipp.* 764–765), husband and wife (E. *El.* 600, 926) or guest and host (Hdt. 2.114–115 concerning Paris), and I have classified them under the categories of relations within the *oikos* and between guest and host. Examples in which ἀνόσιος describes problematic sexual behaviour outside of those typical relationships: B. *Dith.* 3.21, E. *El.* 1261, E. *Ion* 1093.

66 Antipho 3.3.3.10; Th. 2.5.5; Th. 3.56.2.

67 e.g., S. *OC* 981, And. *De Myst.* 19, 23.

2 Internal Organisation of the Semantic Network

The scholarly discussion on ὅσιος as a primarily 'ethical' and/or 'religious' evaluation can be viewed as a debate over the internal semantic organisation of the lexeme. Which usage(s) would a user conceive of as 'primary', as 'the best example' of ὁσιότης, as 'prototypical'? In Chapter 1, we discussed one way of finding the prototypical usage of a lexeme: by studying cases in which the lexeme is activated without much contextual preparation.[68] It was argued by Rademaker and by Sluiter & Rosen (in the context of semantic studies of σωφροσύνη and ἀνδρεία) that the prototypical usage of a lexeme may sometimes be found by examining the first answers to Socrates's 'What is x?' questions in Plato's dialogues.[69] We will examine Plato's *Euthyphro* and analyse his first definitions of τὸ ὅσιον in order to get closer to the prototypical case of ὁσιότης. Euthyphro's initial response is inspired by his own current situation. Euthyphro is prosecuting his father for murder, and his definition follows from that action:

> Λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι *τὸ* μὲν *ὅσιόν* ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νῦν ποιῶ, τῷ ἀδικοῦντι ἢ περὶ φόνους ἢ περὶ ἱερῶν κλοπὰς ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων ἐξαμαρτάνοντι ἐπεξιέναι, ἐάντε πατὴρ ὢν τυγχάνῃ ἐάντε μήτηρ ἐάντε ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι ***ἀνόσιον***.
>
> I say that *to hosion* is precisely what I am doing now, prosecuting the wrong-doer who commits murder or steals from the temples or does any of such things, whether he happens to be one's father or one's mother or anyone else, and not prosecuting him is *anhosion*.[70]

Euthyphro's first definition lies in the ethical *and* in the religious sphere. We have already seen that murder and disrespect of gods' property are often evaluated as not ὅσιον, and we can imagine that pursuing those who commit such crimes *is* ὅσιον. But our previous analysis of the distribution also immediately shows us the problem with Euthyphro's definition, and its probable shock effect on the audience. 'Showing respect for one's parents' is frequently described as ὅσιον, too. Thus, Euthyphro both conforms to and breaches current usage in the same sentence.

68 Chapter 1, section 3.

69 Rademaker 2005:35, Sluiter & Rosen 2003:7–8. Cf. Chapter 1, section 3.

70 Pl. *Euthphr.* 5d8–e2.

Euthyphro's second definition of τὸ ὅσιον is prompted by Socrates's request to hear the essence of ὁσιότης rather than an example of it. Note that although Socrates wants to hear an essentialist definition, in fact he is prompting Euthyphro to come up with a 'schema'. He wants Euthyphro to think about an abstraction from the individual examples of ὁσιότης that he knows.[71] According to Euthyphro,

> Ἔστι τοίνυν τὸ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλὲς *ὅσιον*, τὸ δὲ μὴ προσφιλὲς *ἀνόσιον*.
>
> What is pleasing to the gods is *hosion* and what is not pleasing is *anhosion*.[72]

Euthyphro's reasons for considering the prosecution of his father to be ὅσιον can be inferred from this second definition. He perceives his action as *a way of pleasing the gods*. Thus, in the *Euthyphro*, τὸ ὅσιον not only has ethical and religious components, these two are also crucially connected. According to Euthyphro, behaving in a certain way towards a parent is ὅσιον, because this is agreeable to the divine world. If we may take Euthyphro's views as showing us the prototypical sense of ὅσιος, the evaluation seems to be prototypically ethical *and* religious in the classical period.[73]

A related question concerns how this synchronic situation came about. Van der Valk argued that ὁσίη *originally* had a religious sense, from which the ethical sense developed.[74] We may test this hypothesis by taking a diachronic perspective when examining the very first attestations of ὁσίη, in Homer's *Odyssey*.[75]

In *Odyssey* 16, one of the suitors, Antinous, had previously suggested killing Telemachus somewhere on a quiet road out of town and dividing his possessions amongst the suitors—a plan which was not well received.[76] When Pene-

71 On the notion of the 'schema', cf. Chapter 1, section 3.

72 Pl. *Euthphr.* 6d10–7a1.

73 The method of deriving prototypical usage from initial responses to Socrates's 'What is X?' questions has been fruitfully applied to other lexemes and other Platonic dialogues in previous research (Rademaker 2005:35, Sluiter & Rosen 2003:7–8). Thus, making a tentative inference about the prototypical usage of ὁσιότης on the basis of Euthyphro's utterances here seems reasonably justified, even though obviously we should remain cautious.

74 Cf. Chapter 1, section 2.

75 The adjective ὅσιος does not occur in Homer.

76 *Od.* 16.400–406.

lope heard about Antinous's scheme, she admonished him for showing *hybris* (ὕβριν ἔχων, 418) and denounced him as a 'madman':

> 421 μάργε, τίη δὲ σὺ Τηλεμάχῳ θάνατόν τε μόρον τε
> ῥάπτεις, οὐδ' ἱκέτας ἐμπάζεαι, οἷσιν ἄρα Ζεὺς
> μάρτυρος; οὐδ' *ὁσίη* κακὰ ῥάπτειν ἀλλήλοισιν.[77]
>
> Madman, why do you contrive death and destruction for Telemachus? Do you not care about suppliants, for whom Zeus is a witness? It is not *hosiê* to plot evil against each other.

In this passage, it is obvious that Penelope's warning is not about the plotting of harm against others *in general*. Rather the sentence, 'do you not care about suppliants, for whom Zeus is a witness?', shows that her admonition has to do with the institution of supplication. Moreover, the reciprocal pronoun ἀλλήλοισιν makes it clear that she is referring to a *relationship* between two persons. But what exactly does ἱκέτας refer to? Telemachus is not a suppliant at that moment. Rather, as Penelope explains, a reciprocal bond between the families of Telemachus and Antinous, established in the previous generation, causes them to be obliged to one another. Penelope points out that Antinous's father once supplicated Odysseus successfully when he was being pursued. Odysseus protected him from his own people who wanted to kill him.[78] Then she connects the background facts to the present and emphasizes their current importance: 'of him now' (τοῦ νῦν, i.e. 'of Odysseus') 'you devour and dishonour the household, woo the wife and kill the child'.[79] We can infer that Odysseus's protection gave rise to a hereditary long-term reciprocal relationship.[80] Monro has pointed out that ἐμπάζομαι 'care for' (l. 422) usually takes a genitive, but here it is the accusative, ἱκέτας. This scholar explains that 'as with … μέμνημαι, the acc. is used when the existence of a person or thing constitutes the *fact* known or remembered.'[81] Thus, ἱκέτας (422) does

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77 *Od.* 16.421–423.

78 *Od.* 16.424–430.

79 *Od.* 16.431–432.

80 But this is not because supplication always leads to a long-term bond of ξενία, as Naiden 2006:118–120 explains: a successful act of supplication could also lead to a different tie, or the relationship between suppliant and the person who was supplicated could be discharged after the suppliant had been granted his request.

81 Monro 1914, ad loc. Stanford 1965, ad loc. and Heubeck & Hoekstra 1990, ad loc. read the passage in the same way.

not refer to an *individual suppliant* but to the remembered fact that Antinous's father once supplicated Odysseus.

In this passage, behaving in accordance with ὁσίη seems to mean honouring the long-term reciprocal bond that is sometimes the result of a successful act of supplication. As explained in 422–423, Zeus is a 'witness' (μάρτυρος) of that relationship.[82] It seems that ὁσίη in this passage is not primarily either ethical or religious, but essentially both: the desirable religious behaviour *is* upholding the proper ethical norms. The negatively oriented evaluation οὐχ ὁσίη (as well as the accusation ὕβριν ἔχων, 418) targets the failure to behave properly towards gods and humans alike, by neglecting a relationship between humans that is specially sanctioned by Zeus.

In Book 22, Eurycleа is on the verge of bursting into cries of joy when seeing the suitors' corpses on the floor. Odysseus warns her:

411 ἐν θυμῷ, γρηῦ, χαῖρε καὶ ἴσχεο μηδ' ὀλόλυζε·
οὐχ *ὁσίη* κταμένοισιν ἐπ' ἀνδράσιν εὐχετάασθαι.
τούσδε δὲ μοῖρ' ἐδάμασσε θεῶν καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα·[83]

Rejoice inside yourself, old lady, and be restrained and do not cheer out loud.
It is not *hosiê* to boast over slain men.
The fate of the gods overcame them and their reckless deeds.

As far as we can tell from this passage, Odysseus considers Eurycleа's rejoicing an inappropriate act of 'bragging' (εὐχετάασθαι, 22.412). In his view, an expression of joy apparently implies praise of himself, which is out of place: the 'fate of the gods' (μοῖρα θεῶν, 411) and their own 'wretched deeds' (σχέτλια ἔργα, 413) overcame the suitors. Neither he nor Eurycleа should take credit for the suitors' death. Perhaps Odysseus's objections also concern the fact that Eurycleа

82 Often, though not here, the god is called Ζεὺς Ξένιος or Ζεὺς Ἱκέσιος in these contexts.

83 *Od.* 22.411–413. The authenticity of this speech has been disputed, because it would be out of tune with the 'archaic ferocity of the rest of the book' (Russo et al. 1992, ad loc., and referring to Heubeck 1987:83; Erbse 1972:130–131; Eisenberger 1973:142). For example, as De Jong 2001:541–542 points out, Odysseus's attitude has changed drastically compared to 'ten years ago, when in very similar circumstances (after the punishment of an opponent, the Cyclops, who had perverted the rites of hospitality) he had exulted at his victory'. However, there are enough parallels to the sentiment expressed by Odysseus elsewhere in Homer to defend the authenticity of these lines. For references, cf. the discussion in Russo et al. 1992, ad loc.

is cheering 'over *murdered* men' (κταμένοισιν ἐπ' ἀνδράσιν, 412), which is disrespectful of the dead.[84] If this is the case, ὁσίη seems again to be an evaluation with two layers, though in a different way. Euryclea is admonished for her attitude towards the gods *as well as* to the dead men.

Crucially, in both Homeric passages, two types of conduct are important: in order to be ὅσιος, one must honour the gods (show desirable religious behaviour) but also behave in the appropriate way in interactions between humans (uphold ethical norms). A characterisation of ὅσιος as developing from a narrow 'religious' towards a broader 'ethical' usage—or vice versa—is incompatible with the data. Thus, *hosios & cognates* seem to have been prototypically 'ethical *and* religious' from Homer onwards. The connection between these two evaluative elements was essential to the semantic make-up of *hosios & cognates* in the classical period, as we may deduce from Euthyphro's spontaneous definitions. Indeed, key themes that are evaluated in terms of *hosios & cognates* in fifth-century texts (section 1.6 and 1.7) are bonds between humans that are especially interesting to the gods.[85] Based on the above, we may also make an inference about the 'schema'[86] of ὅσιος as 'behaviour which pleases the gods, which is aimed either at the gods themselves or at other humans whose bonds the gods are particularly interested in'. It also covers any other persons, actions and objects, if a speaker can convince others that they also belong to the category of τὸ ὅσιον.

3 ὅσιος on an Evaluative Scale

The previous investigation allowed us to determine the evaluative nature of the adjective ὅσιος. A question that is still open is where to place the usage of the adjective ὅσιος with a positive argumentative orientation on an evaluative scale. Does it articulate that an object, behaviour or action is praise-

84 The prohibition οὐχ ὁσίη was interpreted in this way by Hayman 1882, Ameis et al. 1911 [1884], Stanford 1965 and Russo et al. 1992. The scholion on *Od.* 22.412 already adduced the parallel of Archil. fr. 134 w οὐ γὰρ ἐσθλὰ κατθανοῦσι κερτομεῖν ἐπ'ἀνδράσιν, 'it is not good to scoff at dead men'.

85 Zeus is especially concerned with these relationships as the special protector of guests, suppliants, sworn oaths and kinship, as we can tell from his epithets: Ξένιος, Ἱκέσιος, Ὅρκιος and Ὅμαιμος.

86 In Chapter 1, section 3, it was argued that language users' mental representations of a lexeme may include a schema. This is an abstraction from the individual members of a category that shows what these members have in common.

worthy, 'pleasing to the gods'? Or does it refer to what is 'religiously neutral', what is merely 'acceptable' to the gods?

One problem with answering this question is that there are many cases in which either translation can be defended. For example, in Euripides's *Helen*, Theoclymenus plans to marry Helen, although he promised his father and the gods he would keep her safe until Menelaus returned for her.[87] Theoclymenus's sister Theonoe wants to help Helen escape from Theoclymenus and so prevent him from marrying Helen. She says she will do her brother a good turn, 'if I make him ὅσιος out of his δυσσέβεια'.[88] The context seems to support both suggested interpretations. The passage may express, 'if I restore him to a state of safe normality, of neutrality with respect to the gods, turning him away from his religiously offensive behaviour (breaking his promise to parent and god and intending to marry someone else's wife)'. But the passage may just as well express 'if I make him a person deserving of religious praise, turning him from his impiety'.

As a second example, the general advice to follow 'a ὅσιον route' in life in Simonides's fragment discussed above[89] may be taken as, 'try to remain religiously inoffensive, avoiding dangers that loom everywhere' (i.e., the almost inevitable transgressions that result from ambition and sexual and material desires). On the other hand, the phrase may also be interpreted as an incentive to be pious, to uphold a high moral standard in all matters.

In other cases in which a person is referred to as ὅσιος (positive argumentative orientation) or is urged to behave in such a manner, it is very difficult to see how we can understand ὅσιος *other than* as an evaluation that expresses praise. We will consider two examples. In a fragment from Euripides's *Hypsipyle*, the girl Hypsipyle supplicates the seer Amphiaraus.[90] Hypsipyle had

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87 This play gives an interesting twist to history: according to its plot, Helen never went to Troy. When Paris came to collect his prize from Aphrodite, an angry Hera substituted an image for her. Paris took this 'phantom Helen' with him to Troy, but Zeus instructed Hermes to take the 'real Helen' to Egypt. She was to stay there at the court of Proteus, who promised to protect her until her husband Menelaus would come to collect her again. However, when Proteus's son Theoclymenus came to the throne, he did not respect the promise to Menelaus and wanted to marry Helen himself. This is all explained in the prologue. When the play begins, Helen has taken refuge as a suppliant at the tomb of Proteus (E. *Hel.* 63–65; 799) to escape Theoclymenus's advances.

88 ἐκ δυσσεβείας ὅσιον εἰ τίθημι νιν, E. *Hel.* 1021.

89 Section 1.7, Simon. fr. 36 P. Oxy 2432 subfr. 1.12.

90 Hypsipyle served as a slave to Lycurgus, priest at the rural sanctuary of Zeus at Nemea and his wife Eurydice, nursing their son Opheltes. The seer Amphiaraus came to see this family.

agreed to guide Amphiaraus to a spring to find water to make a libation.[91] Once there, a snake killed Opheltes, a little boy in Hypsipyle's care. Opheltes's mother Eurydice wanted to put Hypsipyle to death, convinced that the nurse had murdered her son on purpose,[92] which is why Hypsipyle appealed to Amphiaraus for help:

> Ὑψ. [ῥ]ῦσαί με· διὰ γὰρ σὴν ἀπόλλυμαι χάριν.
> μέλλω τε θνῄσκειν, δεσμίαν τέ μ' εἰσορᾷς
> πρὸς σοῖσι γόνασιν, ἣ τόθ' εἱπόμην ξένοις·
> *ὅσια* δὲ πράξεις *ὅσιος* ὤν· πρ[ο]δοὺς δέ με
> ὄνειδος Ἀργείοισιν Ἕλλησίν τ' ἔσῃ.[93]
>
> Hyps. Save me: I am undone because of the favour I showed you.
> I am about to die, and you look upon me bound
> at your knees,[94] the woman who guided you strangers before.
> You will do things that are *hosia* because you are *hosios*: by betraying me
> you will be a disgrace to the Argives and to all Greeks.

It is difficult to see how we can translate l. 862 as 'you will do what is religiously neutral because you are religiously neutral'. Rather, it seems that Hypsipyle is actively urging the seer to perform a commendable action. In the immediately preceding lines, Hypsipyle has carefully built up the idea that there is a relationship of χάρις between herself and the seer. She is the one who escorted the visitors (ξένοις, 861) to the well. By doing so, she performed the first step in the exchange of favours. But her troubles originated there: 'I die because of the favour I have done to you' (διὰ γὰρ σὴν ἀπόλλυμαι χάριν, 859). The contention that Amphiaraus will 'do ὅσια' is in fact an appeal to him to return χάρις, which is a positive, not a 'neutral' action.[95] Amphiaraus should honour *two* relationships in which the gods have a particular interest: ξενία and ἱκετία. The first has been established by Hypsipyle's guidance to the spring, the second is established there and then, when Hypsipyle grasps the seer's knees as a suppliant.

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91 E. *Hyps.* F 752h–k *TrGF.*

92 E. *Hyps.* F 754b *TrGF.*

93 E. *Hyps.* F 757.859–863 *TrGF.*

94 Grasping the seer's knees, Hypsipyle establishes the proper ritual contact between herself and the person she is supplicating, which traditionally guaranteed the safety of the suppliant (Gould 1973:76). This phenomenon is often referred to in the scholarship as *Kontaktmagie*, e.g. Kopperschmidt 1967:11–12.

95 On χάρις in reciprocal relationships: Van Berkel 2013:55–102.

Furthermore, it seems that she is strengthening her request *by paying him a compliment*, not by calling him 'neutral', when she says 'you will do it because you *are* ὅσιος' (862). This assertion seems to operate on the inter-personal level as a clever rhetorical move. Hypsipyle's statement more or less compels the seer to act in a certain way, i.e. he owes it to his own reputation of great piety[96] to help her. In short, it seems to me that we should translate: 'you will act piously because you *are* pious'.[97]

A second example relates to the sphere of burial. In Sophocles's *Antigone*, Antigone tells a frightened Ismene (and in Antigone's view, cowardly) that she would not allow her to assist in the burial of Polynices, even if her sister wanted to. But, she says—in defiance of Creon's decree:

71 Ἀν. … κεῖνον δ' ἐγὼ
θάψω. καλόν μοι τοῦτο ποιούσῃ θανεῖν.
φίλη μετ' αὐτοῦ κείσομαι, φίλου μέτα,
ὅσια πανουργήσασ'· ἐπεὶ πλείων χρόνος
ὃν δεῖ μ' ἀρέσκειν τοῖς κάτω τῶν ἐνθάδε.[98]

Ant. But *I* will bury him. It is noble for me to die while doing this.
I am his *philos* and I will lie with him, my *philos*,
having committed *hosia* as a crime. For there will be a longer time
in which I need to please those below than those here.

Here we cannot translate: 'having committed a "crime" that will nevertheless be considered acceptable by the gods'. The immediate context around the

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96 The seer's reputation for caring about the divine had been emphasised throughout the play, as far as we can tell from its fragments. Amphiaraus attaches great importance to offering to the gods in the correct manner, as shown in E. *Hyps.* F 752h.29–32 *TrGF*. Furthermore, in F 752k.20–21 *TrGF* Hypsipyle asks Amphiaraus why he needs to sacrifice if he is going to die anyway (referring to the fact that Amphiaraus has foreseen his own death). Amphiaraus answers this is 'better' (ἄμεινον), and it is no labour to worship the gods (εὐσεβεῖν θεούς). The image we get here of Amphiaraus is consistent with that in earlier plays, for example: A. *Th.* 610–611, where Eteocles characterises Amphiaraus as a 'prudent, just, good, pious man' (σώφρων δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς εὐσεβὴς ἀνήρ) who, sadly, has to fight alongside 'godless insolent men' (ἀνοσίοισι θρασυστόμοισιν ἀνδράσιν).

97 Amphiaraus's response is affirmative. He says he has come to help Hypsipyle, following τὸ εὐσεβές (E. *Hyps.* F 757.871 *TrGF*). The relationship between τὸ ὅσιον and τὸ εὐσεβής and the implications of this comparison for the interpretation of τὸ ὅσιον is the topic of Chapter 3.

98 S. *Ant.* 71–75.

oxymoron ὅσια πανουργήσασα (74) shows us that we have to read ὅσια in a more positive way. Antigone evaluates her own envisaged action as 'noble' (καλόν, 72) and 'pleasing those below (the gods)' (ἀρέσκειν τοῖς κάτω, 75). A comparable example, also relating to burial, occurs in Euripides's *Suppliants*. The Argive Adrastus tells king Theseus of Athens that he asked for the return of the bodies of the Seven against Thebes, so that they could be buried. Theseus wonders: 'but what did they say, when being asked for ὅσια from your side?'[99] It seems that Adrastus did not ask for what was 'religiously neutral' or 'acceptable to the gods'. Rather, he must have asked to perform a ritual that is both necessary and good.

In these three examples, the adjective ὅσιος definitely seems to express a *positive* value. I have not been able to find any passages in which such a reading is *not* possible. Cases such those discussed above seem to point us in the direction of interpreting ὅσιος with a positive argumentative orientation as articulating approval, appreciation of actions and attitudes. But the most important argument supporting this interpretation comes from the main cultural frame in which this lexeme functions. We will turn to this topic next.

4 The Cultural Frame(s)

Based on the distribution analysis above, we may say that ὅσιος and cognates are associated with different frames: the scenario of sacrificing to the gods, the frame of receiving a guest, of hearing and perhaps accepting a suppliant, of swearing and keeping to an oath, of the long-term bond with one's parents and children, of burying the dead and caring for them subsequently. But all of these associations together also belong to one larger frame. Near the end of Plato's dialogue, Euthyphro states that

> ὅτι ἐὰν μὲν κεχαρισμένα τις ἐπίστηται τοῖς θεοῖς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενός τε καὶ θύων, ταῦτ' ἔστι *τὰ ὅσια*.[100]
>
> If someone knows what kind of pleasing things to say and to do when praying and sacrificing, these things are *ta hosia*.

99 E. *Supp*. 123.
100 Pl. *Euthphr*. 14b2–4.

After this, Euthyphro agrees with Socrates that sacrificing (τὸ θύειν) is the same as giving to the gods, and praying (τὸ εὔχεσθαι) is asking from the gods.[101] Socrates and Euthyphro end up agreeing that ὁσιότης is, therefore, knowledge of giving to and asking from the gods.[102] In fact, as Socrates suggests, ὁσιότης may be called an ἐμπορικὴ τέχνη, 'an art of commerce', which gods and men master: it is the art of doing business with one another.[103] Euthyphro agrees to that characterisation, 'Yes, if you like to call it that.'[104]

Socrates's final move is a cynical reduction of the main cultural frame to which ὁσιότης belongs. The concept of ὁσιότης should be interpreted in the context of the long-term reciprocal relationship between humans and the divine world.[105] Indeed, interaction with Greek gods often concerned the 'exchange' of goods and favours between humans and the divine world. Sacrifices were gifts to the divinities, but they were not intended as one-way traffic. In literary prayers, characters expressed the hope that in return for their gift, they would receive the favour they were asking for. When a wish had been granted, there were different ways of thanking the gods and perhaps asking for another favour.[106] In short, prayers, hymns, sacrifices and other gifts in the literature

101 14c8–10.

102 14d1–3.

103 14e6–7.

104 14e8.

105 Until fifteen years ago, the role of reciprocity in the Greek conceptualisation of religion was 'neglected' or 'undervalued' (Parker 1998:105). However, various recent monographs and smaller studies assert that the mechanism of reciprocity is fundamental to the theological underpinnings of Greek popular religion (Yunis 1988; Pulleyn 1997; Bremer 1998; Parker 1998; Furley 2007), or any religion actually. The central thesis in Pulleyn 1997 is the importance of χάρις in Greek prayer. In Yunis 1988:50–58 reciprocity is taken to be one of the three fundamental religious beliefs of the Athenians, along with the belief that gods exist and that they have an interest in human actions. Notwithstanding Parker's assertion of the 'neglect' of reciprocity in Greek religion, the importance of exchange in Greek religion had been acknowledged before: e.g. Festugière 1976; Versnel 1981:56–57.

106 An important study in this respect is Simon Pulleyn's *Prayer in Greek Religion* (1997), which explores the structure of prayers in Greek literature. Recognising a *do-ut-des* 'I give, so that you will give' format in many prayers, Pulleyn also discussed a number of variations on this type. In literary texts, characters argue that the gods should grant them a wish because they had themselves offered things to the gods in the past (*da-quia-dedi*, cf. e.g. A. *Th.* 174–181), because the god had (not) granted a wish before (*da-quia-*(*non*)*-dedisti*, cf. e.g. *Il.* 1.450–456, *Od.* 6.323–327) or in order to allow them to offer in the future, etc. (*da-quia-dabo*, cf. e.g. A. *Ch.* 246–263, E. *El.* 805–808; S. *OT* 895–903). Pulleyn's categorisation of requests and prayers shows how strongly particular requests to gods were seen as being grounded in a long-term reciprocal relationship between humans and the immor-

were conceived of as part of a two-sided relationship between mortals and divinities, a relationship that was based upon mutual exchange. The idea that gods should reciprocate favours was so central in the theology that it was even shared by the Greek gods themselves in their literary representations.[107]

We can take a closer look at the type of reciprocity characterising the relationship between gods and men by exploring one example of a prayer in more detail. In *Iliad* 1, the priest Chryses offers a famous prayer to the god Apollo:

κλῦθί μευ, ἀργυρότοξ᾽, ὃς Χρύσην ἀμφιβέβηκας
Κίλλαν τε ζαθέην Τενέδοιό τε ἶφι ἀνάσσεις,
Σμινθεῦ, εἴ ποτέ τοι χαρίεντ᾽ ἐπὶ νηὸν ἔρεψα,
ἢ εἰ δή ποτέ τοι κατὰ πίονα μηρί᾽ ἔκηα
ταύρων ἠδ᾽ αἰγῶν, τόδε μοι κρήηνον ἐέλδωρ·
τίσειαν Δαναοὶ ἐμὰ δάκρυα σοῖσι βέλεσσιν.[108]

Hear me, Apollo of the silver bow, you who guard Chryse,
and most sacred Cilla and rule over Tenedus with your might,
destroyer of mice, if ever I covered a charming temple with a roof for you,
or if I ever burnt fat thighs for you
of bulls or of goats, then fulfil for me this wish:
may the Danaans pay for my tears through your arrows.

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tals. West 1997:273 has argued that the absence of evidence in non-literary sources suggests that this is a purely literary motif. However, Parker 1998:107 convincingly takes an opposite stance, stressing that in these cases literary sources may be seen as a model for (or are at least not completely alien to) theological views in the *polis*: 'the underlying mentality is so well attested in sources of other types (dedications above all) that it can scarcely be doubted that past sacrifices were seen as grounding claims on divine favour, whether or not prayers were commonly uttered in just this form' (cf. Pulleyn 1997:2–3 for a similar view).

107 For example, in the Homeric epic Olympian gods are reluctant to let mortals perish who have given them many offerings, as when Zeus considers saving Hector (22.168–176) who is his φίλος (168) and has brought him many sacrifices (170–172). Although the text does not explicitly make a causal link between Hector's gifts and Zeus's unwillingness to let Hector die, such a connection is most definitely implied, and it would a very small step for a Greek reader to make the association. Similar passages: *Il.* 24.32–38; *Il.* 24.66–70; *Od.* 1.60–67.

108 *Il.* 1.37–42.

A significant characteristic of this prayer is the link that Chryses makes between his past favours towards Apollo and the hope/expectation that his wish will be fulfilled. This passage seems at first sight an example of the structure that appeals to the notion of divine reciprocity perhaps most urgently: *da-quia-dedi*.[109] But strictly speaking, the structure is not 'you should give, because of my previous offerings to you'. Instead, Chryses entreats Apollo to fulfil his wish, *if ever* (εἴ ποτε, 40) he built a temple or gave the god any pleasing gifts (40–41). This non-committal way of phrasing the request seems intended to transfer the interpretation of past exchanges to the god. Chryses seems to say, 'I am not sure whether you will take my previous gifts seriously, but if you do, you might consider doing something for me in return.' In other words, it is up to Apollo to decide whether the first human turn in the reciprocal relationship 'counts'; if not, the conditional clause in the request serves to give the god a 'way out'.

This way of phrasing a request reflects various aspects of the nature of the reciprocal bond between humans and gods. First of all, the material terms in which the notion of reciprocity in Greek religion has been discussed above may give the—wrong—impression that Greeks conceived of the reciprocity between themselves and their gods as a 'contractual' bond. As has often been observed, this view is an oversimplification; in Pulleyn's words it is 'to misunderstand the whole nature of reciprocity in Greece'.[110] Rather, the idea is that by giving gifts to divinities, Greek worshippers could create a relationship of reciprocal χάρις with gods, in which the gods *might* grant them the wishes they asked for in return.[111] In this sense, Socrates's characterisation is a sceptical misrepresentation of the mentality underlying religious actions and attitudes. Reciprocity in Greek religion is not a 'commercial contract', but the relationship of reciprocal χάρις is characterised by the voluntary exchange of gifts between the two partners. This type of relationship lends itself to more indirect ways of phrasing a request, as Chryses does.

It seems to me that precisely because of this framing of the relationship between the human and divine world as one of reciprocal χάρις (voluntary gift-giving), we should consider ὅσιος as expressing a very positive value (not 'what is acceptable' or 'neutral').

109 Pulleyn 1997:16–38 emphasises that this structure is unique to Greek religion and does not occur in religions of the Near East, but West 1997:273–274 quotes literary passages from oriental texts that prove the opposite.

110 Pulleyn 1997:12.

111 On religion as a relationship of reciprocal χάρις, cf. Festugière 1976:413–418; Yunis 1988:101–111; Pulleyn 1997, e.g. 4, 12–13, 37, 40–41, 93; Parker 1998:118–122, Mikalson 2010b:32–38, 42, 178–180.

The Greek view on the reciprocal relationship with the gods is the result of other aspects of their theology. The Greeks were well aware that there were fundamental asymmetries between themselves and the gods, at very least in power and in knowledge.[112] Thus, they could not truly conceive of this relationship on a *do-ut-des* principle.[113] Perhaps the Greeks saw a third asymmetry, in the respective contributions to the relationship. They may have thought that the gifts they presented to gods (animals, wine, other small commodities) could never equal what gods gave to men (health, property, life itself).[114]

It is in any case clear that they sometimes also took the opposite view. Humans had one very important gift to give to gods: not wine or animals, but

112 The Greek worshipper was definitely not so simple-minded as to conceive of his interactions with the god as a straightforward one-to-one relationship in which one good turn deserves another. From many sources, starting with the Homeric epic, we can tell that the believer suspected that theodicy should be really viewed on the larger scale of the divine master plan, knowledge of which is unavailable to humans, and that different types of supernatural forces had a share in the development of events. On mortals' perception of this relation, see e.g. A. *A.* 661–666; E. *Cyc.* 606–607; E. *Hec.* 488–491; E. *HF* 1393; E. *Heracl.* 934–935; S. *Ph.* 1316–1320; Hdt. 1.91. A recent discussion of the difficult question of the relation between μοῖρα and the gods in the literature is found in Versnel 2011:163–175. Moreover, the Greeks thought that gods might at times have conflicting interests between them, a point that is raised in Plato's *Euthyphro* (7b2–5, e1–5).

113 There was a definite tension in the theology underlying these religious expressions. Both Yunis 1988:53 and Parker 1998:120–125 have commented on it. These scholars see the use of the notion of reciprocity as an attempt to get closer to the gods; as a way for the Greeks of allowing themselves to believe that the gods are not completely 'unintelligible', 'unpredictable', 'unreachable'. As Parker argues: 'The language of *kharis* sustains, indeed creates, the fiction that the relation between human and god can be assimilated to that between human beings and so brought within a comprehensible pattern. The commercial view of *kharis* treats as a device to manipulate the gods what is more fundamentally a means of gaining access to them, of reaching the unreachable' (1998:120); 'The job of *kharis*, of gift and counter-gift, was to veil these differences, however temporarily and partially, to pretend that the gap between man and god was not too wide to be bridged, and to found that social relationship without which the gods and the world would be completely beyond our grasp' (1998:124–125). To borrow an expression used to describe the effects of narrative by Samuel Taylor Coleridge: Greek religion contained a 'willing suspension of disbelief', as it were, that made this conceptualisation work, despite its inherent tensions. In spite of the obvious asymmetries discussed above, there *was* a level on which the fiction was created that there was a more or less straightforward reciprocal exchange between humans and gods.

114 Festugière 1976:418, Parker 1998:122. For a more general anthropological approach to the incommensurable, unpayable debt that humans owe to gods, cf. Godulier 1996, 44–47, 258–259, 269.

τιμή. Many texts express the view that the status of a god is intrinsically bound up with whether he is honoured or not. Acknowledging a god and giving him the τιμή he deserves are two sides of the same coin. If humans do not wish to honour a particular god—and thus, sustain a reciprocal relationship with the divinity—this god may as well not be a god at all. Such a situation defies the entire purpose of being a Greek god. This is, in my perspective, where the evaluation ὅσιος comes in.

We can see this clearly when examining a comic example. In Aristophanes's *Birds*, two humans, Pisistratus and Euelpides, convince a group of birds that they can regain their sovereignty over men and gods. The intended feathery revolution against the divine world is settled by the birds urging Pisistratus to 'be ὅσιος and attack the gods'.[115] The comic reversal of 'normal' Greek piety on which the plot of *Birds* is based is nicely captured in this paradoxical exhortation: humans must acknowledge the birds, not the Olympians, as their true gods from now on.[116]

Being ὅσιος starts with recognising the status of gods as gods. This crucially implies accepting that one can share a relationship based on the productive mutual exchange of goods and favours, which is precisely what the passage in *Birds* is about. In the preceding discussion, Pisistratus has successfully negotiated the possibility of such a relationship with the birds. When they ask him, 'how will humans acknowledge us as gods' (καὶ πῶς ἡμᾶς νομιοῦσι θεοὺς ἄνθρωποι;),[117] Pisistratus establishes, in what seems to be a mild caricature of the notion of reciprocity in Greek religion, that the birds can indeed be gods because they are able to give men wealth, health and old age.[118] He also establishes that the exchange with these new gods will prove an especially good trade-off for humans because compared to the Olympians, birds do not need elaborate gifts.[119] Humans must be told to start sacrificing to the

115 Ar. *Av.* 631–632.

116 The exhortation to 'attack the gods' is clearly an overstatement, for the birds mean that humans should neglect their worship of the Olympic gods in favour of honouring birds.

117 Ar. *Av.* 571.

118 wealth: Ar. *Av.* 592–601; health: 602–614; old age: 605–610.

119 The ludicrous character of this part of the discussion in *Birds* is evident from some bizarre arguments Pisistratus makes at this point to support the idea that birds can give wealth, health and old age, like gods. Another parodic aspect of the passage is the fact that in this play gods (whether the Olympians or the birds) are conceptualised as actually *needing* the sacrifices as sustenance. Cf. Ar. *Av.* 187–190 (the Olympians are sure to pay a tax on the smoke rising from altars, for they will starve without it); Ar. *Av.* 889–894 (Pisistratus fears that one kite will snatch away the sacrificial meat so the other bird-gods have nothing to eat).

birds,[120] because in this way they can start performing their part in the new mutual relationship and recognise birds as gods. This, it is to be expected, will repair the lack of τιμή which the birds have suffered up until this point.[121]

The exhortation to Pisistratus to be ὅσιος should be interpreted against the background of this discussion. The birds are persuading Pisistratus to acknowledge them as gods, by initiating and then sustaining a long-term reciprocal relationship with these new gods, which will give them the τιμή that is due to them. This is only the crucial first step of ὁσιότης, though. Once this precondition has been met, there are continuous actions to perform. *Hosios & cognates* concern all those positive actions that humans perform to sustain and feed their relationship of reciprocal χάρις with the gods. Such rules relate, first of all, to the direct relationship with the gods: acknowledging gods, honouring them in sacrifice and prayer. In the majority of cases, *hosios & cognates* are about respecting a small collection of interhuman relationships that have the gods' special interest. We can now adjust our view of the 'schema' of this lexeme slightly, by saying that τὸ ὅσιον describes what humans must do to please the gods and give them the τιμή they deserve.[122]

5 The Appearance of a Mentality?

When did this mentality appear? It is striking that *hosios & cognates* rarely appear in the oldest texts we have, but is a frequent evaluation of human behaviour in fifth-century (and fourth-century) literary sources.[123] In Chapter 3, we will see that *eusebês & cognates* had a similar diachronic distribution. Jay-Robert argues that the attested lexical development of *hosios & cognates* reflects the gradual appearance of a new way of thinking after Homer.[124] Per-

120 Ar. *Av*. 561–565.

121 Ar. *Av*. 164; 542.

122 Blok 2011:237–238 has the same view: '*Hosiê*, then, refers to norms of human agency sustaining human reciprocity with the gods, in harmony with the cosmic order that guides both gods and humans. Prescribing conduct that creates *charis* between both parties in the covenant, *hosiê* orders human life by rules, which for the sake of clarity can be distinguished into two components: 1) rules of conduct of humans towards the gods … 2) Rules of conduct among humans valued particularly by the gods and guarded by them'.

123 Cf. section 1.2 in this chapter.

124 According to Jay-Robert, the attested diachronic distribution of *hosios & cognates* should be explained in terms of a *mentality shift*. In her view, the scarcity of occurrences of ὁσίη in Homer indicates that obeying a 'divine' law did not accord with the ideas of the

haps the way of thinking that *hosios & cognates* articulated was alien to or unpopular in early Greek thought. We will test this hypothesis by investigating the usage of other lexemes somehow related to the interaction with the divine world in our earliest texts.

There was no dedicated term to express the attitude of humans towards the gods in epic. One group of lexemes that articulates the attitudes and feelings of humans towards the immortals (though not exclusively) is found in the vocabulary of fear and respect, in the verbs ἅζομαι, αἰδεῖσθαι and σέβεσθαι.[125] Another group of terms connects religiosity and morality in their expression of divine justice. In this section, I will focus on this latter group and examine the earliest usages of the lexemes θέμις and δίκη.[126]

In Homer, θέμις describes 'what is customary, normal' in general or with respect to a particular group. For example, Eumaeus says it is the way of a woman to cry (θέμις γυναικός) when her husband dies far away,[127] and Agamemnon assures Achilles that he did not sleep with Briseis, even though that is θέμις ἀνθρώπων.[128] But Homeric θέμις implies no strict separation between 'how humans customarily do things' and 'how it should be': the description often entails a prescription. For example, Agamemnon tells Odysseus in the underworld that he was killed by his own son, but Odysseus can expect a welcoming embrace from his child instead, 'which is θέμις' (ἣ θέμις ἐστίν).[129] The phrase means more than 'customary': Agamemnon's point is clearly that this is 'as it should be'.[130]

θέμις is a moral evaluation from its earliest occurrences. The sense of morality θέμις expresses is connected to the idea of order in the natural and political sphere.[131] Moreover, θέμις often has an explicit religious element. We can see

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time: people preferred to submit to the natural order of θέμις (28). The increasing amount of attestations of the noun ὁσίη and especially the appearance of the adjective ὅσιος at the end of the archaic period must be seen as a reflection of the developing idea that humans should obey the Olympians. Bruit-Zaidman 2001:87–118 gave an explanation for the introduction of *eusebês & cognates* at the end of the fifth century that much resembles Jay-Robert's view, explaining it in terms of a mentality shift, too.

125 Bruit-Zaidman 2001:97.

126 The usages of *hosios & cognates* vs. *dikaios and cognates* in the fifth century is the topic of Chapter 4.

127 *Od.* 14.130.

128 *Il.* 9.134. Similarly *Il.* 9.276, *Il.* 19.177 (θέμις ἤτ' ἀνδρῶν ἤτε γυναικῶν). Another example in which θέμις refers to 'what is customary, normal' is h.*Ap.* 541.

129 *Od.* 11.451.

130 Rudhardt 1999:20–21.

131 Stafford 1997:87–88, Jay-Robert 2009:15–23.

this when looking at the genealogical background provided in archaic myth. As was mentioned, Θέμις herself is a goddess,[132] and an important one, for there is a close relationship between Zeus, Themis and Dikê. In the *Homeric Hymn to Zeus*, the king of the gods has intense discussions with Themis 'sitting next to him, leaning close'.[133] In the *Theogony* it is explained that Themis, the child of Gaea and Uranus,[134] became Zeus's second wife and gave birth to the Seasons (Ὧραι), the Fates (Μοῖραι), Justice (Δίκη), Peace (Εἰρήνη) and Good Order (Εὐνομία).[135] Themis's children clearly show her to be a divine principle of natural and political order,[136] a principle humans and gods alike need to obey.[137] θέμις (lower case) is also often connected to Zeus and δίκη, a natural continuation of the mythological family relationships described above. θέμις and θέμιστες are said to be of or from Zeus.[138] Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail below, in the archaic literature δίκη and θέμις sometimes express similar meanings, and regularly appear in close conjunction in the same expression.[139]

Sometimes θέμις is used in a moral sense, when characters support their argument for a *proposed* course of action by saying it is θέμις. In these examples, the argument is sometimes supported by an explicit mention of the gods. This is the case when Eumaeus says, 'it would not be θέμις for me (μοι) *not* to honour a guest … because all guests and beggars are from Zeus'.[140] The swineherd thinks he should respect guests because they are under the special protection of Zeus. In a similar example, Aeolus tells Odysseus, 'it would not be θέμις for me (μοι) to take care for or set a man on his way who is hated by the blessed gods' (i.e. considering that *they* thwarted your attempts to sail home).[141] In this example, οὐ θέμις seems to express the idea that humans should not (nor endeavour to) appropriate the position of a god by trying to overturn their decisions.

Thus, θέμις in Homer and Hesiod sometimes shares key characteristics with *hosios & cognates*, being evaluations of human conduct that is authorised by

132 e.g. *Il.* 15.87, Hes. *Th.* 16. *h.Ap.* 94, 124, *h.Ven.* 94.

133 *h.Hom.* 23.2.

134 Hes. *Th.* 135.

135 Hes. *Th.* 901–906.

136 Stafford 1997:87–88.

137 e.g. *Il.* 5.761, Hes. *Sc.* 447.

138 *Il.* 1.238–239: θέμιστας | πρὸς Διὸς, *Il.* 2.205–206: δῶκε Κρόνου πάϊς … | σκῆπτρον τ'ἠδὲ θέμιστας, *Il.* 9.98–99: Ζεὺς ἐγγυάλιξε | σκῆπτρον τ'ἠδὲ θέμιστας, *Od.* 16.403: Διὸς μεγάλοιο θέμιστες, Hes. *Sc.* 22: Διόθεν θέμις.

139 This remark implies a moral reading of δίκη in Homer and Hesiod (*contra*, for example Gagarin 1973, 1974). I will argue for such an interpretation of δίκη below, section 5.

140 *Od.* 14.56–58. Other examples of θέμις relating to hospitality: *Il.* 11.779, *Od.* 9.268, *Od.* 24.286.

141 *Od.* 10.73–74. For a similar example cf. Thgn. 1.687.

gods. We will discuss two examples of this usage of θέμις in more detail. First of all, Hesiod explained that the silver race of people

> παυρίδιον ζώεσκον ἐπὶ χρόνον, ἄλγε’ ἔχοντες
> ἀφραδίῃς· ὕβριν γὰρ ἀτάσθαλον οὐκ ἐδύναντο
> ἀλλήλων ἀπέχειν, οὐδ’ ἀθανάτους θεραπεύειν
> ἤθελον οὐδ’ ἔρδειν μακάρων ἱεροῖς ἐπὶ βωμοῖς,
> ᾗ *θέμις* ἀνθρώποις κατὰ ἤθεα. τοὺς μὲν ἔπειτα
> Ζεὺς Κρονίδης ἔκρυψε χολούμενος, οὕνεκα τιμὰς
> οὐκ ἔδιδον μακάρεσσι θεοῖς οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν.[142]

> lived only for a short time, suffering the pains of foolishness.
> For they could not keep themselves from committing wicked outrage
> against one another, and they did not want to worship the gods
> and offer sacrifice for the blessed ones on holy altars,
> which is *themis* for humans, each according to local custom.
> In time, Zeus, son of Cronus, buried them in anger, because
> they denied the blessed gods on Mount Olympus their due honours.

In this passage, the worship of gods (Hes. *Op.* 135–136) is presented as θέμις ἀνθρώποις ‘customary for humans’ (137). But this is also, clearly, the *appropriate* activity. Humans should maintain their part of the relationship with the gods by offering them τιμή through sacrifice. As the narrator tells us, the silver race’s neglect of the gods caused Zeus to become angry, and he destroyed their race accordingly (138) ‘because they denied the blessed gods their dues’ (τιμάς, 138).[143]

Another relevant case is Homer’s evaluation of the Cyclops Polyphemus in *Odyssey* 9. About the Cyclopes in general and Polyphemus in particular it is said that they do not have θέμιστες and are ἀθέμιστοι or ἀθεμίστιοι.[144] There often seems to be no moral content to the plural noun θέμιστες, when this term refers to ‘decrees, decisions’ or ‘laws’.[145] More specifically, θέμιστες may

142 Hes. *Op.* 133–139.

143 The distributive κατὰ ἤθεα ‘each according to local customs’ is interesting. We have see above (section 1.7) that ὅσιον and ὁσία very often describe not *the fact that* humans honour gods in sacrifice, but the who, what, where, when and how of their cultic endeavours, i.e. their specific, local customs.

144 *Od.* 9.106, 112, 189, 428.

145 e.g. *Il.* 9.156, *Il.* 9.298. The morality may be expressed by additional expressions. Thus, corrupt people make decisions (θέμιστες) with ‘crooked justice’ (σκολιῇς δίκῃς, Hes. *Op.*

be seen as those decisions that people take when assembling (in the *agora*): θέμις represents the order that arises when the people come together and solve matters through debate.[146] It is explained that the Cyclopes do not convene; they have neither ἀγοραί nor θέμιστες (*Od.* 9.112), but each man governs his own wife and children. In this way, the Cyclopes are literally ἀθέμιτοι or ἀθεμίστιοι,[147] but this is at least an *indirect* negative evaluation, because it marks them out as uncivilised.

But in some cases the description that someone 'knows about θέμιστες (or not)' seems to be a positive or negative evaluation of someone's moral character. For example, when it is said about Nereus that 'he does not forget θέμιστες but he knows τὰ δίκαια',[148] θέμιστες itself seems to be the same as 'just decisions' and to be equal to δίκη. The description of Polyphemus as ἀθεμίστιος and not possessing θέμιστες likewise seems partly a negative evaluation of his character, as we infer from the context in which these terms appear. Odysseus introduces Polyphemus as a 'monstrous man' (ἀνὴρ … πελώριος, 9.187), 'versed in lawlessness' (ἀθεμίστια ᾔδη, 9.189). Furthermore, Odysseus explains that when he and his comrades approached the cave, he already thought the Cyclops would be 'savage' (ἄγριον) and 'not knowing δίκας or θέμιστας' (9.215). At the end of the story, he again speaks about Polyphemus as a 'monster, skilled in lawlessness' (πέλωρ, ἀθεμίστια εἰδώς, 9.428). The main cause for the consistently negative evaluation of Polyphemus is, of course, his transgressions against ξενία. These transgressions are explicitly framed as religious offenses.[149] In Homer's Cyclopeia, Polyphemus's 'lack of θέμις (and δίκη)' was apparently an appropriate way of evaluating his failure to honour this important interhuman relationship that was sanctioned by the gods.

Summarising the above, in Homer and Hesiod the term θέμις can mean 'usage' or 'custom' but often seems to express a moral judgment of human actions that includes the imagined perspective of the gods. We have seen that this term evaluated whether humans honour the gods in cultic service (in a specific way), know their place with respect to the gods, and honour

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221); but a good king makes them with 'straight justice' (ἰθείῃσι δίκῃσιν, Hes. *Th.* 85–86); Zeus is angry when men make 'crooked decisions' (σκολιὰς θέμιστας, Hom. *Il.* 16.387).

146 For example in Homer, Themis is the goddess that calls together the meeting of the Olympians (*Il.* 20.4) but also of humans (*Od.* 2.68); and θέμις is characteristic of the *agora* (*Il.* 11.807).

147 But note that the text says, at the same time, that each of the males θεμιστεύει 'declares law and right' over his own wife and children (*Od.* 9.114).

148 Hes. *Th.* 235–236. Cp. Thgn. 1.1134–1150, Archil. fr. 177 l. 3.

149 e.g. *Od.* 9.477–479.

the relationships among themselves, like those between parents and children and between guests and hosts.

The same case can be made for δίκη. According to the main dictionaries, δίκη is used in the sense of 'custom, characteristic'[150] and 'right, justice' from Homer onwards (while acquiring more specific senses relating to a court of law later).[151] Despite this characterisation, it should be noted there is an academic debate on whether δίκη in Homer, Hesiod and other archaic literature had a moral dimension at all.[152] One reason why this question has received so much scholarly attention is because it plays a role in larger discussions on theodicy in Greek religion.[153] A single example may illustrate the difficulty of the debate

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150 This usage does not occur in the *Iliad*. In the *Odyssey*, δίκη, like θέμις, is used in the sense of 'characteristic, normal way of acting'. Thus, it is 'the way of slaves' (δμώων δίκη) to be afraid when young masters rule over them and to give a small gift (*Od.* 14.59–61) and the 'way of old men' (δίκη γερόντων) to sleep softly after they have bathed and eaten (*Od.* 24.254–255). Other examples of this usage in the *Odyssey*: 4.691, 11.218, 19.43, 19.168. This usage sometimes occurs elsewhere, for example, it is the 'way of seafearers' (δίκη ἀνδρῶν ἀλφηστάων) to long for food immediately when they come to land after a troublesome sea journey (*h.Ap.* 458–461). The usage of δίκη in these examples seems to be more descriptive than prescriptive: I agree with Gagarin 1973:83 on this point, though not with the rest of his article, as I will discuss below.

151 cf. e.g. s.v. δίκη IV 1–3.

152 A number of scholars deny that δίκη in Homer and Hesiod is a moral term. For example, Gagarin maintained that δίκη refers to 'a process for the peaceful settlement of disputes' (1973:81) but acquires the abstract sense of justice only much later (1973 and 1974); and Nelson 1996:30 argued that '*dikē* is not, for Hesiod, a moral rather than a practical question'. Dickie 1978:91 provides a survey of earlier similar opinions expressed by Latte 1946:65, Pearson 1962:46, Havelock 1969:51, Rodgers 1971. In contrast, Dickie 1978 defended a moral sense of δίκη from the *Iliad* onwards, as we will see in the main text below; and according to Lloyd-Jones 1987:310, in Homer 'the word δίκη connotes a universal order that the gods maintain: this order, though it is by no means moral in the sense in which Christianity believes in a moral order, cannot be said to be without a moral element.'

153 The question of the morality of Homeric δίκη is part of a larger discussion on whether the Homeric gods are just. Influential scholars who answered that question in the negative were Dodds and Adkins. The former claimed, for example, 'I find no indication in the *Iliad* that Zeus is concerned with justice as such' (Dodds 1963 [1951]:32); while the latter held that 'the gods are portrayed generally in the Greek poems as far from just' (Adkins 1960:62). Reacting to these scholars, Lloyd-Jones's seminal monograph *The Justice of Zeus* is the most famous defence of the idea that the (Homeric) gods are concerned with justice (Lloyd-Jones 1983 [1971]). One aspect of the argumentation in this debate is an investigation of the usage of the term δίκη. Thus, according to Gagarin 1973:81: 'The search for a morality in Homer and Hesiod does not depend entirely upon the meaning of δίκη,

about δίκη, as well as its part in debates about whether the Greek gods were just. In the *Odyssey* the loud breathing of Trojan horses under attack by Patroclus is compared to a storm:

ὡς δ' ὑπὸ λαίλαπι πᾶσα κελαινὴ βέβριθε χθὼν
ἤματ' ὀπωρινῷ ὅτε λαβρότατον χέει ὕδωρ
Ζεύς, ὅτε δή ῥ' ἄνδρεσσι κοτεσσάμενος χαλεπήνῃ,
οἳ βίῃ εἰν ἀγορῇ σκολιὰς κρίνωσι θέμιστας,
ἐκ δὲ ***δίκην*** ἐλάσωσι θεῶν ὄπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες·[154]

as when the whole black earth is weighed down by a furious storm
on a late summer day on which Zeus sends pouring rain
in a rage, angry at men
who make crooked decisions in the *agora* with force,
they drive *dikê* out, not taking heed of the vengeance of the gods.

In this passage, Gagarin takes δίκη to refer to a process of 'peaceful arbitration'. This translation reflects Gagarin's general interpretation of archaic δίκη as the process whereby two parties settle a dispute through debating (or the outcome of that process).[155] Gagarin argues, correctly, that there is no evidence in this passage itself that δίκη should mean 'abstract justice'.[156] We may assume that Zeus is angry because humans have given up on peaceful ways to settle disagreements and act with violence (βίῃ, 387) instead, rather than because they are 'unjust'. This view is difficult to disprove, but so is the opposite view. Dickie argued for a moral interpretation of these lines, but mainly on the basis of the more clearly moral context of a Hesiodic passage that is often compared to it;[157] and Lloyd-Jones defended a moral reading of δίκη, also not arguing with evidence in the passage itself, but seeing it as 'perfectly

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but it is the single most important word in this area, and I believe that a satisfactory understanding of its meaning and function in these two poets is a necessary prerequisite for any discussion of early Greek morality.'

154 *Il.* 16.384–388. This passage has been seen as an interpolation based on a very similar passage in Hesiod, *Op.* 218–224. For references about the debate cf. Lloyd-Jones 1983 [1971]:186 n. 26. Lloyd-Jones has defended the authenticity of these lines.

155 Gagarin 1973, 1974.

156 Gagarin 1973:86.

157 Dickie 1978:98. In Hes. *Op.* 218–224, there is a tumult when Δίκη is being dragged to where corrupt ('gift-devouring', δωροφάγοι, 221) men drag her, and make judgments (κρίνωσι θέμιστας, 221) with crooked δίκῃ (221).

consistent with the theology of the *Iliad* as a whole'.[158] Indeed, in this passage as well as in other passages, it is difficult to see whether δίκη has a moral dimension.

Instead of going into the details of this debate, we will focus on four selected passages in Homer and Hesiod in which δίκη seems quite clearly employed as a moral evaluation of behaviour. Moreover, in these cases the targeted behaviour is evaluated from the imagined perspective of the gods. For example, the swineherd Eumaeus complains to Odysseus

ἔσθιε νῦν, ὦ ξεῖνε, τά τε δμώεσσι πάρεστι,
χοίρε'· ἀτὰρ σιάλους γε σύας μνηστῆρες ἔδουσιν,
οὐκ ὄπιδα φρονέοντες ἐνὶ φρεσὶν οὐδ' ἐλεητύν
οὐ μὲν σχέτλια ἔργα θεοὶ μάκαρες φιλέουσιν,
ἀλλὰ ***δίκην*** τίουσι καὶ αἴσιμα ἔργ' ἀνθρώπων.[159]

Eat now, stranger, what is at hand for slaves,
young pigs, but the fat hogs and sows the suitors eat,
who do not pay heed to the vengeance of the gods and have no compassion,[160]
for the blessed gods do not love wicked deeds
but they honour *dikê* and fitting deeds.

As Dickie rightly pointed out, first of all the δίκη which the gods honour is equated to αἴσιμα ἔργα, a moral commendation in Homer;[161] and contrasted with σχέτλια ἔργα, a moral disqualification, which in Homer denotes 'wicked, morally corrupt deeds'.[162] Eumaeus makes a further point that even enemies to whom Zeus has given booty are overcome by fear of the gods' vengeance when they are sailing home (85–88). But the suitors are not:

οἵδε δέ τοι ἴσασι, θεοῦ δέ τιν' ἔκλυον αὐδήν,
κείνου λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον, ὅ τ' οὐκ ἐθέλουσι ***δικαίως***

158 Lloyd-Jones 1983 [1971]:6.

159 *Od.* 14.80–84.

160 The word ὄπις is generally construed with θεῶν in Homer (e.g. *Il.* 16.388 quoted in the main text above, *Od.* 20.215, 21.28), and seems to refer to the 'vengeance *of the gods*' on its own here; the word ἐλεητύν is less likely to have been construed as such (i.e. as compassion *of the gods*) by the ancient audience. Merry 1901, ad loc.

161 e.g. *Od.* 17.363 (ἐναίσιμος).

162 e.g. *Od.* 9.295, *Od.* 22.413–415.

μνᾶσθαι οὐδὲ νέεσθαι ἐπὶ σφέτερ', ἀλλὰ ἕκηλοι
κτήματα δαρδάπτουσιν ὑπέρβιον, οὐδ' ἔπι φειδώ.[163]

But they know, they heard some voice of a god,
of his mournful death, as they show by the fact they do not want
to woo *dikaiôs* and return to their own houses, but at their ease
they devour the possessions in a presumptuous way, and there is no sparing.

This passage strongly suggests that Eumaeus thinks the suitors pursue Penelope 'not δικαίως' (90) *because* they sit around Odysseus's house and eat his food in a presumptuous manner (ὑπέρβιον, 92). They are convinced that Odysseus is dead and will not return to punish them (apparently, so Eumaeus infers from their actions, 88–89). But the suitors are wrong, in Eumaeus's eyes, in also failing to take into account the punishment of the gods (82–84). The term ὑπέρβιος is used as a negative moral evaluation in the Homeric epic, connected to ὕβρις.[164] Thus, a moral interpretation of δίκαιος is again imposed by the context, while we have no indication that these terms have anything to do with a process of arbitration and settlement.[165] We may summarise that, according to this passage, the suitors do not act along the lines of δίκη (84) and are not δίκαιοι (90) because they do not know their place with respect to other humans and gods alike. These self-invited guests transgress the laws of ξενία by feasting at the expense of a man they presume to be dead, and they are wrong to ignore the possibility of a divine punishment.

Furthermore, when Odysseus washes ashore on Ithaca but does not recognise that he is home, he exclaims:

ὤ μοι ἐγώ, τέων αὖτε βροτῶν ἐς γαῖαν ἱκάνω;
ἦ ῥ' οἵ γ' ὑβρισταί τε καὶ ἄγριοι οὐδὲ *δίκαιοι*,
ἦε φιλόξεινοι καί σφιν νόος ἐστὶ θεουδής;[166]

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163 *Od.* 14.89–92.

164 As Dickie 1978:97 n. 21 points out, the adjective ὑπέρβιος is connected to ὕβρις at *Od.* 1.368, 4.321, 16.410.

165 Dickie 1978:96–98. Gagarin 1973:86 does not provide a satisfactory alternative solution for this passage, merely stipulating that 'δίκη is clearly a valuable possession in itself, and its possession is a benefit to men; but there is no evidence to indicate that we should extend the meaning of δίκη to something approaching "abstract justice" or even "lawful behaviour". The meaning "legal process" is all that the context requires.'

166 *Od.* 13.200–202.

Poor me, to the land of what mortals have I come now?
Are they insolent and savage and not *dikaioi*
or do they love strangers and do they have a god-fearing mind?

A moral interpretation of οὐδε δίκαιοι in 201 is strongly suggested by the evaluations in the immediate context. The qualification οὐ δίκαιος is placed on one line with ἄγριος and ὑβριστής, both descriptions of amoral behaviour in Homer.[167] By contrast, we infer that just people would love guests and suppliants (be φιλόξεινοι, 202) and fear gods (have a θεουδὴς νόος, 202) instead.[168] In the ironic lines that follow (209–214), the disqualification οὐ δίκαιος is connected to a specific guest-host relationship, that between Odysseus and the Phaeacans.[169]

ὢ πόποι, οὐκ ἄρα πάντα νοήμονες οὐδὲ ***δίκαιοι***
ἦσαν Φαιήκων ἡγήτορες ἠδὲ μέδοντες,
οἵ μ' εἰς ἄλλην γαῖαν ἀπήγαγον· ἦ τέ μ' ἔφαντο
ἄξειν εἰς Ἰθάκην εὐδείελον, οὐδ' ἐτέλεσσαν.
Ζεύς σφεας τείσαιτο Ἱκετήσιος, ὅς τε καὶ ἄλλους
ἀνθρώπους ἐφορᾷ καὶ τείνυται, ὅς τις ἁμάρτῃ.[170]

how awful, it turned out that they were not wholly thoughtful nor *dikaioi*,
the leaders and rulers of the Phaeacans,
who carried me off to a different land. Truly they told me
that they would lead me to sunny Ithaca, but they did not fulfil their promise.
May Zeus of the Suppliant punish them, who also
looks upon other men and punishes the one who transgresses.

According to Odysseus, the Phaeacans betrayed their suppliant and guest by not sending him home, even though they had promised to do so. Zeus of the Suppliant, who oversees this relationship, should punish them accordingly.[171]

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167 LSJ s.v. ἄγριος II 1, e.g. *Il.* 8.96, *Od.* 1.199; LSJ s.v. ὑβριστής 1, e.g. *Il.* 13.633, *Od.* 6.120.

168 Note that lines 201–202 are a formula, occurring on three other occasions (in descriptions) when Odysseus arrives at an unknown place: *Od.* 6.120, 8.575, 9.175.

169 The evaluation δίκαιος is connected to the treatment of guests elsewhere, in e.g. *Od.* 18.414, *Od.* 20.322.

170 *Od.* 13.209–214.

171 Compare *Od.* 3.133, where it is said that Zeus obstructed the return journey of the Argives because 'not all of them were δίκαιος'.

This is the context in which the Phaeacans are referred to as 'not δίκαιοι (209)'. In this passage, δίκη and δίκαιος again seem to function in the sphere of moral evaluation of interhuman conduct supervised by Zeus.

Two similar, relevant passages appear in Hesiod's *Works and Days*. In an exposition of morally inappropriate conduct that is displeasing to gods, human misconduct towards a suppliant (ἱκέτης, 327), a guest (ξεῖνος, 327), a brother (by sleeping with his wife, 328–329) and a father (by insulting him with harsh words, 331–332) are discussed together, as if they form a logical and coherent group of behavioural patterns.[172] If someone (in this case, Perses) behaves badly in any of these relationships, Zeus will be angry and will punish him for his unjust deeds (ἔργων ἀδίκων, 333–334). This inventory of 'bad behaviour' is contrasted to a guideline for proper religious behaviour: one should sacrifice to the gods 'purely' and pour them out libations (336–338). The juxtaposition of this religious advice with the previous ἔργα ἄδικα reinforces the presentation of those offences as religious crimes. This passage suggests that not only the divine evaluation of interhuman moral issues, but also the grouping together of these behavioural patterns as part of one and the same concept of piety were prominent ideas in the community in which *Works and Days* was written, and had perhaps been part and parcel of Greek thought for a longer time.

A second Hesiodic passage, the so-called 'sermon on δίκη',[173] starts with the injunction to Perses to observe justice (δίκη, 213) and not to advance ὕβρις (213). The sermon follows the famous fable of the hawk and the nightingale and the story of the five races of men, which ends with the sketch of a grim future scenario for the present race. This is the iron race, which will be destroyed by Zeus when they hit a moral low point. Hesiod's vision, in which ὕβρις triumphs over δίκη (190–192), is of a society experiencing the breakdown of proper interactions between guest and host (183), friends (183), brothers (184), and parents and children (182, 185–189), of peace (189) and of the sanctity of oaths (190). The injunction to Perses to change his ways now (213), which takes up the opposition of ὕβρις and δίκη, functions against the implicit background of this apocalyptic moral bankruptcy. In this passage again, δίκη is an ethical guideline describing relations among humans, which must be followed in order to avoid the anger of the gods.

172 The passage occurs immediately after the advice not to 'seize wealth'. It has just been argued that the gods make a man who seizes wealth powerless and make his house small (ῥεῖα δέ μιν μαυροῦσι θεοί, μινύθουσι δὲ οἶκον | ἀνέρι τῷ, 325–326). This advice is followed by a description of other things the gods do not like.

173 Hes. *Op.* 213–285, e.g. Athanassakis 2004 [1983], ad loc., Verdenius 1985, ad loc.

To summarize the above, we have examined whether the mentality which *hosios & cognates* express may have been unpopular or nonexistent in the pre-classical period. We may conclude that this is not the case because other lexemes clearly express this way of thinking. In the examples given, θέμις, δίκη and δίκαιος target human behaviour towards the gods directly and/or towards other humans in those relationships watched over by the gods. These moral evaluations are closely linked to the perceived opinion of Zeus and other divinities. It seems, then, that θέμις, δίκη and δίκαιος articulate the meaning that ὁσία and ὅσιος express in their rare pre-classical occurrences and in the classical period. The strongly increased popularity of *hosios & cognates* does not seem to reflect the gradual appearance of a new way of thinking after Homer.

6 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to provide an initial characterisation of the meaning of *hosios & cognates* by investigating the inventory of usages and the internal organisation of the semantic network of these lexemes as well as the cultural frame(s) to which they belong.

In our analysis of different aspects of the distribution of *hosios & cognates*, we discovered that a person was considered ὅσιος if he/she respected the gods by acknowledging them as gods, knew his/her place with respect to them and honoured them in ritual practice. But crucially, in order to be considered ὅσιος, a person also had to honour those relationships that the gods were especially interested in, and behave well towards parents, children, spouses, brothers, sisters, guests, hosts, suppliants, and the dead.

By studying, in addition, possible prototypical usages of *hosios & cognates*, we were able to answer our question concerning the evaluative nature (religious or ethical?) of these lexemes. It was argued that *hosios* & *cognates* are primarily religious, or connect a religious and an ethical element. We also looked at where to place ὅσιος with positive argumentative orientation on an evaluative scale. In some examples, an interpretation of ὅσιος as expressing praise seems to be demanded by the textual context. However, the most pressing reason for taking ὅσιος as articulating a positive value (not 'what is neutral' or 'acceptable') emerges from an investigation of the cultural frame to which this value is connected. This is the frame of exchange between gods and men. The relationship between gods and men was conceptualised in the literature as a bond of reciprocal χάρις, characterized by the voluntary exchange of gifts. We may say that ὁσιότης refers to everything that humans do to give χάρις to gods, thereby pleasing them and giving them τιμή. To accomplish this, humans

should not only honour the relationship with the gods themselves, but also those relationships between humans in which the gods take a special interest. To 'do ὅσια', therefore, is to do something positive.

The diachronic distribution of *hosios & cognates* was investigated in greater detail next. The sharply increased usage of *hosios & cognates* after the archaic period gives rise to speculation: should we perhaps assume that the mentality articulated by *hosios & cognates* was alien to (or unpopular in) pre-classical Greek thought? After investigating the archaic usage of two semantically related lexemes, θέμις and δίκη, we answered this question in the negative. This mentality was already attested to in Homer and Hesiod, but articulated through these other lexemes (and possibly others). The next question to ask is if we can pinpoint any *other* reason for the observed lexical development of the adjective ὅσιος (and the introduction of *eusebês & cognates*). We will return to this question at the end of Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 3

ὅσιος vs. εὐσεβής

The differences in meaning and usage between *hosios, eusebês* and their cognates are especially difficult to capture. These two sets of lexemes often seem to be employed in highly comparable contexts, evaluating similar, or the same, religious actions and attitudes. Some scholars have expressed an opinion on the distinction in meaning between the two, others view them as synonyms. This chapter is a contrastive examination of the semantics of *eusebês & cognates* and *hosios & cognates*. The investigation has two main goals. The first is to determine the semantic / pragmatic relationship between these two terms. The second is to use the contrastive approach to further elucidate the semantics of *hosios & cognates*. We will highlight specific semantic qualities of *hosios & cognates* that have not previously been noted, and reinvestigate the usage of ὅσιος for objects and its supposed meanings 'profane' and 'religiously neutral'.

1 Actions vs. Attitudes?

The term εὐσέβεια is generally translated as 'piety'.[1] According to Motte, this lexeme gives the most complete expression of the notion of Greek piety in the classical period.[2]

The noun εὐσέβεια is derived from the root *seb-*. According to Rudhardt, σέβειν (and σέβεσθαι) generally refer to showing honour or expressing deference through visible acts.[3] All conduct inspired by σέβας proceeds from a complex feeling of respect. Fear, admiration and love underlie and comple-

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1 Burkert 1985:273; Motte 1986:153, 157; Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:12; Rudhardt 2008:69; Bruit-Zaidman 2001:11; Frisk 1970:686; Chantraine 1968–1980:992; Beekes 2010:1315. Note that Mikalson 2010b prefers the translation 'properly respectful' (for example on p. 9).

2 Motte 1986:157.

3 Unlike ὅσιος, this term has a generally accepted etymology, which may help us understand its semantics better. The Greek verb σοβέω 'to scare away, chase away' is an old causative verb from the root of σέβομαι. This may indicate that σέβομαι originally meant 'to run away, to flee' *vel sim.* (compare: φοβέω/φοβοῦμαι). The verb σέβομαι is traditionally compared with Skt. *tyajati* 'to desert, leave alone, abandon' from an Indo-European root *tiegʷ- 'leave alone, give

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ment this sentiment.[4] We can see this multifaceted nature of *seb-* words in the earliest, Homeric occurrences. A Homeric stock phrase is σέβας μ'ἔχει εἰσορόωντα 'a feeling of σέβας takes hold of me as I behold'.[5] Odysseus says it when viewing a group of dancers, as does Helena when she sees Telemachus and is struck by how much he resembles his father.[6] Although the awe-inspiring object does not need to have anything to do with religion, the Homeric sentiment of σέβας is very often linked to an experience of the divine.[7] Telemachus, awe-struck by Menelaus's palace, says that Zeus must live in similar quarters; Odysseus, captivated by σέβας at Nausicaa's appearance and beauty, speculates that she might be the goddess Artemis.[8] σέβας is a feeling or an attitude which potentially also moves one to *act*. Achilles is told he should experience a feeling of σέβας which should induce him to start fighting; and when people feel respect (σέβεσθαι), they refrain from killing someone or stripping them of their weapons.[9] The feeling of σέβας may strike humans and gods alike.[10]

After Homer, σέβειν, σέβεσθαι and τὸ σέβας occur regularly in a wide range of religious and non-religious applications. The object of awe can be a god, a spouse, a suppliant or the dead, but also a river, animal, object, an athlete in the competition, prosperous friends or the power that wealth brings, to

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up' (Frisk 1970:686–687, referring to Brugmann 1906:301ff. and Pokorny 1949–1959: 1086). The same etymology is given by Chantraine 1968–1980:992–993 and Beekes 2010: 1315–1316. Burkert 1985:272 notes that 'in the most various languages and cultures the expressions for dealing with the divine are taken from the word-field fear.' Thus, the etymology of this root lies in the semantic field of fear. Note that in the first instances of the root *seb-*, occurring in Homer and the Homeric Hymns in the verb σέβεσθαι and the noun τὸ σέβας, the notions of reverence and admiration (perhaps, as resulting from fear) seem more prominent than danger and flight (Burkert 1985:272).

4 Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:16, similarly Motte 1986:153: 'les mots de la racine **seb* présentent ... une plus grande unité ... tous gravitent autour d'une notion de vénération, de crainte respectueuse inspirant la conduite.' Rudhardt on τὸ σέβας, σέβειν and εὐσέβεια: 1992 [1958]:12–17, 2008:69–99.

5 τὸ σέβας has both an objective and a subjective sense: it is the object that deserves respect and the feeling that brings a person to express respect (Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:17, 2008:72).

6 *Od.* 8.384, 4.142.

7 Rudhardt 2008:70.

8 *Od.* 4.75, 6.161.

9 *Il.* 18.178; 6.167; 6.417.

10 Humans and gods experienced σέβας when seeing the narcissus that Gaea let spring forth (*h.Cer.* 10); and when Athena was born from the head of Zeus, a σέβας seized all the gods (σέβας ἔχε πάντας ὁρῶντας ἀθανάτους, *h.Hom.* 28.6).

name but a few examples.[11] Gods are also said to σέβειν.[12] In contrast, the later, post-Homeric derivations εὐσεβ-, δυσσεβ- and ἀσεβ- (nouns, adjectives and verbs) seem focused on attitudes of *religious* awe or fear and relate to the sphere of piety. The same is true for the less frequently occurring adjectives θεοσεβής, εὔσεπτος and ἄσεπτος. Therefore, the contrastive analysis in this chapter is aimed at these lexemes because they express an evaluation of a religious action or attitude and are thus in clear competition with *hosios & cognates*. I will refer to this group of lexemes as *eusebês & cognates*.

Opinions differ on the semantics of *eusebês & cognates* as opposed to the semantics of *hosios & cognates*. According to some, the two are synonyms.[13] This suggestion is understandable given that the types of actions, attitudes and objects that are sometimes evaluated in terms of *hosios & cognates* are also regularly discussed in terms of εὐσέβεια.[14] The two terms often even describe the same behaviour of the same literary character(s)/persons in the same text.[15] However, scholars have argued that true synonymy in natural language is rare.[16] It is therefore unlikely that ὅσιος and εὐσεβής are synonymous in all respects.

Others have argued that εὐσεβής and ὅσιος have a different semantic scope. Jeanmaire, building on the work by Van der Valk, argued that εὐσέβεια is a disposition that humans can have. One can *be* εὐσεβής because of one's nature or character, while people can only *become* ὅσιος after performing the actions necessary to acquit themselves of all their obligations towards the gods.[17] According to Mikalson, classicists 'seriously overstate the synonymy [between ὅσιος and εὐσεβής]'.[18] In his view, εὐσέβεια refers to a respectful attitude, while ὁσιότης refers to religious correctness:

11 e.g., a god: S. *Ant.* 780, S. *Aj.* 713, E. *Med.* 395, Hdt. 5.7; spouse: E. *Alc.* 279; suppliant: A. *Eu.* 151; the dead: E. *Alc.* 1060, A. *Pers.* 694–695, S. *Ant.* 872; river: Hdt 1.138.2; animal: Hdt. 2.46.2; object: Hdt. 3.128.4; athlete in the competition: S. *El.* 685; prosperous friends: A. *A.* 833; the power that wealth brings: A. *A.* 779.

12 e.g., A. *A.* 778–780, A. *Supp.* 815–816, A. *Eu.* 151, E. *Supp.* 595, E. *Hipp.* 896, 996.

13 This is argued by Bolkestein 1936 and Connor 1988:163 and implied by Van der Valk 1942:33–34. For example, Bolkestein 1936:210: 'ὅσιος c.s. et εὐσεβής c.s s'emploient à peu près dans les mêmes cas … si l'on ne peut pas, pour tous les cas où l'on se sert de ὅσιος, signaler un emploi parallèle d'εὐσεβής, il faudra le plus souvent attribuer au hasard l'absence d'un tel exemple.'

14 We will see this below, section 2.3 and 2.4.

15 Cf. Chapter 1, section 2, n. 45.

16 e.g. Lyons 1981:148.

17 Jeanmaire 1945:74, following the characterisation of ὅσιος in Van der Valk 1942.

18 Mikalson 2010b:140.

> Piety did, however, concern the gods greatly, and piety in the Greek tradition has two interrelated aspects: *eusebeia*, showing "proper respect" for the gods; and *hosiotes*, "religious correctness," acting in ways that conform to the religious laws and traditions of the community. As an example of the difference, not to sacrifice to the gods at all was an act of disrespect of them (*asebeia*), but to sacrifice at the wrong time or place or in the wrong manner was religiously incorrect (*anosion*).[19]

More precisely, ὅσιος and εὐσεβής should be distinguished in three respects. While εὐσέβεια is a question of belief in the gods concerning their existence and nature, ὁσιότης is a matter of knowledge of religious traditions and conventions. While εὐσέβεια is a state of mind, ὁσιότης is a state of being. Thus, εὐσέβεια is a question of attitude, while ὁσιότης is measured by actions. And while εὐσέβεια is a positive concept, ὁσιότης is a 'neutral, passive state'.[20]

Similarly, Rudhardt (and Motte, following Rudhardt) holds that while both terms denote 'piety' and at first sight seem to coincide, εὐσέβεια is the expression of an inner disposition, whereas being ὅσιος means keeping to an objective, social order:

> Alors que la ὁσιότης, nous le verrons, définit ces comportements en considération d'un ordre objectif avec lequel ils s'harmonisent, l'εὐσέβεια les caractérise par leur accord avec une disposition intérieure dont ils procèdent.[21]

Rudhardt's description of εὐσέβεια follows from his study of τὸ σέβας and σέβειν,[22] for σέβας and σέβειν express an inner disposition.[23] A common charac-

19 Mikalson 2010a:23. This statement was not part of the first edition (*Ancient Greek Religion*. Malden, Mass.; Oxford: Blackwell 2005) yet in that edition the text reads (p. 25): '… Piety did, however, concern the gods greatly, and piety in the Greek tradition is the offering of appropriate honors to the gods on appropriate occasions. Piety, for the Greeks, was a matter …'.

20 Mikalson 2010b:168–171. I have defended a different view of ὅσιος as referring to what is 'pleasing to gods' rather than to what is 'religiously neutral' in Chapter 2, section 3 of this book.

21 Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:15. Motte 1986:157, 165, 168 following Rudhardt.

22 Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:15–17.

23 Section 1 above. In his preface to the second edition of the book, Rudhardt states that his ideas on the difference between ὅσιος and εὐσεβής are unchanged (Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:2). Moreover, Rudhardt mentioned that the fact that a god can be qualified as

teristic of the above-mentioned theories is that they seem to view εὐσέβεια as an internal value, commenting on one's character/disposition/attitude, while ὁσιότης does not (necessarily) have such a mental, inner component, but refers to actions.[24]

2 *hosios* & *cognates* vs. *eusebês* & *cognates*: Distributions

2.1 *General Distribution*

Examining the diachronic appearance, the spread across authors and genres, and the general frequencies of occurrence of *eusebês & cognates* will allow us to make some initial comparisons between *eusebês, hosios & their cognates*.

Between Homer and the end of the fifth century there are 240 literary occurrences of adjectives, nouns and verbs of the root σεβ- with a prefix. We find 126 occurrences of the adjectives εὐσεβής (n = 72), ἀσεβής (n = 15), δυσσεβής (n = 26), θεοσεβής (n = 7), εὔσεπτος (n = 1) and ἄσεπτος (n = 5). This count includes the adjectives, the corresponding adverbs, and cases of the comparative and superlative. In addition, we find 47 occurrences of the nouns εὐσέβεια (n = 32), ἀσέβεια (n = 6) and δυσσέβεια (n = 9), and 67 occurrences of the verbs εὐσεβεῖν (n = 31), ἀσεβεῖν (n = 32) and δυσσεβεῖν (n = 4).

Note that although the root σεβ- is much more productive than ὅσιος (recurring in different verbs, nouns, adjectives), the total number of occurrences of *eusebês & cognates* in this period is of the same order of magnitude (240 for *eusebês & cognates* vs. 277 for *hosios & cognates*). Thus, neither *hosios & cognates* nor *eusebês & cognates* are relatively 'common' or 'uncommon', and neither one would be much more easily retrieved from the lexicon.

ὅσιος, but not as εὐσεβής confirms his theory: a god does not let himself be judged by his inner dispositions, but the order to which ὅσιος refers 'pourrait, dans certains cas, se situer au-delà du dieu lui-même, au-dela d'un dieu particulier du moins.' In Chapter 5, I will give a different explanation on the usage of ὅσιος for gods. In my view, gods cannot normally be referred to as ὅσιος either, and the cases in which they are evaluated by this lexeme are examples of what I will call 'marked language usage' (for further explanation cf. Chapter 5).

24 Other studies of ὅσιος and/or εὐσεβής do not focus on the semantic differences between these terms, for example Bruit-Zaidman 1992, Parker 1996a [1983], Chadwick 1996, Samons 2000, Scullion 2005, Jay-Robert 2009 and Blok (2011, 2014). It is not obvious to me what conclusions should be drawn from the separate headings ὅσιος and εὐσεβής in the study of Burkert 1985.



CHART 1 *Diachronic distribution of* eusebês & cognates *and* hosios & cognates

2.2 *Distribution: Authors*

A notable aspect about the occurrences of *eusebês & cognates* is their similar diachronic distribution compared to *hosios & cognates*, as is clear from Chart 1. The forms with εὐ-, ἀ, and δυσ- do not occur in Homer, the Homeric Hymns and Hesiod and are infrequent in archaic literature. The first instance of the adjective εὐσεβής appears in a fragmentary poem of Simonides. Theognis uses the adjective εὐσεβής (n = 1), the noun εὐσέβεια (n = 1) and the verbs εὐσεβεῖν (n = 2) and ἀσεβεῖν (n = 1). In the fragments of the sixth-century historiographer Hecataeus, the adjective ἀσεβής occurs twice, the noun ἀσέβεια and the verb ἀσεβεῖν once each. The adjective εὐσεβής occurs once in Pythagoras. In the fifth century, especially the second half, *eusebês & cognates* become much more frequent, occurring in all genres, just like *hosios & cognates*. Thus, it is not the case that these lexemes cover the same (or similar) semantic grounds in different periods.

In the fifth century, *eusebês & cognates* occur most often in tragedy and forensic oratory. These terms appear in drama: in tragedy (in Aeschylus, n = 25; in Sophocles, n = 41; and Euripides, n = 91) as well as comedy (in Aristophanes, n = 5; the comic fragments of Eupolis, n = 1; and Epicharmus, n = 2).[25]

25 The lexemes δυσσεβής, δυσσέβεια and δυσσεβεῖν are found only in tragedy, occurring for the first time in Aeschylus.



CHART 2 *Distribution of* eusebês, hosios *and their cognates across genres*

Eusebês & cognates are also found in the earliest orators (in Andocides's *De Mysteriis*, n = 13; in Lysias's *In Eratosthenem* and *In Agoratum*, n = 3; and frequently in Antiphon, n = 26). In fifth-century historiography we do not find *eusebês & cognates* often: in Herodotus (n = 7), in Thucydides (n = 3), and in a few fragments.[26] Finally, *eusebês & cognates* are infrequent in lyric poetry and in early philosophical and other texts.[27] There is a clear difference between the numbers of occurrences of *hosios & cognates* and *eusebês & cognates* in historiography. For the rest, the distributions of *eusebês, hosios and their cognates* across genres in the fifth century are rather similar, but *eusebês & cognates* are even more concentrated in Greek drama. An overview of the distribution of *eusebês, hosios and their cognates* is provided in Chart 2.

The number of occurrences of *eusebês & cognates* per 1000 words in those authors in which these lexemes occur most frequently is shown in Table 1.

The relative number of occurrences of *eusebês, hosios and their cognates* in individual authors are of the same order of magnitude, and the 'Top 5' of authors in which these lexemes occur most often differs only by one author.[28] Thus, *hosios & cognates* do not seem to be associated with a different register or style than *eusebês & cognates*.

26 These cases occur in the fragments of Hellanicus (n = 1) and Xanthus (n = 1).

27 *eusebês & cognates* occur in Bacchylides (n = 2), Pindar (n = 4), the fragments of Empedocles (n = 2), of Critias (n = 1) and of Gorgias (n = 1).

28 Cp. the relative frequencies of *hosios & cognates* (Chapter 2, section 1.2). In this "Top 5 of relative frequency" we find Herodotus instead of Aeschylus.

TABLE 1 *Absolute and relative frequency of* eusebês & cognates *in fifth century authors: top 5 of relative frequency*

Author	Words in corpus	*eusebês & cogn.*	#/1000w
1. Antiphon	19621	26	1.33
2. Andocides	19624	13	0.66
3. Sophocles	80062	41	0.51
4. Euripides	193904	91	0.47
5. Aeschylus	93249	25	0.27

2.3 *Distribution: Themes*

We can order the occurrences of *eusebês & cognates* on the basis of the themes that the evaluation refers to.

- 27 % of all occurrences (n = 65) revolves around acknowledging gods as gods and maintaining a proper relationship towards them (n = 24) and honouring them in cultic service (n = 41).
- 25 % (n = 60) has to do with honouring those who are in one's *oikos*: behaving well towards one's parents or children (n = 40), brothers and sisters (n = 5), other family members (n = 4) and spouses (n = 11).
- 8 % (n = 18) has to do with honouring the dead, burying them and providing them with the appropriate honours afterwards.
- 14 % (n = 33) relates to behaviour towards guests, hosts and suppliants.
- 13 % (n = 32) has to do with keeping a promise or oath.
- 14 % (n = 34) seems to reflect a general, unspecific evaluation of behaviour pleasing to gods.

Individuals and their actions are regularly evaluated as *eusebês & cognates* for more than one reason at the same time; 19 % of the cases show such multiple motivations (n = 45). Taking into account the fact that many passages belong to more than one category, the thematic areas listed above together account not for 101 % of the data (the total of the percentages mentioned above) but for 85 %.

- the remaining 15 % (n = 43) can be seen as a remainder category in which *eusebês & cognates* are used to evaluate a wide variety of actions, attitudes and objects.



CHART 3 *The thematic distributions of* eusebês, hosios *and their cognates*

As the analysis shows, not only do more than four-fifths of the attested cases of *eusebês, hosios* and their cognates evaluate the same limited set of attitudes and actions towards the gods and towards humans, the relative shares of these thematic areas are almost the same. Thus, the usages of *eusebês, hosios* and their cognates are extremely similar both in scope and in relative frequencies of occurrence. This is also evident from Chart 3. None of the differences in number of occurrences (for any of these themes) between *eusebês & cognates* and *hosios & cognates* are statistically significant.[29] The only significant difference is found between occurrences of the two terms as a general, unspecific evaluation of behaviour.[30]

A secondary question is whether *eusebês, hosios* and their cognates also evaluate the same issues *within* each of these thematic areas. First of all, *eusebês & cognates* do not seem to refer more or less often to acknowledging a god

29 The χ^2 test can be applied to sets of categorical data to test how likely it is that any observed difference between two data sets is a chance variation. The number p indicates the probability that a given variation arose by chance. A standard that is often used is $p < 0.05$. If $p < 0.05$, this means that the probability that the given variation arose by chance is very low: less than 5%. The difference between two such sets is considered statistically significant. Applying the χ^2 test to our data, we see that the differences between the sets (*hosios & cognates* vs. *eusebes & cognates*) is not statistically significant: gods and ritual practice: $\chi^2 = 0.57$ $p = 0.451$; members of the *oikos*: $\chi^2 = 0.25$ $p = 0.615$; guests and suppliants: $\chi^2 = 0.00$ $p = 0.991$; oath keeping: $\chi^2 = 0.00$ $p = 0.993$; the dead: $\chi^2 = 3.69$ $p = 0.054$.

30 $\chi^2 = 12.68$ $p < 0.001$.

than *hosios & cognates*,[31] but the two terms do have a different distribution when relating to ritual practice. In the case of *hosios & cognates*, most of the cases relate clearly to the *who, what, where, when and how* of ritual practice. The other occurrences refer to the maltreatment of the gods' temples, altars and images, and to honouring a particular god in cultic service. In contrast, *eusebês & cognates* refer to the *who, what, where, when and how* of ritual practice only in a minority of cases, while the majority of instances discuss the abuse of temples, altars and images of divinities, and whether individuals acknowledge a god as a god at all.[32]

With respect to conduct towards members of the *oikos*, guests and suppliants, *eusebês & cognates* refer to a slightly wider variety of issues than *hosios & cognates*. Although *eusebês & cognates* and *hosios & cognates* equally frequently evaluate (intended) murder,[33] the remaining cases of *eusebês & cognates* evaluate a range of commendable *and* blameworthy actions, while the large majority of the other cases of *hosios & cognates* refer to problematic behaviour only. Morever, *hosios & cognates* refer to conduct with respect to the dead slightly more often (but not significantly).[34] They regularly concern the temporal and spatial aspects of these ritual actions, unlike *eusebês & cognates*.[35] Otherwise, the two lexemes refer to the same range of actions concerning the cult of the dead, most notably: making sure that the dead are buried at all, taking care that corpses are not violated, honouring promises to a dead ancestor. Finally, with respect to oath-keeping, *hosios & cognates* refer most

31 6/277 cases or 22% of *hosios & cognates* and 6/240 or 25% of *eusebês & cognates* refer to recognising a god as a god. These numbers are too small to calculate the statistical significance of the difference. When describing whether an individual or a group acknowledges a particular god *at all*, words of the σεβ- root are by far the more common way to do so. But these meanings are especially expressed by the verbs σέβειν and σεβίζειν. These verbs describe which god(s) an individual or a group selects to engage with them in a relationship of mutual exchange, e.g. Hdt. 1.216.4, 5.7, E. *Andr.* 46, E. *Ba.* 1302.

32 *hosios & cognates*: 35/45 cases or 78%; *eusebês & cognates*: 9/41 cases or 24%. The difference is significant: $\chi^2 = 26.76$ $p < 0.001$.

33 Concerning relationships within the *oikos*, 26/60 cases or 43% of *eusebês & cognates* against 33/64 cases or 52% of *hosios & cognates* are about (intended) murder. The difference is not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 0.84$ $p = 0.359$). With respect to dealings between guests and hosts and with suppliants, 10/33 cases or 30% of *eusebês & cognates* against 19/38 cases or 50% of *hosios & cognates* are about (intended) murder. The difference is not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 2.84$ $p = 0.09$).

34 *hosios & cognates*: 25/277 cases or 9%, *eusebês and cognates*: 18/240 cases or 8%. The difference is not significant: $\chi^2 = 0.39$ $p = 0.531$.

35 n = 7.

often to oaths sworn by various parties in legal suits. *Eusebês & cognates* occur frequently in the context of oaths sworn in court too, but also often refer to oaths sworn in personal interactions between people.[36]

One-fifth of the occurrences of *eusebês & cognates* can be seen as a remainder category of evaluations of very diverse actions. There is a considerable overlap between *eusebês, hosios* and their cognates in recurring themes in these remainder categories. For example, *eusebês & cognates* evaluate behaviour having to do with love, marriage and sex. Agamemnon will make Cassandra his mistress (instead of lawfully marrying her), neglecting τὸ εὐσεβές; Theoclymenus's intention to marry Helena (whom he is supposed to keep safe until Menelaus returns) is a δυσσέβεια.[37] Murders are sometimes referred to in terms of *eusebês & cognates* in other contexts than the above-mentioned. For example, in an Euripidean fragment, someone argues that the gods do not exist: the proof is that tyrants who kill, steal and break oaths often prosper more than those who εὐσεβεῖν every day.[38]

2.4 *Distribution: Grammatical Configuration*

The verbs εὐσεβεῖν, ἀσεβεῖν and δυσσεβεῖν occur 67 times in total in our survey. The construction of the verb is absolute,[39] or with an object[40] or a prepositional phrase[41] indicating whom the (im)pious attitude or conduct concerns.

The adjectives εὐ-/ἀ-/δυσ-σεβής (and εὔ/ἄ-σεπτος) occur 126 times in total. In more than half of the cases (56 %, n = 70), these adjectives qualify a lexeme referring to a *person*.[42] Cases in which εὐσεβής, etc. evaluate human *behaviour*

36 In 31/37 cases *hosios & cognates* occur in the context of the law court, while referring to oaths sworn in personal interactions in six occurrences. By contrast, *eusebês and cognates* occur in the context of a lawsuit in nineteen out of 32 cases, while being evoked in the context of another oath in the thirteen remaining cases. The difference in distribution between *hosios & cognates* and *eusebês* & *cognates* in this respect is statistically significant: $\chi^2 = 5.12$ $p < 0.05$.

37 E. *Tr.* 43, E. *Hel.* 1021.

38 E. F 286.9 *TrGF.*

39 e.g. Hdt. 1.159.4, Th. 6.53.1, E. *Med.* 755.

40 e.g. A. *Eu.* 270–271, θεὸν ἢ ξένον … ἢ τοκέας φίλους, E. *Archel.* F 252.3 *TrGF*, θεόν, E. *Tr.* 85, τἄμ' ἀνάκτορ' … θεούς τε τοὺς ἄλλους.

41 e.g. ἐς τὸν θεόν, E. *Ba.* 490; εἰς ξένον, Hecat. fr. 1a, 1 f., 6bis, a18.

42 That is, the adjective qualifies a personal name or pronoun (n = 24) or the substantivised adjective (n = 11) or modifies a word for person (n = 35): φώς (n = 1), ἄλοχος (n = 1), ἀνήρ (n = 17), ἄνθρωπος (n = 1), βλαστόντες (n = 1), βροτός (n = 2), δικαστής (n = 1), ξένος (n = 1), παῖς (n = 3), πατήρ (n = 1), πρόξενος (n = 1), σύγγονος (n = 1), φίλος (n = 2), κατήγορος (n = 1), Κύκλωψ (n = 1).

are uncommon (10%, n = 13),[43] as are passages in which these adjectives evaluate a situation that is the result of someone's behaviour (1%, n = 1). Constructions analogous to the frequently occurring 'to say/do ἀνόσια/ὅσια' are rare, perhaps because these messages are more commonly expressed by the corresponding verbs (εὐσεβεῖν, ἀσεβεῖν, δυσσεβεῖν). A few cases are instances of the substantivised adjective in other constructions (6%, n = 8). Finally, in 2 cases (2%) the usage is unclear due to the fragmentary nature of the text.[44]

In the remaining cases the adjectives εὐ-, ἀ-, δυσ-σεβής qualify an object (25%, n = 32). It seems that we need to assume such cases always semantically make a statement about a person and his/her attitudes/actions, even when the adjective syntactically qualifies something other than a person.[45] The semantic structure of these adjectives (εὐ- 'well', ἀ- 'not' or δυς- 'mis, un' + σέβειν 'show respect') hardly allows a different analysis. In many cases such an interpretation is also obvious from the accompanying noun, when the adjective qualifies an individual or group's life,[46] the course they take,[47] a state or change of mind,[48] their character,[49] speech,[50] their decisions[51] or their actions.[52] In these cases, the phrase clearly evaluates what disposition towards the gods is shown by such words, emotions or actions. But in those cases in which εὐ-, ἀ-, δυσ-σεβής syntactically qualify a different object, we need to assume they metaphorically refer to the person involved in the action (i.e. semantically qualify the person, too). We can see how this could be the case when εὐσεβής refers to body parts,[53] the place where people live[54] or the Cyclops's meal of his

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43 i.e. as an adverb modifying a verb (n = 1), in the construction 'x is εὐσεβές/εὐσεβῆ' (n = 4); or in constructions such as 'to do/say/think etc. τὸ εὐσεβές/ἀσεβές' or 'to hear/see/find etc. τὸ εὐσεβές/ἀσεβές' (n = 6).

44 Simon. fr. 14.55.4, S.F. 52.1 *TrGF*.

45 Cf. Chapter 2, section 1.3 for further explanation.

46 βίος (n = 1, Epich. fr. 261 l. 1).

47 ὁδός (n = 1, E. *Andr.* 1125).

48 διάνοια (n = 1, A. *Th.* 831), τροπαία φρενός (n = 1, A. *A.* 219), γνώμη (n = 1, Pi. *O.* 3.41), φρήν (n = 1, E. *Hipp.* 1454).

49 τρόπος (n = 2, S. F 944.1 *TrGF*, Ar. *Ra.* 456–447).

50 μέλος (n = 1, Ar. *Av.* 897), λόγος (n = 1, A. *Supp.* 941), ὅρκος (n = 1, E. *IT* 743).

51 θέσις ψήφου (n = 1, E. *El.* 1262).

52 ἔργον (n = 2, A. *A.* 758, E. *Med.* 1328), πρᾶξις (n = 1, Pythag. *fr. Astr.* 11.2, 138.25), πόνος (n = 1, E. *Supp.* 373).

53 χείρ (n = 1, E. *Hipp.* 83).

54 πόλις (n = 1, E. F 286.11 *TrGF*), Ἀθῆναι (n = 1, S. *OC* 260), μέλαθρα (n = 1, E. *IT* 694), δῶμα (n = 1, E. F 825.2 *TrGF*).

guests[55] as being '(im)pious': these should be seen as metonymic expressions. The same interpretation holds for those cases in which εὐσεβής or its antonyms evaluate a murder,[56] a person's death or fate[57] or objects to do with the rituals of worship:[58] here, it is really the murderer, the individual causing or suffering the unfortunate death or fate, or those carrying out the rituals that should be seen as εὐσεβής, ἀσεβής, etc. We may assume a similar metaphoric interpretation in the remaining cases.[59]

The types of objects which εὐσεβής, ὅσιος and their antonyms qualify overlap to a very large extent. Both sets of lexemes qualify the human species or life,[60] the 'course' individuals take,[61] human actions (generically),[62] human speech or the lack of it,[63] human body parts,[64] the place where humans live,[65] meals consisting of humans,[66] death,[67] murder,[68] purity, purification or *mias-*

55 δεῖπνον (n = 1, S. *Aj.* 1293–1294), βορά (n = 1, E. *Cyc.* 289).

56 φόνος (n = 2, E. *Med.* 1287, 1383).

57 θάνατος (n = 2, A. *A.* 1493, 1517).

58 ἄγαλμα (n = 1, Emp. fr. 128 l. 18).

59 ψῆφος (n = 1, E. *Or.* 1651), ἁγνεία (n = 1, S. *OT* 864), χάρις (n = 1, S. *Ant.* 514), τἀμά (n = 1, E. *Ion* 1290).

60 *hosios* and antonyms: βίος (n = 1, E. *HF* 1302), γένος (n = 1, Ar. *Av.* 333); *eusebes* and antonyms: βίος (n = 1, Epich. fr. 261.1).

61 *hosios* and antonyms: κέλευθος (n = 1, Simon. fr. 36 P. Oxy 2432 subfr. 1.12), δρόμος (n = 1, E. *HF* 1212); *eusebes* and antonyms: ὁδός (n = 1, E. *Andr.* 1125).

62 *hosios* and antonyms: ἔργον (n = 12, e.g. Hdt. 2.114.2), πρᾶγμα (n = 1, Hdt. 3.120.1); *eusebes* and antonyms: ἔργον (n = 2, A. *A.* 758, E. *Med.* 1328), πρᾶξις (n = 1), πόνος (n = 1, E. *Supp.* 373).

63 *hosios* and antonyms: λόγος (n = 3, e.g. Ar. *Th.* 720), κόμπασμα (n = 1, A. *Th.* 551), φθέγμα (n = 1, E. *HF* 927), ἀρά (n = 2, E. *Med.* 607, E. *Ph.* 67), ἔγκλημα (n = 1, Antipho 4.2.4.6), μέλος (n = 1, Ar. *Av.* 897–898); *eusebes* and antonyms: μέλος (n = 1, Ar. *Av.* 897–898), λόγος (n = 1, A. *Supp.* 941), ὅρκος (n = 1, E. *IT* 743).

64 *hosios* and antonyms: χείρ (n = 2, A. *Ch.* 378, S. *OC* 470), κάρα (n = 2, E. *Or.* 481, E. *HF* 255), κρᾶτα (n = 1, E. *HF* 567), νέκυς (n = 1, S. *Ant.* 1071), πούς (n = 2, E. *IT* 130, E. *Hel.* 868–869), στόμα (n = 2, Emp. Fr. 3.7, S. *OC* 981); *eusebes* and antonyms: χείρ (n = 1, E. *Hipp.* 83).

65 *hosios* and antonyms: πόλις (n = 2, E. *El.* 1319, E. *Antiop.* F 223.115–116), βασιλήϊον (n = 1, E. *Phaëth.* F 773.70 *TrGF*), ἕδεθλα (n = 1, A. *A.* 776–778); *eusebes* and antonyms: πόλις (n = 1, E. *Fr.* Nauck 286.11), Ἀθῆναι (n = 1, S. *OC* 260), μέλαθρα (n = 1, E. *IT* 694), δῶμα (n = 1, E. *Fr.* Nauck 825.2).

66 *hosios* and antonyms: δεῖπνον (n = 1, E. *Cyc.* 31), δαίς (n = 1, E. *Cyc.* 693); *eusebes* and antonyms: δεῖπνον (n = 1, S. *Aj.* 1293–1294), βορά (n = 1, E. *Cyc.* 289).

67 *hosios* and antonyms: ὄλεθρος (n = 1, E. *IT* 871), μόρος (n = 1, Hdt. 3.65.5), συμφορά (n = 1, E. *Hipp.* 814–815); *eusebes* and antonyms: θάνατος (n = 2, A. *A.* 1493, 1517).

68 *hosios* and antonyms: φόνος (n = 3, e.g. E. *Med.* 1305), σφαγή (n = 2, E. *Tr.* 1316, E. *IA* 1318), πρόσφαγμα (n = 1, E. *Tr.* 628); *eusebes* and antonyms: φόνος (n = 2, E. *Med.* 1287, 1383).



CHART 4 *Self- and other-attributed cases of* eusebês, hosios *and their cognates*

ma,[69] things to do with the rituals of worship,[70] a vote in the Areopagus or the court itself,[71] and some other matters.[72] In addition, ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος qualify some behavioural characteristics of humans[73] and marriage,[74] while εὐσεβής and antonyms qualify a state or change of mind[75] or someone's character or way of life.[76] The implications of this comparison will be discussed below, in section 2.7.

69 *hosios* and antonyms: λουτρόν (n = 1, S. *Aj.* 1405), μίασμα (n = 1, E. *HF* 1233), καθαρμός (n = 1, E. *Ba.* 77); *eusebes* and antonyms: ἁγνεία (n = 1, S. *OT* 864).

70 *hosios* and antonyms: θυσία (n = 1, E. *IT* 465), θοίνη (n = 1, A. *Pr.* 529–530), χορός (n = 1, E. *Tr.* 328); *eusebes* and antonyms: ἄγαλμα (n = 1, Emp. Fr. 128.18).

71 *hosios* and antonyms: ψῆφος (n = 1, E. *IT* 945); *eusebes* and antonyms: θέσις ψήφου (n = 1, E. *El.* 1262–1263), ψῆφος (n = 1, E. *Or.* 1651).

72 *hosios* and antonyms: δίκη (n = 1, Thgn. 1.132), θέα (n = 1, E. *HF* 323), νόμοι (n = 1, Antipho 6.2.3), ὀσμή (n = 1, S. *Ant.* 1083), ὄνειδος (n = 1, Antipho 2.2.9.7–8), χωρίον (n = 1, Ar. *Lys.* 743); *eusebes* and antonyms: χάρις (n = 1, S. *Ant.* 514), τἀμά (n = 1, E. *Ion* 1290).

73 *hosios* and antonyms: ὕβρις (n = 1, E. *Ba.* 374), ἔρως (n = 1, E. *Hipp.* 764–765), πόθος (n = 1, E. *IA* 555), θυμός (n = 1, Bacch. *Dith.* 3.21).

74 *hosios* and antonyms: γάμος (n = 5, e.g. E. *Ion* 1092–1093), νύμφευμα (E. *El.* 1261), ὑμέναιος (n = 1, E. *Phaëth.* F 773.64 *TrGF*).

75 *eusebes* and antonyms: διάνοια (n = 2, A. *Supp.* 9–10, A. *Th.* 831), τροπαία φρενός (n = 1, A. *A.* 219), γνώμη (n = 1, Pi. *O.* 3.41), φρήν (n = 1, E. *Hipp.* 1454).

76 *eusebes* and antonyms: τρόπος (n = 2, S. Fr. Radt 944.1, Ar. *Ra.* 456–457).



CHART 5 *Positive and negative cases of* eusebês, hosios *and their cognates*

2.5 *Distribution: Self- or Other-Attributed*

As Chart 4 shows, *eusebês & cognates*, like *hosios & cognates*, are other-attributed in a large majority of cases. In 76 % of the cases, the speakers refer to what is (not) εὐσεβής, etc. about the actions, attitude, etc. of others, and only in 23 % do they refer to their own behaviour or disposition.[77] The difference with the distribution of *hosios & cognates* is not significant.[78]

2.6 *Distribution: Argumentative Orientation*

In the discussion of the various subthemes, it was already clear that *eusebês & cognates* occur more often with a positive argumentative orientation than ὅσιος.[79] The same difference in distribution appears when we take into account the corpus as a whole. As is clear from Chart 5, among the literary occurrences of *eusebês & cognates*, 56 % of the data has a positive argumentative orientation,[80] while 41 % has a negative argumentative orientation.[81] *Eusebês & cognates* appear occasionally in a question or conditional statement.[82] The differences in distribution between *eusebês & cognates* and *hosios & cognates* with

77 Other-attributed: n = 182; self-attributed: n = 56. In two cases occurring in a fragmentary text, it is unclear whether the utterance is self-attributed or other-attributed (1 %).

78 $\chi^2 = 1.53$ $p = 0.216$.

79 On the notions of positive and negative argumentative orientation, cf. Chapter 2, section 1.5.

80 n = 134.

81 n = 98.

82 question: n = 4, conditional statement: n = 4, together these cases account for 4 % of the data.

respect to their argumentative orientations are statistically significant.[83] In 6 % of the cases, the evaluation *eusebês & cognates* used with a positive argumentative orientation does not appear independently, but in direct juxtaposition to a phrase in which the opposite is suggested.[84]

2.7 *Discussion*

The distributions of ὅσιος and εὐσεβής seem to be extremely similar for a number of criteria: in their total number of occurrences, their diachronic distributions, the spread across authors and genres, their general thematic distributions, the types of objects which the adjectives qualify, and whether the adjectives qualify someone else or oneself. Do the differences between these lexemes support the analyses of εὐσέβεια vs. ὁσιότης in the literature?

Even though the thematic distributions of *hosios, eusebês* and their cognates are rather similar, we find different nuances of usage *within* each particular theme. *Hosios & cognates* refer significantly more frequently to temporal and spatial details, in other words, to the *who, what, where, when and how* of religious actions. In this respect, they are indeed more about 'religious correctness' (that is, sacrifice by the right person on the right day and at the right place, Mikalson). Moreover, when referring to objects, two thematic areas that εὐσεβής and antonyms cover but ὅσιος and antonyms do not are those denoting a state or change of mind and a way of life. This is precisely the kind of information that would support the hypothesis that εὐσέβεια refers to a disposition, an attitude, while ὁσιότης only concerns actions, keeping to a religious order.[85] However, it should be noted that the differential evidence is scanty. *Hosios, eusebês* and their cognates only refer to ritual practice in a minority of their attested occurrences (around 16 %). And although there are no parallels in which ὅσιος qualifies nouns that refer to an attitude/state of mind/character, there are actually only six such attested cases of εὐσεβής and antonyms in the corpus. Moreover, there is one case of 'ὅσια φρονεῖν' 'thinking thoughts that are ὅσια'.[86] These differences in distribution appear insufficient to support the hypothesised distinction.

More generally, it seems impossible to make the distinction between religious attitude and actions in these texts. When εὐσέβεια expresses a state of

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83 $\chi^2 = 19.83$ $p < 0.001$. Questions, conditionals and unclear cases were excluded from this calculation, for the sake of the argument.

84 n = 15.

85 Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:15, Motte 1986:157, 165, 168, Mikalson 2010a:23, Mikalson 2010b, Ch. 4 (on Greek philosophical texts).

86 E. *El.* 1203.

mind, the expression is always linked to what a character *said* or *did*. For example, when Theseus tells his son Hippolytus that he has a mind (φρήν) that is εὐσεβής, he does so after Hippolytus has forgiven his father for cursing him. The chorus in *Agamemnon* sings that anyone who said the gods do not take an interest in transgressions against what is important to them was not εὐσεβής.[87] This person's religious attitude crucially shows from what he said. In the Greek texts on which our views are based, there is an essential link between the attitudes of worshippers and their actions and speech.

The high similarity between ὅσιος, εὐσεβής and their antonyms in almost all respects and especially in their reference to objects allows us to draw a conclusion about the usage of ὅσιος for objects. We may argue by analogy that ὅσιος and antonyms are always used metaphorically. That is, these adjectives always *semantically* refer to the persons involved, even when *syntactically* qualifying an object. Like εὐσεβής, ὅσιος is never a characteristic of the object itself but always says something about the religious attitudes and actions of the humans involved. The use of an εὐσεβές object by humans pleases the gods and fulfils the obligations to them. Given the almost complete semantic overlap between *hosios, eusebês* and their cognates, it seems that we can make the same inference for objects that are ὅσια.[88]

Thus, when the chorus in Aeschylus's *Prometheus* prays that they may never cease from approaching the gods with ὁσίαις θοίναις (529–530), it means that they wish to be ὅσιος or 'pious' when bringing these sacrifices. This is because they want to honour the gods in general (by making an effort to sacrifice and so giving them their dues), but they also respect the specific temporal, spatial and other prescriptions that apply to the sacrificial practice: the two go together. We may translate this phrase ὁσίαις θοίναις as 'pious offerings'.

3 Affect in Disqualification

We have seen that the distributions of ὅσιος and εὐσεβής differ mostly in their argumentative orientation: ὅσιος is employed much more often with a negative argumentative orientation than εὐσεβής. In this section we will analyse the

87 A. *A*. 372.

88 Here I fully agree with the brief statement by Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:3, who does not believe that objects that are ὅσια are 'profane' or 'desacralised'. Since ὅσιος and εὐσεβής are often used synonymously, he cannot imagine how to connect the synonymous adjective εὐσεβής to the meaning 'profane' or 'desacralised'.

negative argumentative orientation usages of the two lexemes more closely. In each sub-section a pair of scenes is evaluated, consisting of one passage that describes behaviour as ἀνόσιος / οὐχ ὅσιος, the other disqualifying the same or similar conduct as ἀσεβής / δυσσεβής.[89] I hope to reveal the contrast in their affective charge by doing so.

3.1 *Beating up Lycus*

In Euripides's *Heracles*, the ruler Lycus is disqualified as ἀνόσιος and δυσσεβής. The chorus of old men of Thebes verbally abuses Lycus (usurper of the throne of Thebes) who is threatening to kill a group of suppliants seated at an altar. These suppliants are Heracles's wife Megara, his children and Amphitryon. Lycus wants to kill this family, fearing they will avenge his murder of Creon, and therefore they have taken refuge at the altar of Zeus the Saviour. Heracles is assumed to be dead. The chorus of old men of Thebes is appalled by the impious treatment of the suppliants. They encourage the Thebans to take up their staffs and beat Lycus up:

Χο. ὦ γῆς λοχεύμαθ', οὓς Ἄρης σπείρει ποτὲ
λάβρον δράκοντος ἐξερημώσας γένυν,
οὐ σκῆπτρα, χειρὸς δεξιᾶς ἐρείσματα,
ἀρεῖτε καὶ τοῦδ' ἀνδρὸς ***ἀνόσιον*** κάρα
καθαιματώσεθ', ὅστις οὐ Καδμεῖος ὢν
ἄρχει κάκιστος τῶν ἐμῶν ἔπηλυς ὤν;[90]

Ch. Son of earth, whom Ares once sowed
when he had robbed the dragon's fierce jaw,
will you not raise your staffs, your right hand's support,

89 I will take δυσσεβής and ἀσεβής together. Euripides is the only author in the corpus in which a semantic distinction between ἀσεβ- and δυσσεβ- is made. In E. *Ba.* 476, 490, 502 ἀσεβ- refers to 'not acknowledging the god (Dionysus) at all', this term occurs in only two other passages (E. *Or.* 823 and E. *Antiop.* F 223.58 *TrGF*); Euripides uses δυσσεβ- for all other types of impiety. No such difference between ἀσεβής (ἀσεβεῖν, ἀσέβεια) and δυσσεβής (etc.) is found in Antiphon, Aristophanes, Thucydides, and Herodotus: in these authors δυσσεβής does not occur, and ἀσεβεῖν is used in a more general sense than 'not acknowledging a god as a god' (Ar. *Th.* 367, Hdt. 1.159.4, 2.139.2, 8.129.3, Th. 4.98.7, 6.53.1, Antiphon: e.g. 3.3.8.6, 5.88.8). Neither ἀσεβ- nor δυσσεβ- occur in Pythagoras, Pindar or Bacchylides. There does not seem to be a clear difference between the usages of ἀσεβ- and δυσσεβ- in Aeschylus and Sophocles.

90 E. *HF* 252–257.

and bloody the *anhosion* head of this man,
not a Theban but a vicious foreigner,
who rules over my people?

Further on in the play, when Heracles returns from his labours and hears about his family's plight, he expresses a similar sentiment:

Ἡρ. ἐγὼ δέ, νῦν γὰρ τῆς ἐμῆς ἔργον χερός
πρῶτον μὲν εἶμι καὶ κατασκάψω δόμους
καινῶν τυράννων, κρᾶτα δ' *ἀνόσιον* τεμὼν
ῥίψω κυνῶν ἕλκημα·[91]

Her. As for me—for now there is work for my hand—
first I will go and raze the palace to the ground
of these new rulers, and when I have cut off his *anhosion* head
I will throw it to the dogs as prey.

The affective charge in both statements is evident as both characters propose a violent attack on Lycus. Our aggressive impression of these speakers is increased by their verbal abuse: Lycus is put down as a 'vicious foreigner' (κάκιστος ἔπηλυς, 257) in the first passage,[92] in the second, he is being promised quite a bloody 'funeral' (567–568). Moreover, note that the word κάρα (255) has an emotional ring to it in many passages in tragedy.[93]

91 E. *HF* 565–568.

92 Here the chorus focuses on another apparent reason for their negative evaluation: the fact that he is not only a usurper, but not even a Theban. As is explained in the prologue, Lycus came from Euboea to Thebes, killed the ruler Creon, and took over power (E. *HF* 31–34). The Thebans, by contrast, and in accordance with popular genealogical myth, ultimately trace their lineage to the earth-born race of Sown Men (ὁ γηγενὴς | σπαρτῶν στάχυς, E. *HF* 4–5). Given the importance of genealogical myths in classical Greece (and within that genre, the centrality of claims to being the autochthonous inhabitants of a place), the fact that Lycus is not even a Theban is a serious accusation, making his usurpation of power even more inappropriate.

93 This is the case usually in a positive sense. Perhaps the most famous example is the first line of Sophocles's *Antigone*, where Antigone addresses Ismene as 'Oh sisterly head of Ismene of the same origin' (ὦ κοινὸν αὐτάδελφον Ἰσμήνης κάρα), a line in which, according to O'Brien 1978, ad loc. 'every word suggests endearment' and κάρα 'reminds Ismene of their close affection'. Gibbons & Segal 2003, ad loc., take this formulation '"head of" someone' as a 'more emotional … form of address than the ordinary'; Jebb 1962 [1900] and

The discourse environment in which the chorus evaluates Lycus as δυσσεβής is different. After Heracles has murdered the ruler, the chorus sings:

Χο. γέροντες, οὐκέτ' ἔστι *δυσσεβὴς* ἀνήρ.
σιγᾶι μέλαθρα· πρὸς χοροὺς τραπώμεθα.
[φίλοι γὰρ εὐτυχοῦσιν οὓς ἐγὼ θέλω.]
χοροὶ χοροὶ
καὶ θαλίαι μέλουσι Θή-
βας ἱερὸν κατ' ἄστυ
μεταλλαγαὶ γὰρ δακρύων,
μεταλλαγαὶ συντυχίας
⟨ ⟩ ἔτεκον ἀοιδάς.[94]

Ch. Old friends, that *dussebês* man is now no more.
The house is still; let us turn to the dance.
My friends are prosperous, as I wish.
Dance, dance,
and festivities are on everyone's mind
throughout the holy city of Thebes
the changing of our tears (to joy)
the changing of our fortune
has brought forth songs.

The aggression of their previous statement has made way for delight and relief, and the emphasis of the choral song is on the expression of joy and gratitude towards the gods.

3.2 *Teiresias in Anger*

Oedipus's grave transgressions against his parents, exposed in Sophocles's *Oedipus Rex*, more than justify his repeated description (by himself or others) as ἀνόσιος and ἀσεβής. Near the beginning, when Oedipus is still looking for the murderer of Laius, he consults the seer Tiresias. The seer tells Oedipus that *he* is the 'impious polluter' (ἀνόσιος μιάστωρ) of the country. Tiresias's usage of the disqualification ἀνόσιος may be seen as a hint, an anticipation of the terrible truth Oedipus is as yet unaware of: calling Oedipus an ἀνόσιος μιάστωρ reveals

Kamerbeek 1978 concur. κάρα in the phrase ἀνόσιον κάρα (here and in E. *Cyc.* 438, E. *Or.* 481) may have a similar affective charge, but in these cases in a negative sense.

94 E. *HF* 760–767.

not only that he is the murderer, who has brought a pollution on the city (as is communicated by the second word, μιάστωρ), but also suggests that he has committed crimes in the sphere of those inter-human relations that are of special interest to the gods: in this case, those towards his father and mother.

In this speech we can again sense an aggressive tone. The hostile atmosphere of the discussion between Tiresias and Oedipus is initiated by Oedipus. When Tiresias refuses to disclose the identity of the murderer, Oedipus accuses Tiresias of betraying (331) and disrespecting (340) the *polis*; he also addresses the seer as 'the worst of villains' (ὦ κακῶν κάκιστε, 334), claiming that Tiresias would even anger someone with a heart of stone (334–335). Tiresias has been composed up until this point and remained silent. But when Oedipus persists (345) and even accuses Tiresias of having had a hand in the murder himself (346–347),[95] Tiresias's response is triggered:

Τε. ἄληθες; ἐννέπω σὲ τῷ κηρύγματι
ᾧπερ προεῖπας ἐμμένειν, κἀφ᾽ ἡμέρας
τῆς νῦν προσαυδᾶν μήτε τούσδε μήτ᾽ ἐμέ,
ὡς ὄντι γῆς τῆσδ᾽ *ἀνοσίῳ* μιάστορι.[96]

Ti. Is that so? I bid you to stand by the announcement
you made earlier, and from this day on
not to speak to these men nor to me,
because you are the *anhosios* polluter of this country.

We can *imagine* that Tiresias is upset by Oedipus's taunts, but there is also a textual clue that Tiresias is losing his calm. This is the question 'is that so?', 'really?' (ἄληθες;). This question at the beginning of a sentence occurs in similar passages as a strong aggressive or emotional reaction to an earlier claim in a conversation. For example, in Euripides's *Cyclops*, when the servant Silenus has told Polyphemus in detail what kind of violence Odysseus is planning to use against him, Polyphemus answers: 'Really?' and orders his knives to be sharpened and a fire to be lit, saying he will slaughter the men and eat them all immediately. In Aristophanes's *Wealth*, Blepsidemus and Chremylus do not recognise the personification of Poverty as a kind of deity. They speculate that

95 Oedipus first accuses Tiresias of having assisted in planning the murder, and then adds: 'If you did not happen to be blind, I would have assumed you killed him with your own hands' (S. *OT* 345–349).

96 S. *OT* 350–353.

she must be a shopkeeper of some kind, otherwise she would not shriek so loudly at them when they have done nothing wrong to her. Poverty, who is already agitated, replies, 'Is that so?' and exclaims they have done her the worst possible wrong, seeking to expel her from every country.[97]

It is likely that the question ἄληθες; initiates the same type of reaction here. By calling Oedipus ἀνόσιος, Tiresias does not state factually that 'these are grave transgressions in the eyes of the gods'. Rather, ἀνόσιος occurs in a context that is affectively far from neutral and expresses a strong, emotional rejection of Oedipus's behaviour. Moreover, the disqualification is triggered by a whole cluster of reasons at the same time: besides transgressions against his father and mother, the term also seems to be a direct reaction to Oedipus's severe insults directed at the seer, the representative of the god.[98]

The disqualification ἀσεβής occurs in a different discourse environment. Near the end of the play, after Oedipus has found out the truth and has blinded himself, he says it is quite right that he is blind: for how could he desire to look upon his children, now that he knows their incestuous origin (1375–1377)? And how could he desire to look upon the city or its temples, from which he cut himself off (1378–1381), 'commanding with my own lips that all should drive away the impious one' (αὐτὸς ἐννέπων | ὠθεῖν ἅπαντας τὸν ἀσεβῆ, 1381–1382)? Oedipus refers to his previous proclamation to all citizens, in which he had forbidden them to welcome the killer once his identity became known. He had also ordered them to drive the murderer away from their homes.[99] The expression τὸν ἀσεβῆ 'the impious one' in 1382 is a

97 E. *Cyc.* 241–249; Ar. *Pl.* 429. The turn-initial question ἄληθες; occurs 4 other times in fifth-century literature. In Ar. *Av.* 1606 and Ar. *V.* 1223 this question does not introduce an aggressive or emotional reply, but in the other cases it does. In Ar. *Nu.*, Strepsiades has told Phidippides he must go and learn from Socrates and Chaerepho, and Phidippides wonders what good anyone could learn from them. Strepsiades replies, 'Really?' (841), and says they can teach any kind of wisdom and that Phidippides will soon find out how ignorant and stupid he really is. In Sophocles's *Antigone*, Haemon and Creon are having a heated discussion in which Haemon tells Creon his views are unjust and impious and threatens to commit suicide; Creon is angry and calls Haemon all sorts of names. When Haemon persists and claims Creon does not even listen to him, Creon's reply is, 'Is that so?' (758), and he says he will bring out Antigone to die immediately in the presence of her bridegroom.

98 Greek seers, like priests, were mediators between the human and divine sphere, concerned as they were with ascertaining the will and intentions of the gods in relation to human actions (Flower 2008:189). Being representatives of the gods, any insult against them was indirectly an insult to the gods themselves.

99 S. *OT* 236–243.

general, non-person-specific description of the murderer of King Laius, who now turns out to be Oedipus himself.

Some lines further on, Oedipus asks Creon for a favour, to expel him from the country as soon as possible:

1436 Οι. ῥῖψόν με γῆς ἐκ τῆσδ’ ὅσον τάχισθ’, ὅπου
θνητῶν φανοῦμαι μηδενὸς προσήγορος.
Κρ. ἔδρασ’ ἂν εὖ τοῦτ’ ἴσθ’ ἄν, εἰ μὴ τοῦ θεοῦ
πρώτιστ’ ἔχρῃζον ἐκμαθεῖν τί πρακτέον.[100]

Oe. Cast me out of this land as soon as possible,
wherever I will find myself not addressed by any mortal.
Cr. I would have done so, be aware of that, if I did not
desire first of all to learn from the god what has to be done.

Creon hesitates, because he is uncertain what the gods want. Previously, Oedipus had sent Creon to Delphi to ask how he might protect the city (69–72). Upon his return, Creon explained that Apollo had told him that the Thebans should drive out a μίασμα from the country caused by the killing of King Laius (95–107). Now Oedipus provides an explanation for him:

1440 Οι. ἀλλ’ ἥ γ’ἐκείνου πᾶσ’ἐδηλώθη φάτις,
τὸν πατροφόντην, ***τὸν ἀσεβῆ*** μ’ἀπολλύναι.[101]

Oe. But his oracle has been made completely manifest,
to let me, the parricide, the one who is *asebês*, perish.

The aim of Oedipus's statement (1440–1441) is to identify himself as the culprit (τὸν ἀσεβῆ) of Apollo's oracle: he emphasizes that he himself is the murderer, and this fact should guide Creon's actions.[102] That is, Oedipus reinterprets Apollo's message in the light of the knowledge that the person meant was himself.[103] τὸν ἀσεβῆ in 1441 is a description of the criminal that the Thebans were looking for, not a term of abuse. In summary, there seems to be a difference in this play between Teiresias's aggressive disqualification ἀνόσιος and Oedipus's factual self-incriminating τὸν ἀσεβῆ.

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100 S. *OT* 1436–1439.

101 S. *OT* 1440–1441.

102 Jebb 1885, ad loc.

103 Kamerbeek 1967, ad loc.

3.3 *Danaus's Daughters in Fear*

In Aeschylus's *Suppliants*, the 50 daughters of Danaus, fleeing from a marriage with their cousins (the 50 sons of Aegyptus) supplicate King Pelasgus of Argos and ask him for protection. According to the Danaids, the marriages pursued by the Aegyptians show an impious way of thinking and they express this in terms of ἀσέβεια and τὸ ἀνόσιον.[104] Their point seems to be that these marriages will force them to be unwilling partners in incestuous relationships.[105] Moreover, the women expect (correctly, as it turns out) that the sons of Aegyptus will disrespect their status as suppliants. Indeed, both incest and the maltreatment of suppliants are evaluated in terms of ἀσέβεια and τὸ ἀνόσιον elsewhere in fifth-century literature.[106] In fact, the girls' reasoning is not very strong,[107] but that is not what interests us most here. Our aim is to compare the Danaids's evaluation of their cousins as ἀνόσιος and ἀσεβής in two different speeches.

In the parodos, the Danaids have just landed on the coast near Argos. They are moving towards a sanctuary of the major gods of the city and set out their situation in a prayer, asking Zeus of the Suppliant (Ζεὺς ἀφίκτωρ) to look kindly upon their group (1–2). The girls explain they have come from the mouth of the Nile as fugitives (2–5), not through any exile for bloodshed, having been judged guilty by the city's vote (6–7):

104 A. *Supp.* 9, 762.

105 Cf. A. *Supp.* 37–39, 223–228. In 223–228 the impiety of the marriage between close relatives is explored through a metaphor: the marriages are compared to cannibalism of one bird eating another. The point seems to be that a marriage with a close relative perverts the normal relationship between relatives. More specifically, the marriage is framed as a polluting transgression of this family bond. The supposed impiety in marrying someone who does not want to marry (the second objection of the Danaids, A. *Supp.* 39, 227) is not motivated. The implicit argument seems to be that the gods do not sanction marriages between unwilling partners. Various rituals belonging to marriage are elsewhere described as ὅσιος, such as the dance (χορός, E. *Tr.* 328, cf. Chapter 6, section 3, n. 35) and songs (ὑμέναιοι, E. *Phaëth.* F 773.107 *TrGF*) that accompany the marriage ceremony. Such passages show that marriage is normally seen as pleasing to, and subject to sanctioning by, the gods.

106 Incest: Oedipus in S. *OC* 946 and *OT* 1360; cf. section 3.2 and 3.5 of this chapter. Supplication: the religious evaluation of dealings with suppliants is the topic of Chapter 4, section 2.

107 The Danaids seem to miss the point. Their complete lack of response to Pelasgus's increasingly explicit wondering (A. *Supp.* 336, 344, 387–391) whether Aegyptus's sons do not simply have the *right* to marry them strongly suggests that there is no legal or perceived religious crime in the proposed marriage in Egypt. Cross-cousin marriages were very common in classical Greece. Cf. Macdowell 1978:86. This discussion between Pelasgus and the Danaids is examined in some detail in Chapter 4, sections 2.2 and 2.8.

Χο. ἀλλ' αὐτογενῆ φυξανορίαν,
γάμον Αἰγύπτου παίδων ἀσεβῆ τ'
ὀνοταζόμεναι ⟨ διάνοιαν ⟩.[108]
Δαναὸς δὲ πατὴρ καὶ βούλαρχος
καὶ στασίαρχος τάδε πεσσονομῶν
κύδιστ' ἀχέων ἐπέκρανεν[109]

Ch. … but through a self-inflicted aversion to wedlock
abominating a marriage with the sons of Aegyptus
and their *asebeia*.[110]
Danaus, our father, adviser
and leader, surveying the situation like a gameboard,[111]
decided the following plan to be the best of evils …

This part of the parodos is an exposition of the facts[112] and an explanation of the reason for the request they will make next. Having been advised by their father (11–13), the girls will ask Pelasgus to help and protect them. The first part of the play is on the whole characterised by a more or less rational discussion between the Danaids and Pelasgus, a debate in which the Danaids provide arguments for why the ruler should accept these suppliants. In the course of their speech, the girls show *some* signs of being agitated, displaying negative emotions towards the Aegyptians and uttering some repeated interjections.[113] But these utterances are incomparable, both in concentration and in vehemence, to what we see further on in the second part of the play.

The atmosphere changes markedly after Danaus has seen the boat with the fifty sons of Aegyptus, coming to pursue the Danaids, on the horizon. In ll. 710

108 suppl. Weil.

109 A. *Supp.* 8–13.

110 The adjective ἀσεβῆ qualifies a noun lost in the lacuna (and tentatively restored as διάνοιαν); my paraphrase attempts to render the probable approximate sense of the utterance.

111 This is the translation of the participle πεσσονομῶν by Sommerstein 2008:293.

112 Heath 1987:175. In many tragedies the situation is explained in the prologue. In this tragedy the chorus enters the stage at the play's outset (as in Aeschylus's *Persians* and Euripides's *Rhesus*). In such cases the parodos has a clearer expository function (Adrados 1975:126).

113 The girls pray for the destruction of their cousins (A. *Supp.* 29–36) and say their thoughts are crazy (μαινόλιν, 109). A few repeated interjections also betray some emotionality on the part of the girls: ἰή, ἰή (115), ἰὼ ἰώ, ἰώ (125).

onwards, after Danaus has told his daughters about the arrival of their cousins, the girls experience a fit of great fear. For example, as they exclaim in 734–738:

Χο. πάτερ, φοβοῦμαι, νῆες ὡς ὠκύπτεροι
ἥκουσι, μῆκος δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἐν μέσωι χρόνου
περίφοβόν μ᾽ ἔχει τάρβος ἐτητύμως
πολυδρόμου φυγᾶς ὄφελος εἴ τί μοι·
παροίχομαι, πάτερ, δείματι.[114]

Ch. Father, I am afraid, because the swift-winged ships
have come, and there is no time remaining;
I am terrifyingly frightened, has my flight
over such a long distance really been of any use?
I am besides myself with fear, father.

Here, the tone, the way in which the chorus speaks about their prospective husbands changes significantly. From this line onwards the girls' utterances are consistently characterised by great anxiety.[115] It is also at this point that the Danaids start abusing the men violently:

748 Χο. μόνην δὲ μὴ πρόλειπε, λίσσομαι, πάτερ·
γυνὴ μονωθεῖσ᾽ οὐδέν· οὐκ ἔνεστ᾽ Ἄρης.
οὐλόφρονες δ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι, δολομήτιδες
δυσάγνοις φρεσίν, κόρακες ὥστε, βω-
μῶν ἀλέγοντες οὐδέν.
...
οὐ μὴ τριαίνας τάσδε καὶ θεῶν σέβη
δείσαντες ἡμῶν χεῖρ᾽ ἀπόσχωνται, πάτερ.
περίφρονες δ᾽ ἄγαν ἀνιέρωι μένει
μεμαργωμένοι κυνοθρασεῖς, θεῶν
οὐδὲν ἐπαΐοντες.
...

114 A. *Supp.* 734–738.

115 We can tell that their emotional state persists from different textual clues. Further on, the Danaids repeat their expression of fear (οἴχομαι φόβῳ, A. *Supp.* 786). Once the men actually arrive, their anguish becomes even more extreme: they start screaming 'ooooh! aaaah! (ὅ ὅ ὅ, ἅ ἅ ἅ, 825), 'Aaaaaaah! Mother Earth!' (ὀτοτοτοτοῖ· | μᾶ Γᾶ, μᾶ Γᾶ ..., 889–890, and repeated in 899–900). They also employ other vicious animal metaphors, saying one of these men is like a spider (886), a viper (896), a beast (898). The girls' fear hangs over this entire scene.

762 ὡς αἱματηρῶν ἀνοσίων τε κνωδάλων
ἔχοντος ὀργὰς χρὴ φυλάσσεσθαι κράτος.[116]

> Ch. Do not leave me alone, I beg you father.
> A woman left on her own is nothing: there is no war spirit in her.
> Those men mean harm, they are full of cunning deceit,
> with their dirty minds, like ravens,
> caring nothing for [the sanctity of] altars
> …
> Father, they will not keep their hands off us
> in fear of these tridents or the awesomeness of the gods,[117]
> they are all too arrogant, raging with an unholy rage,
> as shameless as dogs, they give no ear to the gods.
> …
> Their tempers are like those of murderous and *anhosiôn* wild beasts:
> we need to watch out they don't get control of us.

The sons of Aegyptus are considered to have the tempers of godless wild beasts (ὡς αἱματηρῶν ἀνοσίων τε κνωδάλων ἔχοντος ὀργάς, 762–763) because the Danaids assume they would care nothing for the altars of the gods but would just drag them, suppliants, away from it (751–752, 755–756, 758–759). But these men have many other problems of character, according to the Danaids: they are deceitful (750), criminal (750) and shameless as dogs (758). Note also that the girls even use various novel disqualifications to make their point when speaking about their cousins as those men 'with their dirty minds' (δυσάγνοις φρεσίν, 751) who are 'raging with an unholy rage' (ἀνιερῷ μένει | μεμαργωμένοι, 757–758).[118] The girls clearly do everything in their power to portray their cousins as godless villains. This part of their speech contains no calm argumentation or rational contemplation at all. ἀνόσιος is found in the context of an all-out, aggressive rejection of these men, full of abusive terms.

The evaluation ἀνόσιος may be a continuation of the religious disqualification of the sons of Aegyptus in the parodos as ἀσεβεῖς with respect to *content*. Both terms refer to these men's supposed religious transgressions. But although

116 A. *Supp.* 748–752, 755–759, 762–763.
117 This is the translation of θεῶν σέβη by Sommerstein 2008:385.
118 The term δύσαγνος does not appear anywhere else in the extant classical Greek literature; and this is the first occurrence of ἀνίερος, a term which does not ever become common.

the Danaids’ portrayal of their cousins as ἀνόσιοι has the same referential value as their disqualification of them as ἀσεβεῖς, the two adjectives seem to be different in affective charge. We can infer this from the different discourse environments in which the two terms appear.

3.4 *The Impious Six of Seven against Thebes*

In Aeschylus’s *Seven Against Thebes*, six of the seven men stationed at Thebes’s city gates display a range of direct offences against the gods.[119] This becomes clear from the descriptions of a spy, reporting on each of these warriors to Eteocles. In this section we will study Eteocles’s reactions to three reports in more detail: on Capaneus (the second warrior), Parthenopaeus (the fifth one) and Amphiaraus. These are the three speeches in which piety and impiety are discussed most extensively.[120]

First, Eteocles’s reaction to Capaneus:

Ἐτ. Καπανεὺς δ’ ἀπειλεῖ δρᾶν παρεσκευασμένοις·
θεοὺς ἀτίζων κἀπογυμνάζων στόμα
χαρᾶι ματαίαι. Θνητὸς ὢν ἐς οὐρανὸν
πέμπει γεγωνὰ Ζηνὶ κυμαίνοντ’ ἔπη.
πέποιθα δ’ αὐτῶι ξὺν δίκηι τὸν πυρφόρον

119 The first warrior insults the seer Amphiaraus, saying he is a coward (A. *Th.* 382–383). Other warriors hubristically anticipate their victory and appropriate it as their own achievement. For example, the second warrior has written on his shield that he will burn the city (434) and boasts that he will sack Thebes ‘whether the god wants it or not, and not even the anger of Zeus crashing down to the earth will stand in his way or hold him back’ (427–429). The third warrior has a shield on which a soldier climbs a ladder to the top of the enemy’s wall, saying that not even Ares can throw him off (469). The fourth warrior, Hippomedon, portrays a different type of impiety by boastfully displaying an enemy of Zeus (Tydon, a monster with fifty heads of snakes) on his shield, contesting Zeus’s sovereignty in that way. The fifth warrior is convinced he should worship (σέβειν) his own spear more than a god (529–530) (but note that the fact that he also swears by the spear he holds (529) is not impious in itself, people could swear by a spear or another weapon or old possession, e.g *h.Merc.* 460, *Il.* 1.234, E. *Ph.* 1677; cf. Tucker 1908, ad loc). The seer Amphiaraus is the only pious person. His fate is also different from that of the other six, as he is to become a healing hero or even a god.

120 The reporting spy describes the behaviour of all men in a largely uniform manner, pointing out their arrogance and over-boastfulness. Echoing the scout’s descriptions, Eteocles evaluates their claims mostly in terms of arrogance and boastfulness, too. However, he also disqualifies the claims of most of the Seven as impious, using different evaluations.

ἥξειν κεραυνὸν οὐδὲν ἐξῃκασμένον
μεσημβρινοῖσι θάλπεσιν τοῖς ἡλίου·[121]

Et. Capaneus is threatening men who are prepared to act,[122]
dishonouring the gods and taking a foolish joy in
straining his tongue. Even though he is only a mortal,
to heaven he sends seething words resounding in Zeus' ears.
I am convinced that the fire-bearing thunderbolt
will come to him with full justice, not
a mere semblance to the mid-day heat of the sun.

Eteocles evaluates Capaneus's boasts as foolish (442) as well as religiously undesirable. That is, he refuses to give the gods the τιμή they deserve (θεοὺς ἀτίζων, 441) and does not know his place as a mortal, as is implied by the participial phrase 'being a mortal' (θνητὸς ὤν, 442), which I interpret concessively. Moreover, he expresses his confidence that Zeus will act, providing a matching response to Capaneus's boasting (444–446).[123]

We find the same ingredients in Eteocles's response to the fifth warrior, Parthenopaeus:

Ἐτ. εἰ γὰρ τύχοιεν ὧν φρονοῦσι πρὸς θεῶν
αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις *ἀνοσίοις* κομπάσμασιν·
ἦ τἂν πανώλεις παγκάκως τ' ὀλοίατο.
ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τῷδ', ὃν λέγεις τὸν Ἀρκάδα,
ἀνὴρ ἄκομπος, χεὶρ δ' ὁρᾶι τὸ δράσιμον[124]

Et. May the gods pay them in kind for what they are thinking
With those *anhosiois* boasts and all

121 A. *Th.* 440–446.

122 A contrast seems to be implied between mere words and actual deeds. This is a theme running throughout the description of these men and the reactions to them by the spy and Eteocles. As was mentioned in this section, the spy disqualifies all men as boastful, and Eteocles emphasizes this aspect, too.

123 The phrase ξὺν δίκῃ indicates more than the justice in punishing impiety, the term δίκη also implies the notion of proportion, of matching kind with kind. Cf. Chapter 4, section 1, on δίκη as distributive justice. Since Capaneus's shield shows a fire-bearing warrior on it (πυρφόρον, 432), he will be repaid in kind by Zeus's fire-bearing (πυρφόρον) thunderbolt.

124 A. *Th.* 550–554.

> Then surely would they perish in utter misery and be completely destroyed.
> But also for this man, the Arcadian you speak of,
> There is a man without boasts, but his hand sees what needs to be done

The gist of Eteocles's response in 550–552 is very similar to the previously quoted passage with respect to its *content*:[125] boasts that are displeasing to the gods (ἀνόσια κομπάσματα, 551) will hopefully lead to a divine response, and when Zeus acts, this should be with a punishment that matches the misbehaviour (550). But the discourse environment of this response and the previous one is different. Note that Eteocles's reaction to this fighter is a cumulative one: his initial response in 550–552 targets all five warriors. This partly explains the outburst of built-up aggression against all of the men jointly that we see here. In fact, multiple aspects of the passage indicate that Eteocles has lost his calm. First of all, his expression of the punishment he envisages for his enemies is quite strong, when he speaks in alliterating, disqualifying adjectives (πανώλεις παγκάκως) about their complete and utter destruction (552). Moreover, his description of the religiously undesirable conduct is vague when he talks about 'these men with their *anhosiois* boasts *and all*' (αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις ἀνοσίοις κομπάσμασιν, 551), in one sweeping statement. This phraseology is characteristic of an emotional outburst, not of a precise accusation. We may translate: '… with their godless boasts and all.'

The aggressive tone is sustained in the next part of the description, in which Eteocles says that the envisaged defender, Actor,

> Ἐτ. … οὐκ ἐάσει γλῶσσαν ἐργμάτων ἄτερ
> ἔσω πυλῶν ῥέουσαν ἀλδαίνειν κακά,
> οὐδ᾽ εἰσαμεῖψαι τεῖχος ἐχθίστου δάκους
> 559 εἰκὼ φέροντα πολεμίας ἐπ᾽ ἀσπίδος[126]

> Et. … will not allow a mere tongue without deeds
> To flow inside the gates and breed trouble,
> Nor will he allow to enter the wall the semblance of a hateful beast,
> Someone carrying this on a hostile shield[127]

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125 One clear difference between the two speeches is that this one is couched in the form of a prayer.

126 A. *Th.* 556–559.

127 I deliberately translated 558–559 in this slightly odd manner to capture the misleading effect of these lines, as I discuss in the main text later.

When Eteocles states that Actor will not allow 'a mere tongue without deeds' (γλῶσσαν ἐργμάτων ἄτερ, 556) to flow into the gates, nor 'the likeness of a hateful beast' (ἐχθίστου δάκους | εἰκώ, 558–559) to enter the wall, this 'beast' turns out to be an actual monster: the Sphinx on Parthenopaeus's shield.[128] However, the structure of the preceding clause[129] with its metonymic subject (i.e. 'tongue', for Parthenopaeus and his big mouth), the semantic ambiguity of the noun εἰκών (which can be 'semblance' or 'image, portrait'), and the distribution of information units in 558–560 put the listener on the wrong track: ἐχθίστου δάκος εἰκώ is initially taken as the grammatical subject of the infinitive εἰσαμεῖψαι: 'nor will he allow to enter the wall the semblance of a hateful beast'. The 'beast' seems to be Parthenopaeus,[130] in a continuation of the derogatory, aggressive language Eteocles is using.[131] The participle φέροντα forces a reconstruction of the sentence,[132] and the listener realises that εἰκώ is not a 'living image' but the image on the shield carried by Parthenopaeus. But the idea of Parthenopaeus being a 'beast' himself is by then already activated.[133]

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128 The Sphinx is ἐχθίστη because she did a lot of harm to Thebes before Oedipus answered her riddle, threatening anyone who wanted to enter the city and eating those who answered the riddle wrongly.

129 i.e. the clause running from γλῶσσαν (A. *Th.* 556) to κακά (557).

130 τὸ δάκος is used in Aeschylus both to refer to real animals (A. *Pr.* 582, A. *Ch.* 530), and as a pejorative description for humans (Clytemnestra in A. *A.* 1232, the sons of Aegyptus in A. *Supp.* 898).

131 Sentences of this type, in which the listener initially parses the grammatical structure in the wrong way due to the linear distribution of information, and then has to make a 'costly reanalysis', are called 'garden path sentences' in the linguistic literature, from the English expression 'to be led up the garden path', i.e. 'to be misled, deceived'. Cf. Pritchett 1992.

132 i.e. with φέροντα as the subject of εἰσαμεῖψαι, and εἰκώ as the object of φέροντα. Weil deletes A. *Th.* 559, in which case there is no garden path, and the reinterpretation of the 'beast' (τὸ δάκος) as the Sphinx is not forced until the next sentence starting at 560 'but she will blame her bearer'. However, the deletion of the line is not convincing, because in this reading of the text it is not clear how the feminine participle τυγχάνουσα (561) should be constructed.

133 Note that ἀνόσιος in the second speech is also the disqualification of the enemy who anticipates a fratricide through the visual representation on his shield. Parthenopaeus has a Sphinx subduing a Theban on his shield. This depiction of a Theban on the shield is ominous: if the Thebans throw their spears at this enemy, they will hit this image of another Theban (Thalmann 1978:115; Trieschnigg 2009:177–178). The visual representation on the enemy shield is symbolically unsettling, because it hints at the fact that Thebans are going to attack a fellow citizen (Polyneices), more specifically, that two brothers will take up arms against each other. Finally, note the scornful reaction of Eteocles (A. *Th.* 553) to the fact that this warrior is an immigrant. This fact is apparently another reason for a negative

In these two speeches, different descriptions of 'impiety' function in different discourse environments. In the calm and rational response to the figure of Capaneus, 'dishonouring gods' (θεοὺς ἀτίζων) is a factual description of wrongful religious behaviour, whereas the 'impious boasts' (ἀνόσια κομπάσματα) of the second speech occur in a textual environment full of emotional and aggressive features.

Again, there seems to be a difference with the disqualification δυσσεβής, occurring in Eteocles's response to the sixth warrior: Amphiaraus. The seer is the only pious warrior of the seven. As the spy explains, he seriously doubts whether launching a military expedition against one's own city and its native gods with the help of a foreign army is pleasing to the gods (προσφιλές θεοῖς, 580–584). In reaction to this description, Eteocles starts to make an elaborate abstract comment. He sighs for 'the fate that links a just man (δίκαιον ἄνδρα, 598) to more impious ones (τοῖσι δυσσεβεστέροις, 598)'. He considers how a pious (εὐσεβής) man on a ship together with criminals may suffer shipwreck along with the god-detested kind (θεοπτύστωι γένει, 604); or how an upright (δίκαιος) man may be struck by the gods when he finds himself among fellow citizens 'who hate strangers and give no heed to the gods' (ἐχθροξένοις τε καὶ θεῶν ἀμνήμοσιν, 606). That is, we find the term δυσσεβής in a gnomic statement that abstracts from the actual situation and from concrete persons. The term ἀνόσιος reappears once Eteocles connects his theoretical musings to Amphiaraus's predicament and the six impious warriors actually positioned at the gate. The switch to the present situation is marked by the phrase 'in this way, the seer' (οὕτω δ' ὁ μάντις … 609 ff.), and then Eteocles continues, 'a virtuous, just, good and pious man' (σώφρων δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς εὐσεβὴς ἀνήρ, 610) joined together with 'impious, insolent men' (ἀνοσίοισι θρασυστόμοισί τ'ἀνδράσιν, 611–612) against his wish will perish along with them, Zeus willing (614).

Summarising the above, in three of Eteocles's speeches it seems confirmed that δυσσεβής, as well as the religious disqualification 'to dishonour the gods' (ἀτίζων θέους), occurs in more detached, emotionally neutral discourse settings than ἀνόσιος does.

3.5 *Parallel Cases*

We will discuss three additional cases in which ἀνόσιος is found in similar, emotionally or aggressively charged contexts.

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evaluation of the man. As elsewhere, the disqualification ἀνόσιος is overdetermined: it is motivated by multiple reasons at the same time.

Aristophanes's *Wealth* is another example of a scene in which someone uses the term ἀνόσιος in the context of a violent threat to physically harm the other person, as in Euripides's *Heracles* (section 3.1).[134] In Aristophanes's *Wealth*, two men (Chremylus and Blepsidemus) plan to restore the eyesight of the god Wealth, so that he can distribute wealth to everyone. The goddess Poverty fears for her position as a god in a world in which everyone is rich.[135] She accuses Chremylus and Blepsidemus of 'daring to do what is ἀνόσιον'.[136] One of the most striking characteristics of the context in which the term ἀνόσιος appears is the tone of this scene. Poverty cannot stop accusing and abusing the two men, addressing them as 'evil little men' (ὦ … ἀνθρωπαρίω κακοδαίμονε, 415–416). She also tells Chremylus and Blepsidemus that their audacious enterprise is not to be tolerated (τόλμημα γὰρ τολμᾶτον οὐκ ἀνασχετόν, 419), that no god and no man has ever dared to do anything like this before (420–421), and that the two of them have done her a most appalling wrong (δεινότατα δεδράκατον, 429). In addition, she addresses the men as 'scum' (ὦ καθάρματε, 454) and even threatens to put a miserable end to their miserable existence personally (ἐγὼ γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἐξολῶ κακοὺς κακῶς, 418), claiming they are both 'dead men' already (ἀπολώλατον, 421). Thus, the context in which the disqualification ἀνόσιος appears is far from neutral.[137]

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134 Bowie 1993:273–278.

135 Aristophanes's *Wealth* is about a breakdown of χάρις between gods and worshippers (Bowie 1993:273–278). In a world in which everyone is rich, no one sacrifices to the Olympians any more, because humans no longer need the gods. This threatens the position of the gods as gods. The 'goddess' Poverty suffers especially, for when abundant wealth has been distributed to all people, she ('poverty') will be banned from human life, or at least this is what she fears (430). Note that although Poverty was not a god in real life, having no cult or presence in art (Sommerstein 2001:169), she is portrayed as such within the fiction of this play (e.g. Revermann 2006:284). The introduction of a goddess Poverty in this comedy should be seen as a parody on the religious system (if there is a god Wealth, why not a goddess Poverty?).

136 Ar. *Pl.* 415. Indeed, one sure way to become ἀνόσιος is by terminating the long-term reciprocal relationship with a god. Whether Poverty fears that she will no longer receive worship from a *polis* full of rich people (on apotropaic worship in Greek religion: Burton 2011, Stafford *forthc.*) or that she will be literally 'driven out' (as a personification of penury) is left ambiguous, but in fact, these two options boil down to the same thing: a Greek god who receives no worship, no sacrifice or prayers is not a real god at all. Making a plan that will result in that situation, as Chremylus and Blepsidemus did, is one sure way to counteract ὁσία, and Poverty is right to reject it as a 'godless deed' (ἀνόσιον ἔργον).

137 We may contrast the usage of ἀνόσιος to the only other passage in this play in which religiously undesirable conduct is addressed. This passage occurs in the same fictional

The seer Tiresias employs the term ἀνόσιος in response to a provocation in Sophocles's *Antigone* (as in Sophocles's *Oedipus Rex*, section 3.2). Tiresias had told Creon that his burnt sacrifices had failed (1005–1011). This is an alarming state of affairs because the gods' refusal of man's prayers and sacrifices (1019–1020) signifies, in effect, their discontinuation of the exchange with humans. In such a situation, they might do anything. The message to Creon was to take immediate action: bury Polyneices and set Antigone free. But Creon refuses to listen and accuses the seer of being shameful (αἰσχρός, 1047) and providing false guidance in the pursuit of profit (κέρδους χάριν, 1047). Although Teiresias warns Creon that he is being rude,[138] Creon goes on to call him avaricious (φιλάργυρον, 1055), foolish (μὴ φρονεῖν) and prone to injustice (τἀδικεῖν φιλῶν). When Teiresias then explicitly asks Creon not to provoke him,[139] Creon repeats his accusation that the seer only spoke for the sake of profit (ἐπὶ κέρδεσιν λέγων, 1061).

These taunts finally provoke Tiresias to start talking. He angrily sketches a grim future scenario for Creon, telling him that the Erinyes will wait for him and destroy him, and speaking about corpses

1081 Τε. ὅσων σπαράγματ' ἢ κύνες καθήγνισαν
ἢ θῆρες, ἤ τις πτηνὸς οἰωνός, φέρων
ἀνόσιον ὀσμὴν ἑστιοῦχον ἐς πόλιν.[140]

Ti. of which dogs or wild animals have consecrated
fragments, or some winged bird, carrying
an *anhosion* scent to the city with its hearths.

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conversation, in which Chremylus argues that 'it is right and just that the virtuous among mankind should have prosperity, and the wicked and the godless (τοὺς ἀθέους) of course, the reverse of that'. We may note that the discourse environment in which this religious disqualification occurs is quite different from the context of Poverty's outburst. The impious persons in this scene (τοὺς ἀθέους) are not specific people, and the impiety that is attributed to them is not specified. This is a general, unspecific disqualification of their supposed negative religious attitude: Chremylus is making an abstract point.

138 S. *Ant.* 1053–154: Κρ. οὐ βούλομαι τὸν μάντιν ἀντειπεῖν κακῶς. | Τε. καὶ μὴν λέγεις, ψευδῆ με θεσπίζειν λέγων. | Cr. 'I do not want to reply rudely to the prophet.' | Ti. 'But you do, by telling me my prophecies are false.'

139 S. *Ant.* 1060: Τε. ὄρσεις με τἀκίνητα διὰ φρενῶν φράσαι. Ti. 'You will incite me to tell you things that should be kept secret.'

140 S. *Ant.* 1081–1083. The authenticity of lines 1080–1084 has been contested (on which cf. Kamerbeek 1978, ad loc.). I follow Kamerbeek and the most recent commentator, Griffith 1999, in keeping these lines.

The smell of a decomposing corpse being torn apart by animals and birds of prey that have 'consecrated' (καθήγνισαν, 1081) it, instead of it receiving proper burial rites, is a terrible affront to the gods. Thus, the disqualification ἀνόσιος, referring metaphorically to those who refuse to bury the corpse (i.e. Creon), is referentially straightforward. But the term Tiresias has chosen is a term of abuse, which is supported by what he says next:

Τε. τοιαῦτά σοι, λυπεῖς γάρ, ὥστε τοξότης
ἀφῆκα θυμῷ καρδίας τοξεύματα
βέβαια, τῶν σὺ θάλπος οὐχ ὑπεκδραμῇ.[141]

Ti. Such things I have shot, since you hurt me, like an archer,
in anger at your heart, certain arrows
of which you will not escape the sting.[142]

In this case we not only get the impression that Tiresias, having been provoked, is choosing an aggressive term, he states it outright. In my view, we may translate ἀνόσιον ὀσμήν (1083) as 'a goddamned scent'.

Finally, a parallel to the emotional usage of ἀνόσιος by a chorus of young, frightened, angry girls (as in Aeschylus's *Suppliants*, 3.3) is found in Aeschylus's *Seven Against Thebes*. Hearing about the boasts of the Seven, these girls respond:

Χο. ἱκνεῖται λόγος διὰ στηθέων,
τριχὸς δ᾽ ὀρθίας πλόκαμος ἵσταται
μεγάλα μεγαληγόρων κλυούσαι
ἀνοσίων ἀνδρῶν· εἴθε ⟨ ⟩ θεοὶ[143]
τούσδ᾽ ὀλέσειαν ἐν γᾶι.[144]

Ch. The words pierce through my breast,
my braid formed of upright hair stands on end
when I hear the big words of loud-mouthed

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141 S. *Ant.* 1084–1086.

142 This is a reply to Creon's previous complaint that everyone is shooting at him like archers at a target (S. *OC* 1033–1034).

143 I follow the edition of Page (OCT); some manuscripts read εἰ θεοὶ θεοί 'if the gods are gods …' but the choice is immaterial to my argument here.

144 A. *Th.* 563–567.

anhosiôn men: may the gods
destroy them in my land.

Trieschnigg has called this utterance 'the most vehement expression of fear in the play'.[145] The chorus has been in an emotionally heightened state throughout the drama, since its entrance on the stage.[146] In the parodos, the extreme state the girls are in is expressed verbally,[147] but also through the usage of dochmiac metre.[148] Although the girls seem to calm down somewhat as the play progresses, their expressions of fear continue.[149] The reaction in 563–557 quoted above recalls precisely their previous emotional state, both in the recurrence of the dochmiac metre and because here the girls' fear is specifically triggered (or fed) by what they hear.[150] Again, the term ἀνόσιος occurs specifically in the speech of very emotional characters, who remind us of the state the Danaids are in, in the second half of *Suppliants*.[151]

145 Trieschnigg 2009:174.

146 The group of girls was not called up, but presented themselves spontaneously and entirely in panic when they heard about the army that was being led against Thebes. As Trieschnigg argued, we need to imagine a chorus of girls running around in a highly confused and noisy stage entrance (lacking the composure characteristic of most tragic choruses). Cf. the analysis in Trieschnigg 2009:78–79 with further references.

147 Trieschnigg 2009:79 for an overview with further references: the chorus says they are afraid (A. *Th.* 78, 121, 135, 203) and conveys their panic through exclamations (ἰώ: 87, 98, 166, 167 and 174; ἒ ἔ: 150 and 158), repetitions (e.g. 92, 100, 106, 135, 136, 156, 171) and sound effects: through repetition of τ- and π- (78–80). Their emotional expressions of fear continue to be repeated in the first episode (e.g. 203, 214, 240, 249, 259).

148 Normally, a chorus entering would start with an astrophic part consisting of anapaests, but this chorus enters singing in astrophic dochmiac metre in 78–107. This metre, as Dale 1968 [1948]:110 has described, 'to a much greater extent than any other metrical type appears to have a definite emotional connotation. All three tragedians use it freely to express strong feeling, grief, fear, despair, horror, excitement, occasionally triumph or joy.' The use of this metre in the parodos perhaps indicates they enter out of formation and/or with frenzied movement. Cf. Stehle 2005:104; Trieschnigg 2009:77–78 with further references.

149 The panicky impression these girls make remains throughout the second episode (in which the passage quoted above appears), as A. *Th.* 419–421 testifies to. The dochmiac metre also resurfaces from time to time, e.g. 417–419, 452–454, 482–483, 522–523.

150 Trieschnigg 2009:174. Previous, terrifying, auditory experiences were the trampling of hooves (A. *Th.* 84), the clattering of shields (100) and spears (103), and the rattle of chariots (151, 153). Here, the boasts of the enemy (565) produce the same effect.

151 Perhaps this speech provides another example for the point made by Stehle (2005) that Eteocles and the chorus clumsily keep on alienating the gods with various types of

3.6 *Discussion*

I have suggested that, even though ἀνόσιος and δυσσεβής/ἀσεβής overlap to a large extent with respect to the *types* of religious behaviour they describe (i.e. their semantic range), these two evaluative adjectives differ crucially in the affective dimension (section 3.1–3.4). On the basis of these observations, we may tentatively conclude that ἀνόσιος has strong negative, emotional connotations and functions as a term of abuse—a suitable translation would be ‘godless’.[152]

These differences between the two lexemes are not absolute. ἀνόσιος is not always an obviously emotional, aggressive disqualification. This term also emerges in abstract, general descriptions of problematic behaviour. For example, in Euripides’s *Ion*, the chorus argues that minstrels may sing about the ἀνόσιους γάμους of women, but women ‘surpass the unjust race of men in εὐσέβεια’.[153] The term also occurs as a factual description of religiously problematic conduct. For example, in Euripides’s *Helen*, a priestess asks her attendants to cleanse the path before her, in case anyone harmed it by treading with an ἀνοσίῳ ποδί.[154] In these examples, the supposed ‘affective charge’ is not present—or at least not evident. Secondly, as was established in Chapter 1, ἀνόσιος and ἀσεβής/δυσσεβής regularly occur in the same sentence. Within such sentences there is obviously no difference between the ‘discourse environments’ in which these terms occur.[155] Finally, there are two counterexamples in the corpus, in which the term δυσσεβής / ἀσεβής appears in clearly emotionally charged contexts. In Euripides’s *Medea*, when Jason discovers that Medea murdered their children, he exclaims

Ια. ὦ μῖσος, ὦ μέγιστον ἐχθίστη γύναι
θεοῖς τε κἀμοὶ παντί τ’ ἀνθρώπων γένει,
ἥτις τέκνοισι σοῖσιν ἐμβαλεῖν ξίφος

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dysphemic speech. Goose-hair (ll. 564–565) is elsewhere triggered by a fear/awe of the divine or something sent by a divinity (*Il.* 24.359, S. *OC* 1624–1625). It seems rhetorically suboptimal for the chorus to claim a goose hair-causing awe or fear when they say at the same time that their feeling is not triggered by gods, but by hubristic enemies whose fault is precisely that they think they are like the gods (I owe the collection of passages in which people have goose hair to Trieschnigg 2009:174–145 n. 24–25).

152 The dictionary by Montanari captures this pejorative sense most clearly, s.v. ἀνόσιος ‘empio, sacrilego, scellerato’ (impious, sacrilegious, wicked/evil).

153 E. *Ion* 1092–1095.

154 E. *Hel.* 868–869.

155 For a list of examples cf. Chapter 1, section 2, n. 45.

ἔτλης τεκοῦσα κἄμ' ἄπαιδ' ἀπώλεσας.
καὶ ταῦτα δράσασ' ἥλιόν τε προσβλέπεις
καὶ γαῖαν, ἔργον τλᾶσα *δυσσεβέστατον*;[156]

O detestable creature, o woman most utterly hated
by the gods and me and every race of humankind
one who brought herself to take the sword to your very own children
and destroyed me, making me childless
and although you have done this, do you still look on the sun
and the earth, having dared a most *dussebestaton* deed?

In the following, he curses her with death (E. *Med.* 1329) and abuses her by calling her 'she-lion instead of woman, one with a disposition more savage than that of the monster Scylla' (1342–1343). Then he realises that 'a thousand insults from his side could not hurt her', impudent as she is 'by nature' (1344–1345). In the final part of the speech he says he never wants to see her again, and bewails the loss of his children (1346–1350). The term δυσσεβής, or actually its superlative, appears exactly in the affectively charged type of discourse environment in which we would have expected ἀνόσιος.

A second example occurs in Euripides's *Electra*. Aegisthus is dead, and Electra addresses a long speech to him, giving way to her desire to 'revile him' (λέγειν κακά, 907, 913). That is, she explicitly intends to insult the corpse, and here we have again a clearly affectively charged, aggressive context. Electra accuses Aegisthus of destroying her life and murdering her father (914). She tells him that not only did he contract this marriage 'in a shameful manner' (αἰσχρῶς, 916), but also that he was 'foolish' (ἐς τοῦτο ἦλθες ἀμαθίας ὥστε …, 918) in thinking her mother would make him a good wife. This is the context in which she says that Aegisthus knew he had made an impious marriage (ἀνόσιον γάμον, 926) and her mother knew she had obtained in him an impious man (ἄνδρα δυσσεβῆ, 927). In this speech we find both ἀνόσιος *and* δυσσεβής as emotionally charged disqualifications of religiously offensive conduct.

The differences between the two evaluative terms are evidently not absolute. Still, we have seen that there is a tendency for ἀνόσιος to appear in affectively charged contexts, while δυσσεβής and ἀσεβής seem to be more common in descriptive, affectively more neutral environments.

156 E. *Med.* 1323–1328.

4 Conclusion

In this chapter the distributions of *eusebês & cognates* and *hosios* & *cognates* were shown to be extremely alike in almost all respects. The small differences that were found are insufficient to support the hypothesis that τὸ ὅσιον only refers to outward behaviour of religious correctness—performing the required religious actions, keeping to an objective order—while εὐσέβεια is also the expression of an inner disposition, a respectful attitude towards the gods. On the contrary, given that the distributions of these lexemes are so similar, we must conclude that the two were semantically extremely close (in the mind of a fifth-century B.C. language user). Consequently, we can use our knowledge of the semantics of εὐσέβεια to understand the nature of ὁσιότης better, in this way building on the conclusions drawn in Chapter 2. When εὐσεβής and antonyms syntactically qualify an object, we assume that the adjective semantically refers to the person using the object (metaphorical usage). Given the extreme semantic proximity of *eusebês & cognates* and *hosios* & *cognates*, we may infer, similarly, that a ὅσιον object is an object whose use by a person shows that he/she is ὅσιος or 'pious'. One attested difference between the two groups of lexemes is a division of labour between *eusebês & cognates* and *hosios & cognates* in their argumentative orientation. Whereas the former are used more often in positively oriented utterances, the latter more commonly express that something or someone is *not* pious. This is the only area in which we can see a semantic differentiation between these lexemes. In the final part of this chapter, the usage of the adjectives ἀνόσιος, δυσσεβής and ἀσεβής was discussed. The two sets of lexemes seem to be found in different discourse environments, thus perhaps differing in their affective quality. The disqualification ἀνόσιος tends to occur in discourse environments that are charged with strong negative emotions: fear (Aesch. *Suppliants*), anger and aggression (Eur. *Heracles*, Soph. *Oedipus the King*, Soph. *Seven Against Thebes*, Soph. *Antigone*, Arist. *Wealth*). By contrast, ἀσεβής and δυσσεβής often occur in the same texts in emotionally more neutral or positive discourse environments: in a factual description (Soph. *Oedipus the King*), in an exposition of a state of affairs (Aesch. *Suppliants*), in an abstract, general description of religious transgressions (Soph. *Seven Against Thebes*, Arist. *Wealth*), and in a choral song expressing relief about a happy outcome (Eur. *Heracles*). The contrastive approach thus highlights a semantic quality of *hosios & cognates* that was not previously noted: ἀνόσιος may have an especially emotional or aggressive connotation.

CHAPTER 4

ὅσιος vs. δίκαιος

Lexemes are inextricably linked with frames and differ from one another *semantically* when they evoke different frames. They consequently have the ability to frame situations in different ways. This chapter is a qualitative study focusing on one specific theme: the ways in which *hosios & cognates* and *dikaios & cognates* contrastively frame interactions with suppliants. In literary discussions, we get an image of supplication as a complex matter in which various types of considerations (legal, religious, social, political) are involved in evaluating what to do with a suppliant. ὅσιος and δίκαιος could be selected by a speaker to support different types of such claims, and we will explore precisely how this is done. In the final part of the chapter, we shall return to our question regarding the diachronic attestation of *hosios & cognates*. I will present a tentative explanation for the strongly increasing frequency of usage of ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος in the course of the fifth century.

1 Pleasing Gods and Pleasing Humans

Both ὅσιος and δίκαιος are evaluations of the morality of attitudes and actions. Moreover, as Rudhardt already pointed out: 'les mots ὅσιος et δίκαιος sont très fréquemment associés, ou employés dans différents contextes de telle manière que leur étroite correspondance ne peut être mise en doute'.[1] From Hesiod onwards, δίκη is presented as a personification or goddess or as originating from Zeus.[2] Thus, the moral judgment expressed by *dikaios & cognates* frequently has a religious element. Like *hosios & cognates, dikaios & cognates* often expressed what is right from the imagined point of view of the gods, or Justice is presented as a divine principle itself. Here, the semantic networks of the two sets of lexemes overlap. But *dikaios & cognates* also have a number of other applications. To compare the semantic fields of *hosios, dikaios* and their cognates, we will establish the prototypical usages of *dikaios & cognates* in the fifth century first. Studying the distribution of δίκη and derived adjectives, nouns and verbs (δίκαιος, ἄδικος, ἔκδικος, δικαιόω, etc.) by examining all individual

1 Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:32.

2 Goddess: e.g. Hes. *Op*. 220, 256. Originating from Zeus: e.g. *Op*. 36, 279.

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cases in the corpus is feasible here, due to the high frequency of occurrence of these lexemes. Since the general distribution of δίκαιος is well described, it will not be necessary to attempt such a comprehensive chart of its distribution either. The main spheres of meaning in the authoritatitve dictionaries (LSJ, Bailly, Montanari) identified for δίκαιος and δίκη in the classical period are:

– what is characteristic, customary;
– what is 'right' or 'just' from the assumed perspective of other humans or gods, who 'point out' the right direction;
– what is 'right' or 'just' because it shows a fair division, a proper balance;
– what is 'right' or 'just' because it conforms with what humans have legally committed to.[3]

The first three spheres of meaning may have been prototypical from the earliest attestations of δίκη. In chapter 2 we have seen that δίκη was used in the sense of 'what is characteristic, what is customary' from Homer onwards.[4] Furthermore, δίκη and δίκαιος were used in a moral sense in Homer and Hesiod already, and this moral judgment was often linked to the divine perspective on events in these sources.[5] The distributive idea of δίκη, prominent in the fifth century, seems to have been present from the earliest literature onwards, too. Consider, for example, the Homeric promise of two talents to the one who speaks δίκη in the 'straightest way' (ἰθύντατα). Palmer pointed out that 'the underlying notion [is] … the drawing of a line'.[6] By contrast, deciding for a 'crooked' δίκη results in an unbalanced and therefore unfair situation.[7] The term δίκη also surfaces in those situations in which characters discuss divisions in privileges

3 What is characteristic, customary: LSJ s.v. δίκαιος A1, δίκη I 1, 2; Bailly s.v. δίκη I; Montanari s.v. δίκη a. What is just (in the eyes of gods and men): LSJ s.v. δίκαιος A2, δίκη II, III; Bailly s.v. δίκαιος A δίκη II; Montanari s.v. δίκαιος a, δίκη b. What is just, showing a proper division, balance or order: LSJ s.v. δίκαιος B I 1a, δίκη II. What is just because humans have legally committed to it: LSJ s.v. δίκαιος B I 1b, 2, δίκη III, IV; Bailly s.v. δίκαιος A II, δίκη: II, III; Montanari s.v. δίκαιος b, δίκη b, c. The dictionaries give some other senses of these lexemes, which seem less central: e.g. LSJ s.v. δίκη V: Pyth. name for *three* or *five*; Bailly s.v. δίκαιος A 2 humain, civilisé, A3, euph. of sacred snake; B II 2 real, genuine; Montanari s.v. δίκαιος c esatto, preciso (of numbers).

4 As was argued in Chapter 2, section 5, this sense of δίκη is found in the Odyssey (e.g. *Od.* 14.59–60, 24.254–255) and later in the construction genitive + δίκην 'in the way of' (e.g. Pi. *P.* 2.84, S. F 659.1 *TrGF*).

5 Chapter 2, section 5. As I discussed, it is a matter of debate whether δίκη is a moral term in its earliest attestations.

6 *Il.* 18.508. Palmer 1950:158.

7 Robbiano 2005:189.

and property, for example in the *Iliad*, where Odysseus says that Agamemnon should give a feast and other gifts to Achilles, 'so that you (i.e. Achilles) may have nothing lacking of your due' (ἵνα μή τι δίκης ἐπιδευὲς ἔχῃσθα). Palmer considered this passage an instance of a sense of 'allotted portion, rightful portion, lot' for δίκη.[8]

After Homer, δίκη and δίκαιος acquire a set of meanings related to legal proceedings. The term δίκη may refer to a lawsuit, trial, or legal penalty, and appears in many set phrases in this semantic sphere;[9] the adjective δίκαιος refers to what is 'lawful'.[10] Given the prominence of these usages in fifth-century texts, it seems fair to say that the usage of δίκαιος as what is 'legally right' becomes a new prototypical sense of this lexeme in the classical period.

Abstracting from these diverse usages to a 'schema', a fifth-century language user may have considered δίκη and δίκαιος to be 'what is *in some sense* just or fair'.[11] Moreover, these prototypical usages of δίκη and δίκαιος seem to be connected to particular cultural frames. δίκη and δίκαιος fit within the cultural knowledge that a group of people living together is held together by a set of norms and values. δίκη and δίκαιος may also activate the cultural frame that *hosios & cognates* activate: the notion that humans keep up a long-term relationship with the gods, in which the gods are interested in particular kinds of moral behaviour (i.e. towards other humans in those relationships that they are especially interested in). Furthermore, δίκη and δίκαιος are linked to the frame of 'legal justice': the notion that humans have agreed upon a set of written rules, and that disputes are settled in an institutionalised manner, by reference to these rules, in a court of law. Finally, δίκη and δίκαιος evoke a frame of

8 *Il.* 19.180. Palmer 1950:160–161, *contra* Gagarin 1973:85. Gagarin's consequent translation (1973, 1974) of archaic δίκη as 'settlement' is based on the distributive idea, but according to Gagarin this notion lacks moral content. Cf. the discussion in Chapter 2, section 5.

9 LSJ s.v. δίκη IV 1–3.

10 LSJ s.v. δίκαιος B I 2.

11 The etymology of δίκη and δίκαιος may help us (21st century scholars) understand the diverging semantics of these terms better. δίκη derives etymologically from δείκνυμι 'to show' or 'to point out' (Chantraine 1968–1980:284, Frisk 1960:394). The usage of δίκη in the sense of 'what is characteristic, what is customary' may originate from the idea of 'what shows' (Chantraine 1968–1980:284). The normative usage of δίκη may originate from the notion of 'pointing out' (i.e., a particular direction, Chantraine 1968–1980:284, Gagarin 1973:82). Moreover, it has been put forward that the root *deik-* (of δείκνυμι) contains the notion of a 'marked line' (Chantraine 1968–1980:284, Gagarin 1973:82). In this sense, δίκη may be seen as the 'right, justice' that emerges from the idea of the proper placement of a 'dividing line', which is the achievement of a proper balance. The normative aspect of δίκη can be understood from the notion of the drawing of a line, too.

'distributive justice': the notion that, when people live together, the collective must achieve some distribution of goods and privileges that is motivated and accepted by its members. We will elaborate on these cultural frames in section 3 below.

The semantic relationship between *hosios, dikaios* and their cognates has been discussed by ancient and modern scholars. The lexicographer Hesychius gave δίκαιος as one of five explanations of the meaning of ὅσιος, indicating that ὅσιος is sometimes used as a (near-)synonym of δίκαιος.[12] In the 20th-century literature, Bolkestein wrote that ὅσιον and δίκαιον are nearly synonymous in the majority of their occurrences.[13] All other ancient and modern authors articulate a differential view of the semantics of these lexemes. Plato defined τὸ ὅσιον by contrasting it to τὸ δίκαιον, providing various views on the semantic connection between the two terms in different dialogues. In *Gorgias*, the 'prudent' person (ὁ σώφρων) is one who does what is fitting towards humans and towards gods. When he does what is fitting towards the gods, these actions are τὰ ὅσια. By contrast, in acting according to what is appropriate towards other humans, his actions are τὰ δίκαια.[14] In Plato's *Euthyphro*, Socrates helps Euthyphro find a definition of τὸ ὅσιον. Socrates suggests that τὸ ὅσιον is *a part* (μέρος, μόριον) of τὸ δίκαιον. Euthyphro goes on to define τὸ ὅσιον as that part of τὸ δίκαιον that concerns caring for the gods (θεραπεία). The part that concerns caring for other humans is 'the remaining part' of τὸ δίκαιον.[15] In Plato's *Protagoras*, the question is raised of whether τὸ δίκαιον is *identical to* τὸ ὅσιον.[16] This suggestion is rejected, but no further attention is paid to answering the question.[17]

Van der Valk follows the semantic differentiation suggested in *Gorgias*: someone who has fulfilled his/her duties towards the gods is ὅσιος, while a person who has discharged his/her obligations towards humans is δίκαιος.[18] As was discussed in Chapter 2, he saw the usage of ὅσιος in a non-religious sense (regarding duties towards humans) as a secondary development,[19] and

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12 Chapter 1, section 2.

13 Bolkestein 1936:190.

14 Pl. *Grg*. 507a6–b4.

15 Pl. *Euthphr*. 11e8–12e5.

16 Pl. *Prt*. 329c–331e.

17 On ὅσιος and δίκαιος in classical philosophy, cf. Mikalson 2010b esp. Ch. 5.

18 Van der Valk 1942:114–115, 118. Jeanmaire 1945:68 follows his view.

19 Chapter 2, section 2. Van der Valk 1942:133–137. He argued that ὅσιος came to be used in a non-religious but ethical sense to intensify an evaluation. I have proposed the view (in accordance with Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:30, 33) that ὅσιος fundamentally concerns behaviour towards the gods *and* towards other humans.

due to this development ὅσιος came to be used almost as a synonym to δίκαιος, though keeping its own semantic 'residue' (of the religious).[20] However, we have already seen that ὁσιότης is an ethical *and* religious term, and that seeing δικαιοσύνη as a non-religious, ethical concept is too restrictive, for this term often expresses the imagined perspective of the gods as well.

The usage of ὅσιος and δίκαιος in fifth-century literature was characterised differently by Benveniste, who acknowledged that *hosios, dikaios* and their cognates most frequently evaluate relationships among humans. According to him, ὅσιος is what is prescribed/permitted by divine law, and δίκαιος is what is prescribed/permitted by human law.[21] Motte follows this characterisation, but notes that it does not work in every instance, because sometimes ὅσιος and ἄδικος are juxtaposed as *ant*onyms and so it seems that ὅσιος and δίκαιος would be *syn*onyms, and not to refer to different things at all.[22] He states that in such cases the usage of the term ὅσιος still imposes 'une connotation religieuse' on the context.[23] Connor likewise argues that ὅσιος and δίκαιος appear in close coordination in various passages, where 'the same action might be described as *dikaion* when viewed from a human perspective and *hosion* when the reactions of the gods are conjectured. Thus among the writers of this [i.e. classical Greek] society *hosios* may occur in close parallel to *dikaios*, but often with a hint of divine involvement or concern.'[24] Finally, Rudhardt stated similarly that 'ὅσιος a pour le Grec une consonance spécifiquement religieuse, alors que δίκαιος, bien que la justice intéresse les dieux et complète la piété, paraît à cet égard moins nettement caractérisé'.[25]

The definition by Benveniste is problematic. It assumes that we need to find some clear-cut difference between the two sets of lexemes that works for all cases. It has already been argued by others, such as Motte, that there are no such hard distinctions. The theory of semantics that was set out in Chapter 1 stresses that it is not *necessary* to look for such a distinction, because that is not how the competition between lexemes works. By contrast, the consensus among Motte, Connor and Rudhardt seems correct, and we may re-phrase their

20 Eatough 1971:240–241 supports Van der Valk's description, but emphasizes that ὅσιος and δίκαιος were never used truly synonymously, because ὅσιος always has a religious connotation. Burkert 1985:270 follows Van der Valk.

21 Benveniste 1969:198. Similarly: LSJ: ὅσιος = '*sanctioned by divine law* … the sense of ὅσιος often depends on its relation on the one hand to δίκαιος (sanctioned by *human law*) …'.

22 e.g. in A. *Supp*. 404, discussed below.

23 Motte 1986:167.

24 Connor 1988:163.

25 Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:30, 33.

views in the linguistic terms we have been working with. ὅσιος may refer to a diverse range of actions, attitudes, or persons, but in the large majority of cases it refers to a very select number of themes (dealings with gods and with humans in a small selection of relationships). When a speaker says that something or someone is ὅσιος for some particular reason, his utterance activates this small group of usages in the mind of the listener. It has been argued that these usages all connect to the same larger frame: thinking and acting in a way that sustains the long-term reciprocal relationship with the gods. That is, usage of the term ὅσιος always activates a religious frame. By contrast, the terms δίκη and δίκαιος have a diverse range of usages, being connected to diverse cultural frames. If a speaker says, for example, that something is δίκαιον because it is in accordance with what humans have legally committed to, the listener understands the lexeme in this particular usage, but temporarily activates the other senses of δίκη and their associated frames. The 'religious' frame is one among them.

In the remaining part of this chapter, we will examine more closely the notion that *hosios, dikaios* and their cognates differ in their semantics because they frame situations differently. We would like to know *in what way* precisely *hosios, dikaios* and their cognates do this and *to what extent* they overlap in this respect. Which types of frames recur if we examine their respective usage in the context of debate? How often is δίκαιος used in the sense of 'doing things right, because the gods will approve'?

2 *hosios* & *cognates* vs. *dikaios* & *cognates*: Frames

Given the frequency of lexemes with the root δικ-, we will choose a qualitative approach rather than a quantitative one. We will focus on the usage of ὅσιος and δίκαιος in fifth-century contexts of supplication. As a corpus, we will take the five main 'supplication plays' identified by Belfiore,[26] complemented by

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26 1998:153. These are: Aeschylus's *Suppliants* and *Eumenides*, Sophocles's *Oedipus at Colonus* and Euripides's *Heraclides* and *Suppliants* (as Belfiore 1998 notes, Burian 1971:1 and Lattimore 1958:13 n. 3 categorised the first four as suppliant plays, while Taplin added Aeschylus's *Eumenides*). Euripides's *Suppliants* is not useful for our purposes, because although Adrastus is a suppliant, the argumentation of Adrastus and his conversation partner Theseus is not really about the treatment of the suppliant Adrastus *as a suppliant*. The cases of *hosios & cognates* in this play do not refer to the dealings with a suppliant either. However, in the other plays good examples of speeches in which the treatment of a suppliant is framed in terms of *hosios & cognates* or *dikaios & cognates* (or both) can be found.

all other passages in fifth-century texts in which claims about how to treat suppliants are made in terms of τὸ ὅσιον.[27]

2.1 *A Case Study: Ancient Supplication*

Ancient supplication makes a good case study because this theme had religious, moral and legal aspects in classical Athens. Suppliants in fifth-century literature claimed that it is ὅσιον to protect them, sometimes explicitly stating that refusing them help will result in the anger of Zeus Xenios, Zeus Hikesios (traditional protectors of suppliants) or the divine world in general.[28] However, the historical status of such claims is unclear. The religious dimension of supplication in the Greek world of the fifth century BCE is subject to debate, and we will need to consider this question first to have a context for the literary cases to be discussed. The traditional sanctity and inviolability of suppliants are generally accepted, following Gould, who explained supplication as a ritual with religiously binding force. However, a scholarly disagreement has arisen over the status of suppliants in the classical period. According to Naiden, the religious factor was removed from the equation altogether, when supplication became a fully rational and institutionalised procedure;[29] others, such as Chaniotis, do not accept this view.

The authoritative article by Gould (1973), which became a standard reference for the subject of supplication in the Greek world, provided an account of supplication at an altar and of humans face to face as *a ritual act*.[30] In this view, supplication can be seen as a very serious version of a 'game', with a standard procedure and a set of rules to follow. The basic rule was that as long as there was physical contact between suppliant and supplicandus[31]—touching

27 These are: Euripides's *Cyclops* (the interaction between Odysseus and the Cyclops throughout the play); Euripides's fragmentary play *Hypsipyle* (Hypsipyle's supplication of Amphiaraus, F 757.856–867 *TrGF*); Euripides's *Orestes* (disqualification of Menelaus, 1213); the supplication of Pactyes in Herodotus's *Histories* 1.157–160 and the Plataean debate in Thucydides's *Histories* 3.52–68.

28 e.g. *Od.* 9.269–271, A. *Supp.* 478–479. Zeus Xenios: e.g. *Il.* 13.624–625, *Od.* 14.389, Pi. *O.* 8.22, A. *A.* 362, E. *Cyc.* 354; Zeus Hikesios: e.g. A. *Supp.* 347, S. *Ph.* 484, E. *Hec.* 345. Not surprisingly, as we have seen, the interaction with suppliants and guests was one of the central themes covered by the semantic scope of *hosios & cognates*.

29 Gould 1973, Naiden 2004, 2006.

30 Gould 1973:75.

31 The term 'supplicandus' was coined by Naiden 2004:72, 2006:3 to denote the person to whom a supplication is addressed.

the knees, the chin, the hands or an altar—the safety of the suppliant was guaranteed.[32] That is, as long as a suppliant was clinging to the supplicandus or an altar, 'there was no question but that any violence brought against the suppliant was a direct challenge, either to the power of the god whose sanctuary or altar was involved to protect his own suppliants or more generally to the power of Zeus ἱκέσιος'.[33]

By contrast, Naiden (2004, 2006) presented a highly rationalist account of ancient supplication. He sees supplication as a four-step process, in which after the *approach* by the suppliant (step 1) and the use of a *gesture*, such as touching the knees of the supplicandus (step 2), the suppliant makes a *request*, accompanied by *arguments* (step 3), which are *evaluated* by the supplicandus, who then, finally, makes his *decision* about whether to accept or reject the suppliant (step 4). The last two steps are the most important parts of the process. Crucially, according to Naiden, this shows us that supplication was not a 'ritual' but rather a rational, 'quasi-legal' procedure, brought into the sphere of law in the classical polis. There was no religious requirement to accept a supplicant's case. The supplicandus was free to accept, reject or dismiss[34] the suppliant on the basis of rational choice.[35] The gods were not offended and did not punish this, and mortals 'followed the gods' lead'.[36]

32 This phenomenon is often referred to in the literature as *Kontaktmagie*, e.g. Kopperschmidt 1967:11–12.

33 Gould 1973:78. Cases in which the 'rules' are broken by such violence occur, but it is more common to attempt to trick the suppliant into breaking contact. This was a way of circumventing the ritual, exploiting the 'rules' of the game without actually breaking them (Gould 1973:82–85). This happens for example in E. *HF* 238 ff., where Lycus threatens suppliants that he will build a fire around the sanctuary, with the intent of inducing them to leave. As Gould shows, Homeric examples in which someone killed a suppliant without incurring divine punishment were all cases in which the supplication was not a completed ritual act, and so harming a suppliant was no direct insult to Zeus Hikesios. That is, the suppliant is killed before he has made physical contact or he never tries to grasp the supplicandus's knees (for example, because he is standing at a distance), or he has already given up and let go of the supplicandus. There is one exception: Odysseus killed Leodes in *Od.* 22.310 ff. even though he clasped Odysseus's knees.

34 'To dismiss' a suppliant means: not to accept or reject him, but to let him go (Naiden 2006:158).

35 For example, one could reject a suppliant because he was an enemy (e.g. *Il.* 10.449–453), a hypocrite (e.g. Isoc. 4.59–60, 12.194–195) or a criminal (e.g. Apollod. 2.6.2).

36 As Naiden 2006:146 argues, supplicandi rejecting suppliants are punished only once by the gods, through a human helper (Agamemnon in A. *A.* 231–247), and only four times by humans in the entire timespan covered by this monograph (Timoleon's brother in

There are literary cases that do not fit this model. Naiden mentions Aeschylus's *Suppliants*, in which the Danaids argue that they should be accepted because Zeus Xenios watches over them, and the assembly of Argos finally accepts this argument. Naiden's view is that these literary characters do not really understand how supplication works,[37] because there are only two matters that the gods care about. One should not kill a suppliant at the altar—here, Naiden argues, the 'prevailing view' (i.e. Gould) is correct; and once a suppliant has been accepted, the supplicandus must indeed help him. Keeping promises was a norm, whereas acceptance and rejection were optional;[38] 'betrayal' was punished by the gods or by humans as agents of the gods.[39]

Naiden shows that the institution of supplication became further rationalised by its embedding in official state matters. It became a legal procedure when suppliants were evaluated by the Council and the Assembly in a process of double evaluation.[40] Transposing the evaluation of suppliants to a legal setting was a way in which the Greeks tried to give concrete shape to the divine

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Plu. *Tim.* 4.5–6, Polyphemus in *Od.* 9.250–280/E. *Cyc.* 590–607, Menelaus in E. *Andr.* 537–544 and a Hebrew supplicandus in J. *BJ.* 4.360/6.118–121). Note that of this total of five supplicandi, all except one are punished for multiple crimes (like Polyphemus in *Od.* 9 and E. *Cyc.*).

37 'The … mistake committed by the Danaids (and, I think, by scholars naturally or theoretically sympathetic to suppliants) is that they assume that acceptance of a suppliant is compulsory and rejection is impious. What they do not understand is that although suppliants may comply with the requirements of the practice, they are not exempt from evaluation on legal and moral grounds … The assembly of Argos also makes a mistake. Their mistake is in thinking that they have no choice. Because of this, they fail to examine the character of the suppliants' (Naiden 2004:87). This does not seem the best way of approaching this tragedy, as long as the text does not give us any clues or reasons to believe that the Danaids and the Council both obviously 'misunderstand' the way things are in the world. The most we can say about this is that it is in the Danaids' best interest to trust in the ritual blindly, or at least, to make the Council believe that they do, as a rhetorical move that is part of their persuasive speech, intended to put pressure on the Council.

38 Naiden 2006:124.

39 Naiden 2006:128.

40 In their imagination of how matters are regulated elsewhere, the Athenians even imposed this system of dual evaluation on other cities in the mythical past (A. *Eu.*, A. *Supp.*, E. *Supp.*, E. *Heracl.*). This is indirect evidence for double evaluation in Athens in the fifth century. Naiden (2006:177) sees these literary cases as an indication that this system was 'inherited' and not a democratic invention. However, we should see the legal system in these texts as achronological constructs in which characteristics of the Athenian *polis* were projected on the literary situation, as Goldhill (1986, e.g. 146–147, 167) argues for other aspects of Greek tragedy.

norm they perceived as preceding and underlying the law. When a suppliant came to the altar of the Athenian council, he placed a suppliant bough on the council altar, then presented his arguments. The council considered the suppliant's request first, and if they approved, they sent the suppliant to the Assembly, with or without a favourable recommendation.[41] The Assembly in its turn devoted regular and frequent meetings in every prytany to deal with supplications. A decree was published about the outcome.[42] Thus, the acceptance of a suppliant, not only in private situations but also by the state, was not automatic nor a religious necessity, but the outcome of a process of rational assessment.

Fifth-century literary sources do not present a clear picture that could help us choose between Gould's and Naiden's accounts. The complexity of the problem may be illustrated by a single example in a Herodotean story. When the Lydian Pactyes, pursued by the Persians, fled to the city of Cyme, the Cymaeans were uncertain of what to do.[43] Protecting this suppliant surely meant trouble with the Persians. But simply dismissing Pactyes would undoubtedly lead to his death and, perhaps, the anger of the gods. The Cymaeans decided to refer the problem to the nearby oracle of Apollo at Branchidae.[44] An envoy asked 'by means of which action they would please the gods the most' (ὁκοῖόν τι ποιέοντες θεοῖσι μέλλοιεν χαριεῖσθαι). Surprisingly, but to the relief of a majority of the Cymaeans, the oracle advised them to 'surrender Pactyes to the Persians' (ἐκδιδόναι Πακτύην Πέρσῃσι). However, one Cymaean citizen, Aristodicus, insisted

41 Naiden 2006:174–175. In several Attic inscriptions the positive evaluation of a supplication is written down in a decree, stating that the Council considers the suppliant ἔννομα ἱκετεύειν ἐν τῇ βουλῇ. In this context, ἔννομος means that the suppliant is eligible to supplicate, that he has done so at the right time, and that he has made a lawful request.

42 Naiden 2004:81, *AthPol* 43.6. MacDowell 1978:228–229 explains this was a practical measure: in the Athenian Empire, citizens of dependent *poleis* had to travel to Athens to conduct their legal business. It would be impractical if, having arrived in Athens, they had to wait for an undetermined period of time for their case to come up.

43 Hdt. 1.157. The background of this story is narrated in Hdt. 1.153–156. After Cyrus had captured Sardis, he entrusted control of this city to Tabalus (a Persian) and left the management of the gold which had belonged to Croesus and the other Lydians to Pactyes (a Lydian). Then he left taking Croesus with him. However, as soon as Cyrus was away from Sardis, Pactyes used the gold in his care to hire troops and convince the Lydians to revolt against Cyrus and Tabalus. When Cyrus discovered what was happening, he planned to sell all the Lydians into slavery, but Croesus persuaded him to punish Pactyes alone. Cyrus sent an army against Pactyes, but Pactyes fled to Cyme. Messengers were then sent to the Cymaeans, ordering them to surrender Pactyes.

44 All Greek quotes in this paragraph are taken from Hdt. 1.158.

that a new group of sacred envoys including himself be appointed to ask the oracle a second time. Aristodicus 'disbelieved the oracle's response and thought the envoys were not telling the truth' (ἀπιστέων τε τῷ χρησμῷ καὶ δοκέων τοὺς θεοπρόπους οὐ λέγειν ἀληθέως).

And so Aristodicus revisited the oracle,[45] this time asking explicitly whether to surrender Pactyes, 'a suppliant' who had come to the Cymaeans 'fleeing a violent death at the hands of the Persians' (ἱκέτης … φεύγων θάνατον βίαιον πρὸς Περσέων). The oracle gave exactly the same advice. But Aristodicus had anticipated that, and carried out a premeditated plan (ἐκ προνοίης ἐποίεε τάδε). To the god's dismay, he removed the birds in Apollo's temple. 'You most godless of all men (ἀνοσιώτατε ἀνθρώπων), how dare you do this!' Apollo exclaimed, 'Are you stripping my temple of its suppliants?' (τοὺς ἱκέτας μου ἐκ τοῦ νηοῦ κεραΐζεις;). As the story goes, Aristodicus 'wasn't put out' (οὐκ ἀπορήσαντα) by Apollo's rebuke and asked, 'Do you yourself help your suppliants in this way, but order us to surrender ours?' The god answered, showing that his previous advice did not express his true feelings: 'Yes, I do order this, so that you, 'having committed an impiety' (ἀσεβήσαντες), will perish all the sooner, and never come here in the future to consult this oracle about the surrender of suppliants (ἱκετέων ἐκδόσιος).'

When Apollo calls Aristodicus ἀνοσιώτατε ἀνθρώπων, he seems to be angry for various reasons, all of which together account for his outburst.[46] Aristodicus deliberately provoked and tested the god.[47] Furthermore, when Aristodicus took the god to task for his actions ('then why do you protect your own suppliants …?'), this verbal challenge to the god had a clear element of ὕβρις to it:

45 All Greek quotes in this paragraph are taken from Hdt. 1.159.

46 The Herodotean example quite explicitly illustrates the usage of ὅσιος as an evaluation of human conduct of special concern to the gods, with the figure of a god shouting out to a human that he is ἀνοσιώτατος (even if in this case the situation was rather ironic, with Aristodicus actually wanting to do the right thing and when Apollo's denunciation of the bad treatment of suppliants was more about his own apparent consent than about Aristodicus's morality). Cases in which a god/personification evaluates human behaviour as ὅσιος or the opposite occur sometimes: B. *Ep.* 3.83 (Apollo), E. *HF* 853 (Madness), E. *Hipp.* 1287 (Artemis), Ar. *Pl.* 415 (Poverty: on the status of Poverty as a 'goddess' in this play cf. Chapter 3, section 3.5). In E. *IT* 1461 a goddess (Athena) explains a course of action as ἡ ὁσία.

47 Removing the birds is something he had planned to do all along. He had even prepared a response to Apollo's apparently expected rebuke. Testing the gods was not approved by the Greeks. We may compare Aristodicus's action to Croesus's testing of the Greek oracles (Hdt. 1.46–49), which has been argued was a very un-Greek action (Klees 1965: esp. 16–49 and 63–68).

Aristodicus judged a god by the same evaluative standard as he would judge his fellow humans. On more than one occasion in the archaic and classical literature *hybris* is connected to the disqualification 'not ὅσιος'.[48] But Apollo's most direct reason to be upset was obviously Aristodicus's behaviour towards the birds, 'suppliants in his temple'. Aristodicus's action should be interpreted metaphorically: the Cymaeans' proposed rejection of Pactyes is symbolically realised by Aristodicus in his removal of the birds. Even though Apollo initially consents to the Cymaeans' request to surrender Pactyes, his outburst is a clue that their very suggestion of doing so in fact greatly angers him.[49] This negative judgment runs parallel to the god's later, more explicit disqualification of the surrender as committing an impiety (ἀσεβεῖν). Finally, the Cymeans' attempt to shift their moral dilemmas to the gods may be considered an additional problem, adding to their (proposed) bad treatment of the suppliant.[50]

Neither Gould's nor Naiden's account helps clarify the Herodotean passage unambiguously. With the traditional view (Gould), surrendering Pactyes to the Persians would be committing an impiety (ἀσεβεῖν). In this passage, even considering the surrender of Pactyes is construed by Apollo as a gross impiety.[51] But there is tension in the passage: the idea that one should offer asylum to any suppliant by order of the gods is in fact challenged by events at every stage in the story. The Cymaeans could *imagine* not honouring the suppliant to the extent that they sent out an official embassy to the oracle to ask about this; the god himself has no scruples about surrendering Pactyes just to teach the

48 *Od.* 16.418–433, E. *Ba.* 370–378, Hdt. 4.146.1.

49 It is not clear whether the certainty of the suppliant's death, if he was indeed surrendered, also influenced Apollo's reaction.

50 Various authors (Brown 1978:72, Fontenrose 1988:15, Pelling 2006:151 n. 36) have compared the Cymaeans' consultation of the oracle to Glaucus's question to the oracle in Delphi (Hdt. 6.86γ). Glaucus had accepted money for safekeeping from a Milesian stranger, but when this man's sons asked for the return of the money, Glaucus pretended he could not remember the arrangement and travelled to Delphi to ask the oracle whether it was all right if, by swearing a solemn (but false) oath that the money was his, he could get away with keeping it for himself. The Pythia was very angry at this suggestion and cursed his family, saying that testing the god (τὸ πειρηθῆναι τοῦ θεοῦ) and committing the crime was the same. But there is a clear difference between these passages. Glaucus asked to do something that was very clearly a crime. The Cymaeans had a difficult dilemma: helping Pactyes could lead to war and their own deaths. Should the protection of one man jeopardise the lives of an entire *polis*? This seems a valid problem.

51 Gould 1973:84 characterises what the Cymaeans end up doing as an example of exploiting, but not breaking the rules, when by sending Pactyes off to Mytilene, they smuggle the suppliant 'off the field.'

Cymaeans a lesson; the Cymaeans, having learnt from Apollo that surrendering Pactyes was not an option, shipped him off to Mytilene and then Chios, in this way still evading responsibility;[52] and finally, the Chians surrendered Pactyes to the Persians for a reward, though feeling uneasy about this towards the gods.[53] Nor does Naiden's approach 'solve' the passage: for if the gods do not punish the rejection of a suppliant, why would Herodotus's Apollo bother to get so angry in the first place? Playing down the religious dimension does not make interpreting the passage any easier.

We can understand this passage, and other literary stories that show the same dual perspective,[54] if we accept the view proposed by Chaniotis (1996) instead. Chaniotis presented a multidimensional view on dealings with suppliants at public altars in Greece. He took the inviolability of suppliants at an altar, as argued by Gould, at face value. This 'right, probably as old as the sanctuaries themselves'[55] is still the norm in the classical period. However, crucially, as Chaniotis shows, from the early fifth century onwards, various *poleis* realised there was a problem: the presence of suppliants at public altars threatened to get out of control.[56] Sanctuaries became crowded with suppliants staying for longer periods of time.[57] Some of these might be native

52 When it turned out (1.160) that the Mytileneans were planning to surrender Pactyes to the Persians for a bribe, the Cymaeans felt slightly responsible and intercepted their former suppliant, sending him to Chios instead (where the Chians ended up dragging Pactyes from the sanctuary and returning him to the Persians after all).

53 The Chians surrendered Pactyes to the Persians in exchange for Atarneus (a place in Persia), but 'it was a long time before any Chian would sprinkle a sacrificial offering of barley that came from Atarneus to any of the gods, nor would anyone bake wafers with flour that came from there. Indeed, they kept anything that might come from this place away from anything having to do with religion' (Ἦν δὲ χρόνος οὗτος οὐκ ὀλίγος γενόμενος, ὅτε Χίων οὐδεὶς ἐκ τοῦ Ἀταρνέος τούτου οὔτε οὐλὰς κριθέων πρόχυσιν, ἐποιέετο θεῶν οὐδενὶ οὔτε πέμματα ἐπέσσετο καρποῦ τοῦ ἐνθεῦτεν, ἀπείχετό τε τῶν πάντων ἱρῶν τὰ πάντα ἐκ τῆς χώρης ταύτης γινόμενα, 1.160.5).

54 Cf. the literary examples in this section.

55 Chaniotis 1996:67.

56 In fact, Gould ended his own article with a similar, very brief diachronic qualification to his theory: by the end of the fifth century, 'supplication, though a living thing … was becoming increasingly a ritual whose binding force was weakening in face of the counter-strain of political realities' (101).

57 Chaniotis 1996:69. 'As Ulrich Sinn has recently demonstrated, we must assume that from the classical period on large numbers of suppliants ran to Greek sanctuaries and sometimes remained there for a long time, so that installations for their lodging became necessary.'

or foreign murderers, fugitives whose presence in a city could lead to aggression by their pursuer,[58] or other unwanted figures, such as less serious criminals or runaway slaves. Moreover, as state institutions grew and developed and the solution of legal conflicts became an issue of the public courts, law became an instrument, not so much to deal with this problem as to work around it. As Chaniotis argues, 'the persistence of sacred law prevented the formulation of clear, unequivocal, generally applicable rules for the acceptance or rejection of claims of supplication';[59] the Greeks were 'extremely reluctant to introduce … unambiguous limitations [to *asylia*]'.[60]

What then did they do? The simplest way of getting rid of a suppliant was to send him away and hope that the gods would turn a blind eye.[61] One could try to get around the rules for *asylia* in a clever way, for example by making a fire close to the altar so that the suppliants would have to leave, or threatening to do so.[62] Another possibility was to ask the oracle for permission, as in the Herodotean example, in which the Cymaeans attempted to shift the responsibility to the oracle at Didyma.[63] But most importantly, the documentary and literary evidence shows us that many individual rules were constructed, which were either intended to or had the secondary effect of *circumventing* the problem by reducing the actual numbers of suppliants.[64]

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58 Tragic situations especially play out this scenario. In three of the five plays called 'suppliant tragedies' (Belfiore 1998:153), i.e. A. *Supp.*, E. *Heracl.* and S. *OC*, the action centers around a suppliant seeking protection in a *polis* that is not his own; this brings that *polis* into trouble with an aggressive pursuer.

59 Chaniotis 1996:70.

60 Chaniotis 1996:71.

61 The Greeks must have noticed that divine punishment (e.g. a thunderstorm, a plague) did not follow every time one denied help to a suppliant. But the decision to neglect the rights of suppliants would always remain open for potential future debate. Any calamity befalling the supplicandus or the *polis* later on could be interpreted retrospectively as an expression of divine anger after all. For example, in Th. 1.128, the Spartans had previously put to death a group of helots who had taken refuge in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus. When a terrible earthquake ravaged the city later, the Spartans thought this was a divine punishment. A comparable case is Hdt. 6.75. In Aeschylus's *Suppliants*, Pelasgus wonders whether he should 'take his chances' (τυχὴν ἑλεῖν, 380), i.e. not helping the suppliants and simply hoping he will escape divine punishment.

62 e.g. Ar. *Th.* 726–777; E. *HF* 238 ff. I have not encountered any historical examples.

63 Hdt. 1.159. Two other potential examples of asking an oracle, IG V 2 262 (Arcadia, fourth cent.) and *LSAM* 29 (Metropolis, fourth cent.), are discussed by Chaniotis 1996:75–79, but his interpretation of these documents is speculative.

64 Not only the rules described below, but also literary stories, such as Ion's attack on the

These laws regulated where, when and with what requests one was allowed to supplicate at an altar, and they limited who was allowed to supplicate.[65] Certain *persons*, such as murderers, were prohibited from approaching public altars. Though such rules were aimed primarily at the avoidance of pollution, a secondary and perhaps not unwelcome effect was that they could not supplicate either.[66] Another measure that discouraged potential suppliants was demanding entry fees to the sanctuary.[67] And even for those who were allowed inside, regulations tried to make sure that they could not stay indefinitely.[68] Furthermore, restrictions on supplicatory *location* occur for example in Athens, where runaway slaves were only allowed to supplicate at the Theseion;[69] and a drastic measure to keep them out of the Acropolis was the decision to build a wall so that neither slaves nor thieves could enter.[70] The *timing* of placing suppliant boughs was regulated,[71] and finally, there were regulations that limited the *content* of supplications. Suppliants were not allowed to ask for what the laws of the city had denied them; once convicted of wrongdoing, they could not supplicate for the verdict to be overturned or to reduce punishments.[72] In

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institution of *asylia* that unrighteous persons should not be protected by an altar (E. *Ion* 1312–1319), show us that the Greeks reflected on the problems of the institute of supplication, even if (as Burnett 1962:99 argued) Euripides distances himself from Ion's criticism. Cf. Chaniotis 1996:66–68.

65 Not all of these are mentioned by Chaniotis; I present a collection of measures from different sources. These measurements can partly be seen in the light of practical measures dealing with human presence in a sanctuary, aimed at protecting sanctuaries from becoming overcrowded and incurring damage to the natural environment. There were for example regulations about camping out, cutting wood, commercial exploitation of a site, etc. For a discussion and references to the relevant inscriptions, cf. Dillon 1997 and Chapter 6, section 1, n. 11.

66 Chaniotis 1996:74, Naiden 2006:178. These were: murderers, *atimoi* (including male prostitutes, cowards, deserters, draft dodgers and impious persons) and felons (including kidnappers, thieves, robbers, burglars and assailants). E.g. *LSAM* 55 (Knidos, fourth cent.).

67 This is the case at one healing shrine at least, Oropos (*LSS* 35.4–6, fourth cent.). Cf. Naiden 2006:187.

68 For example, in the Samian Heraion (Habicht 1972:210–225, third century) shopkeepers inside the sanctuary were not allowed to hire suppliants nor were they allowed to help or hide suppliants. Cf. Naiden 2006:185–191.

69 Naiden 2004:73. For the sources cf. Christensen 1984.

70 This is IG i^3 45 dated c. 432–431 BCE. Cf. Chaniotis 1996:72; Naiden 2006:184.

71 Naiden 2004:74. We can deduce this from Andocides's *De Mysteriis* 116 in which Andocides was accused of placing a suppliant bough on the altar of the Athenian Eleusinium, while there was a law against doing this when the Mysteries took place.

72 This is apparent from D. 24.51–52. Cf. Naiden 2004:75, 2006:179.

addition to these regulations dealing with supplications at public altars, some cases of private supplication were regulated,[73] as were some cases of 'international' supplication.[74]

Note that in Chaniotis's account two different domains may be distinguished: an unwritten custom that one should assist suppliants, and a set of written rules providing a way around undesirable practical consequences of the divine norm. Note that these written rules were *ad hoc* reactions to the problem.[75] They are all external measures, procedural guidelines, evasive manoeuvres, which do not attack the traditional sanctity of suppliants. This remained the unwritten norm in the fifth century. Nor were there any legal procedures against people who had violated *asylia*, at least until the Hellenistic age.[76]

The reluctance which the Greeks felt to restrain the institution of *asylia* directly, and the circumventing measures they ultimately resorted to, sit uneasily with Naiden's empirical conclusion that there was no perceived divine pressure towards accepting suppliants. Naiden argues that 'of the seventy rejecting supplicandi in Greek sources, only one, Aeschylus' Agamemnon, faces punishment by the gods'.[77] In order to determine how to interpret this observation in the light of our questions, it is necessary to examine the evidence for ourselves. However, we will focus on those cases that appear in fifth-century and earlier texts. Naiden's broad diachronic span,[78] in other ways a strength of the book, may distort the picture when looking at a specific period.

All of Naiden's Greek sources from the fifth century and earlier are literary stories or literary adaptations of possibly historical stories.[79] Thus, his findings would imply that in the Greek literary conceptualisation of the divine world

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73 Athenian law regulated that a murderer who had killed unwillingly was allowed to approach the dying victim or relatives of the victim, asking them for forgiveness and to be allowed to stay in Attica, as is apparent from D. 23.72, 38.22, 43.51. Cf. Naiden 2004:73, 2006:198–199.

74 Cf. Chapter 4, section 3.7.

75 Chaniotis 1996:79–83 argues that there is one exception: the systematic legislation around supplication by runaway slaves, which perhaps emerged because the problem this group presented was the most pressing. But the evidence for such systematic regulation is patchy.

76 Chaniotis 1996:70.

77 Naiden 2006:146.

78 The monograph has a diachronic span ranging from Homer to the end of the Roman Principate, focusing on Greek and Roman supplication with occasional reference to Hebrew and other Near Eastern acts of supplication. Cases of rejection in Greek literature (listed Naiden 2006:162–163) range from Homer to Himerius (fourth cent. CE).

79 Thirty out of Naiden's total of seventy cases of rejection in Greek literature are found in the period from Homer to the end of the fifth century. Naiden lists seven rejections in the

in this period, the gods are portrayed as uncaring about violations against suppliants, even if this conflicts with any claims human characters might make in the same texts. If Naiden's observations are correct, the theology emerging from these literary texts would be quite cynical indeed with respect to suppliants. Such a conclusion may be considered irreconcilable with Chaniotis's view that honouring suppliants was a strong religious norm in the classical period. However, if we focus on Naiden's data in more detail, it turns out that rejection of suppliants who established the appropriate physical contact—and thus made the event a completed ritual with binding religious force—is actually rare. Thus, it is not surprising that there are also very few cases in which a rejecting supplicandus remains unpunished.[80]

With respect to the Herodotean example, Chaniotis's account explains both Apollo's imagined divine perspective as well as the fact that humans will try to circumvent the strongly imposed divine norm. Appealing to τὸ ὅσιον in issues of supplication was a strong appeal in the second half of the fifth century, and not only when issuing from the mouth of a god (which was, in fact, rather rare).[81] At the same time, adhering to this strong divine norm was not automatic: in the face of political reality and due to the existence of circumventing strategies,

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Iliad, three in the *Odyssey*, two in Aeschylus, three in Sophocles, ten in Euripides, two in Aristophanes, one in Herodotus and three in Thucydides.

80 Thirteen of the thirty suppliants establish the ritually required physical contact with the supplicandus or an altar. In the other cases the ritual would not have a binding, religious force. Two of these supplicandi faced punishment (Agamemnon in A. *A.* and Polyphemus in *Od.* 9). So eleven literary cases remain in this period in which a suppliant was rejected (and sometimes killed), even though he performed the ritual correctly. Yet no divine punishment occurred. What proportion is this? Naiden 2006:301–388 lists a total of 168 acts of Greek supplication from Homer until the end of the fifth century. This means that 11/168 = 6.5% of all suppliants were rejected without punishment. Splitting up the data in individual authors: in the Iliad, there are four unpunished rejections out of a total of 22 supplications (19%); one out of 23 in the Odyssey (4%), one out of 12 in Sophocles (8%) and five out of 47 supplications in Euripides (11%). In other authors, no cases of unpunished rejections occur. We can conclude that in each individual author these cases are quite extraordinary, and I think they do not represent nor are formative for the dominant Greek theological view in this period. Literary texts confirm that *asylia* is important and not to be ignored in a different way: Chaniotis shows (1996:86) that literary criticism, such as Ion's (n. 64 in this chapter) in the end works to *confirm*, not undermine, the divine norm of inviolability of suppliants: had this unwritten law not been in place, Ion would have killed his mother (who was supplicating at an altar) instead of complaining about the norm.

81 cf. n. 46 in this chapter.

the claim that accepting a suppliant was ὅσιος or that rejecting, betraying or harming him was ἀνόσιος became one of the possible arguments in a situation that was increasingly negotiable. Thus, τὸ ὅσιον does not refer to an absolute norm; the evaluation is a strong rhetorical means of persuading the other in the context of debate.

Literary debates about the treatment of suppliants often find themselves in this field of tension between the divine norm and its practicability, between automaticity and morality, between religion, law and politics. We will see that all these different aspects of interacting with suppliants are debated in terms of ὁσιότης, (εὐσέβεια) and δικαιοσύνη.

2.2 *Justice and Piety Equated*

In Aeschylus's *Suppliants*, ὅσιος and δίκαιος evoke the same frame—behaving morally to uphold one's relationship with gods. In this play, the fifty daughters of Danaus seek to escape a marriage with their cousins, the fifty sons of Aegyptus. Having fled to Argos they supplicate the local ruler, Pelasgus, to protect them against such marriages. The girls take their seat at a shrine of the major gods of the city and invoke Zeus, the 'home protector (οἰκοφύλαξ) of pious men (ὁσίων ἀνδρῶν)'.[82] The Danaids appeal to Zeus because he watches over and cares about those who are respectful towards suppliants, protecting their homes, as they are pious (ὅσιοι) men. Zeus is also portrayed as the instigator of human morality, when the girls pray to be received 'in a spirit of respect (αἰδοίωι πνεύματι) on the part of the country (χώρας)', i.e. for Zeus to cause the Argives to treat them with αἰδώς, respect.[83]

A similar thought is expressed more elaborately further on when the Danaids equate piety (ὁσιότης) and justice (δίκη). King Pelasgus cannot make up his mind about whether he should accept these suppliants. First, he considers abandoning his suppliants and 'taking his chances' (τυχὴν ἑλεῖν, 380), that is, hoping that Zeus will not notice (or at least, not punish him).[84] Then he wants to consult his people, for he does not want to accept the responsibility for his individual decision. Should the sons of Aegyptus attack the city, he would be the one blamed, and the people are bound to say afterwards that 'by honouring foreigners (ἐπήλυδας τιμῶν), he destroyed the city'.[85] That is, he is afraid that if he protects the Danaids, his city will be ravaged by their pursuers. But the Danaids respond:

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82 A. *Supp.* 26–27.

83 A. *Supp.* 28–29.

84 A. *Supp.* 380.

85 A. *Supp.* 398–401.

Χο. ἀμφότερ', ὡς ὁμαίμων, τάδ' ἐπισκοπεῖ
Ζεὺς ἑτερορρεπής, νέμων εἰκότως
ἄδικα μὲν κακοῖς, *ὅσια* δ' ἐννόμοις·
τί τῶνδ' ἐξ ἴσου ῥεπομένων μεταλ-
γεῖς τὸ δίκαιον ἔρξαι;[86]

Zeus, guardian of family relationships,[87] watches over both of these:
as is reasonable, he balances out each lot for each, distributing
to wicked people *adika*, to the just *hosia*.
If these things are balanced out fairly, why
do you regret to do what is just?

The chorus reminds Pelasgus that Zeus watches over (ἐπισκοπεῖ, 402) both potential decisions, i.e. protecting and not protecting them (ἀμφότερα τάδε, 402). The implicit threat is that *not* helping them will also lead to the destruction of Argos, i.e. through the revenge of Zeus.[88]

Zeus does more than just watch over human morality (ἐπισκοπεῖ, 402); he is also its instigator, as seems to be expressed in the next two lines. Here,

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86 A. *Supp.* 402–406. I use the edition of Friis Johansen & Whittle 1980.

87 Friis Johansen & Whittle (1980, ad loc.) point out that the adjective ὁμαίμων (nom. sg.,) is used only where the more common ὅμαιμος does not scan, except here and in A. *Th.* 415. In these two passages ὁμαίμων is a divine epithet.

88 Their argument is in fact more subtle, when they imply that Zeus, as 'guardian of family relationships', is interested in their situation for reasons besides and above the mere fact that they are suppliants. The Danaids have quite elaborately established before that they are related to the Argives through ancestry (in the discussion with Pelasgus, A. *Supp.* 274–324); Pelasgus has accepted their claims (325–326) and commented on their ambivalent status in this situation by calling them citizen-strangers (ἀστόξενοι, 356). But in his deliberation immediately preceding this, Pelasgus called them foreigners (ἐπήλυδας, 401). By invoking Ζεύς Ὁμαίμων, the chorus corrects his views: Pelasgus should honour the family relationship between themselves and the Argives in order to honour Zeus, the 'Patron of Family Relations'. The Danaids pick up this argument further on. After Pelasgus has finally accepted them, they use the adjective again to refer to their kinship with the Argives. The chorus praises the Argives because they 'honour relatives' (ἅζονται ὁμαίμους, 652) and expresses confidence that they are in a good relationship with the gods and will avoid divine punishment accordingly (646–655). Not only are the Danaids family of the Argives; the marriage the suppliants fear is also, according to them, a transgression of a normal family relationship. As the Danaids have argued (37–39, 223–226), they do not want to marry their cousins because they are relatives (πατραδέλφειαι, 38; ὅμαιμοι,

the Danaids claim that Zeus distributes (νέμων, 403)[89] injustices to wicked people and pious things to the just (ἄδικα μὲν κακοῖς, ὅσια δ'ἐννόμοις, 403–404).[90] It is not clear whether ὅσια and ἄδικα should be read actively or passively or both. Perhaps the chorus intends to say that the share of virtuous people is that they *act* in accordance with the wishes of the god, whereas unjust people keep on committing crimes. The phrase may also express that Zeus rewards and punishes, causing others to act piously *towards* just people and unjustly to wicked people.[91] In any case, note that τὰ ὅσια and τὰ ἄδικα

225). Their insistence that their cousins are ἀσεβής (l. 9) apparently holds the claim that such 'incest' is a transgression of proper relations between close relatives. I have discussed this part of the Danaids' argumentation in more detail in Chapter 3, section 3.3.

89 Sommerstein 2008:343 n. 81 supposes that l. 404 means that Zeus weighs up or keeps an account of men's good and evil deeds. But in Aeschylus, the transitive verb νέμω, used with a god as agent, always refers to *giving* or *distributing* (talents, honours, goods or positive outcomes of events [A. *Pr.* 292: Oceanos distributes a share (μοῖρα) (of honour) to Prometheus; A. *Pr.* 229: Zeus gives privileges (γέρα) to the gods; A. *Pr.* 526: Zeus distributes everything (πάντα); A. *Supp.* 1068: may Zeus distribute victory (κράτος) to the women; A. *Eu.* 716: Apollo will no longer distribute pure oracular responses]). This usage of νέμω is also the most common one in Aeschylus. νέμω elsewhere in Aeschylus is: 'to inhabit a place' (n = 5), 'to enjoy something' (n = 1), 'to consider' (n = 1), 'to manage or govern' (n = 4), but most frequently the meaning is 'to distribute' (n = 7, the abovementioned passages plus A. *Supp.* 505, A. *Eu.* 401). I assume that νέμω in this passage also means 'to distribute'.

90 The idea, expressed once more by the epithet ἑτερορρεπής (403) 'balancing out each lot for each', seems to be that humans can choose for themselves whether they want to be pious or wicked and Zeus will treat them accordingly. ἑτερ- = ἕτερα ἑτεροις implying the idea of weighing one lot for the one side, and the other for the other, Friis Johansen & Whittle 1980, ad loc.

91 The verb cannot refer to 'gifts' from Zeus, in the sense of punishments and rewards. It cannot mean that Zeus distributes to the wicked 'injustices' (bad unpleasant things) and to the just, 'things he considers ὅσια'. This is because τὰ ὅσια are not transferrable: humans do not 'possess' ὅσια nor 'receive them' or 'give them to somebody else'. As I showed in Chapter 2, section 1.3, τὰ ὅσια in the archaic and fifth-century literature usually refer to human actions. Mortals say, do or think ὅσια or ἀνόσια, and sometimes meet with or undergo ὅσια or ἀνόσια. Zeus does not distribute ὅσια (and ἄδικα) in the sense of 'giving' them, but the phrase must mean that he ensures people commit or meet with injustices and ὅσια. Blok (2014:29 with n. 60) primarily gives these lines the second, passive interpretation. She connects the usage of ὅσια in this phrase to a series of post-classical curse tablets from Knidos, in which people ask ὅσια for themselves (i.e. to meet with ὅσια from other people), e.g. Knidos 256, b1, Knidos 260.11–13.

are juxtaposed as antonyms and that both terms evaluate morality from the imagined perspective of the gods.

Given this state of affairs, Pelasgus should not hesitate to do 'what is right' (τὸ δίκαιον). Although this is articulated as a general exhortation, δίκη should be interpreted as 'honouring suppliants because that is the proper conduct towards the god'. Whereas Pelasgus seemed to see an opposition between the interest of the city and the religious aspect of the situation, the Danaids argue that these, in fact, coincide: doing τὸ δίκαιον is the same as doing what the gods want.

The suppliants in Aeschylus's *Suppliants* use ὅσιος and δίκαιος *synonymously*. In other literary sources ὅσιος and δίκαιος are often *not* interchangeable. In fact, as will be argued below, the consequent equating of ὅσιος and the 'δίκη of Zeus' by the Danaids is an argumentative strategy, for the girls have a vested rhetorical interest in equating the two concepts. In order to understand their rhetoric, it will be useful to turn to other literary contexts first, and examine debates about suppliants in which ὅσιος and δίκαιος frame an event differently.

2.3 *Justice and Piety in the Plataean Debate*

In the fifth year of the Peloponnesian war, the Plataeans implored the Spartans in a famous speech not to surrender them to the Thebans.[92] They argued that the Spartans would 'make a ὅσιον decision' (ὅσια ἂν δικάζοιτε) by granting them freedom from fear of death (3.58.3), offering multiple reasons for their claim. First of all, they are not enemies (ἐχθρούς) on whom the Spartans could reasonably be expected to avenge themselves, but rather well-disposed (εὔνους) folk who were forced to fight.[93] The Spartans should also consider that the Plataeans had surrendered voluntarily with their arms stretched forth (χεῖρας προϊσχομένους)—a typical gesture defining the Plataeans as suppliants.[94] As the Plataeans argue, it is the religious norm (νόμος)[95] among the Greeks not to kill

92 Th. 3.53–59. The background of the speech: The Plataeans were being besieged by the Thebans, when the Spartans intervened. They asked the Plataeans if they would surrender voluntarily to the Spartans and accept the Spartans as their judges. The Spartans would decide whether to allow the Thebans to destroy Plataea.

93 The grounds for this argument were explained in Th. 3.55: the Plataeans had asked the Spartans for help against the Thebans, but the Spartans told them to go to the Athenians instead, which is why they had fought against the Spartans later, as allies of the Athenians. The Plataeans reinforce the argument in 3.58.4, when they say that they 'have always done the Spartans well' (εὐεργέτας γεγενημένους).

94 Naiden 2006:51. Other places where they stress they are suppliants are Th. 3.59.2, 3.59.4.

95 The Plataeans refer to νόμος in the sense of a (religious) custom: as discussed above, it

suppliants (τούτους).[96] Furthermore, many of the Spartans' ancestors, slain by Persians (i.e. during the battle of Plataea), are buried in Plataea. The Plataeans point out that they are taking care of these graves—while the Thebans will not. Surrendering Plataea to the Thebans would mean that the Spartans would leave their fathers and kinsmen deprived of the gifts of honour (ἀτίμους γερῶν) they enjoy now (3.58.5). Moreover, if the Spartans make their territory Theban, this would be equivalent to 'abandoning' the temples of the gods. In these temples, the Greeks prayed before they fought against the Persians, but the Thebans fought against the Spartans alongside the Persians (3.58.5).

Thus, there is more than one reason why helping the Plataeans is the most ὅσιον course of *actions*. The Plataeans present many motivations, which all coincide with frequent usages of *hosios & cognates*. They are not only suppliants who must not be killed, they are also friends who deserve to be spared in return for their good deeds. They also take good care of the dead, performing ancestral sacrifice for the Spartan deceased on their territory, and finally they care for temples in which the Greeks formerly prayed for victory against the Persians.

By contrast, the term δίκαιος and its antonyms in this speech[97] refer consistently to other aspects of the situation. These aspects are the legal trial in which the Plataeans find themselves, the way in which this trial is conducted, and the judges' decision-making process. The Plataeans had agreed to a trial, in which it would be decided whether or not they should be surrendered to

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had traditionally been the custom or unwritten rule that one should not kill a suppliant at an altar. On the religious sense of νόμος: Rudhardt 2008:49–68, 98–99. Or is this a more manipulative statement, a clever exploitation of the term νόμος? By the second half of the fifth century, νόμος had increasingly incorporated the notion of written law. The Plataeans may be playing on this new sense of νόμος suggestively, implying that there is a written law about not killing suppliants. We have already established that there was no such law in Athens, and there was certainly no written law on killing suppliants among Greeks. Individual *poleis* had their individual laws, and they had treaties with other individual *poleis* to deal with legal cases involving their own citizens in the other *polis* and vice versa, but there was no transcendent law code extending over the whole of Greece.

96 Th. 3.58.3. Note that the speaker tacitly equals the rejection of the Plataeans' case to an act of murder. This is a manipulative move. We may infer from other literary stories (e.g. Hdt 1.159 discussed above) that the Greek attitude towards rejecting suppliants in danger of their lives was more ambivalent than their view of physically harming a suppliant at an altar (undoubtedly negative).

97 Cases of δίκη, δίκαιος, ἄδικος in this speech (which runs from 3.53–59): Th. 3.53.1, 3.54.1, 3.56.3, 3.56.5., 3.56.6, 3.59.3.

the Thebans. It was made clear that the Spartans would punish the unjust, but no one unjustly (παρὰ δίκην). However, when a group of judges arrived, they made no accusation (κατηγορία) but only asked the Plataeans whether they had aided the Spartans at any time in the war. The Plataeans objected to this procedure, fearing that the Spartans had already made up their minds against them and the trial was a sham (3.53.2). In spite of this, they said they would nevertheless (ὅμως) offer a justification of their case (παρεχόμενοι δὲ ὅμως ἃ ἔχομεν δίκαια). I interpret his statement as, 'in contrast to the way in which this whole trial is conducted, at least *we* want to make arguments under the presupposition that this *is* a real trial' (3.54.1). The kinds of decisions the judges should make are evaluated in terms of δίκαιος vs. not δίκαιος as well. When judging the Plataeans, Sparta should not measure justice (τὸ δίκαιον, 3.56.3) by what is in their immediate interest; it is also just that the Spartans weigh the past actions of the Plataeans in a certain way (δίκαιον, 3.56.5). Finally, at the end of their exposition, the Plataeans refer again to the *procedure* in the trial, saying that if they have not persuaded the Spartans, it would be just if the Spartans put them back in their original position (i.e. of being besieged by the Thebans) and let them choose for themselves the risks they would subject themselves to (δίκαιον, 3.59.3).

To summarise the argument: when convincing the Spartans that saving them would be a ὅσιον decision, the Plateaens present themselves as suppliants and friends and argue that they are taking care of the Spartan graves in their city and of Greek temples. By contrast, the references to δίκη consistently draw on the legalistic sense of this term and refer to the legal trial in which the Plataeans find themselves, the way in which this trial is conducted, and the judges' decision-making process.

2.4 *Justice and Piety in Oedipus's Supplication*

When Oedipus arrives in Colonus (northwest of Athens) with his daughter Antigone at the end of his life, he takes a seat on a rock. After he learns that the rock is part of a sacred grove of the Eumenides, he decides to station himself there as a suppliant (S. *OC* 42–45). However, this grove is inaccessible to humans (37, 39, 167), and a chorus of old men force Oedipus to move (150–169). He does so after having been given a pledge that he will not be harmed when abandoning physical contact with the sanctuary (173–177). However, almost as soon as Oedipus moves away from his seat as a suppliant and tells them his true identity, the chorus, frightened of his μίασμα, send him away (226). Despite Oedipus's reminder of their promise (227) and a supplicatory speech by Antigone (237–253), the old men persist and 'do not dare to say any more, dreading what comes from the gods' (τὰ δ'ἐκ θεῶν τρέμοντες, 256).

At this point Oedipus makes a long supplication speech.[98] Its implicit main claim is that the old men's 'fear of the gods' is wrong. Countering what the old men have said, Oedipus argues that to honour the gods, one must help suppliants who have been given pledges of protection. Oedipus establishes that he is supplicating the old men of Colonus by the gods (275).[99] His request implicitly refers to the promise the old men gave him, 'just like you made me leave my seat, so save me now', in other words: 'I only moved away from the rock because you promised me no harm would come to me' (276). He proceeds by appealing to the chorus for piety, 'honouring the gods' (θεοὺς τιμῶντες, 277),[100] they should not want to curtail that honour now.[101]

The consequences of rejecting Oedipus are spelled out next, 'consider that they [i.e., the gods] look upon pious mortals (βλέπειν μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸν εὐσεβῆ βροτῶν, 279) and upon impious ones' (βλέπειν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς δυσσεβεῖς, 280). When Greek gods and humans were asked to look at something, this tended to mean that they should also take action.[102] Indeed, Oedipus continues, '… and (consider) that no ἀνόσιος man has ever escaped' (φυγὴν δέ του | μήπω γενέσθαι φωτὸς ἀνοσίου ποτέ, 280–281). Therefore, in accordance with the gods

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98 S. *OC* 258–291. There are two other supplication speeches in S. *OC*: Antigone's speech to the chorus of old men (237–253) and Polyneices's speech to Oedipus (1284–1345). However, they do not contain any of the selected value terms and cannot be used for comparison.

99 Previously, Oedipus appealed to the Athenian's reputation for piety (being θεοσεβεστάτας, S. *OC* 260) because of its history of saving suppliants who have been wronged (261–262). He also defends his moral situation (263–274) saying that he *suffered* rather than committed evils. He is not evil in nature, but was provoked by his father and, moreover, he was ignorant of the truth.

100 Oedipus may be referring to the chorus's remark about fearing what comes from the gods (S. *OC* 256) or, further back, to their anxious protection of the sacred grove in e.g. 36–37 and 155–169, or to Athens's reputation in general (260) or to all of these things. Such appeals to reputation are made by suppliants elsewhere, e.g. by Hypsipyle to Amphiaraus, 'you will do ὅσια because you are ὅσιος' (E. *Hyps*. 757.862).

101 τοὺς θεοὺς | ποιεῖσθ'ἀμαυροὺς μηδαμῶς 'do not make the gods obscure in any way' (S. *OC* 277–278). There is a textual problem in vs. 278. Different textual suggestions have been made. Besides OCT: ποιεῖσθ'ἀμαυροὺς μηδαμῶς, Kamerbeek has μώρους ποεῖσθε· μηδαμῶς·, following the reading of RK. Jebb has μοίραις ποεῖσθε μηδαμῶς following Q (cf. his Appendix 1, 277–278).

102 In complaints by mortals to gods about injustice apparently overlooked by them, the verb ὁράω is sometimes used in a question ('do you see this?') or an admonition ('look at this!') both with an illocutionary force: 'do something about it'. E.g. E. *Hipp*. 1363, E. *Cyc*. 354.

(ξὺν οἷς, 282), they should not cast a shadow over the happiness of Athens 'by serving godless deeds' (ἔργοις ἀνοσίοις ὑπηρετῶν, 283). Then the original request is repeated, so that the argument comes full circle: 'just like you received the suppliant under your pledge, rescue me and watch over me carefully' (284–285).

The term ἀνόσιος evokes the frame of honouring an interhuman relationship (that between suppliant and host) because it is important to the gods. Sending away a suppliant who has been given a promise of protection is the ἀνόσιον act (283) of an ἀνόσιος man (281). Oedipus claims that failing to honour the gods has resulted in divine punishment in other cases and may have the same consequence in this case.[103]

We will now turn to the usage of δίκη and its cognates in this play. Theseus decides (631–641) that Oedipus can stay in Athens and that he will be protected. However, a new complication arises when Creon, ruler of Thebes, enters the stage (728). Because it is known that Oedipus will be a blessing to the country in which he will be buried,[104] Creon has come to Athens to persuade Oedipus to return to Thebes. When Oedipus refuses, Creon tries to abduct Oedipus's daughters Antigone and Ismene in order to force Oedipus to come with him. Theseus is not pleased, and a discussion about the treatment of Oedipus and his daughters ensues. Unlike Oedipus's supplication speech, this discussion is mainly conducted in terms of δίκη and its cognates.

This new evaluative frame had already been established in Creon's initial words (728–760) to Oedipus, where he emphasises Oedipus's responsibility to his former city and its citizens. Creon claims that he had been ordered to fetch Oedipus by all the Cadmean people: they 'righteously' (δικαίως, 742) summon Oedipus to return to the home of his forefathers (δόμους … | τοὺς σοὺς πατρῴους, 757–758). As Creon argues, Athens deserves a kind farewell, but his home city should in justice (δίκῃ, 760) be reverenced more, because it reared him (οὖσα … τρόφος, 760). Even though Creon asks him this 'by his ancestral gods' (πρὸς θεῶν πατρῴων, 756), the argument centres on obligations towards his fellow citizens. Discussions of duties within the *polis*, between citizens as citizens, are not commonly expressed in terms of ὅσιος or its antonyms. ὅσιος evokes the frame of honouring other citizens not 'as citizens' but in response to special religious duties towards them when they are parents, children, family members, guests, hosts, suppliants, or dead ancestors. As the emphasis is on responsibilities to

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103 The antithesis εὐσεβής—δυσσεβής supports the same line of argumentation.

104 Apollo has told Oedipus that he will become a blessing for the country in which he is buried (s. *OC* 84–93); Oedipus had already reminded the chorus of these 'advantages' (ὄνησιν, 288).

citizens, it is not surprising that the evaluation δίκη is used instead. In his reply Oedipus agrees in the same terms: the request is—in theory—a rightful plea (λόγος δίκαιος, 762), but Creon just uses it as a cunning trick (μηχάνημα ποικίλον, 762).

When Oedipus bitterly refuses to oblige Creon, the atmosphere becomes grim. As a final means of 'persuasion', Creon abducts Oedipus's daughter Ismene and threatens to capture Antigone as well (818–819). A new discussion about the suppliants, this time between the Athenians and Oedipus's pursuer, starts in line 831 ff., where the chorus exclaims, 'Oh, stranger, your actions are not just!' (ὦ ξέν', οὐ δίκαια δρᾷς) and a short conversation follows:

832 Κρ. *δίκαια.*
Χο. πῶς *δίκαια*;
Κρ. τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἄγω.[105]

Cr. They [i.e. my actions] are just.
Ch. How can they be just?
Cr. I am taking those who are mine!

Whatever the chorus means precisely with their appeal to δίκη, Creon chooses to understand this term in its distributive sense. As was discussed above, δίκαιος and antonyms are often used specifically to frame a situation in terms of entitlement, shares or portions and to discuss property, entitlement, borrowing, returning and stealing.[106] Here, Creon interprets δίκαιος in terms of what he is entitled to, when he says that removing the suppliants with him is 'leading off those who are mine'.[107]

Theseus understands and reverses these claims directly. The suppliants do not belong to Creon, but are rather the property of the *polis* and the gods. By bringing Oedipus back to Thebes, Creon would not 'take back what is rightfully his'. On the contrary, he would plunder Theseus's property and that of the gods (συλῶντα τἀμὰ καὶ τὰ τῶν θεῶν, 922) when he takes away unhappy

105 S. *OC* 832.

106 The same argument, that one is entitled to a suppliant or even that the suppliant is one's possession, and that carrying him away is thus δίκαιος or in accordance with δίκη, is made by the messenger in E. *Heracl.* 139–140, discussed in section 2.7 of this chapter, and by the messenger in A. *Supp.* 916–918, 924, 932.

107 Perhaps his argument is based on the fact that he is Oedipus's uncle, and due to the family relationship he believes he can lay claim to them.

suppliants by force (φωτῶν ἀθλίων ἱκτήρια, 923).[108] Theseus equates the removal of the suppliant to *hierosylia*, stealing one of the holy objects in a temple.[109] Thebes would hardly praise Creon if they heard about this (921). Earlier, the chorus had already complained that they had been 'robbed' of the girls (τῶνδέ γ'ἐστερημένος, 857). A bit further on, Theseus says that 'possessions gained by unjust deceit are not kept' (τὰ γὰρ δόλῳ | τῷ μὴ δικαίῳ κτήματ' οὐχὶ σῴζεται, 1026–1027), again using a cognate of the term δίκη.

But the usage of δίκη also activates a legal frame in the mind of the listener. Theseus and the chorus use this frame to attack Creon's argument in another way. They state that δίκη is adherence to the laws in the *polis*, but abducting two girls and proposing to carry Oedipus off do not fall under that heading. It has already been mentioned that supplication at an altar was embedded in the legal system of the *polis*; such a suppliant was entitled to a preliminary hearing. The chorus of old men have already said that if Creon takes the suppliants with him, they 'will no longer consider this city a *polis*' (τάνδ' ἄρ'οὐκέτι νεμῶ πόλιν, 879). Theseus elaborates on this unacceptable thought in a longer speech, when he tells Creon that he will never quit this country until he has brought the girls back before his eyes (909–910). What Creon has done is not worthy (οὐ … κατάξια, 911) of Theseus, because he has come to a city that observes justice (δίκαι'ἀσκοῦσαν … πόλιν, 913) and makes no decision without law (κἄνευ νόμου κραίνουσαν οὐδέν, 914). But now Creon arrives, taking what he likes (ἄγεις ἃ χρῄζεις, 916) and appropriating it by force (παρίστασαι βίᾳ, 916).[110] He must have thought he had come to a different type of community, 'some kind of city without men or an enslaved *polis*' (πόλιν κένανδρον ἢ δούλην τινά, 917).[111] In fact, Theseus cannot even believe that Thebes raised him in this way: this city is not used to raising unjust men (ἐκδίκους ἄνδρας, 920). In other words: Creon not only fails to honour the rules in Athens; his behaviour is

108 lit. suppliant objects consisting of unhappy persons, Jebb 1907 [1903] ad loc.

109 In A. *Supp.*, Pelasgus refutes the messenger's argument that the suppliants are his possession in exactly the same way: 'I do not extend hospitality to those who plunder the gods' (οὐ γὰρ ξενοῦμαι τοὺς θεῶν συλήτορας, 927).

110 Creon has indeed continuously spoken about Oedipus in this manner, announcing that he would seize this man and carry him off (τόνδε ἀπάξομαι λαβών, S. *OC* 860) and take him away by force (ἄξω βίᾳ, 874); even after Theseus's speech he will proceed to do so, for example when saying that he has subdued his prey (ἐχειρούμην ἄγραν, 950).

111 The term δοῦλος is frequently used of Persians and other nations subject to a despot e.g. by Hdt. and Aeschylus says of the Greeks: οὔτινος δοῦλοι κέκληνται (LSJ s.v. I). By contrast, Theseus's *polis* is an enlightened city, even if not a democracy. Easterling 2005:63 calls the characters "proto-democratic" citizens.

literally ‘outside of justice (ἐκ + δίκη)’ in the sense that it does not belong in *any polis* that is based on the rule of law.

In summary, the most important supplication speech in the play (258–291) frames the situation in terms of an obligation to the gods, in this specific case: *not to betray a suppliant who has been given a pledge*. Failing to do this is ἀνόσιος and δυσσεβής and will certainly result in divine retribution. When Creon asks Oedipus to return to Thebes, he first posits a kind request to the suppliant in terms of the latter’s obligations to his fellow citizens. In the remainder of the play, Creon makes more aggressive claims to having δίκη on his side: in particular, he is entitled (it is δίκαιος for him) to take the suppliant with him, because the suppliant is his property. In reply, Theseus and the chorus of old men advance their own proposal about what is δίκαιος: acting in accordance with the laws of the *polis*. They also directly counter Creon’s claims about ‘possessing’ Oedipus, by explaining that suppliants belong to the *polis* and the gods, and that taking them away equates to stealing holy property (the crime of *hierosylia*). The employment of ὅσιος and δίκαιος in this play is quite distinct. ὅσιος refers to the religious side of dealings with suppliants, whereas δίκαιος explores what humans are entitled to (the ‘distributional sense of δίκη’) and that to which they have legally committed.

2.5 *The Rightful Share*

An analysis of a play in which only *dikaios & cognates* appear points to the same conclusion. In Aeschylus’s *Eumenides*, Orestes is pursued by the Erinyes and sits at Apollo’s Delphic shrine as a suppliant (προστρόπαιος, 41; ἱκέτης, 92). Since Apollo persuaded him to commit the matricide, Orestes has turned to this god in his search for protection against the Erinyes. A debate in terms of δίκη on what should happen to this suppliant is central to the plot of this tragedy. For example, the Erinyes think it is not δίκαιος that Apollo protects Orestes as his suppliant (154), but they themselves follow straight justice (they are εὐθυδίκαιοι, 312) in pursuing matricides. Apollo, in his turn, claims Orestes is not justly pursued by the Erinyes (οὐ … ἐνδίκως, 221), and Athena asks Orestes if he sits at her altar trusting in δίκη (439).

There are at least two factors that make *dikaios & cognates* preferable over near-synonymous evaluative terms in this discussion. First, this play stages the first homicide trial on the Areopagus in history. This strong ‘legal frame’ activates a field of lexemes connected to this frame, including *dikaios & cognates*. Second, the discussion about the suppliant Orestes is set in a frame of distributive justice, revolving around entitlement, shares or portions. Orestes’s moral position and his inviolability as a suppliant hardly come into play. Rather, the

play revolves around a conflict between an older generation of goddesses (represented by the Erinyes) and a younger generation of gods (represented by Apollo). Orestes becomes the main 'issue' in this discussion about the respective position of these two groups: both parties feel entitled to him.

The Erinyes feel that Apollo, by protecting Orestes as suppliant (τὸν ἱκέταν σέβων, 151), prevents them from carrying out their main task, to pursue murderers. This 'lot' or 'appointed office' (λάχος) or 'divine ordinance' (θεσμόν) was 'assigned to them' (προστεταγμένον) or 'ordained by fate' (e.g. μοῖρ' ἐπέκλωσεν, μοιρόκραντον, πέπρωται, ἐκράνθη).[112] All of these descriptions show that the goddesses feel that this is part of *their* portfolio, *their* 'share'. These claims push the discussion into a frame of 'portions' and 'entitlement'. When the Erinyes say that they are just (εὐθυδίκαιοι δ'οἰόμεθ'εἶναι, 312), this means acting in accordance with what they are entitled to, even if that means ignoring the rights of a suppliant. In the eyes of the Erinyes, Apollo is precisely *not* acting in accordance with his entitlement. He is 'destroying *moira*, which had been ordained long ago' (παλαιγενεῖς δὲ μοίρας φθίσας, 173). In other words, by taking the Erinyes' prey (ἄγρα, 148), he has *stolen away* (ἐξέκλεψας, 153) their share, thievish as he is (ἐπίκλοπος, 149). Which of these things, the goddesses ask, will anyone call 'just' (τί τῶνδ' ἐρεῖ τις δικαίως ἔχειν, 154)?[113]

Thus, δίκαιος is used in a discussion on *what* belongs to *whom*, or more broadly speaking, the term is used in a legal frame.

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112 As the Erinyes say themselves, when Apollo tells them that it is not fit for them to enter his temple: 'but we have been ordered this … to drive out mother murderers' (ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡμῖν τοῦτο προστεταγμένον, A. *Eu.* 208 …. τοὺς μητραλοίας ἐκ δόμων ἐλαύνομεν, 210). Elsewhere: 'this is the office that fate with her piercing stroke has ordained that I should hold fast' (τοῦτο γὰρ λάχος διανταία Μοῖρ' ἐπέκλωσεν ἐμπέδως ἔχειν, 333–335), 'at our birth these offices were ordained to us' (γιγνομέναισι λάχη τάδ' ἐφ' ἁμὶν ἐκράνθη, 347–348). Also, they say that all mortals feel awe and dread, 'when they hear from me the divine ordinance, powerful, ordained by fate and granted by the gods' (ἐμοῦ κλύων θεσμόν, τὸν μοιρόκραντον ἐκ θεῶν δοθέντα τέλεον, 391–393). Other characters use the same terminology. Thus, Athena says the Erinyes 'have an allotted share, not easily dispensed with' (ἔχουσι μοῖραν οὐκ εὐπέμπελον, 476), and Clytemnestra asks the sleeping Erinyes, 'what task is your destiny besides working evil?' (τί σοι πέπρωται πρᾶγμα πλὴν τεύχειν κακά; 125).

113 They complain that the younger gods have sovereign power, 'beyond justice' (δίκας πλέον, A. *Eu.* 163). They also claim that when they received these offices (λάχη, 347), it had been ordained that no one would join in and share in their feast (οὐδέ τις ἐστὶ συνδαίτωρ μετάκοινος, 351). This is where Apollo goes wrong: he is 'honouring bloody matters' (αἱματηρὰ πράγματα … σέβεις, 715) which *he* has not obtained as his portion (οὐ λαχών, 715).

2.6 (*Un*)*quantifiable Claims*

In contrast to *dikaios & cognates, hosios & cognates* appear more than once in the context of non-quantifiable, interpersonal claims. These are situations in which A (for example, the Plataeans) argues that B (for example, the Spartans) owes them 'something' due to some relationship between them. Such appeals to friendships or the idea of 'having been good' to the other person do not have any exact support (in the sense of a written law, or in the idea of ownership, shares or entitlement). We have found argumentations quite similar to the Plataeans' in other passages. The earliest example was *Odyssey* 16.423, in which Penelope denounces Antinous's plans to harm Telemachos as 'not ὁσίη' due to *philia* based on a successful supplication in the previous generation (discussed in Chapter 2).[114] A similar plea was made in a fragment from Euripides's *Hypsipyle* (also discussed in Chapter 2).[115] Hypsipyle's appeal to Amphiaraus was staged in an informal, inter-personal setting. There was no legal or quasi-legal reason for Amphiaraus to help Hypsipyle. Rather, the appeal to Amphiaraus to act in a way that is ὅσιος appears in the wider context of a claim that Amphiaraus somehow 'owes' it to Hypsipyle to help her.

This characteristic of *hosios & cognates* can be linked to two other characteristics discussed previously: the 'emotional, aggressive' connotation of the disqualification ἀνόσιος and the fact that these lexemes often evaluate multiple issues at the same time. Recall that the Plataeans claimed that it would be ὅσιον to help them, not only because the Greek νόμος is not to kill suppliants, but also because they have a reciprocal relationship with those supplicated, *and* because they took care of Spartan ancestral worship, *and* because they looked after the Greek temples. Similarly, Hypsipyle trusted that Amphiaraus would 'do ὅσιος things' and help her, because she was his suppliant *and* because Amphiaraus was her guest, *and* Amphiaraus owed her a favour, *and* because Amphiaraus already had a reputation for piety. In the absence of exact claims, it makes sense to accumulate as many reasons as one can think of to support one's plea. Precisely in such situations it is also opportune to

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114 As we discussed in detail in Chapter 2, section 2, in her explanation of this reproach, Penelope focuses *on the long-term reciprocal relationship* between Odysseus's and Antinous's families, which resulted from Odysseus's protection of a suppliant (Antinous's father). 'Not ὁσίη' is in this case: not honouring the bond of ξενία that followed a successful act of supplication, in which the gods have a special interest.

115 Hypsipyle served as a slave to Lycurgus, priest at the rural sanctuary of Zeus at Nemea and his wife Eurydice, nursing their son Opheltes. The seer Amphiaraus came to see this family.

invoke the notion that 'the gods have an interest in this relationship', to strengthen such a claim with *some* authority.

If arguments supported by *hosios & cognates* are fundamentally non-quantifiable and relate to a feeling about what is right and proper in inter-personal relationships, we can also see how they may take the form of especially emotional or aggressive complaints when flipping to the negative side. An example occurs in Euripides's *Orestes*, where Orestes refers to Hermione (daughter of Menelaus and Helen) as the 'cub of a godless (ἀνόσιος) father'. In this play, Electra has come up with a plan to kidnap Hermion restes thinks it is an excellent plan but wonders about practicalities:

1211 Ορ. ἥξει δ᾽ ἐς οἴκους Ἑρμιόνη τίνος χρόνου;
ὡς τἄλλα γ᾽ εἶπας, εἴπερ εὐτυχήσομεν,
κάλλισθ᾽, ἑλόντες σκύμνον *ἀνοσίου* πατρός.[116]

Or. But when will Hermione come home?
Because the other things you have said sound really good,
if only we will succeed in catching this cub of a godless father.

I understand the reference to Menelaus as an ἀνόσιος πατήρ as grounded in Menelaus's previous refusal to help the suppliant Orestes. Earlier on in the play, Orestes had supplicated Menelaus (380 ff.), drawing on the supposed reciprocal obligations Menelaus had towards him as Agamemnon's son.[117] But Menelaus refused (682–716), after which he was repeatedly called κακός.[118] Orestes's unfavourable designation of Menelaus as ἀνόσιος in 1211 is a more specific version of his earlier abuse of Menelaus as κακός. Orestes argues that Menelaus's refusal of him as a suppliant is not only 'bad' or 'cowardly'. Using the disqualification ἀνόσιος, Orestes does not make exact or legalistic claims (he has no grounds for them), but communicates directly that he considers Menelaus's actions beyond *any* standard set by humans and especially the

116 E. *Or.* 1211–1213.

117 Orestes proposed that Menelaus should accept some troubles and repay his debt to Agamemnon by 'paying a favour to those who deserved it' (χάριτας πατρῴας ἐκτίνων ἐς οὓς σε δεῖ, 453), i.e.: to Orestes and his sister.

118 Orestes calls him κάκιστος (E. *Or.* 718, 736), κακός to his φίλοι (740) and a κακὸς φίλος (748). Electra likewise calls him Μενέλαος ὁ κακός, ὁ προδότης τοὐμου πατρός (1057). As Sluiter (2008:4) has shown, the disqualification κακός is highly underspecified, leaving open an 'enormous interpretative range'. In this case the intention will be something between 'cowardly' and 'disloyal'.

gods. As we have already argued,[119] the disqualification probably should be interpreted as an emotionally charged—even aggressive, abusive—rejection of behaviour.

2.7 *The Ambiguity of δίκη*

Having considered the ways in which *hosios & cognates* and *dikaios & cognates* frame situations in different ways (or are used to support different frames), we will now focus on *dikaios & cognates*, more specifically, on those instances in which these lexemes seemingly activate different frames at the same time. Euripides's *Children of Heracles* revolves around the children of Heracles, who are fleeing from Eurystheus, ruler of Argos. Eurystheus had been responsible for many of Heracles's hardships. Since he wanted to prevent the children of Heracles from taking revenge on him, he meant to kill them. This is why they escaped Argos under the protection of Iolaus, a good friend (and nephew) of their father's. A debate about the future of these suppliants is conducted between the suppliants themselves, their pursuer, a chorus of old men and King Theseus of Athens; this discussion is conducted in terms of what is δίκαιος and what is not.

The starting point of the play is the situation described in section 2.1. The religious ideal of protecting suppliants was not always respected in the face of political reality, here a powerful enemy. As explained in the prologue, the group had been driven away from every city they sought protection in, for Eurystheus had threatened all of these cities with war (15–24).[120]

In the opening scene of the play, we see Iolaus and the children of Heracles who have finally arrived at the altar of Zeus Agoraeus in Marathon (an Athenian deme) where they sit as suppliants. A messenger of Eurystheus is present and ready to drag them away from the altar. When a group of old men from Marathon (the Chorus) appears, Iolaus appeals to them for help:

Ιο. ὦ τᾶς Ἀθήνας δαρὸν οἰκοῦντες χρόνον,
ἀμύνεθ᾽· ἱκέται δ᾽ ὄντες ἀγοραίου Διὸς

119 Chapter 3, section 3.

120 As Iolaus says, the *poleis* that did not wish to accept the suppliants 'are honoring the mightier' (τοὺς κρείσσονας σέβοντες, 25). This is ironic: the active verb σέβειν is used especially and mostly of gods, so the use of this verb activates the idea of the worship of divinities in the mind of the listener. The phraseology τοὺς κρείσσονας σέβοντες reminds us of what these cities *should* be doing: honoring (σέβειν) the gods. Thus, in this brief utterance, Iolaus captures the clash between the demands of divine law and its practicability. Cf. the discussion on the semantics of σέβειν in Chapter 3, section 1.

βιαζόμεσθα καὶ στέφη μιαίνεται
πόλει τ' ὄνειδος καὶ θεῶν ἀτιμίαν.[121]

Io. Oh you, who have lived in Athens from old times,
protect us. For we are being violently treated even though we are
suppliants of Zeus Agoraeus and our wreaths are being defiled,
a disgrace to the city and a dishonour to the gods!

Although Iolaus invokes Zeus and appeals to the 'dishonour' the gods are facing,[122] it is striking that Iolaus should claim that they are suppliants of Zeus Agoraeus, instead of appealing to Zeus's more common manifestations in contexts of supplication: 'Zeus of the Stranger' (Ξένιος), 'Zeus of the Suppliant' (Ἱκέσιος), or 'Zeus the Saviour' (Σωτήρ). Zeus Agoraeus was the god of assemblies and trials and symbolic for the Athenian democratic debate.[123] By invoking Zeus Agoraeus, the suppliants appeal to the citizens and democratic institutions of the *polis*.[124] This sets the tone for the rest of the play, where almost no religious evaluative terminology enters the discussion.[125]

But first there is the reaction of the Chorus of old men of Marathon, who *do* interpret the situation in the light of the *religious* importance of protecting suppliants. The Chorus tells the messenger that it is fitting to respect suppliants of the gods (εἰκὸς θεῶν ἱκτῆρας αἰδεῖσθαι, 101); they should not leave the gods' seats by force (μὴ βιαίωι χειρὶ δαι-|μόνων ἀπολιπεῖν σφ' ἕδη, 102–103). As the Chorus claims, 'mighty Justice will not allow it' (πότνια γὰρ Δίκα τάδ' οὐ πείσεται, 104). The messenger suggests in response that they could expel the children of Heracles from the *polis*, and he will use no violence *inside* the city (105–106). But the Chorus answers, 'it is godless for a city to give up a suppliant band of strangers' (ἄθεον ἱκεσίαν μεθεῖναι πόλει | ξένων προστροπάν, 107–108). As in Aeschylus's *Suppliants*, the Chorus's appeal to justice (δίκη) is directly related to the divine interest in dealings with suppliants. In fact, the old men speak about a divine power Justice (πότνια Δίκη), honouring the rights of suppliants

121 E. *Heracl.* 69–72.

122 He does the same further on in E. *Heracl.* 78.

123 Allan 2001:48.

124 Wilkins 1993:60.

125 Religious terminology in this tragedy is rare. No cases of ἀνόσιος, εὐσεβής, ἀσεβής, δυσσεβής appear. καθαρός occurs once (E. *Heracl.* 1055), ἄθεος occurs once (107), ἁγνός occurs once (1011). By contrast, δίκαιος and ἄδικος occur 23 times. ὅσιος occurs once, used by Alcmene to evaluate the behaviour of Zeus. This rare usage of ὅσιος used to evaluate the conduct of a god is discussed in detail in Chapter 5, section 2.4.

herself. The herald in turn ignores the religious dimension of the situation altogether, when he replies, ‘Yes, but it is nice to keep out of trouble’ (καλὸν δέ γ’ ἔξω πραγμάτων ἔχειν πόδα, 109).

In his next speech, too, the messenger blatantly refuses to take the sacrosanctity of suppliants into account:

Κη. Ἀργεῖός εἰμι· τοῦτο γὰρ θέλεις μαθεῖν·
ἐφ’ οἷσι δ’ ἥκω καὶ παρ’ οὗ λέγειν θέλω
πέμπει Μυκηνῶν δεῦρό μ’ Εὐρυσθεὺς ἄναξ
ἄξοντα τούσδε· πολλὰ δ’ ἦλθον, ὦ ξένε,
δίκαι’ ἁμαρτῆι δρᾶν τε καὶ λέγειν ἔχων.
Ἀργεῖος ὢν γὰρ αὐτὸς Ἀργείους ἄγω
ἐκ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ τούσδε δραπέτας ἔχων,
νόμοισι τοῖς ἐκεῖθεν ἐψηφισμένους
θανεῖν· ***δίκαιοι*** δ’ ἐσμὲν οἰκοῦντες πόλιν
αὐτοὶ καθ’ αὑτῶν κυρίους κραίνειν δίκας.[126]

Mess. I am an Argive, since you wanted to know that
But I want to tell you for what purpose I’ve come and from whom.
Eurystheus, King of Mycene, has sent me here
to take these children with me. I have come with many just things
to do and at the same time to say.
Being an Argive myself, I take Argives with me
these runaways from my own country
who have been condemned to death by vote, through the laws
there. We, living in this city, have the right
to pass lawful judgments ourselves concerning ourselves.

In the messenger’s argument, the religious dimension of the problem is not considered at all. But crucially, he *does* manage to counter the accusation, ‘Justice will not allow you to drag this suppliant from the altar’. Picking up the notion of δίκη from the claim of the Old Men, the messenger uses it throughout his own exposition, arguing that what he is doing *is* δίκαιος (138, 142). First of all, in a variant of Creon’s ‘I am taking those who are mine’ (τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἄγω, S. *OC* 834),[127] the messenger says he is leading away (ἄγω, 139) his runaway slaves (δραπέτας, 140): the indirect message being here that the children of Heracles are his personal property.

126 E. *Heracl.* 134–143.

127 Cf. Section 2.4.

Turning the problem into a legal issue between *poleis* and making his argument in terms of who has the right to judge and pass sentences over whom, the messenger further exploits the semantic scope of δίκη in the fifth-century debate on supplication. When the messenger claims that he has come to say and do things that are δίκαιος, he argues that the suppliants fall under the jurisdiction of his *polis*. He, being an Argive citizen (134, 139), wants to take the children, also Argives, from his own *polis* (139–140), who are condemned to die by vote, through the laws which are in place in Argos (141–142). It is δίκαιον, the messenger argues, for the Argives, living in their own city, to pass valid judgments on their own people (142–143). Thus, the messenger cleverly uses the ambiguity in the term δίκη to answer the charges made against him.[128]

Iolaus implicitly accepts the herald's line of thought when he replies in exactly the same terms. It is hard to tell whether Iolaus fully endorses the argumentation that an Argive has the right to carry off other Argives in a foreign sanctuary.[129] But in any case, Iolaus stresses that this is beside the point: the children of Heracles and himself are no longer Argives. In fact, they have 'nothing in common' with the messenger (ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ τῶιδ' οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐν μέσωι, 184). Every line in Iolaus's subsequent speech serves to bring home this argument and effectively maximises the distance between Iolaus himself (and Heracles's children) and Eurystheus (and his messenger):

ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ τῷδ' οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐν μέσῳ:
Ιο. ἐπεὶ γὰρ Ἄργους οὐ μέτεσθ' ἡμῖν ἔτι,
ψήφωι δοκῆσαν, ἀλλὰ φεύγομεν πάτραν,
πῶς ἂν **δικαίως** ὡς Μυκηναίους ἄγοι
ὅδ' ὄντας ἡμᾶς, οὓς ἀπήλασαν χθονός;
ξένοι γάρ ἐσμεν.[130]

There is nothing in common between us and this man here
Since we no longer have a share in Argos
as was decided by vote, but we are fugitives from our native land,

128 cf. Goldhill 1986, Chapter 3, for a similar appropriation of different usages of δίκη by different speakers to suit their own rhetorical purposes, in the Oresteia. Goldhill calls this a 'rhetoric of appropriation'.

129 Lonis (1988:81) claims the argument is 'irrefutable', but Allan (2001, ad loc.) thinks the situation is more complicated. I will discuss this question in the main text below.

130 E. *Heracl.* 184–189.

> how could it be just that this man here takes us away as Mycenaeans
> us whom they have expelled from their country,
> for we are strangers.

'We no longer have a share in Argos (Ἄργους οὐ μέτεσθ' ἡμῖν ἔτι, 185),' he says, meaning, 'we are not longer active citizens of Argos'—as Blok shows, μέτεστι with a dative and a genitive is typically used to denote an individual's membership in the community.[131] Indeed, a democratic decision (ψήφῳ δοκῆσαν, 186) has been made to expel them, so they are now fugitives (φεύγομεν πάτραν, 186). As a result, the herald's argumentation does not apply, as explained in the rhetorical question: how can this man lead us off justly (δικαίως), *as if we were* Myceneans, when they drove us out of their country? Iolaus chooses the term δίκαιος as a retort to the herald, staying in the same evaluative frame. The closing statement, 'we are ξένοι', playing on the polysemy of that term, is doubly effective: the Heraclides are strangers to the Argives, but guests of the Athenians. This frees them of Argos and buys them the entitlement to protection from the Athenians.

The validity of the herald's argument in the eyes of the contemporary audience is doubtful. Even if the representation of the Heraclides as runaway slaves is correct, neither in Athens nor in Samos could such "property" simply be removed by their masters, once they had taken refuge at specified sanctuaries. The slave had the right to have his case heard in a legal procedure.[132] What would happen if a slave from *polis* A escaped to the sanctuary at *polis* B and claimed asylum there—as is the case in the herald's interpretation of the

131 μέτεστί μοι + genitive case indicates having a claim to something due to membership of the group (Blok 2009:145). For example, Apollod. *Neaira* 104 paraphrases a decree of 427 granting Athenian citizenship to a group of Plataeans: μετεῖναι αὐτοῖς ὧνπερ Ἀθηναίοις μέτεστι πάντων, καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων ('the Plataeans shall share in everything in which the Athenians share, both *hiera* and *hosia*'). Citizen status in classical Athens was often summarised in the phrase μετεῖναι / μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως (Blok 2009:159). Cf. Chapter 1, section 2.

132 In Athens, runaway slaves could take refuge at the Theseion. There they hoped to be resold to a better master. If the slave's original master objected, there would be a trial, conducted by the priests of the Theseion, on a charge of ὑβρίζειν. If the accused citizen was not found guilty of abusing his slave, the slave was returned to him (Christensen 1984:25). A similar procedure was in place in Samos, where an inscription (Habicht 1957:226–231, third century BCE) about runaway slaves at the sanctuary also mentions a trial; if the master had stronger arguments, the slave was returned to him (Chaniotis 1996:80–81). Crucially, in neither of these cases could the master take the law into his own hands and simply take the slave.

situation—is more difficult to say. There is evidence to suggest that procedures differed from the one regarding slaves escaping *within* their own *polis*.[133] Chaniotis assumes that these slaves stayed in the sanctuary and served as sacred slaves. Such a course of action would imply, too, that the herald could not simply take his slaves with him.[134]

Laws about the extradition of slaves could be captured in *symbola*, i.e. treaties between Greek *poleis* laying down judicial conventions.[135] In a fourth-century *symbolon* between Stymphalos and Sikyon, it was specified that the master in one of the *poleis* could regain his runaway slave in the other *polis* by paying a finder's reward.[136] It is not clear how common such laws were.[137] No fifth-century *symbola* mentioning the extradition of slaves between Athens and Argos are known. This is obviously not to say such a treaty did not exist, but as far as we can tell, the herald's case does not seem very strong.

Still, even though the messenger's argument may not have been in accordance with the actual laws in Argos, the fact that he makes these arguments at all and that Iolaus responds in the same terms is significant. Even if the messenger's attempts to drag the suppliants away represents the way in which the Athenians imagined that less enlightened others dealt with suppliants,

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133 For example, in Andania (92–91 BCE, *LSCG* 65.80–84) a priest decided whether a slave should be returned to his master—and the inscription specifies that this rule regards slaves 'from our own *polis*' (ἐκ τᾶς ἁμετέρας πόλεος). This phraseology suggests the procedures differed from what happened to slaves from *other poleis*, but the inscription does not specify what happens to this second category of slaves. According to Allan (2001, ad loc.) 'in a slave-owning society like Athens runaways were a major problem and it made sense for slave-owners throughout Greece to cooperate in returning them to their 'native' cities'. In the absence of documentary evidence this is speculative.

134 Chaniotis 1996:80.

135 MacDowell 1978:221.

136 IP*Ark* 17.135–140, 303–300 BCE, discussed in Arnaoutoglou 1998:116–118. The rule seems to be (but the crucial passage is difficult to read) that if a slave is caught, the master can take possession of the slave if he carries with him a reward for bringing the slave back, different amounts being specified for male, female and child slaves (ε̣ἴ̣ κ̣α δὲ ὁ δοῦλος ἢ ἁ δούλα ἁ̣λ̣[ίσ]- | κ̣η̣ται̣, ἐξέστω τ[ῶι] δεσπότα Λ̣Υ.. | Τ̣Ω κ̣ρ̣[α]τ̣εῖν, ε̣[ἰ συν]τ̣ι̣θείη· συνε̣π̣ι̣φ̣έ̣- | ρει μὲν ὁ δεσπότας τ̣ὰ̣ σ̣ῶστρα τ̣[οῦ ἀ]- | [ν]δρὸς ἴκατι̣ δραχμαί, γυναικ[ὸς] | [πα]ι̣δὸς δέκα δραχμαί·). There is no mention of refuge at a sanctuary in this rule, though.

137 Lonis (1988:84) argues that even if there were such rules, actual cases of extradition were rare. According to Phillipson (1911:359), sketching the historical development of laws providing for the delivery of foreign criminals/runaway slaves, such laws existed already in the 14th century BCE in Egypt and were common in Roman times; but in many areas of classical Greece, extradition may not have been clearly regulated, as for example the Herodotean case of Pactyes (Hdt. 1.153–160) discussed above shows.

the debate between the messenger and the Heraclides confirms that questions about the juridical status of suppliants—especially when multiple *poleis* were involved—were present in the contemporary public debate. The rhetorical clash between Eurystheus's herald and the Athenians also shows us that speakers came to use the semantic field of δίκη to stake claims about this topic.

This passage illustrates the semantic ambiguity of δίκη in the context of the fifth-century debate on supplication, and the potential for (deliberate) misunderstanding. The old men of Athens framed the situation as part of the ongoing relationship with the gods (δίκη = respecting the religious inviolability of suppliants). But the messenger, ignoring the accusation of the old men, accessed a different part of the semantic field of δίκη, transporting the discussion to a debate about property and about who has the right to judge over whom in inter-*polis* affairs.[138]

2.8 *Ambiguity Undermines*

Finally, we return to Aeschylus's *Suppliants*. In this play, the discussion revolves around different notions of justice in a very similar way to Euripides's *Heraclides*. However, in the Danaids' case, the ambiguity of δίκη works against them. Their assertions of having δίκη (divine justice) and νόμος on their side provoke Pelasgus's continued preoccupation with the legal situation in their country. When they fail to show that their cause is *also* δίκαιος and ἔννομος in the way Pelasgus suggests, this finally undercuts their case.[139] In section 3.2 it was argued that the Danaids use ὅσιος and δίκαιος not to frame situations differently, but in the same way. Below we will see that this semantic equation is a rhetorical choice: the Danaids have a vested interest in treating the two concepts as precisely the same.

Pelasgus wants to know from the very start of the discussion with the Danaids whether or not the Aegyptiads have the right to marry their cousins according to the customs or laws in Egypt.[140] When the Danaids state they are

138 Recall that the chorus and Theseus in *Oedipus Coloneus* (section 2.4) did something similar when they replied to Creon's accusation (δίκη = taking my property with me) by juxtaposing their own interpretation of δίκη (respecting the laws in the *polis*) before answering Creon in his own terms.

139 His first decision is not to help them at all. He only changes his mind in response to the serious and imminent danger of μίασμα through the girls' threatened suicide on the altar (A. *Supp.* 455–467).

140 In *Suppliants*, we again see a reflection of the twofold attitude towards suppliants in a fifth-century democratic *polis* discussed above, projected on to Argos in the mythical past. On

supplicating so they may not 'become a slave to the sons of Aegyptus' (335), Pelasgus asks an informative question (336), 'Is that because you hate them, or are you claiming this is not θέμις?' The Danaids do not answer, and their silence implies that the marriage is not unlawful in Egypt. Instead, they focus their persuasive speeches on divine Justice, which they claim to have on their side. This seems like a strong rhetorical move, but actually it is not, because every time they mention δίκη and νόμος, Pelasgus is reminded of the other framework in which these two concepts function: the *polis* and its laws. Thus, when the Danaids say that 'Justice stands by those who fight for her' (ἡ Δίκη γε ξυμμάχων ὑπερστατεῖ, 343), Pelasgus has already moved from the factual ignorance of l. 336 to scepticism, 'Yes, if justice was an ally in your cause in the first place' (εἴπερ γ' ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πραγμάτων κοινωνὸς ἦν, 344). Again, the Danaids fail to answer Pelasgus's implicit question, and the matter remains open for a while. In fact, it seems as if Pelasgus temporarily forgets about his previous line of questioning, when he ponders his two choices: helping the suppliants and risking war or not helping them and risking the anger of the gods and μίασμα.[141] After the discussion comes to an impasse in 377–380, the Danaids throw in another speech that should finally convince him, but which does exactly the opposite.

Χο. τὸν ὑψόθεν σκοπὸν ἐπισκόπει
φύλακα πολυπόνων
βροτῶν οἳ τοῖς πέλας προσήμενοι
δίκας οὐ τυγχάνουσιν ***ἐννόμου***·
μένει τοι Ζηνὸς ἱκταίου κότος
δυσπαράθελκτος παθόντος οἴκτοις.[142]

Ch. Look out for him who watches from above,
the guardian of much-suffering mortals,
who sit to supplicate their fellow creatures

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the one hand, the Danaids can convincingly assert that accepting them is compulsory in order not to anger the gods and incur a terrible μίασμα. On the other hand, the acceptance of the suppliants is not automatic, which we see reflected in the fact that Pelasgus questions the Danaids about the reasonableness of their request and wishes to refer the matter to the citizen body, in analogy to the historical fifth-century system of (double) evaluation of suppliants (by Assembly and Council).

141 A. *Supp.* 345–380.

142 A. *Supp.* 381–386.

because they do not get lawful justice:
the anger of Zeus god of suppliants is enduring
it won't be placated by the wailings of the sufferer.

Unfortunately their choice of vocabulary reactivates the legal frame in the Argive ruler, causing him to resume his previous line of questioning. Pelasgus picks up on their notion of ἐννόμος δίκη (384) and wonders once more, but this time more insistently, about the reasonableness of their plea:

Πε. εἴ τοι κρατοῦσι παῖδες Αἰγύπτου σέθεν
νόμωι πόλεως, φάσκοντες ἐγγύτατα γένους
εἶναι, τίς ἂν τοῖσδ' ἀντιωθῆναι θέλοι;
δεῖ τοί σε φεύγειν κατὰ ***νόμους*** τοὺς οἴκοθεν,
ὡς οὐκ ἔχουσιν κῦρος οὐδὲν ἀμφὶ σοῦ.[143]

Pe. If it is the case that the sons of Aegyptos rule over you
by the law of your *polis*, saying they are your nearest kin,
who would want to oppose those claims?
You must plead your defence and argue that they do not have any
authority concerning you, according to the laws of your home country.

Pelasgus is assuming that the marriage is actually in line with the law or custom of their *polis* (νόμος, 388); if not, the Danaids have to prove that their cousins do *not* have the authority over them according to the laws at home (κατὰ νόμους τοὺς οἴκοθεν, 390).

This exchange seems to mark a turning point in the debate. The Danaids have no response for the third time. They seem to realise that their case has been undercut, and that the best strategy left is to draw attention away from the notion of δίκη as referring the laws of their city and the authority their cousins have over them. Pelasgus had already been convinced he should honour the gods by treating suppliants properly. Now, the Danaids start aggressively to argue that piety and τὸ δίκαιον are actually the same thing, 'By choosing Justice as your ally, choose being respectful to the gods' (ξύμμαχον δ'ἑλόμενος Δίκαν κρῖνε σέβας τὸ πρὸς θεῶν, 395–396). A bit further on, in ll. 402–406, τὸ δίκαιον is again equated to piety (τὸ ὅσιον).[144] The important thing to note is that the usage of ὅσιος and δίκαιος as synonyms, to frame the situation in the same way

143 A. *Supp*. 387–391.

144 These lines were discussed in detail in section 2.2 of this chapter.

(as opposed to what we saw in previous sections), is a conscious rhetorical choice: the girls deliberately make this semantic equation as part of their argumentative strategy.

In 418 ff. the suppliants throw in a final plea in which they explicitly equate piety with τὸ δίκαιον once more, 'become our pious *proxenos* with full justice' (γενοῦ πανδίκως | εὐσεβὴς πρόξενος, 418–419).[145] However, their speeches are to no avail: after this, Pelasgus rejects them, saying he wants to have nothing to do with the matter anymore. It seems as if the polysemy of δίκη has undermined their argument to such an extent that they lose this plea.

3 The Fine-Tuning of Evaluative Vocabulary

Against the background of the preceding discussion, we return to the question posed in Chapter 1: is it possible to determine a motivation for the strongly increasing frequency of usage of the adjective ὅσιος and its antonym ἀνόσιος, and the introduction of *eusebês & cognates* in the course of the fifth century? The motivation behind the introduction of a new word, or the increasing popularity of an existing rare word in general seems to be: a mismatch between the conceptual space and the available words to cover it, on one level or another. Such a disparity can arise when a new 'concept' or 'mentality' is born. Our hypothesis might have been that some new mentality in the classical period came to be expressed by means of ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος and *eusebês & cognates*.[146] However, my analysis in Chapter 2 showed that the mentality that *hosios, eusebês & cognates* articulate was frequently attested in our earliest literary sources.[147] Another possibility is that semantic movements in one place cause referential 'gaps' elsewhere. This may lead to the introduction of new words, or the rising popularity of existing rare words, to fill up those gaps. In the present case, perhaps the changing semantics of δίκη is relevant. δίκη is a highly central term in the Greek evaluative inventory, but it is rather ambiguous in the fifth century. Speakers occasionally used δίκη in the sense of 'behaving in a way that other humans and the gods will perceive as just'. However, such a usage activated other, strong, prototypical applications of δίκη: 'keeping to the law' and 'getting one's rightful portion'. We have seen that such multiplicity of meaning led to misunderstandings (deliberate or not) in conversations.

145 'Do not allow us to be dragged from the altar in spite of justice' (βίαι | δίκας, 429–430); 'the Justice coming from Zeus rules' (δίκαια Διόθεν κρατεῖ, 437).

146 This is the hypothesis of Jay-Robert 2009:28. Cf. Chapter 2, section 5.

147 Chapter 2, section 5.

Perhaps the increasing popularity of ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος and the introduction of *eusebês & cognates* simply covered the need for more dedicated terms to articulate that actions, attitudes and persons were praiseworthy because they pleased the gods and thus helped sustain the reciprocal bond between the human and the divine world.

4 Conclusion

In this chapter we have contrasted the semantics of *hosios & cognates* and *dikaios & cognates* by studying their application in a specific thematic field, that of ancient supplication. This case study confirmed earlier views that it is impossible to make a clear-cut semantic distinction between these two lexical fields which works for all cases. Our linguistic approach enabled us to re-state the conclusions of previous scholars in a more precise way. It was argued that *hosios & cognates* and *dikaios & cognates frame* situations differently, even when evaluating the same behavioural patterns, each having a different set of stored associations in the mental lexicon. In the fifth century, *dikaios & cognates* had accumulated a rich set of associations, referring not only to what is just in the eyes of the gods, but also to a proper distribution or to what individuals have legally committed to. Even when *dikaios & cognates* referred to what 'pleases the gods', these other associations were co-activated. By contrast, the semantics of *hosios & cognates* seem to be much more focussed. It was suggested that *hosios & cognates* in the fifth century covered users' need for more dedicated, specific terms to express morality from the imagined perspective of gods when *dikaios & cognates* became more specialized for other usages.

CHAPTER 5

Pious Gods

The Marked Usage of ὅσιος for Divinities

In this chapter we will discuss a remarkable group of semantic outliers of ὅσιος and ὁσία: cases in which ὅσιος or ὁσία is used to describe the behaviour of a god. In the following analysis these cases will be analysed in terms of markedness. In previous chapters we have compared the usage of *hosios & cognates* to other ways a speaker had of conveying a similar message, determining the situations and 'frames' in which *hosios & cognates* are *typically* used, as opposed to near-synonyms. Now we will study the usage of *hosios & cognates* in highly *atypical*, unexpected situations, and in the face of readily available and more plausible lexical alternatives. The aim is to provide a better view on the semantic/pragmatic status of the discussed 'outliers', and thereby to increase our understanding of the semantics of *hosios & cognates*. I also want to offer an insight into the interpretative steps that were taken by audiences: the listeners within the dramatic setting itself, and the real-life audience outside of the text. How did they make sense of such 'marked' language use?

1 Markedness

One of the main strengths of the cognitive linguistic model is its ability to deal with the semantic flexibility characteristic of real language use. According to Langacker categories are built up around prototypes (typical instances of a category). Other elements are assimilated to the category on the basis of their perceived resemblance to the prototype.[1] A language user can add new 'members' to the category at the edges of the network—for example, when a speaker uses a word in a new sense, stretching or extending its general currency of usage. Of course it is not always possible to extend a semantic network without any explanation. Interpretability may become an issue when more marginal members are added to a category, and it may be necessary to help other language users understand the utterance.[2] But in principle the model of network

1 Langacker 1991:266. Cf. the discussion in Chapter 1, section 3 in this book.

2 For example, when the word 'mouse' was introduced for the computer-mouse (which was called a 'position indicator control' before), explicit mention that this was a new usage of

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semantics allows for what actually happens in language use: the addition of meanings to a semantic network by integrating them at the periphery of the mental chart. As Langacker stated, 'There is no fixed limit on how far something can depart from the prototype and still be assimilated to the class, if the categoriser is perceptive or clever enough to find some point of resemblance to typical instances.'[3] Langacker's theory correctly predicts that any action or behavioural pattern could be evaluated in terms of ὁσιότης, providing that the speaker could convince his audience that this was the relevant evaluative category. But the strength of the model on this point is at the same time a weakness. The notion that mental categories have no boundaries potentially presents a problem that we will address in this chapter. The problem is that extended language use often has an effect (intentional or not), but this effect does not derive directly from the fact that they are marginal or peripheral instances of a lexeme.

To illustrate the problem, we will consider a modern and then an ancient example. Some time ago a Dutch newspaper reported on the killing of a sheep, 'Nasty wretches shot a sheep this weekend in a field along the Wantijdijk in Dordrecht. The police have no idea who is responsible for the execution.'[4] The word execution is normally used for the deliberate and planned killing of a human being 'in pursuance of a judicial or authoritative sentence'.[5] Describing the shooting of an animal (perhaps accidental, and very probably not highly motivated) as an 'execution' is a clear case of stretching or extending the normal meaning of a term. As the network model predicts, we can *understand* the message. However, this choice of word also clearly has an *intended effect* that most users will catch. The author apparently wishes to convey that the act is comparable to killing a person, and also that it was certainly no accident. The reporter's indignation is evident, matching his interpretation of the event, when he refers to those responsible as 'nasty wretches'.

Turning to antiquity, near the beginning of Sophocles's *Antigone*, Ismene asks her sister a rhetorical question, 'How much more miserably [than the rest of our family] will we be destroyed if we, in defiance of the law, transgress

the word 'mouse' facilitated the introduction and entrenchment of the term. In the *New York Times* of 26 November 1982 (D1), it was explained that 'instead of typing commands or code words to request information, users can point to words or symbols on the screen … through manipulation of a hand-held device *known as* a mouse' (italics for emphasis are mine).

3 Langacker 1991:266.

4 *Algemeen Dagblad*, 27/5/08: 'Onverlaten hebben afgelopen weekeinde een schaap doodgeschoten in een weiland langs de Wantijdijk in Dordrecht. De politie heeft nog geen idee wie verantwoordelijk is voor de executie'.

5 OED s.v. execution 8b.

against the vote of the rulers (ψῆφον τυράννων) or their power?'[6] The usage of the term ψῆφος in this context is unusual. This term has very strong democratic connotations and typically refers to 'that which is decided by vote', whereas the term τύραννος does *not* belong in a democratic context. LSJ explain the usage of ψῆφος in this passage as an extended use of its normal reference, namely as '*any* resolve or decree'.[7] While that may be what we should understand, this suggestion does not do full justice to the *effect* of the utterance, which was perhaps intended by Sophocles. The oxymoronic combination of ψῆφον and τυράννων will strike the listener as remarkable. This striking utterance prepares for the negative characterisation of Creon as a tyrant (in the pejorative sense of the word) who grossly transgresses against all democratic values.[8]

Langacker's network model correctly accounts for the understandability of these examples, but does not enlighten us about the cause of their effect. To explain this effect, we need to return to the notion of lexical competition, and add two other, more general linguistic ideas. These are economy considerations and the social basis of language.

Effective communication depends crucially on the consistent employment of the principle of least effort and on second-order theory of mind.[9] While a speaker is selecting a lexeme, other lexical candidates are temporarily co-activated. The speaker chooses the optimal candidate for the meaning he wants to express, because this is the most economical way for him to communicate.[10] Thus, if a speaker wants to refer to a 'chair' he says 'chair', not 'couch'. Crucially, listeners are aware that speakers have to choose between alternatives, and they expect speakers to select optimal candidates. The listener relies on the speaker meaning 'chair' if he says 'chair', because he assumes the speaker would not have chosen a suboptimal form-meaning pair in the first place. The speaker in turn can rely on the listener reasoning like this. Hence, when the

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6 S. *Ant.* 59–60: ὅσῳ κάκιστ' ὀλούμεθ', εἰ νόμου βίᾳ | ψῆφον τυράννων ἢ κράτη παρέξιμεν.

7 s.v. ψῆφος 2.5c.

8 The term τύραννος used for an absolute ruler does not always have the negative connotation of 'tyrant'. The mythological setting of tragedy often involved pre-democratic societies in which monarchic rulers were anachronistically portrayed as upholding ideals with a clear positive democratic ring to them (e.g. Pelasgus in A. *Supp.*), but Creon in his interaction with Antigone does not show such high ideals.

9 Second-order theory of mind: speaker and hearer are both able to imagine what the other person is thinking and aware that both are aware of the other person's perspective. On the social basis of language, see for example, Tomasello 2003 and especially Tomasello 2008, for a very readable introduction.

10 Chapter 1, section 3.

speaker says 'chair', he can be fairly certain that the listener interprets 'chair'. This is called 'bidirectional optimisation'.[11] Optimisation in lexical semantics means that speakers find the optimal form to express a given meaning, and that listeners find the optimal interpretation for a given form. But listeners optimise *bidirectionally* when, in the process of interpretation, they also take into account the speaker's considerations. Therefore, the usage of a lexeme L_y to express meaning M_x strikes a listener as remarkable if there is a different lexeme (L_x) available that is much more commonly used for meaning M_x, because

a) for the speaker, L_x is a default option to express M_x and for the hearer, M_x is a default interpretation for L_x. Hence, the form-meaning pair L_x–M_x is optimally economical.
b) both speaker (or author putting words in the mouth of a fictional speaker) and interpreter are *mutually aware* (i.e. aware that both know they are both aware) of these facts and will therefore *expect* L_x in M_x.

In the context of our first example, the words 'death' or 'killing' would have been available to the reporter; in the second example, Ismene could have used, for example, the term κρίσις. The usage of 'execution' and 'ψῆφος' violate the economy principle and the frame of expectation that both users have. This principle underlies most everyday language use. It is only because we are mutually aware of the normal context for words that using a word slightly out of its normal context has an effect.

We can understand such extraordinary language use by referring to a more general mechanism: that of markedness. Markedness theory concerns binary distinctions and is intended to account for the asymmetries in these binary distinctions.[12] Some markedness relations are defined with respect to one another,

11 Cf. the Bidirectional Optimisation hypothesis (Blutner & Zeevat 2004) within Optimality Theory (Prince & Smolensky 1993, McCarthy & Prince 1995, for introductions, see Kager 1999 and McCarthy 2001). NB: This idea is not new; it was already captured in different terms (although perhaps slightly less explicitly) by Grice's cooperative principle and his notion of conversational implicatures (1989:22–40) as well as by Sperber & Wilson's (1986) Relevance Theory.

12 Murphy 1993:2. The terms 'marked' and 'unmarked' originated in the so-called Prague School (also called Prague linguistic circle: Trubetzkoy 1939, Jakobson e.g. 1941, 1949a,b, 1978). These notions were applied in typological research by Greenberg 1966. Since then, markedness has been widely applied by linguists of different linguistic orientations to describe a wide variety of phonological, syntactic, semantic, morphological and pragmatic phenomena (cf. De Lacy 2006:3). There are several competing theories of

for example masculine and feminine titles of professions.[13] Other markedness relations are not fixed, but contextually determined. Aert Kuipers summarises the contingent nature of markedness by means of a simple example:

> If we write in black on a white background the black 'stands out' and is "marked". That of which there is less, that which is less usual, will be experienced as "marked". If we normally read roman type, italics are marked. In a text printed in italics, a word in roman type will stand out.[14]

In this case, markedness is defined as abnormality of usage, but against a particular background, in a particular context.[15] Note that this notion can be applied to phenomena that are not linguistic. For example, wearing an evening gown to the supermarket is marked, but wearing it to the opera is unmarked.[16] In the following I will analyze the usage of lexemes in context in terms of markedness as 'abnormality'.

What are the advantages of using markedness theory in the cognitive model of lexical semantics, and how does it apply? Conceptual markedness is a relational concept: something is marked with respect to something else. Hence, 'unmarked' is not the same as 'prototypical': prototypicality captures the relation between different usages of the same word, whereas the concept of 'markedness' also takes the usage of a different word in the same context into account. I will argue that the sheep's death being referred to as an execution and Creon's decision being called a ψῆφος are marked in fact not because these passages show 'marginal' or 'non-prototypical' uses of these terms, but rather because other terms are available that would be less 'marked' in this context. Note that 'marked' is not the same as 'strange'. I argue that the oxymoron ψῆφος

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markedness set in different linguistic frameworks. Recently, Haspelmath 2006 has provided an overview of twelve different senses in which markedness has been used.

13 While masculine forms of professions in English are often gender-neutral (a director can be both male and female), the morphologically more complex feminine forms especially refer to women. Hence the masculine forms are unmarked (and preferred) but the feminine forms are marked: one does not use them, unless one specifically wants to discuss female professionals (or if one wishes to emphasize that they are women). For some professions typically carried out by women, the situation is the opposite: the feminine form is the unmarked case (e.g. 'waitress').

14 Kuipers 1975:43, in Battistella 1990:5.

15 Haspelmath's senses 7–11.

16 Battistella 1990:5.

τυράννων is not on its own responsible for the effect on the listeners, but ψῆφος is marked *because the speaker has other options*.

In the following, we will analyse some occurrences of *hosios &cognates* in terms of markedness. These cases evaluate the behaviour of gods. To explain them, Rudhardt suggested that *hosios & cognates* must refer to some 'higher order' to which gods must also conform, thus representing a crucial difference in meaning between ὅσιος and εὐσεβής.[17] Clearly, then, our interpretation of these cases is essential to a proper understanding of the semantics of *hosios & cognates*. I will argue that an analysis in terms of markedness not only achieves that aim, but also helps us make better sense of each individual passage discussed. I will assume that these cases do not represent a normal semantic characteristic of *hosios & cognates*, but are exceptional. Perhaps indicative of the 'markedness' of these cases is their low frequency of usage: these cases are very rare.[18] More importantly, as we have seen, ὅσιος essentially evaluates *human* actions and attitudes (towards other humans or gods) that are *pleasing to the gods and provide them with the timê they deserve* (Chapter 2). Hence, the usage of ὅσιος for gods is inherently paradoxical. We will proceed by studying the relevant cases one by one.[19]

2 ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος Gods

2.1 *Impious Apollo*

In Euripides's *Orestes*, an increasingly desperate Orestes tries to deal with the accusations against him. Several characters in the play disqualify his matricide as ἀνόσιος (374, 481); Orestes himself in fact admits to this charge (286, 546).

17 Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:2. Moulinier 1952:286–287 has also argued that gods can be ὅσιος.

18 n = 7. As Haspelmath 2006:33 describes, Greenberg 1966 was the most important early author to take frequency as a measure for markedness. Many authors, such as Radford 1988 and Archangeli 1992 use this notion. Haspelmath agrees that 'frequency of use is an extremely important factor for explaining … asymmetries in language structure'. Arguments *against* taking frequency as a criterion for neutrality or unmarkedness made by Kirk 2013 (mentioning earlier critiques) are not relevant to my investigation, because they relate specifically to syntactic assumptions of the theoretical framework (generative linguistics) in which Kirk's research is set.

19 We will discuss four out of seven extant occurrences in this chapter. The remaining three highly debated passages in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* (130, 173, 470) are analyzed in terms of markedness in Chapter 7, section 5, because they are part of the discussion on the alleged semantic paradox of ὅσιος.

In a plea to his grandfather Tyndareus, Orestes pulls out all the stops in a spectacular defence. He emphasizes the impossibility of his situation: he had to choose between two terrible wrongs (murdering his mother or failing to avenge his father). He claims that he wanted to stop a practice in which women can just kill their husbands whenever they like (564–571).[20] He points to Tyndareus as the 'real culprit', because he is the father of Clytemnestra (585–587). Finally, Orestes blames the god Apollo, claiming that people should 'call *him* ἀνόσιος, and put him to death instead' (595). Orestes's argument is clearly a *reductio ad absurdum* of his opponents' moral critique of the matricide. Orestes only committed his dreadful crime in obedience to the god (594). Therefore, the god is responsible for it, at least partly.[21] If one wishes to consider anyone ἀνόσιος, Orestes argues, it should be Apollo, and they should "kill" the god accordingly. But the disqualification of a divinity as ἀνόσιος is as incongruous as the plan to execute him.

Let us analyse the steps that a contemporary listener would have taken (unconsciously and in a very short amount of time) when interpreting this unusual utterance. When comparing what is said to his or her linguistic knowledge of ὅσιος, a listener would first of all realise that this usage of ὅσιος is far from prototypical. Orestes's qualification of Apollo by an evaluative term that is in essence inapplicable to a god is highly unusual. Such usage may be something the listener had never encountered (or consciously registered) before.

The next interpretative step a listener would take is *to make sense of* the utterance. This is the case because in communicative settings, listeners always apply the principle of charity: they always assume that the speaker is conveying a meaningful message, and they will try to understand that message. Although the evaluation ἀνόσιος creates a semantic paradox, it is obviously still understandable in its context. This usage is an extension of the more frequently occurring usage of ἀνόσιος for Orestes in this play. Orestes *transfers* the accusation, which was aimed at him, to Apollo, because he considers the god to be the 'true' murderer. However, the realisation that this passage shows a 'marginal' use of the term ὅσιος—and the attempt to make sense of it nevertheless—are not enough to explain its full rhetorical punch. Orestes's unusual choice of the adjective has an effect that does not emerge from the above-mentioned explanation of its usage.

This is the case because listeners optimise bidirectionally. The listener realises that Orestes had other commonly used evaluative terms at his disposal to

20 Kovacs deletes these lines.

21 E. *Or.* 285–287.

describe Apollo's moral state (such as the adjective δίκαιος), but nevertheless chose this paradoxical term. Thus, the audience interprets this usage of ὅσιος as marked when comparing it to the normal reference of the term, and taking into account the availability of alternatives to the speaker.

The final interpretative step taken by the listener is to form a hypothesis as to *why* the speaker makes such a striking lexical choice in the face of more obvious alternatives. One of the listener's options is to suppose linguistic incompetence, naïveté or an abnormal world-view on the part of the speaker. In other words, the listener may conjecture that the speaker is not aware of the normal reference of the term ὅσιος. This is not the most charitable interpretation. Another option is to assume that the speaker's choice was conscious and serves an intended effect. In this case, it is most likely that the audience takes Orestes's words as purposeful in the specific dramatic context in which they were (originally) uttered. As we have seen, Orestes, in this bombastic and despairing attempt to save himself, turns to ever new arguments. The final verbal attack against his accusers is a deliberate attempt to underscore the impossibility of his situation and thus brings to the fore that there was really no way in which he could have done right.

2.2 *Pious Apollo*

A second Euripidean passage can be explained in a similar way. In the prologue of *Alcestis*, the god Apollo enters the stage in the guise of a servant. As the god explains, Zeus condemned him to serve the mortal Admetus as a punishment for his murder of the Cyclopes. The god says about himself and Admetus, 'being pious (ὅσιος), I met a pious man (ὁσίου ἀνδρός)'.[22] This is one of very few cases in archaic and classical Greek in which a god refers to *himself* as ὅσιος.

Modern 'listeners' or interpreters (i.e. scholars commenting on this passage) have noted the exceptional application of ὅσιος to a god.[23] They have also tried to make sense of the utterance. Some commentators have argued that it is merely motivated by Euripides's fondness of repeating the same word (in different grammatical forms);[24] or that Apollo is referring to his human manifestation as Admetus's servant.[25] Others have proposed a meaning extension from

22 E. *Alc.* 10.

23 Hayley 1898, Dale 1954, Beye 1974, Conacher 1988, Luschnig & Roisman 2003, Parker 2007, ad loc.

24 Hayley 1898, Parker 2007, ad loc. NB: Parker does not think the usage of ὅσιος for a god is really 'meaningful' in this passage, but he does comment on the effect of the 'odd' application of ὅσιος to a god in Pi. *P.* 9.36, discussed in section 2.3 of this chapter below.

25 Dale 1954, Luschnig & Roisman 2003, ad loc.

the more common, prototypical applications of ὅσιος used for humans, to make it meaningful in application to a god. In earlier literature it was supposed that ὅσιος had to do with Apollo's purification from his murder of the Cyclopes.[26] Conacher reasoned that 'because Apollo is in a reciprocal guest-host relationship in which he wants to honour his host, he can use the term ὅσιος of himself referring to his status as guest'.[27] Beye gave a more general moral interpretation to ὅσιος. He suggested that because ὅσιος refers to scrupulousness mainly in the relationship of a human to a god, 'perhaps "honourable" or "just" conveys the application when ὅσιος is applied to a god'.[28]

Indeed, we must find some common characteristics of this situation and more prototypical situations in which ὅσιος is applied to make its usage in this situation interpretable. One of these common factors is the fact that Apollo has a human-like status in the play as servant of Admetus, and so he can use the vocabulary normally used to evaluate human behaviour; another is Apollo's position as a ξένος.[29] However, in the previous section it was argued that such an explanation is not enough to understand the full rhetorical *effect* of such a passage. In a process of bidirectional optimisation, a contemporary audience would have realised that the divine speaker could easily have described himself in other terms more commonly used for gods, whether wishing to refer to his moral state (using, for example, the term δίκαιος) or a state of ritual purity (by means of the terms καθαρός or ἁγνός). Again, they would have interpreted Apollo's choice of words as marked, and likely perceived it as deliberate: we can view Apollo's utterance as part of the creation of a paradoxical image throughout this whole scene, both on the verbal and the visual level.

The juxtaposition of a human and divine identity is evident. On the textual level, Apollo emphasizes that he is a god, not only by explicitly saying so (θεός περ ὤν, 2) but also by emphasizing his position of divine influence and power, especially in his explanation of how he saved Admetus from death by tricking

26 Wüstemann 1823, Hayley 1898, Hadley 1901 argued that it is strange for Apollo to call himself ὅσιος, having not been purified for the killing of the Cyclopes. In this train of thought we might think Apollo means that he *has* been purified (and consequently has restored his relations with the gods).

27 Conacher 1988.

28 Beye 1974, ad loc.

29 As we have seen in Chapter 2, section 1.6, actions in a ξενία relationship are often evaluated in terms of ὁσιότης. Both guest and host need to act in a way that is ὅσιος. Hosts that are (not) ὅσιος: E. *Cyc.* 125, 693, E. *Hec.* 790, 792, 852, 1235; Hdt. 2.119.2; guests that are (not) ὅσιος: Hdt. 2.114.2–3, 2.115.4.

the Fates.[30] At the same time, he refers to himself as a serf (l. 6). This clash is the verbal counterpart of the equally confusing *visual* impression that is created here. In accordance with his novel status as low-ranked labourer, Apollo is dressed in rags. But the god is also still wearing the bow that marks him out as Apollo.[31] Various commentators have pointed out that these clashes create a highly comical situation.[32]

The usage of the term ὅσιος contributes to the topsy-turvy image of the god in this prologue. Apollo does not simply apply the evaluative term ὅσιος to *refer* to his human manifestation. By choosing the marked term ὅσιος as opposed to, for example, δίκαιος (less marked in this situation), Apollo contributes to *creating* the comical "partly god and partly human" status he has in this play. This effect is strengthened by the fact that he applies the same term to Admetus in the same line ('being ὅσιος I met a ὅσιος man'). The god placing himself on the level of a human by using this 'human' word linguistically reflects the paradox of the situation in which Apollo finds himself.[33]

2.3 *Apollo in Love*

In Pindar's *Pythian* 9, a god wonders with respect to his own behaviour, 'whether it is (in accordance with) ὁσία'. Again, this paradoxical self-reference of the term ὁσία *contributes to creating* a highly anthropomorphic picture of the divinity in this scene.

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30 E. *Alc.* 12.

31 Cf. E. *Alc.* 39, in which Death asks him why he's wearing a bow.

32 e.g. Luschnig & Roisman 2003, ad loc. comment that Apollo's bow 'would add a strong visual element to his comic comedown'.

33 Note that the expression ὁσίου γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ὅσιος ὢν ἐτύγχανον (l. 10) presents more than just a remarkable evaluation for Apollo. When Admetus is called ὅσιος here, seemingly in reference to his treatment of the stranger Apollo, the irony and paradox in this characterisation of Admetus become apparent almost immediately. Admetus may have treated a stranger well and have earned the qualification ὅσιος in this respect, but his behaviour towards his parents would earn the opposite evaluation. In l. 12 we learn that, when looking for a substitute person to die in his place, Admetus asked everyone he knew to die for him, including his mother and father. Obviously, that is not a ὅσιος way of treating one's parents. When a child has become an adult and his parents are ageing, the balance of reciprocity turns and the child is supposed to take care of his parents, not ask them to die for him (cf. Chapter 2, section 1.7). Moreover, further on in the play Admetus receives Heracles as a guest, even though he had promised his wife that the house would remain in cheerless mourning. He wins her back through that hospitality, even though ironically (Smith 1960:127) that action requires him to fail to be ὅσιος towards his dead wife.

Pythian 9, which was composed for the victory of Telesicrates of Cyrene in the hoplite race of 474 BCE, contains a long mythological exposition (5–70). When the god Apollo saw the virgin Cyrene wrestling with a lion on Mt. Pelion, he fell in love. He asked the centaur Chiron for advice and after gaining his approval, carried Cyrene off to Libya, where he had intercourse with her and installed her as the local queen.[34] Apollo's question about ὁσία occurs in the conversation between Apollo and Chiron in this foundation myth. When Apollo first spotted Cyrene, he asked the Centaur in awe:

τίς νιν ἀνθρώπων τέκεν; ποί-
ας δ' ἀποσπασθεῖσα φύτλας
ὀρέων κευθμῶνας ἔχει σκιοέντων,
γεύεται δ' ἀλκᾶς ἀπειράντου;
ὁσία κλυτὰν χέρα οἱ προσενεγκεῖν
ἦρα καὶ ἐκ λεχέων κεῖραι μελιαδέα ποίαν;

Who of mankind bore her?
Torn off from which stock
does she now occupy the hiding places of shadowy mountains
and taste her infinite strength?
Is it *hosia* to lay my famous hand on her
and to cut from her bed the honey-sweet grass?

Apollo's question of whether it is ὁσία ('in accordance with the gods' wishes') to take the girl's virginity[35] is as remarkable as the characterisation of himself as ὅσιος in Euripides's *Alcestis*. As a god, he should obviously be aware of the divine world's rules, and definitely as god of prophecy, he knows past, present and future and is therefore perfectly aware of the answer to his own question. What is more, individuals usually do not ask, with respect to *themselves*, whether a particular course of action they are about to take, or something they are about to say, is ὁσία or ὅσιον. Instead, the near-synonym θέμις is more common in

34 This tale is not only a foundation myth of the city of Cyrene, but as other scholars have explored, the story is also a foil for Telesicrates's victory. Cf. Grethlein 2011:384–385 with n. 7 for references. Grethlein argues that the contrast between the two narratives serves to emphasize the gap between the human and divine world.

35 'To cut the honey-sweet grass from her bed' is clearly an euphemism for 'taking her virginity', as Giannini 1990:62 points out was already explained by the scholia (Drachmann 1910:225–226, *schol.* 61c & 64c). Cf. Instone 1996:126. The phrase continues the botanical metaphor in l. 33. Cf. e.g., Burton 1962:44; Carey 1981:75.

self-attributed statements.[36] θέμις is also much more common in deliberations in the form of conditional statements ('if x is θέμις …') and in questions ('is it θέμις?').[37] Moreover, both humans and gods reflect on the validity of planned courses of action or speech-acts, wondering whether or stating that they 'are θέμις'.[38] In sum, the noun θέμις would have fitted better in Apollo's utterance in three different respects: a *god* (not a human) is asking a *question*, and this question regards *his own* behaviour.

36 *themis & cognates* are more often self-attributed than *hosios & cognates*, although the majority of cases still concerns an action or attitude of someone else. In the archaic instances of *themis & cognates*, 31% are self-attributed (n = 12) and 62% are other-attributed (n = 24). In addition, one text (3%) is unclear (Hes. fr. 343.16), and in two cases (5%) it is ambiguous whether 'what is θέμις' is self- or other-attributed (*Il.* 11.779, *Od.* 9.268). In the fifth-century evidence of *themis & cognates*, 40% concerns the action or attitude of oneself (n = 38), 57% that of someone else (n = 55). In addition, 3% is unclear (n = 3). If we collapse the preclassical and classical evidence, 37% of the cases are descriptions of one's own action or attitude, 59% of the cases refer to someone else. The difference between the distributions of *themis & cognates* and *hosios & cognates* (self: 19%, other: 79%, cf. Chapter 2, section 1.4) is statistically significant (χ^2 = 17.87 p < 0.001). NB: "*themis & cognates*": the singular noun θέμις, the adjectives ἀθεμίστιος, ἀθέμι(σ)τος, θέμι(σ)τος and corresponding adverbs. In calculating whether *themis & cognates* are used with respect to oneself or someone else, I have not taken into account those archaic/classical cases in which the text refers to the goddess/personification Θέμις (printed with a capital), n = 34, or the plural form θέμι(σ)τες, n = 19. The aim of the comparison is to assess the usage of θέμις in those cases in which this term evaluates actions and/or attitudes. This is not the case for the references to a goddess/personification or θέμι(σ)τες 'laws', 'decrees'.

37 In the pre-classical evidence, 54% of occurrences of *themis & cognates* has a positive argumentative orientation (n = 21) and 44% has a negative argumentative orientation (n = 17), while one case is unclear (Hes. fr. 343.16). In the fifth century, 16% of the cases has a positive argumentative orientation (n = 15), 55% has a negative argumentative orientation (n = 53). In the fifth century it becomes relatively common for characters to ask or wonder whether a particular action is θέμις, with 8% of the cases occurring in a question ('is it θέμις …?', n = 8), and 19% in a conditional statement ('if x is θέμις, …', n = 18). Two cases occur in a damaged/fragmentary text (Pi. fr. Paian 52i.16, A. *Ch.* 641). If we consider the evidence as a whole, 27% is positive and 52% is negative, while the remaining cases occur in a question (6%) or conditional (13%). By contrast, recall that *hosios & cognates* occur in a question or conditional statement in a very small minority of cases (together accounting for 2% of the data, cf. Chapter 2, section 1.5). *Themis & cognates* occur significantly more often in a question/conditional statement than *hosios & cognates* (χ^2 = 35.15 p = 0). NB: on "*themis & cognates*", cf. n. 36 above.

38 *themis & cognates* referring to the behaviour and attitudes of gods: n = 10 (*Il.* 5.761, 14.386, Hes. *Th.* 396, *Sc.* 447, A. *Eu.* 414, 471, E. *Hipp.* 1396, 1437, E. *HF* 1341, Xenoph. fr. 12.3).

A contemporary listener would have noted that the term ὁσία is highly unusual (because paradoxical) in this context. He would have been aware of the availability of suitable lexical alternatives. Therefore, such a listener would have interpreted ὁσία as a marked choice when optimising bidirectionally.

The speech is assessed as such not only by the audience of the ode, but also by the addressee *within* the narrative, Chiron. His reaction is interesting to us, because it suggests how a contemporary audience would have responded to a marked utterance. As we read, Chiron, smiling 'greenly' (or 'indulgently')[39] with a gentle brow, answers Apollo that 'the keys that clever Persuasion holds to sacred love(s) are hidden' (κρυπταὶ κλαΐδες ἐντὶ σοφᾶς Πειθοῦς ἱερᾶν φιλοτάτων) and that 'gods and humans alike experience αἰδώς when they obtain the pleasure of the marriage bed openly for the first time'.[40] Chiron also points out to Apollo that his sweet passion (μείλιχος ὀργά) causes him to make a deceptive speech (παρφάμεν τοῦτον λόγον, i.e., implying ignorance about what to do) for he is all-knowing[41] and has come to this place precisely to share a bed with Cyrene.[42]

Chiron's smile and his response have presented many interpretative difficulties.[43] However, two crucial aspects of the scene are undisputed among schol-

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39 l. 38. The mss. offer χλιαρόν 'lukewarmly', or χλάρον 'relaxed, cheerful, indulgent' from χαλάω. The scholiast comments on the latter option: κεχαλασμένον … προσηνὲς καὶ ἡδύ. Francis 1972:291 and Woodbury 1982:564 follow this reading and translate χλάρον as 'indulgently'. For critique of the reading χλάρον cf. Carey 1981, ad loc. Schroeder's emendation to χλοαρόν (1900), Att. χλωρόν, lit. "greenly", has been accepted by most other authors, but the interpretation of χλωρόν has varied widely. For example, Carey 1981, ad loc., translates "gently", while Kirkwood 1982, ad loc., holds that 'Chiron's smile is vigorous' because 'it has the strength and liveliness of nature'. But Instone 1996, ad loc., translates "subduedly" and explains: 'the expression "smiling subduedly" perhaps implies that Cheiron, though finding Apollo's questioning amusing, was wary of laughing out aloud at a god.' I will not attempt to solve this problem here. On Chiron's smile, cf. also Fowler 1983.

40 Pi. *P.* 9.38–41.

41 Pi. *P.* 9.44–49.

42 Pi. *P.* 9.51–53.

43 The first difficulty relates to Chiron's laughter, and most particularly, the meaning of the adjective χλωρόν (Cf. n. 39 above). The second concerns Chiron's principal point. Does he intend to say that Apollo should seduce Cyrene by *persuading* her rather than taking her by force? (Winnington-Ingram 1969:11, 13; Burton 1962:40, Robbins 1978:104, Carey 1981:78, Grethlein 2011:386). And/or that the god should make love to her in a *private* 'hidden' place rather than in public, there and then on Mt. Pelion? (Burton 1962:40, Köhnken 1985:85–94, Instone 1996, ad loc.). Third, it has been disputed whether the

ars. First, it is clear that Chiron thinks Apollo is hesitating about seducing the girl (and so asks for advice) and in his hesitation forgets (or feigns to forget) his divine omniscience. Second, Apollo's behaviour is presented by Chiron as induced by his sudden passion for the girl. It is unclear whether Apollo is genuinely confused or is merely putting on a pose, and what Chiron believes to be true. In any case, Chiron suggests Apollo's infatuation causes him to *assume the role of* a hesitant lover with the limited perspective of a mortal, who is uncertain how to act.[44] Moreover, Chiron's smile may imply that he considers this situation somehow comical or endearing, or both.[45]

In sum, it seems that Chiron registers the markedness of Apollo's question, even if we do not know precisely how he (or, for that matter, the audience of the Pindaric Ode) assessed the nature of the utterance. Either way, Apollo's paradoxical usage of the term ὁσία (in defiance of other available lexical alternatives) strongly *contributes to the creation* of the image of him as an uncertain, young, almost human lover, and to the comical effect of the scene as a whole.[46]

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scene is a description of Apollo's loss of virginity (Woodbury 1982, Carey 1974:79, Jakob 1994–1995:429) or something else.

44 Various scholars have emphasized the 'humanity' of the god in this scene. Schroeder 1922:80: 'echt menschlich also, doch in vollkommenem Einklang mit der von Aphrodite über sein Liebeslager gebreiteten Scham'; Burton 1962:41: 'We may be content to see Pindar here in a Homeric mood, pleased to display the deity of the Delphic oracle as a young man in love at first sight who turns for advice [to Cheiron]'; Woodbury 1982:572–573: 'The picture of the god as a young and modest pupil of a wise teacher is refreshingly unselfconscious in its candid anthropomorphism. Apollo, though the god of prophecy, behaves with the circumspection of a well-bred youth who falls in love for the first time … The full humanity of the god, I conceive, was as important to Pindar, and to traditional belief, as his august knowledge and power'; Giannini 1990:63–64: 'i due personaggi divini sono presentati qui in un aspetto fortemente umanizzato e l'intera scena costituisce un significativo esempio di genere serio-comico in Pindaro'; Instone 1996, ad loc.: 'Apollo is here acting as a mortal' (cf. note 46 below).

45 Our assessment of the nature of Chiron's smile depends partly on the interpretation of χλωρόν (n. 39 above). But a humorous element in the dialogue has in any case been recognised: cf. Burton 1962:41: 'its delightful humour is obvious, and resides as much in the situation as in the language'; Instone 1996:119: 'the Apollo-Chiron dialogue is told with gentle humour and irony'.

46 Only one scholar established a connection between the usage of ὁσία and the creation of a human-like image of the god in this scene, this is Instone 1996, ad loc., who commented: 'Do the gods permit me …? ὁσία sc. ἐστί μοι; It is ironic that Apollo, a god, should ask if what he wants to do is right in the eyes of the gods … The questions emphasize that Apollo is here acting as a mortal, and he wants, as any mortal in his position should want, to be sure that his act will be approved by the gods.'

2.4 *Zeus Knows …*

The analyses made above will help us interpret a final, less straightforward passage in which a human evaluates a god in terms of whether he is ὅσιος. In Euripides's *Children of Heracles*, King Eurystheus of Argos is in pursuit of Heracles's children, with the intention to kill them. Therefore, the Heraclides flee under the protection of Iolaus, Heracles's nephew, and Alcmene. When Iolaus decides to go out and fight, leaving Alcmene alone, he assures Alcmene that Zeus will be concerned about her and the grandchildren:

Αλ. τί χρῆμα μέλλεις σῶν φρενῶν οὐκ ἔνδον ὤν
710 λιπεῖν μ' ἔρημον σὺν ⟨τέκνου⟩ τέκνοις ἐμοῖς;
…
717 Ιο. καὶ Ζηνὶ τῶν σῶν, οἶδ' ἐγώ, μέλει πόνων.

Alc. Why are you planning to leave me deserted,
with my grandchildren, are you out of your mind?
…
Io. Zeus, too, will be concerned about your troubles, I know that.

Alcmene answers:

718 Αλ. φεῦ· Ζεὺς ἐξ ἐμοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἀκούσεται κακῶς·
εἰ δ' ἐστὶν *ὅσιος* αὐτὸς οἶδεν εἰς ἐμέ.

Alc. Pheu! Zeus will hear no angry words from me.
But he knows himself if he is *hosios* to me.

I take Alcmene's utterance in 718–719 as referring to the fact that Zeus had been her lover, resulting in the birth of Heracles.[47] I assume that Alcmene's statement, 'he knows himself whether he is ὅσιος towards me', is meant as a critical or even ironical statement: it is highly dubious whether Zeus, being a father, is ὅσιος; perhaps, Zeus is *not* ὅσιος.[48] On the basis of the previous

47 Cf. Wilkins 1993 and Allan 2001, ad loc.

48 Such criticism or irony is understandable given all the hardships Alcmene has had to bear. Concentrating on the period after Heracles's death alone (narrated in this play), Alcmene and the children of Heracles have been pursued and threatened with death by Eurystheus, fled from city to city, and their supplication has been denied everywhere. Now that they have finally been accepted by Athens, they have already endured the death of one of Heracles's daughters and at this specific point in the play there is an undecided

analyses, it seems legitimate to assume that the paradoxical usage of ὅσιος for a god in this text is interpreted by the audience as marked. Alcmene's utterance does not seem to be caused by linguistic naïveté or ignorance—it appears to be deliberate. Its intended effect seems to be to bring Zeus down to the level of a human.

But how does that help Alcmene in conveying her message? In *Pythian* 9, the goal of humanising Apollo seemed to be: reinforcing the uncertainty he felt in his amorous adventures. In *Alcestis*, the main intended effect of the topsy-turvy image of Apollo seemed to be: creating a ridiculous picture of the god as he entered the stage. And in *Orestes*, Orestes attempted a *reductio ad absurdum* to show there was no way in which he could have acted with justice. What does Alcmene want? I will argue that the uncommon usage of this evaluative term by Alcmene is a smart rhetorical move, a means of facilitating a highly unusual criticism of a parent-god.

We will understand both the exceptionality of this utterance and its function better if we compare it to other literary instances in which humans blame gods. Literary passages in which humans are angry with gods and admonish them for their behaviour or governance are not uncommon.[49] However, as I show in more detail elsewhere,[50] cases in which mortals blame gods more specifically because they are disappointed in their expectations of reciprocity are quite rare.[51] The primacy of the idea of reciprocity in Greek religion[52] begs the question of what humans do when they do *not* get what they hoped for. Perhaps not surprisingly, there is hardly any evidence of cases in which humans express disappointment or anger when the gods have not met their wishes or hopes of a divine gift. The absence of such evidence is most probably due to the perceived fundamental asymmetries in the relationship between humans

war between Argos and Athens going on, which the only other adult in Alcmene's party, Iolaus, is determined to join, old and infirm as he is. Divine assistance has not been evident anywhere.

49 For discussions of cases in which Greeks criticise gods in general see Schadewaldt (1926:118–122, 128–138), Dale (1969), Labarbe (1980), Versnel (1981:37–42).

50 Peels *forthc.*

51 What I think is 'rare' are cases in which disappointment *in reciprocity with gods* is made explicit. Here my approach differs from that of Yunis (1988), who views *all* human complaints to gods as implicitly or explicitly expressing frustrated hopes of reciprocity.

52 In Chapter 2, section 4 we discussed the notion of reciprocity as fundamental to the conceptualisation of Greek religion. The bond between gods and humans can be characterised as one of reciprocal χάρις, in which humans give gifts to the gods and in prayer express the hope that the gods will grant a wish in return.

and gods, in power, in knowledge and perhaps in respective contribution to the relationship.[53]

Significantly, there are two rare types of scenarios in which humans *do* sometimes explicitly blame the gods for thwarted hopes of reciprocity.[54] The first case is when the reproach is part of the contrastive characterisation of a person who takes a non-Greek or otherwise very odd perspective. Apparently, reproaching the gods because they have not returned favours was so unlike a Greek, such a fundamental breach of the normal interaction with the divine world, that only non-Greeks and persons portrayed as having abnormal religious views utter such reproaches.[55] The other scenario comes from mythological stories when specific humans are engaged with specific gods in a different kind and particularly intimate, long-term, reciprocal relationship: that of parent and child. Humans *do* blame gods about disappointed expectations of reciprocity when a god has fathered a human child and has failed to take care of him or her.[56]

To summarise the above, passages in which gods are confronted with their dysfunctional reciprocal behaviour towards humans are very uncommon. The distribution and nature of such complaints when they *do* occur show that reproaching gods about disappointed reciprocity was only acceptable within the mythological frame of a family relationship with a god, and was a very uncommon thing to do otherwise. The passage from *Children of Heracles* discussed here is part of this pattern—although note that Alcmene still voices her criticism extremely carefully. In fact, she leaves it to Zeus himself (and to her audience) to decide whether or not he is "ὅσιος".

In this case, Alcmene facilitates her careful and implicit criticism of the god by selecting an evaluative term (ὅσιος) that is usually applied to humans.[57] By choosing this particular evaluative term, Alcmene not only brings Zeus down

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53 On these asymmetries, cf. Chapter 2, section 4.

54 Peels *forthc.*

55 Hdt. 1.90, Hdt. 7.35, B. *Ep.* 3.37–39, E. *Hipp.* 1363–1369.

56 A. *Supp.* 168–175, S. *Tr.* 993–995, 1264–1271, E. *HF* 339–347, E. *Heracl.* 709–719 and E. *Ion* esp. 384–389, 905–922.

57 Note that it is not surprising that the utterance occurs within a scene that is marked within the tragedy itself: Burnett (1976:18) characterises the whole scene as 'light-weight parody'. About this passage Burnett argues, ' "Pheu!" says the old lady, disregarding reverence and metrics equally. Then she continues: "Zeus will not hear me speak open blasphemy, but he knows whether or not he has dealt reverently with me!" … Even at this point her surly insinuations fall short of true solemnity; the "girl betrayed by a god" becomes inevitably comical when portrayed by an octogenarian.' Other scholars have noted the humorous tone of lines 664–747: cf. Zuntz (1955:29), although Wilkins (1993, ad loc.) does not seem

to the level of a human, she evokes the range of connotations attached to this term. We have seen that, in the large majority of literary cases, ὅσιος evaluates a small group of relationships between humans, and very important among them were the bonds between parents and children and between spouses.[58] By selecting the lexeme ὅσιος, Alcmene activates the idea of honouring these sacred, long-term, reciprocal relationships among humans. Most particularly, she activates the notions of behaving well towards one's children (i.e. Heracles) and towards a lover (i.e. Alcmene), and thus places the relationship she and Heracles have with Zeus within those special frames.

Alcmene's highly unusual, compact utterance, 'he knows whether he is ὅσιος', allows her to assess a special case of reciprocity between humans and gods. It enables her to say, 'Zeus, by fathering our child, has brought himself down to a human level, and he is now in a relationship of mutual obligation with me in which he should look after me and my child. He knows himself whether or not he is honouring this mutual bond between us' (in other words, he may not be).

3 Conclusion

Not only the selection of lexemes but their interpretation, too, involves weighing lexical alternatives. I have argued that the highly un-prototypical, marginal use of lexeme A in a particular context is *marked* if there is a lexeme B that prototypically expresses the same meaning. Marked language usage is the surprising choice of a word outside of its usual context, in defiance of other suitable and available terms. Such marked usage of lexemes always has a rhetorical punch (intended or accidental).

Although lexical meaning is highly flexible in the maximalist approach, it is not the case that 'anything goes'. Semantic networks cannot simply be extended haphazardly. The main difficulty of identifying marked language usage in a dead language is that we often cannot *see* that a certain usage had a particular effect. Still, such identification should be part of the semanticist's task of studying and comparing networks of meaning of closely related lexemes, to gain a correct understanding of their internal semantic structures. In this chap-

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to be convinced of their comic character. In his recent commentary, Allan (2001:183–185) provides a discussion of these different views in the literature about whether this dialogue is part of a comic scene and in what way that would deprive the scene of serious tragic meaning. To me, the scene has parodic elements but that does not take away the serious tragic note of the scene.

58 Chapter 2, sections 1.6 and 1.7.

ter we have analyzed one group of occurrences of *hosios & cognates* in terms of markedness. Their usage for gods has been interpreted to indicate that even gods need to obey a higher order, and that *hosios & cognates* are crucially different from *eusebes & cognates* in this respect. I have argued instead that this usage should not be viewed as a 'normal' case, but is highly un-prototypical, and inherently paradoxical, since 'piety' is a behavioural norm that gods set for humans. Our analysis of these exceptions confirms our understanding of *hosios & cognates* as always referring to *human* behaviour that pleases gods. The effect of using ὅσιος or ὁσία for a divinity is to draw the god down to the level of a human. We also obtained a better interpretation of each individual passage studied.

In Chapter 7, we will similarly analyse the remaining instances of ὁσίη used for gods occurring in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* in terms of markedness. The interpretative problems with these passages have significantly affected scholarly views on the meaning of *hosios & cognates*. Following the same method of elucidation, we will be able to solve these problems and reveal the internal semantic structure of *hosios & cognates* to be consistent.

CHAPTER 6

ὅσιος vs. ∅

Religious Evaluation in Ritual Norms

In this chapter we will use the contrastive method to juxtapose the usage of *hosios & cognates* with the *absence* of an evaluation: ὅσιος vs. ∅ 'zero'. That is, we will compare texts in which we find ὅσιος to similar texts in which we find no evaluative term at all. We will focus on a case study of epigraphical material, more specifically, texts that discuss ritual norms.[1] This approach serves to discuss a historical rather than a semantic question: what was the persuasive value of the term ὅσιος?

1 Religious Evaluation in Ritual Norms

A late fifth- or fourth-century law from Ialysos (Rhodes) deals with the purity of a local sanctuary and lists 'things which it is not ὅσιον to bring into the sanctuary'.[2] The catalogue includes horses, donkeys, mules, other pack-animals, shoes and anything made from pig. It is stated that the transgressor (who introduces any of these animals or objects 'against the law', παρὰ τὸν νόμον) must purify the sanctuary and make a sacrifice, or else be 'guilty of the ἀσέβεια'. If sheep and goats are brought in, the penalty is one obol per animal. These rules are laid down in the second half of this law codifying ritual norms (l. 19 ff.):

1 I refer to 'ritual norms' instead of the more conventional designation 'sacred laws' after the useful suggestion of Carbon & Pirenne-Delforge (2012). These authors present a discussion of the problematic aspects of the designation 'sacred laws', after Parker (2004), Lupu (2005) and Rostad (2006). Parker (2004) has rightly argued that the term 'sacred law' is in many aspects a modern construct. Parker points out that, by and large, we can present part of the extant corpus of inscriptions as a group and call them 'sacred laws', classifying them on the basis of their subject matter, but it is impossible to isolate clear criteria that define and mark out the group. Lupu (2005:4) and Rostad (2006:84–87) endorse Parker's view on the methodological difficulties of using the term 'sacred laws'. Note that Lupu only called his recent book *Greek sacred law: a collection of new documents* because he considered the term 'sacred law' to be still useful for practical purposes: the label signals that a text should be understood as part of a set of comparable texts. The term 'ritual norms' aims at describing the character of the relevant texts more accurately.

2 Newton 1878:441–447; Syll.^{2} 560; LGS II 145; IG XII, 1 677; Syll.^{3} 338. Cf. *LSCG* 136, Le Guen-Pollet no. 28; Brodersen no. 295; Chandezon no. 41; Helbing no. 19.

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ἔδοξε τοῖς μαστροῖς καὶ Ἰαλυσίοις·
Στράτης Ἀλκιμέδοντος εἶπε·
ὅπως τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὸ τέμενος
τᾶς Ἀλεκτρώνας εὐαγῆται κα-
τὰ τὰ πάτρια, ἐπιμεληθήμειν
τοὺς ἱεροταμίας, ὅπως στᾶλαι
ἐργασθέωντι τρεῖς λίθου λαρτ[ί]-
ου καὶ ἀναγραφῆι ἐς τὰς στάλα-
ς τό τε ψάφισμα τόδε καὶ ἃ οὐχ ὅ-
σιόν ἐντι ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐσφέ-
ρειν οὐδὲ ἐσοδοιπορεῖν ἐς τὸ τέ-
μενος, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια τῶ[ι] πράσ-
σοντι παρὰ τὸν νόμον· θ̣έμειν δὲ
τὰς στάλας μίαμ μὲν ἐπὶ τᾶς ἐσό-
δου τᾶς ἐκ πόλιος ποτιπορευομέ-
νοις, μίαν δὲ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἱστιατόριον,
ἄλλαν δὲ ἐπὶ τᾶς καταβάσιος τᾶ[ς]
ἐξ Ἀχαΐας πόλιος.
νόμος ἃ οὐχ *ὅσιον* ἐσίμειν οὐδὲ
ἐσφέρειν ἐς τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὸ τέ-
μενος τᾶς Ἀλεκτρώνας· μὴ ἐσί-
τω ἵππος ὄνος ἡμίονος γῖνος
μηδὲ ἄλλο λόφουρον μηθὲν μη-
δὲ ἐσαγέτω ἐς τὸ τέμενος μη-
θεὶς τούτων μηθὲν μηδὲ ὑποδή-
ματα ἐσφερέτω μηδὲ ὕειον μη-
θέν, ὅ τι δέ κά τις παρὰ τὸν νόμον
ποιήσηι, τό τε ἱερὸν καὶ τὸ τέμενος
καθαιρέτω καὶ ἐπιρεζέτω, ἢ ἔνο-
χος ἔστω *τᾶι ἀσεβείαι·* εἰ δέ κα
πρόβατα ἐσβάληι, ἀποτεισάτω ὑ-
πὲρ ἑκάστου προβάτου ὀβολὸν
ὁ ἐσβαλών· ποταγγελλέτω δὲ
τὸν τούτων τι ποιεῦντα ὁ χρήι-
ζων ἐς τοὺς μαστρούς.

The *mastroi* and the Ialysians decided. | Stratês, son of Alkimedôn, proposed. | In order that the shrine and precinct | of Alectrona remain pure,[3] | according to the ancestral traditions, the *hierotamiai* must take care | that three *stêlai* are made | of Lartian marble, | and that this decree is inscribed on them, | together with what is not *hosion* to bring in | or (for which animals it is not *hosion*) to walk into the sanctuary, | according to the customs,[4] and the penalties | for the one who acts against the law. |

3 The verb εὐαγεῖσθαι is difficult to translate. Cf. Pirenne-Delforge *forthc.*, who shows that its semantic range surpasses that of the notion of ritual purity and refers to the relationship between the cultic group and the gods: if the sanctuary is pure, this allows for a normal, functioning communication with the divine sphere. Pirenne-Delforge suggests the corresponding interpretation: 'afin que le sanctuaire et le domaine d'Alektrôna soient maintenus, selon les traditions, dans leur status d'interface adéquat …'. On the importance of tradition in Greek religion cf. also Rudhardt 2008:55.

4 The semantic scope of the lexeme νόμος also allows for a translation of ἐκ τῶν νόμων as 'according to the laws' (Chaniotis 2007:98). But which laws could these be? Note that references to this newly enacted law are otherwise in the singular: παρὰ τὸν νόμον (l. 13), νόμος (l. 20). Perhaps the phrase referred to other Rhodian laws on purity (in this sanctuary?). It seems more likely to me that the phrase refers to traditional practice, and is closely synonymous with κατὰ τὰ πάτρια in ll. 4–5. Cf. the discussion in Carbon & Pirenne-Delforge *forthc.*

> And (it was decided) to set up the *stêlai*, one at the entrance for those who approach | from the city, one above the banqueting hall | and another one on the road down | from the city of Achaea. | Law regarding what is not *hosion* to enter or | bring into the shrine and the | precinct of Alectrona. A horse, | a donkey, a mule, hinny, | and any other animal with a long-haired tail[5] must not enter, | and no one should lead into the sanctuary | any of these or bring in sandals | or anything made from pig. | If anyone does any of this against the law then | he must purify the shrine and the precinct | and offer a sacrifice afterwards, or he must be considered | guilty of the *asebeia*. If someone brings in | cattle, then he must pay | one obol for every animal, | the one who brings them in. Let the one | who wants it report him who does any of these things to the *mastroi*.

The lexical content of the prohibition οὐχ ὅσιον in (l. 9–10, 19) is not difficult to understand. It transmits a clear message: 'the gods do not approve, and it is against the religious custom that these things are brought into the sanctuary.' The intention is also evident. In this local sanctuary, the authorities were determined to put a stop to any disturbance of the sacred precinct caused by these various equids. Such animals would typically be brought along by travellers, who came to visit a sanctuary from elsewhere, and may have been a real nuisance. The animals would not only destroy the grass and upset the general orderliness of the sanctuary, but also literally pollute it with their excrements. Correspondingly, the Ialysians advertised the message by means of a 'no admittance' notice, which they decided should be put up in three different places.[6]

At the same time, this text raises a number of questions. If we compare this text to inscriptions with a similar subject matter, we realise that it is fairly

5 Gr. λόφουρος. LSJ translate λόφουρος as a 'pack-animal'. Literally, λόφος means 'a head of hair' (the meaning 'neck' of λόφος may originally be metonymic for 'place where the hair grows' in the case of animals), while οὐρά is 'tail'. Hence the etymological dictionaries give as a meaning for λόφουρος (= λόφος + οὐρά) 'animal with a longhaired tail', e.g., Chantraine 1968–1980 s.v. λόφουρα 'qui ont une queue à long crins'. What is the point of the usage of this rather inexact term? The other animals that are forbidden in the sanctuary are: horse, donkey, mule (usually: a cross of a male donkey with a female horse), hinny (offspring of female donkey and male horse). When the author forbids the λόφουρος as well, it seems as if he wants to say, 'or any other animal with a long-haired tail', as if he wants to cover every possible type of horse-like animal, any crossbreed that could be used as pack-animal (personal communication from L.C. van Beek).

6 ll. 13–18 of the law. Cf. section 5.1 of this chapter.

exceptional. The inscription belongs to a large group of purity regulations, prescribing that people should enter pure,[7] or prohibiting things and persons likely to cause pollution, for example restricting access for a fixed number of days after funerals, sex or childbirth.[8] Sometimes a breach of ritual norms in general was framed as pollution (such as making the wrong type of sacrifice).[9] In such cases of transgression, purification of the sanctuary is sometimes prescribed, seemingly a symbolic measure to restore order.[10] In the Ialysian case, the requirement for purification seems both literal (taking out the animal dung) and symbolic (re-establishing order).

The prohibition against the animals should also be seen in the context of a host of practical measures dealing with the presence of humans and animals in sanctuaries throughout Greece. Practical problems would have been caused by the crowding of sacred sites with worshippers throughout the year and especially during religious festivals. We have plenty of inscriptions that regulate against bringing animals into the sanctuary and against pasturing, as well as many other inscriptions that more generally manage the natural environment of sanctuaries, i.e. by dealing with potential practical dangers posed by local inhabitants and perhaps crowds of worshippers at sanctuaries.[11]

7 e.g. *LSAM* 35.

8 e.g. *LSAM* 29.2–7.

9 *LSS* 115.26–31. *LSCG* 152. Cf. Parker 1996a [1983]:144–145, 339.

10 *LSS* 115.26–31. *LSCG* 152.

11 Cf. Dillon 1997. Numerous inscriptions with rules for visitors to sanctuaries illustrate how we should picture the presence of these worshippers. For example, visitors coming to sacred sites brought animals with them that grazed, and carts that could also damage the grass and compact the soil (e.g. IG IV^2 122, cf. Sokolowski 1960:79; Dillon 1997:123). Various sanctuaries also had prohibitions against dumping animal excrements (e.g. *LSCG* 57). Travellers coming from afar wanted to stay overnight and brought tents to sleep in, which may take up much space. One local rule stipulates that the measurements of such tents should not exceed thirty feet in length (*LSCG* 65), another prohibits camping in the sanctuary altogether (*LSCG* 101). Especially numerous were rules against chopping down the trees in sanctuaries, cutting off their branches, picking leaves, and even against using brushwood lying around (e.g. *LSCG* 37; for an overview of relevant inscriptions, cf. e.g. Jordan & Perlin 1984; Ragone 1998:18–22; Rostad 2006:117–123). Wood was in demand by the visitors, who naturally wanted to make fires for warmth and to wash and cook. Some cults prohibited campfires altogether, perhaps with a view to bushfires (e.g. *LSCG* 3.6, *LSCG* 67.21, *LSCG* 100). Finally, besides the visitors, other people were found at the sanctuary, trying to make a living from the travellers. Prescriptions deal with merchants running shops inside the *temenos* (SEG 27.545, *NGSL* 18); one law addressed those who—apparently—made a living by selling hot baths to the crowd (*LSCG* 65.108–109). In short, we can see that officials

The difference between the Ialysian inscription and these other recorded messages is that similar offences are hardly ever explicitly conceptualised elsewhere as religiously undesirable behaviour (e.g. by means of the terms ἀσέβεια or 'not ὅσιον').[12] The above-mentioned regulations in which purification is required usually just state the offence and the fact that purification is necessary. Ritual norms concerning the protection of the sanctuary itself are usually enforced in a pragmatic manner, stipulating exact monetary penalties—or whippings, in the case of slaves.[13] Religious terminology does not enter the picture. But in the Rhodian inscription it does, and we may well wonder why. Was there a special reason for the author to codify the ritual norm in this way? Or is this variation no more than a mere coincidence?

A similar picture is evident on a more general level. As we have seen in Chapter 2, *hosios & cognates* often concern rules and customs that describe the who, what, where, when and how of ritual proceedings at sanctuaries and their physical environment. An impressive range and number of matters regarding sanctuary and cult that are explicitly described as ὅσιον or ὁσία is found in literary sources. For example, these are the favourite meal of a local god, the requirement to be silent at certain moments during the sacrificial ritual, permission to touch sacred objects, etc., etc.[14] We also have a large number of fifth- and fourth-century epigraphical sources that deal with precisely these issues. However, very few inscriptions describing these rules of ritual practice and sanctuary actually label these rules as ὅσιος or ὁσία.[15] Evidently, many more ritual norms in the documentary sources *concern* what is ὅσιον / ὁσία than those that overtly *designate* rules as such.

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had to try hard to keep the environmental impact of all of these visitors within reasonable limits. The proliferation of these rules, identical or similar to the Ialysian case in subject matter, show us not only that the authorities were concerned about the sanctuaries, but also that such extensive regularisation was apparently necessary (Dillon 1997:115).

12 Dillon 1997:127 makes the same observation. One other such exception is *LSCG* 150, which I will discuss below, section 5.2.

13 This is also true for the most common environmental transgression: the cutting of sacred wood. An illustrative example of the pragmatic tone of that genre is an inscription about cutting sacred wood that imposes a fine of 50 drachmas for a free man and 50 lashes for a slave, apparently equating these two punishments (*LSCG* 37).

14 Chapter 2, section 1.7.

15 As far as I know there are only 8 extant fifth- and fourth-century inscriptions containing ὁσίη / ὅσιος that describe ritual practice. These are: 1. IG IX I^2 3:718; 2. SEG 43:630; 3. Lindos II 26; 4. ID 68. Delos; 5. IG XII, 1 677; 6. N. Suppl. Epig. Rodio 169a. 7. IG V, 2 4.; 8. SEG 9:72.

In this chapter we will ask under which circumstances classical Greek inscriptions recording ritual norms explicitly framed offences as religious transgressions (as compared to similar inscriptions without any evaluative terminology). Under what pragmatic circumstances was 'failing to obey the rule' labelled an impiety in these texts? Or what kind of inscriptions that stipulate ritual norms would have such an explicit appeal to religion in the first place? Because of the scarcity of the evidence, I also include some examples of θέμις and of *eusebês & cognates* in the analysis.[16]

2 Cultural Knowledge of the Unwritten Norm

We should start by being aware of one clear factor that partly explains why there are few inscriptions about ritual norms containing *hosios & cognates*. Crucial rules and customs concerning the treatment of sanctuaries and ritual practice and perceived as ὅσιον or ὁσία were generally known to the members of a community. Hence, there was no need to record them in stone in the first place.

Common general knowledge of the *form* of such rules is presupposed in, for example, Aristophanes's *Wealth*, where the slave, Carion, makes jokes based

16 *hosios & cognates* and *themis & cognates* are used in highly similar ways when referring to ritual practice. Like ὅσιος and ὁσία, θέμις frequently describe the 'who, what, where, when and how' of ritual practice, in literary texts and inscriptions. For example, in a statement concerning the *who* of ritual practice, Dionysos explains to an inquiring Pentheus that Bacchic rites are οὐ θέμις for the uninitiated to hear: secrecy was a common requirement of mystery cults (E. *Ba.* 474). Similar cases occur in Ar. *Nu.* 140, Ar. *Thesm.* 1150, Hdt 3.37.3, 5.72.3, E. *Or.* 97, E. *Ion* 220–222. Referring to the *what* of ritual practice, Iphigenia plans to say it is not θέμις to sacrifice Orestes to Artemis, because he is polluted (E. *IT* 1035–1037). Similar examples: Ar. *Pax* 1018, E. *Hel.* 1353. With regard to the *where* and *when* of ritual practice, a chorus of Asian Bacchants wants to go to Pieria, a place at which it is θέμις for them to celebrate their rites (E. *Ba.* 416). In a comic parody of these types of religious rules, an Aristophanic character who finds himself at a ritual of worship for the Clouds says he 'needs to shit (there and then), whether it is θέμις or not' (A. *Nu.* 295). Sometimes ὁσία and θέμις occur side by side, as when a tragic chorus accuses Helen of having burnt as a sacrifice 'those things of which it is not θέμις or ὁσία [to sacrifice them]' (E. *Hel.* 1353, this reading is uncertain, for the passage is highly corrupt. The editions of Burian and the OCT print ὅσια (n. pl. of ὅσιος), but I think ὁσία (f. sg. noun) is more plausible, if correct at all, with Allan and Dale). For examples of θέμις describing the 'who and what' of ritual practice in inscriptions, cf. section 6.2 of this chapter.

on aspects of ritual practice. For example, when the starving god Hermes asks Carion to give him some of the bread and meat from the sacrificial offerings, the slave replies: 'but they are not to be carried out' (ἀλλ'οὐκ ἐκφορά).[17] This joke assumes knowledge on the part of the audience about the occasional requirement to consume all the sacrificial meat on the spot (in such cases, the meat is οὐκ ἐκφορά or οὐ φορά: 'no take-away').[18] Furthermore, when Carion sees a priest putting cakes from the sacrificial table in a sack, he assumes he is stealing, and seizes the opportunity to appropriate and finish off a bowl of porridge himself, 'because I believed there was much ὁσία in it' (i.e. in stealing and eating whatever is on the sacred premises).[19] In fact, it was a common religious practice that offerings deposited on a sacrificial table (τραπεζώματα: e.g., cakes or parts of the sacrificial animal) were consumed by the priest, as the audience was apparently aware.[20] This is why the slave's assumption characterises him as comically naïve or disingenuous, or as a foreigner,[21] and it functions as a joke.[22] Finally, in a comparable example with θέμις, Medea says, when she is about to kill her children, 'and for whom it is not θέμις to attend my blood sacrifice, it will weigh upon his mind'.[23] Medea's utterance is a bitter parody on any limitations that a cult might impose to restrict attendance at sacrifices.[24] She also parodies another formula that sometimes appears in ritual norms, '(if someone transgresses anyway), let it weigh upon his con-

17 Ar. *Pl.* 1138, bis.

18 On the ungodly appetite of Hermes, cf. Chapter 7, section 5.

19 Ar. *Pl.* 682. On the unusual grammatical construction 'much ὁσία' cf. Chapter 7, section 5.

20 Van Straten 1995:154 on this passage: 'as a matter of fact, any Athenian would have known that what the priest here collected was nothing but his due'.

21 Slaves were often named by a generic name that designated their origin. Καρίων is a diminutive of Κάρ, 'Carian'. Cp. the usage of Θρᾷττα for a Thracian slave girl, as in Ar. *Th.* 279–294.

22 It seems more likely that the slave's utterance characterises him as disingenuous than as naïve. Throughout the play, he is talking in quite a sophisticated manner, with paratragic elements of speech: Ar. *Pl.* 9, 39, 660–661, 758–759, cf. Sommerstein 2001 ad loc.; also Silk 2000:25. Moreover, he also makes the linguistic joke (1138 bis) discussed in the main text, requiring knowledge of the customs of ritual practice. Based on these utterances, we do not get an impression of him as an unknowledgeable, naïve character who is not aware of this cult rule. He does, however, use ὁσία in an odd way (cf. Chapter 7, section 5).

23 E. *Med.* 1053–1055.

24 The impure should stay away from a sacrifice (e.g. S. *OT* 239–240, E. *IT* 1226–1229, references from Mastronarde 2002:339), and admittance was sometimes restricted to particular social groups (as will be discussed extensively in section 6 of this chapter).

science': an implicit threat that the god will come after you.[25] The tragedian plays on the collective cultural knowledge of these recurring phrases in ritual norms.

It is not clear to what extent members of a particular cultic community would have been aware of the more specific details concerning what is ὅσιον or not at particular sanctuaries, e.g. the specific animals to sacrifice to particular gods at particular times, the role of various social groups in the sacrificial rituals. But here the epigraphic material is insightful: some inscriptions perhaps tacitly presuppose such awareness to a certain extent. In the fifth-century foundation decree of the colony Naupactus, a group of Locrian colonists receive the right to participate in the cults of their old community 'where' or 'in the way in which it is (also) ὁσία for a ξένος'.[26] There may have been another inscription originally put up near this decree and explaining 'where' or 'the way in which' ξένοι could participate. But another option is that the authors of the decree assumed that those who read it would already be aware of these rules. An inscription from Selinus prescribes that a sacrifice be made by those 'for whom it is ὁσία', again perhaps referring to rules explained in another contemporary text we are not aware of,[27] or (and this seems not unlikely) assuming that the worshippers would already know who these members of the community were.[28]

Thus, we may restate our main research question. Against a background in which the most important rules considered ὅσιον / ὁσία may have been unwritten knowledge, what were the situations in which people actually recorded these ritual norms in stone, and when did they explicitly state what is ὅσιον / ὁσία or not?

3 ὁσία and ὅσιος in the Context of Ritual Practice in Literary Texts

Because the range of extant inscriptions containing the term ὅσιος is so restricted, it will be instructive to study the *possible* functions of overtly mentioning what is ὅσιον or ὁσία with respect to ritual practice by examining the usage of these terms in ritual matters in the literary passages first.

25 cf. n. 88 in section 5.3 of this chapter.

26 IG IX 1^2 3 718.

27 i.e., an inscription on stone we have not found, or perhaps a norm inscribed on perishable material.

28 SEG 43:630, l. 12. On the interpretation of this inscription cf. Jameson, Jordan & Kotansky 1993, Clinton 1996, Scullion 2000, *NGSL* 27.

One obvious occasion on which to discuss explicitly what is ἡ ὁσία is when a new custom or cult is instituted. Thus, Athena instructs Orestes to build a temple at Halae, and every time they celebrate the sacred rites, they must draw blood from a man's neck 'because of ὁσία'.[29] Another reason to bring up what is ὅσιον concerns its use to characterise a people or an individual. Thus, Herodotus narrates what is ὁσίη / ὅσιον for the Egyptians (what animals they sacrifice, their burial customs) to show us their particularities and to define them as other. The expression shows us how, in the eyes of the historian, a people's identity was bound up with what they consider ὅσιος: ritual practice was an essential, defining aspect of any community.[30] Similarly, θέμις is used in a description of 'the most shameful of Babylonian customs': the explanation of that ritual is partly intended to show us the 'otherness' of non-Greeks.[31] By contrast, priests in Herodotus have to tell arriving foreigners that it is not ὅσιον or θεμιτόν for them to sacrifice at or even to enter a local sanctuary,[32] for an outsider cannot be expected to know what is considered ὅσιον in every place he visits.

On the level of the individual, Aristophanes used the 'mistake' of slave Carion regarding ἡ ὁσία for dramatic characterisation: someone who apparently does not know the ritual norms is at best naïve, at worst a fraud. An entirely different way in which an author employed the closely related notion of θέμις for characterisation is Medea's distorted and 'chillingly parodic'[33] use of ritual language. Framing the murder of her children as an act of piety, a religious sacrifice, shows a rather perverted way of thinking in itself, but Medea's warning exposes her mental perversion especially well: how could there be a category

29 E. *IT* 1461. Gr: ὁσίας ἕκατι. The ritual means that the goddess will still receive human blood, but in an acceptable, non-polluting form. There is no other evidence for this religious practice: Cropp 2000, ad loc. Similarly, in *h.Cer.* 211 a disguised Demeter receives the κυκεών (a mixed drink containing the grain that is sacred to this goddess) 'because of the rite' (ὁσίης ἕνεκεν). The story is also an *aetion*, namely for the practice of taking this drink during the preliminary rites of the Eleusinian Mysteries. Cf. Foley 1994, ad loc.

30 A sustained irony in *Iphigenia in Tauris* is based on the fact that the Taurians' idea of ὅσιος behaviour is outrageous in Greek eyes, although the Taurians themselves seriously think they are very pious. Cf. Chapter 7, section 4.4.

31 Hdt. 1.199. On the much-discussed construction ἀποσιωσαμένη τῇ θεῷ, cf. Chapter 7, section 4.2.

32 Hdt. 5.72.3 (οὐ θεμιτόν); 6.81 (οὐκ ὅσιον).

33 Parker 2004:66.

of persons for whom it would be right (θέμις) to witness this murder?[34] Thus, Medea's metaphoric use of θέμις serves to flesh out her character.[35]

Most of the comic and tragic contexts in which *hosios & cognates* are used with respect to ritual practice are in fact situations in which a person tries to *persuade* someone else that a particular course of action is the right one by claiming that it is ὅσιος: here, the term is employed as a rhetorical instrument.

In Euripides's *Iphigenia in Tauris*, when the priestess Iphigenia is imagining how she will persuade Thoas of her eccentric plan to take Orestes and Pylades out to sea in a boat, she thinks of a speech in which she will use many religious terms: she will say she has to wash them, since it is 'not θέμις' to sacrifice Orestes

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34 Mossman 2011, ad loc. Moreover, as Mossman also pointed out, her obscure way of expressing herself makes sure that the children do not understand her true meaning.

35 A similarly distorted usage of religious language occurs in Euripides's *Trojan Women*, where Cassandra celebrates her upcoming union with Agamemnon as a marriage by means of torches and dance, and says, 'The dance is ὅσιος, come, Apollo, lead it' (328). The statement is highly ironic and part of an inversion of values throughout this scene. The Greeks danced to express divine adoration, at feasts and choral competitions, at weddings and funerals—in this sense such dancing could be seen as ὅσιον, because it was part of honouring the gods, part of the ritual activity (Lonsdale 1993). At a marriage, this would be a dance to Hymenaeus. But Cassandra is a virgin priestess of Apollo (41–44) who intends to lead her life in that capacity (253–254). When she invokes the god to 'lead the dance that is ὅσιος', this is an apparent invitation to him to guide her ritual transition from being ὅσιος to Apollo (in her service to him as a virgin priestess) to becoming a wife. Celebrating the union with Agamemnon through a ritual dance that honours the god of marriage is an obvious misrepresentation of the facts, for Cassandra is a Trojan captive who will not get married, but will be forced to live as Agamemnon's concubine. Moreover, portraying that transition as having a divine sanction, guided by Apollo himself, is another distortion of reality: this is a 'marriage' of which Apollo is said to disapprove. Previously, Poseidon had said (42–44) that Agamemnon takes her away 'passing over the god (i.e. Apollo) and τὸ εὐσεβές' (note that it was in itself not uncommon at all for a virgin priestess to get married, as Connelly 2010:17–18 points out: 'priesthoods [for women] with a prerequisite of virginity were held for a short time, after which maidens were free to marry'; in this case, however, Apollo did not approve). Cassandra is aware of all of these facts, and her acquiescence is a sham (Scodel 1998:147). As it turns out, the torch of 'marriage' turns out to be a symbol of revenge. The marriage will enable Cassandra to destroy Agamemnon, to harm the enemy that infringed on Apollo's τιμή by forcibly taking away his priestess. The characterisation of the dance as ὅσιος could only be interpreted as such in that it indirectly repairs the τιμή of the god. But since it is actually the symbolic representation of the step towards revenge, this is clearly a manipulative and distorted interpretation of ὁσιότης.

as he is, being 'not καθαρός', while she only gives 'what is ὅσιον' for sacrifice;[36] and she also intends to put forward, as mentioned above, that it is only ὅσιον for her (not for anyone else) to touch the holy statue.[37]

In sharp contrast to this clever woman, the Argive King Adrastus and the mothers of the Seven employ a very unfortunate rhetoric when they come to supplicate Theseus to help them recover the bodies of their sons (who are lying unburied at Thebes), although they, too, seem to appeal to τὸ ὅσιον in order to persuade. They concede that they supplicate 'not in a manner that is pious' (οὐχ ὁσίως) but 'through necessity' (ὑπ' ἀνάγκας).[38] Their point is that their supplication is interrupting a fertility festival for Demeter and Persephone, the Proerosia at Eleusis.[39] The women's tearful appearance,[40] supplication boughs[41] and dark mourning clothes[42] would have disturbed the festival and might offend the gods.[43] It seems as if the women anticipate criticism on these scores and try to use their obvious offences to emphasize the urgency of the situation, 'We are making this plea despite its not being ὅσιον (so you can imagine we had no choice).' However, this is hardly a persuasive way of framing a supplication: suppliants usually said the exact opposite, arguing—in a strong rhetorical move—that their claim to protection was ὅσιος, thereby appealing to the gods' special interest in their situation.[44] Thus,

36 E. *IT* 1035–1037.

37 E. *IT* 1045. When Thoas appears on the stage (1153 ff.), she successfully follows a similar strategy, but also (1161) solemnly invokes a personification or goddess Ὁσία (who is attested hardly anywhere else, only in E. *Ba.* 370–371). Here she goes too far, because Thoas cannot follow her anymore and says, 'What kind of newfangled thing are you starting your speech with? Express yourself clearly!' (1162).

38 E. *Supp.* 63.

39 On the Proerosia, cf. Deubner 1932:68–69.

40 E. *Supp.* 48–49, 71–86, 87–99.

41 E. *Supp.* 10, 102.

42 E. *Supp.* 97.

43 Morwood 2007 ad loc., Morwood 2012:555–556, Smith 1967:154–155. There are indications in the text that the characters are concerned about this: Aethra thinks Theseus might remove the suppliants because of the distress they are causing (E. *Supp.* 38); Theseus remarks that their hair and robes are not fit for a festival (οὐ θεωρικά, 97); Theseus implores the women not to weep at Demeter's altar (289–290). Beside the women's behaviour and appearance, there may be reasons to assume that supplicating during a festival was generally considered problematic, e.g. And. *De Myst.* 110–116 which mentions a penalty for a supplication during festival time.

44 On the role of religious argumentation in fifth-century supplications, cf. Chapter 4, section 2.

it was particularly unhelpful to say a supplication was 'not ὅσιον' (*vel sim.*),[45] and the 'argument' may very well have contributed to Theseus's initial rejection.[46] Note that the speech also gives us a clear indication of the perceived importance of the temporal and spatial requirements of ritual practice. The mothers of the Seven show a great sensitivity to these questions of 'where, when and how to approach the gods', apologising for their transgression of these aspects of ἡ ὁσία, even if their plea itself is actually completely ὅσιον in all respects.

By studying the literary material, we have been able to identify at least four reasons why one would spell out what is ὅσιον or ὁσία: at the institution of a new cult or custom; when an insider explains a particular cult rule to a outsider; when these notions are used for dramatic characterisation; and to persuade another of the reasonability and importance of a particular action. In the epigraphic material, dramatic characterisation obviously does not apply, but we may hypothesise that the explicit inclusion of *hosios & cognates* sometimes involves one of the other three motivations, or a combination of them.[47] In the next sections we will take a closer look at the employment of ὅσιος and ὁσία for persuasive purposes, to strengthen an appeal. For Robert Parker, the usage of religious terms in ritual norms is rather an indication that they were *not* so serious, that adherence to these rules was not very important. Before analyzing the material, we will examine Parker's classification of *leges sacrae* in more detail.

4 Two Ideal Types of Sacred Law

Robert Parker's article, '*What are sacred laws?*', is among the first systematical studies of the disparate corpus of texts conventionally referred to as *leges sacrae*. Parker distinguishes two 'ideal' types of *leges sacrae*. The first is the

45 The Argive women's utterance seems even more inappropriate given the fact that their supplication is about recovering unburied bodies. Giving the dead an honourable funeral is one of the most important themes assessed in terms of the evaluation ὅσιος, and so these women would definitely be seen as ὅσιος by any Greek. Actually, a bit further on, Theseus himself says that they 'were asking ὅσια when requesting the bodies back' (E. *Supp.* 123).

46 The analysis fits within Morwood's argument (2012:553–554) concerning the generally weak rhetoric of the first supplication.

47 The explicit usage of ὁσία may of course also be the result of chance variation or variation in local diction.

'black-tie-will-be-worn' or 'how to deal with a haunting' rule.[48] Parker quotes laws with the phrase οὐ θέμις, for example:

> Χάρισιν αἶγα οὐ *θέμις* οὐδὲ χοῖρον
>
> To the Graces (it is) not *themis* (to sacrifice) goat nor piglet.[49]

As we have seen, οὐ θέμις and οὐχ ὁσία/ὅσιον are used in a highly similar way when referring to ritual practice.[50] Therefore, we may see similar inscriptions with οὐχ ὁσία/ὅσιον as variants. In this type, 'the rule is sometimes framed not in the imperative but in the indicative',[51] that is, the rule simply states that 'x is (not) done'.[52] For Parker, such a syntactic form stresses that these rules express conventions, traditional practice, local custom. The aim of such rules is not to constrain, but rather to advise, to provide guidelines for the worshipper who wants to do things right and 'respect local ritual tradition in all its pernickety particularity'. The general absence of sanctions in these texts indicates that they are not laws, lacking legal force.[53] Parker's second 'ideal' type is the 'true law', issuing from the assembly. It aims to constrain and regulate behaviour, and contains a secular sanction and a procedure for enforcement. Although many texts are a mix between the two types or define a borderland, this does not 'obliterate the distinction between the ideal types'.[54]

One important distinction between the first and the second type of sacred laws is the presence or absence of a secular sanction. For Parker, this also seems to be diagnostic of "seriousness". The characterisation of the first kind as 'exegetic lore'[55] implies that this scholar considers the first type as less serious than the second.[56] One example is Parker's discussion of a third-century funeral law from Gambreion in Asia Minor. This law states that any woman who

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48 2004:62, 65. 'how to deal with a haunting': Parker is referring to the Cyrenean Cathartic law (SEG 9.72, *LSS* 115) which describes dealings with 'suppliants' (ἱκέσιοι), a term which in this inscription seems to mean 'supernatural visitants'.

49 IG XII, 8 358, *LSCG* 114b, Thasos (fifth century).

50 cf. n. 16 of this chapter.

51 Parker 2004:62.

52 E.g. 'Libations are made with honey' (*LSS* 62, cult of Zeus Elasterus). Other examples are ritual norms stating that there is 'no carrying away of portions of sacrifice' (expressed as οὐ φορά, οὐκ ἀποφορά).

53 Parker 2005a:63.

54 Parker 2004:65.

55 Parker 2004:65.

56 Naiden has a similar view, stating that 'Sanctions [in ritual norms] are rare because the

violates the funeral regulations is banned from participating in any sacrifice for ten years, on the grounds that this is not ὅσιον for her anymore, because she is ἀσεβής.[57] Parker considers this a borderland rule, a real law that apparently envisages enforceability but does not contain a sanction:

> … The services of a state official, the 'woman-controller' (γυναικονόμος), are also called in. *But all the woman-controller is required to do* is to utter a prayer before the Thesmophoria that women who observe the rules shall prosper and those who do the opposite shall not. 'And' the law continues 'it shall not be permitted by religion (μὴ ὅσιον εἶναι) for women who disobey, as being guilty of impiety,[58] to sacrifice to any god for ten years'. This text is complete, and *we can be sure that secular sanctions and modes of actions against offenders were not included.* The parallel section of Solon's funerary law was *similarly sanction-free* … [italics for emphasis are mine].

I infer that Parker does not consider the threat of preclusion from future ritual actions as a real sanction.[59] To me, it seems a severe punishment. Sacrifice was the most important means of communicating with the gods and an essential way of being part of the community (especially for a woman). Versnel 1985 studied five inscriptions[60] cursing someone by saying something like 'may he not be able to sacrifice'. Versnel argued that such curses are quite serious because they are *variants* on the invocation of the wrath of the gods, which is central in Greek and Latin curse formulas.[61] Although these inscriptions date to the 2nd and 3rd century AD, the conclusion seems valid for this case as well.

This chapter proposes a different interpretation of the effect of such threats in inscriptions stipulating the ritual norm. Parker's analysis in terms of these two 'ideal types' does not seem to be the optimal way of characterising differences. I think an understanding of the difference between various ritual normative texts should begin by distinguishing sentence type and speech act.

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community includes them only with regard to those practices on which it has staked its own survival or well-being'. But in the extant inscriptions in which access to shrines is forbidden to particular groups (the topic of the second half of this chapter, section 6), 'the stakes are too low … not … [a] matter of civic survival' (2008:126).

57 *LSAM* 16.

58 μὴ ὅσιον αὐταῖς εἶναι, ὡς | ἀσεβούσαις, θύειν μηθενὶ θεῶν ἐπὶ δέ|κα ἔτη (ll. 25–27).

59 2004:61.

60 or 6, depending on the interpretation of the text discussed on his pp. 252–255.

61 Versnel 1985:263.

Although cult regulations of the first type ('libations are made with honey') are often simple indicative sentences, straightforward expressions of states of affairs, they probably have the illocutionary force of a warning.[62] As both Naiden (2008) and Dreher (2008) have pointed out, such 'x is (not) done' rules implicitly contain the threat of a strong sanction, namely divine punishment.[63] In this way, these rules probably have the perlocutionary effect of pressuring people into obeying, just like Parker's second type of 'laws' with overt sanctions.

The success of these illocutionary acts in both types of text recording ritual norms depends on their meeting a set of appropriateness conditions. The author must be capable of imposing the suggested sanction or believe the supposed enforcer (here: the gods) will do so. The listener must understand the utterance as a warning, take its enforceability seriously, and actually fear the sanction. I will argue that adding the expression 'not ὁσία/ὅσιον/θέμις' is an attempt to make sure these appropriateness conditions are met. The texts of Parker's type 1 which express that something is not ὁσία or θέμις are the equivalent of rules stating that 'x is not done' with respect to their function: both aim at regulating the behaviour of worshippers regarding cultic activities. But rather than being mere variations, norms using the terms ὁσία/ὅσιον or θέμις may have been more likely to ensure the intended effect of the utterance (frightening the reader so that he will comply), because they are more explicitly constructed as important to the gods and so express the threat of a divine sanction more clearly.

In Parker's view, the lack of a serious secular sanction more or less 'downscales' a law of the second type (a true law) to an example of the first type (exegetic lore), and we can assume the matter was not very important to a community. This is one possible interpretation of the source material. However, the proposed nature of the distinction between the two types of texts seems problematic. Moreover, the general historical information available to us about these types of inscriptions suggests a different stance as more likely.

Before we can start with the analysis, we need to address one more methodological question. How can we find out whether or not an explicit appeal to religion in ritual norms would convince the reader to obey the rule or avoid

62 On the terminology used here and below (speech act, illocutionary, perlocutionary, appropriateness conditions) cf. Abrams 1999 [1957]:291–294.

63 Dreher (2008:140–141) criticises Naiden (2008) for his contention that sanctions in sacred laws are rare, by pointing out that these texts *do* contain a sanction, in the form of the threat of divine punishment. But this point is advanced by Naiden himself near the end of his article (2008:134), although at the beginning of the same article (126–131), he seemingly equals 'sanction' to 'fine'.

transgressions? In the previous chapters, we could often tell that ὅσιος or ὁσία was used with the *intention* to persuade, for example when the term appeared in the context of a debate. We could also determine just how persuasive appeals to τὸ ὅσιον actually were by studying the effect of such an appeal on the interlocutor and on others. But in the case of inscriptions stipulating ritual norms, the only thing we can try to infer is how much weight 'not ὅσιον' was *supposed* to carry by investigating the textual context, historical context and physical circumstances of these inscriptions. From these clues we can try to deduce the kind of ritual normative texts into which authors would insert an appeal to τὸ ὅσιον in the first place. Taking two extremes, does 'not ὅσιον' appear in authoritative laws in which the survival of a community is at stake, or in regulations dealing with minor and trivial details of the ritual practice?

5 Religious Disqualifications in Ritual Norms with Other Sanctions

5.1 *Animals in Alectrona's Sanctuary*

Let us return to the inscription from Ialysos first. It seems that the usage of οὐχ ὅσιον here should be seen in the context of the (re-)installation of the cult. The law (νόμος) applies to the sanctuary of Alectrona, who was Helius's daughter according to myth. Her cult was originally widespread on the island of Rhodes, especially among the inhabitants of Carian origin. But with the Dorian invasion, the importance of the cult diminished. After the synoecism at Rhodes (408/7), the cult of Helios was adopted as a combined *polis* cult, and divinities affiliated to Helios in one way or another became well known. This is how the cult of Alectrona regained its popularity.[64] The inscription from Ialysos records an important moment in history because it marks the decision to give the cult of Alectrona new life and to reinstate the old cult and the ancestral customs, which had been neglected or perhaps wholly forgotten.[65] Rostad argued that the sanctuary had become disused and was in danger of becoming a pasture.[66] Precisely in this context, the authorities may have wanted to draw up a law against the presence of animals on the premises of the sanctuary, to make a

64 Le Guen-Pollet 1991:86.

65 Le Guen-Pollet 1991:87. Cf. ll. 3–5 of the inscription: ὅπως τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὸ τέμενος τᾶς Ἀλεκτρώνας εὐαγῆται κατὰ τὰ πάτρια '[the council etc. have decided the following] in order that the shrine and the precinct of Alectrona remain pure according to the ancestral customs'. Cf. also n. 3 above.

66 Rostad 2006:116.

very clear statement that this space was *not* a pasture, and to frame that law explicitly as part of the covenant with the gods.

Moreover, the document itself suggests it was partly intended to explain cult rules to outsiders. The first part of the law referred to setting up the *stêlai* in three locations, one of them on the 'road down from the city of Achaea' (ἐπὶ τᾶς καταβάσιος τᾶ[ς] | ἐξ Ἀχαΐας πόλιος),[67] a place nearby Ialysos.[68] This suggests an influx of visitors who needed to be informed about the local customs.

We should also consider the persuasive force of this document. The best we can do here is try to estimate what weight the authors intended the document to have, by looking into its textual and historical context and the circumstances of its publication. The historical context described above implies that the ritual norm was a matter of some importance to the local community. The physical circumstances of its publication (or actually: what we are told about the physical circumstances) confirm that view, since the *stêlai* were to be set up at three different strategic places. This multiple publication of ritual norms was by no means exceptional, but the fact that the Ialysians took such care to acquaint the visitors with these rules can be seen as indicative of their perceived importance.[69]

With respect to the textual context, we should find out what the phrase 'let him be guilty of the impiety' (ἔνοχος ἔστω τᾶι ἀσεβείαι, ll. 29–30) means. What kind of sanction does it amount to? One possibility is that the phrase signals that the transgressor will be tried in a case of ἀσέβεια. Such severe consequences of breaking the rules would certainly add to our impression of the perceived importance of the law. Impiety (ἀσέβεια) was a legal offence in classical Greece: you could bring someone who had committed ἀσέβεια (according to you) before a court, and if this person was found guilty he was convicted on this charge.[70] The law about ἀσέβεια most probably did not have a precisely defined character, but may have been of the form: 'if anyone commits

67 IG XII, 1 677, *LSCG* 136, ll. 17–18.

68 Craik 1980:161.

69 *LSAM* 16 and ID 68 discussed below (section 4 and 6.1 respectively) were also published multiple times.

70 Discussions on ἀσέβεια as a legal offence: MacDowell (1978:192–202), Todd (1993:307–315), Parker 2005, Bruit-Zaidman & Schmitt-Pantel 1992:11–12, Naiden 2008. Note that almost all of our information on ἀσέβεια comes from Athens (Parker 2005:63) but some epigraphical material from other *poleis* shows that people were tried and condemned on a charge of ἀσέβεια in other places, as well, e.g. I.*Ephesos* 2 (fourth century); IG II^2 2635 (Delos, 374/73). Delli Pizzi 2011:69–72 discusses these inscriptions. There is no such evidence for Rhodes and Kos in the classical period, as far as I know.

impiety, let anyone who wishes submit a *graphê* …'.[71] It would be up to the accuser to decide that a particular action constituted an ἀσέβεια, and then to convince the jury of it.[72]

Perhaps the phrase ἔνοχος ἔστω τᾶι ἀσεβείαι did precisely that: it categorised the mentioned offences as ἀσέβεια. However, it does not seem that this text stipulates that the offender will go to trial on the grounds that he has committed an ἀσέβεια. The phrase describes a specific 'impiety' connected to a specific situation, as indicated by the definite article (ἔνοχος *τᾶι* ἀσεβείαι). Therefore, its primary meaning is probably 'guilty of this (particular) activity we consider impious' or 'liable' to it,[73] not 'answerable to (a charge of) ἀσέβεια' (i.e. the legal category).[74] The fact that there is no indication of any envisaged punishment connected to the impiety may be relevant as well. Because offences of different degrees of gravity could be brought under the rubric of ἀσέβεια, there was no fixed penalty for it. Delli Pizzi argues that a law categorising a particular offence as an ἀσέβεια would also say something about the intended punishment.[75] On the other hand, there are enough examples of ancient laws that do not stipulate punishments. In those cases, it was up to the prosecutor of a particular offender to suggest a punishment for that individual case.

If the phrase does not signal that the transgressor will be prosecuted in court, what *does* it do? Labelling an offence as an 'impiety' first and foremost seems an attempt to warn the offender that his action will be considered an affront in the eyes of the gods, likely to disturb his relationship with the divine world. Framing the action as 'not ὅσιον' does exactly the same. But the term ἀσέβεια, unlike the prohibition 'this is not ὅσιον' implies a legal transgression, and such a categorisation of the offence paves the way for a possible formal charge on

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71 MacDowell 1978:199. Cf. Parker 1996b: 215 n. 63; Parker 2005:65, Todd 1993:310.

72 The undefined charge of ἀσέβεια existed as a separate legal route alongside a number of other, more clearly demarcated religious offences on the grounds of which one could formally accuse someone. These other categories of religious offences included a) *hierosylia* (temple-robbing); b) theft of sacred money, e.g. Antipho. 2.1.6, D. 19.293; c) matters concerning olive trees, e.g. Lys. 7; and d) matters concerning conduct during public festivals, e.g. D. 21.175–180. Cf. MacDowell 1978:135, 149, 194–196, Parker 2005:63–64. NB: Bruit-Zaidman & Schmitt-Pantel 1992:11 consider offences concerning olive trees as ἀσέβεια, while MacDowell and Parker treat such offences as a separate category.

73 i.e. any consequences will be on his account.

74 Delli Pizzi 2011:75. Cf. Parker 2004:65; *contra* Naiden 2008:134–135, whose opinion on *LSCG* 150, discussed in section 5.2 of this chapter, is that 'a trial for *asebeia* must have awaited those failing to pay the fine'. NB: ἔνοχος + dat. can mean 'guilty of' (e.g. ἔνοχος τῷ φόνῳ, Antipho 1.11.9) or 'liable/answerable to' (e.g. ἔνοχος νόμοις, Pl. *Lg*. 869b1).

75 Delli Pizzi 2011:72.

these grounds, without entailing that this will actually happen. This is another way in which the phrase ἔνοχος ἔστω ται ἀσεβείαι could frighten the reader into compliance.[76] Note that although 'not ὅσιον' and 'ἀσέβεια' do not have exactly the same semantic reference, their illocutionary force is the same: both are deterrents.[77]

Thus, it seems that we can infer from the historical circumstances, the textual context and the manner of publication of the law that the issue discussed was a matter of some importance to the community. Apparently, the Ialysians thought that using a layered system of religious threats would seriously help to achieve the intended persuasive purpose: frightening the readers into compliance.

5.2 *Cutting Wood on Cos*

If we compare the Ialysian text to a similarly exceptional case—the only known ritual norm in the classical period about cutting wood that employs religious terminology[78]—we get a similar impression. In a sanctuary on Cos (*LSCG* 150a, late fifth century), the officials put some effort into preventing the cutting of sacred wood. According to this law, someone who cut down the cypress trees or took wood from the holy grove must be considered as committing an impiety

76 Delli Pizzi 2011 makes the same argument, understanding ἀσέβεια in the epigraphic evidence in the framework of social control, not just in a legal perspective. Delli Pizzi also makes the interesting observation that 'the idea that these expressions refer to being considered impious, whatever it means concretely, rather than more specific consequences such as a trial, is supported by the fact that we sometimes find νομιζέσθω instead of ἔστω in the case of other notions [such as ἐναγής, ἱερόσυλος]' (2011:60 n. 29).

77 This view entails the expectation that the second part of the text could also have been phrased as 'ἀνόσιος ἔστω' instead of 'ἔνοχος ἔστω τᾶι ἀσεβείαι'. Indeed, this is precisely the case in another ritual norm of the fifth century (*LSS* 85, Rhodes (Lindos), end of fifth century). This inscription concerns a decision made in the Council about a tax payable to the war-god Enyalius. Any soldier from Lindos should pay to Enyalios one-sixtieth of his wages. Those soldiers in public service had to pay the tax to their general, who handed it over to the priest; those who served voluntarily paid the contribution to the priest directly. The text states that if the generals had failed to collect the money from the soldiers, 'let it be impious ([ἀ]ν̣ό̣σιον ἔστω, 44) in the eyes of the god and let him be responsible (ὑπεύθυνος ἔστ-|[ω], 45–46)', and that the same goes for a voluntarily serving soldier who had not paid his tax to the priest.

78 As explained above (section 1, n. 11 of this chapter), the 'no cutting wood' subtype is prominent in the larger group of ritual norms that try to manage the potential damage visitors could do to the sanctuary and its environment. Restrictions on animals, such as appear in the Ialysian regulation, were also part of this group of texts.

with regard to the sanctuary (τ-|ὸ ἱαρὸν ἀσεβείτω, l. 5–6) and had to pay a fine of one thousand drachmas. Note that the fine is exceptionally high compared to contemporary inscriptions.[79] A subsequent decree, passed in the next century (*LSCG* 150b), confirms and strengthens the impression that this community really had a serious problem with deforestation. In this second decree, it is again forbidden to cut down any of the trees. But whereas the first decree held an 'escape clause'—the only valid reason to use the wood was if the community decided they needed it for a public project—in the new situation, that was no longer possible. The decree silences those who might be considering it at all: 'no one is allowed to make the proposal, or put to the vote, or [even] to voice the opinion that the cypress wood be used'.[80]

The astronomic monetary penalty imposed in the first decree and the subsequently imposed censorship in the second imply that the situation was very urgent indeed. Both strong measures were apparently felt necessary to prevent further 'environmental degradation'.[81] The exceptional procedure of threatening the transgressor with ἀσέβεια apparently fits into the general communicative strategy: the lawgiver seems to employ this term because he perceives it to be a similarly strong incentive to make people abide by this law. In fact, the enormous monetary sanction likewise seems intended more as a threat, a last resort, than as a regularly envisioned scenario. In this way, the imputation of impiety seems to function in a similar way as in the Ialysian law: as a (strong) deterrent.

A similar analysis of the usage of evaluative terms in normative documents as social and religious deterrents was made by van 't Wout,[82] who focused on the formula ἄτιμος ἔστω in the entrenchment clause (*sanctio legis*) of formal decrees. Van 't Wout interpreted this formula, occurring in statements of the type 'if anyone subverts the decisions in this decree, he must be ἄτιμος', as a social evaluative. Against the *communis opinio* that ἀτιμία in legal documents refers to 'disenfranchisement' or 'the loss of citizen rights',[83] van 't Wout argues

79 The same offences lead to a fine of one hundred drachmas in a fourth-century inscription of Euboea (IG XII, 9 90) or 'only' fifty drachmas in another fourth-century, Attic inscription (*LSCG* 37). Naiden 2008:129 also finds this sum rather large.

80 *LSCG* 150b8–12: [π]ροστάτας μη-|δεὶς προτιθέτω μηδὲ ἐπιψαφ[ι]-|ζέτω μηδὲ γνώμαν μηδεὶς | ἀγορ[ευ]έ̣τ̣[ω ὡ]ς δεῖ καταχρῆ̣[σθαι]| τ̣ο̣ῦ [κυπαρισσίνο]υ ξύ[λου].

81 Dillon 1997:118 sees the serious measures in the second decree as an indication of 'the progress of environmental degradation': in any case, the first decree already strikes a rather urgent note.

82 Van 't Wout 2011a, 2011b, 2013.

83 The standard account is Hansen 1976:55–97.

that ἄτιμος ἔστω does not prescribe a future action that should be taken against offenders, which is, imposing the alleged legal penalty of ἀτιμία.[84] Rather, the formula ἄτιμος ἔστω should be seen as a performative, quasi-magical speech act that 'construes a causal relationship between transgressing against the decree and becoming unable to fulfil one's social role within the community'.[85] The primary aim of the statement ἄτιμος ἔστω is to safeguard a communal decision by threatening the reader—namely, with a complete *social death*[86]—and to coerce compliance in this way.[87] This statement can be viewed as the threat of a sanction, even if it is not a fine or penalty. If someone transgresses against the decisions in the decree, he can expect that no one will take heed of him any longer. Although the *consequence* of the loss of one's social position may be the loss of citizenship rights (some or all), this is not the stated content. The formula ἄτιμος ἔστω does not mean that the transgressor should and will be tried in a court case and punished with ἀτιμία, just like ἀσεβὴς ἔστω does not prescribe that the offender will be taken to court on a charge of ἀσέβεια, even though these disqualifications paved the way for a *potential* legal suit.

5.3 *Discussion*

We can now summarise our analysis. Texts regulating matters concerning the sanctuary, rituals and manageability of visitors generally dealt with transgressions in a pragmatic way. The inscriptions from Ialysos and Kos are atypical in their explicit usage of religious evaluative terms (οὐχ ὅσιον, ἀσέβεια).[88] My study

84 Van 't Wout 2011a:151 = 2013:38.

85 Van 't Wout 2011a:151 = 2013:38.

86 Van 't Wout 2011a:157 = 2013:46, 2011b:132–133.

87 Van 't Wout 2011a:152 = 2013:40.

88 Note that the absence of these religious terms elsewhere does not necessarily entail the absence of a 'religious' way of framing the offence. For example, in one fifth-century inscription, the notion that the god is displeased by a material transgression is expressed rather clearly: this is *CID* I 3 (*LSCG* 76), 475–450 BCE: τὸν ⟨ϝ⟩οῖνον μὲ̄ φάρεν ἐς τοῦ δρ- | όμου. αἰ δέ κα φάρε̄ι, *h*ιλαξάστō | τὸν θεὸν *h*ôι κα κεραίε̄ ται καὶ | μεταθυσάτō κἀποτεισάτō πέν- | τε δραχμάς, τούτου δὲ τôι κατα- | γορέ̄σαντι τὸ *h*έ̄μισσον. | 'You should not carry the wine from (ἐς is a dialect form for ἐκ) the race- | course. If someone carries it out, he must appease | the god for whom the wine is mixed [i.e. for making a libation in the context of the sacrificial ritual] | he must redo the offering and pay five | drachmas, of this half is for | the one who reports him.' I am grateful to Folkert van Straten for bringing this inscription to my attention. This inscription shows exactly the same mentality expressed in the Ialysian text (a transgression in the context of the sanctuary will displease the god, and the upset balance between the human and divine world must be restored), but it happens to express this way of thinking in different terms. Also, Parker 2004:69–70

tentatively shows that the phrase οὐχ ὅσιον was not only an explanation of the religious rule, functioning at the re-instatement of the cult. It may also have been a rhetorical move, an attempt to strengthen a law that was considered very important to the community. My interpretation is the opposite of that of Delli Pizzi, who sees these rules as 'trivial'.[89] On the contrary, explicitly framing the offence as a religious transgression in Ialysos seems to have been a serious means of persuading the reader to keep his animals out and preventing the area from becoming a pasture again. Our examination of a set of decrees from Cos confirms the impression that religious terms were used in ritual norms as a strong deterrent in situations in which it mattered.

6 Religious Disqualifications in Ritual Norms *without* Other Sanctions

We will turn next to the discussion of inscriptions that explain ritual norms in religious terms, but without adding any threat of punishment for transgressors.

6.1 *No Entry for ξένοι*

A small number of inscriptions contain prohibitions against foreigners (ξένοι), who are barred from entering a sanctuary on the grounds that this is not ὁσία.[90] For example, two such cases originate from Delos, where two lintels were found, presumably with an identical text:

> Lintel A:
> Ξένωι οὐχ *ὁσίη* ἐσι[έναι].

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n. 44, 47 points out that some sacred laws contain a phrase like ἐνθυμιστὸν αὐτῷ ἔστω (with ἐνθύμιον as an alternative): 'let it weigh on his conscience'. Both Parker 1996a [1983]:253 n. 105 and Karila-Cohen 2010 view this as a religious phrase, denoting a feeling of unease towards the god. I have found one classical epigraphic example in which this term occurs: *LSS* 64, Thasos (end of fifth/beginning of fourth century). This inscription lays down norms for the funeral of dead soldiers. If someone does not oblige, 'let it weigh upon his mind' (ἐνθυμιστὸν αὐτῷ ἔστω, l. 5). Also, the responsible magistrates will punish him by the punishments of the law. In this chapter I have not taken such cases into account.

89 Delli Pizzi 2011:76; a similar statement occurs on p. 72: 'in the case of trials involving an impiety, the offences are very serious and threaten the harmony of the city itself … In the case of preventive laws, however, one can hardly assume that carrying away pieces of wood from a sanctuary or bringing in one's cattle is such a threat to the society.'

90 This group is studied by Butz 1996.

Lintel B:
Ξένωι οὐχ ὁ[*σίη* ἐσιέναι].[91]

To understand what kind of prohibition ὁσίη expresses in these inscriptions, we need to find out what kind of historical reality they are reflecting. We will consider this question before examining the relevant inscriptions themselves. There are hardly any inscriptions on the participation of strangers in cult, and there is no *communis opinio* on the status of foreigners in Greek sanctuaries and local cultic practice. So what is the status of these prohibitions?

If Greek sanctuaries were normally open to foreigners, it makes sense to spell out and advertise situations in which their presence *is* forbidden: a stranger cannot be expected to know the customs of all the sanctuaries he happens to visit. Funke made a proposal along these lines. In Funke's view, Greek cults were characterised by a 'principled openness' towards strangers. Cases in which entrance is systematically denied to all ξένοι, as in ID 68 A and B above, were rare individual cases that did not challenge the general principle of inclusivity.[92] Earlier, Körner argued similarly that these prohibitions are the exceptions and only confirm that inclusion is the norm.[93] The scarcity of extant inscriptions that deal with the participation of foreigners tacitly supports the views of Funke and Körner: if principled inclusivity is the standard, the default, we do not expect many explicit sources.

Even though such an argument from silence is legitimate, it is worthwhile seeing if there are perhaps other sources that can help us. Another way of gaining a better understanding of the role of ξένοι at Greek sanctuaries is by studying a more general question: how different groups of non-citizens received a role in *polis* religion. An informative scholarly work here is Wijma's monograph on the participation of metics (resident foreigners) in Athenian *polis* religion.[94]

91 *ID* 68 A and B. Butz found the second inscription on the site of Delos and reunited these 'epigraphical twins', as she presumes them to be (Butz 1994). The second lintel is badly weathered, but the first nine letters can be distinguished. In this publication Butz also summarises the earlier scholarship on ID 68A, and her article is the best starting point for any further study on this inscription. A related publication is Butz 1996, a study of the group of four inscriptions prohibiting ξένοι.

92 Funke 2006. But Funke also argued that the fact that ξένοι could participate did not necessarily mean they could also participate in the same way.

93 Körner p. 179. The opposite view—that these exclusions would reflect a general religious taboo, a perceived inherent dislike of the gods of ξένοι in their sanctuaries—is obviously not the solution: on the contrary, gods are the special protectors of ξένοι, especially at sanctuaries.

94 Wijma 2014.

Following previous research by Sourvinou-Inwood,[95] Wijma assumes that the identity of different social groups in Athenian society was articulated through participation in cultic service. She argues that participation in ritual activities was differentiated for different groups. The variables of differentiation included their place in the Panathenaic procession, the attributes they carried, the clothes they wore. The status and integration of various groups in the community were created, reflected and negotiated by the fact that each held their own, more or less 'central' or 'prestigious' role in ritual activities. Thus, as Wijma argues, such differentiated cultic participation of groups within the community was a way of articulating *polis* membership. Wijma's research was focused on 'resident *xenoi*'. She showed that when the group of metics became sufficiently large, the Athenians started to articulate a special status for this group, among other things by differentiated participation in *polis* cults.

Although Wijma's research did not cover the non-resident foreigner (ξένος), the general mechanism she describes is instructive for our research. If we can project the Athenian situation onto other *poleis*, it means that authorities made conscious choices about precisely *who* they allowed to participate and *how*, and these decisions also involved ξένοι. Is this true? And what did they decide? One hypothesis on the basis of Wijma's analysis could be that *non*-resident foreigners did not have a place in the ritual activities of a *polis*, reflecting their *non*-membership of that *polis*. Another hypothesis is that they were given a place in cultic service, but a well-defined one that somehow reflected their status as foreigner-guests.

We rely on coincidental shreds of documentary information to learn more about the status of ξένοι in Greek *polis* religion. One such valuable shred is the early fifth-century foundation decree of a new colony in Naupactus (on the northern shore of the Gulf of Corinth).[96] This colony was formed by the so-called Hypocnemidian Locrians, who decided to send a group of their citizens to settle in Naupactus. The decree establishes the rights and duties of the colonists, not only in their new home city, but also in their old community, and the text starts by stating the rules about sharing in cult. The inscription explains that the Naupactian colonist visiting Locris is allowed to sacrifice and partake in the sacrificial meal (λανχάνειν καὶ θύειν) in the manner in which this is ὁσία for a stranger (*h*όπο (= ὅπω<ς>) ξένον ὁσία), if he wants. He is allowed to do so on all levels of cultic organisation, the cults of the *polis* and the cults

95 Sourvinou-Inwood 1990.

96 This is IG IX 1 (2) 3:718, *Syll.* 47, *ML* 20, Körner no. 49, *Nomima* I, 43. I will discuss this inscription in more detail in Peels (in preparation a).

of the subgroups.[97] This rule in the Naupactus decree is—apparently—based on another set of rules about what is ὁσία for ξένοι with respect to their role in cult. These other rules, of which knowledge is presupposed here, may have involved a restriction of *the extent* to which the ξένος could participate in individual cultic activities. For example, he may have received a smaller portion of the sacrificial meat than citizens did. Another possibility is that the restriction concerned matters such as the position in the procession, the seating plan, or attributes of clothing. Instead of interpreting *h*όπο as ὅπω⟨ς⟩ 'in the manner in which', we can also take *h*όπο as ὅπω, Doric for ὁπόθεν, 'from where', in which case the text restricts the participation of Naupactian colonists to those cultic places 'from where (it is) ὁσία that a ξένος (sc. receives sacrificial meat and sacrifices)'.[98] Under that interpretation, we can infer that ξένοι could participate in cult on all levels of the *polis* organisation, but not everywhere.

Even if it is impossible to decide between ὅπω<ς> and ὅπω, the law gives valuable information with either interpretation. In Locris, ξένοι were not always automatically excluded from all cults, but they were not simply treated as Locrian citizens either: apparently they could participate in at least *some* of the rituals or at least in *some* way, i.e. there was a system of differentiated participation, as in Wijma's description for Athens. Furthermore, the decree presupposes common knowledge of a set of laws (which may have been unwritten, or published on stones we have not found, or published on perishable material) dealing with these ways in which or the places where different groups (at very least: one group of ξένοι and one group of non-ξένοι) could participate in the cults of the Locrians. Third, these rules, which had a social and political origin, were considered or construed as sanctioned by divine authority: they were ὁσία.

Some other inscriptions point to the same pattern of differentiated participation between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' (although they do not use religious terminology). There is a law from Piraeus in which the Piraeans have decided to honour Callidamas of the deme Chollidae. In the decree it is written that 'when the Piraeans sacrifice in the communal *hiera*', Callidamas is to receive a share that is equal to that of the other Piraeans, and Callidamas is to dine together with the Piraeans in all the *hiera*, 'except if somewhere it is in accordance with the rules for the Piraeans themselves to enter, but not for anyone else' (πλὴν | εἴ που αὐτοῖς Πειραιεῦσιν νόμιμόν ἐστ-|ιν εἰσιέναι, ἄλλωι δὲ μή).[99] This

97 ll. 1–5.

98 This was the proposal of Meister 1895.

99 IG II^2 1214, ca. 280 BCE, ll. 15–17.

inscription implies not only a system of differentiated participation but also, like the text from Naupactus, that people already knew the relevant local rules. The fact that provisions were normally made for different groups is also evident from the ritual norm in Tegea, which describes the conditions for entrance and makes an explicit statement about citizens as well as non-citizens: 'in Alea, neither stranger nor citizen (ξένον μέτε ϝαστόν) is allowed to dwell in the sanctuary if he does not come for the sacrificial meal'.[100] Other inscriptions stipulate that ξένοι should make a sacrifice or give a particular honorary portion to the priest, and their obligations are sometimes compared to or contrasted with those of citizens.[101]

These inscriptions, combined with the more general notion of differentiated participation in religious activities sketched by Wijma, suggest that the Greek way of thinking was not one of principled (unqualified) openness towards foreigners with exceptional exclusions, nor one of principled exclusion of foreigners; rather, the manner and degree of integration of ξένοι in religious activities of the *polis* were decided by individual communities on a case-by-case basis. Assuming such a system, cases in which foreigners were excluded, as in the Delian lintels, *ID* 68 A and B above, or in which their participation was otherwise limited, may not have been exceptional. But apparently, explicitly recording such rules was (and stating they were ὁσία). Besides *ID* 68 A and B, according to Patricia Butz, two other inscriptions (IG XII, 5 225 and IG XII 7, 2 discussed below) 'are the only examples found in the epigraphic record prohibiting access to a religious precinct or participation in a religious ritual by the ξένος' in the classical period.[102] If such rules were considered common knowledge among the local worshippers, what were the circumstances under which they were published on stone (*vel sim.*)?

The original provenance of the two lintels from Delos is uncertain. Although we cannot identify with confidence the doorway over which Lintel A would have been placed, many different scholars have assumed it was located over a door of the Delian Archegesion, presumably the east door (the principal entrance) of this sanctuary.[103] Anios, son and priest of Apollo, was believed

100 IG V 2, 3, ll. 11–12.

101 SEG 56:997 (Chios, fifth century), *LGS* II 60 (Olympia, sixth or fifth century), *LSS* 77 (Chios, beginning of fourth century), *LSAM* 59 (Iasos, fourth century), *LSAM* 44 (Miletus, ca. 400), *LSCG* 145 (Axos, end of fourth century).

102 1996:92.

103 The reason to assume it was located over the east door is that the stone's dimensions accord with the dimensions of the doorway (Butz 1994:77–80). No consensus or convincing idea has been proposed for the location of the second stone, which is smaller (Butz

to be the mythical ἀρχηγέτης of Delos, and the Delian Archegesion was his sanctuary.[104] This indigenous founder cult of Anios is attested archaeologically and epigraphically on Delos from the archaic period onwards and, presumably, strongly reflected the Delians' own local collective identity.[105] Concerning their date of composition, Butz placed these inscriptions in the late fifth or early fourth century, which gives them a very specific political context. The Delians would not always have had control over the Archegesion or the opportunity to set up this type of inscription: the most likely time they could have done this was during a period of independence. After the end of the Peloponnesian War, Delos enjoyed a short period of such independence. From this period we have a Spartan decree, presumably inscribed on Delos, granting independence to the Delians (*ID* 87). That text explicitly states that the control over the temple site and its religious activities is given back to the Delians. According to Butz, the letters of *ID* 68 bear a striking similarity to those of this Spartan decree, suggesting they were drawn up in the same context.[106] Under this interpretation, the norm would have been directed against the Athenian ξένος.[107]

If this is the proper temporal placement for this inscription and if the attribution to this specific sanctuary is correct, the motivation for recording the ritual norm and the usage of ὁσίη in it seem to be a combination of the reasons discussed in section 2.2 above. The inscription may represent the establishment of a *new* norm after being granted independence. It is also a way of clearly communicating to the outsider, who may not be aware of the rules, that he is not welcome.

We may consider the persuasive force of the document next. The historical context, if we have reconstructed it correctly, suggests that the stakes were high.

1994:81–86). Its shape suggests it was part of a keystone construction around a doorway, or a lintel block in its own right (Butz 1994:81) and its resemblance to stone A suggests it was part of the same construction. In any case, the fact that it was found in the same area as Lintel A (Butz 1994:70) means it would have been somewhere among the buildings belonging to the precinct.

104 The term ἀρχηγέτης is an epithet of a hero or god, and refers to the founder or leader of a community (Butz 1996:78).

105 Archaic archaeological evidence for the sanctuary: cf. the references in Butz 1994:88 n. 47; archaic epigraphic evidence: *ID* 30, *ID* 35.

106 Butz 1994:93–96.

107 An alternative dating places the inscription after 314 BCE, during a much longer period of Delian independence (until 167 BCE), when there was a large number of resident foreigners. This may have created the need to restrict access (Butz 1996:81). However, the letterforms 'certainly do not encourage such an interpretation' of putting it at the end of the fourth century or even later (Butz 1994:97).

The exclusion of foreigners at precisely this time from precisely this sanctuary that represented Delian identity would be understandable. The Delians would have been keen to symbolically assert their newfound independence by keeping the former oppressors out of their local founder's cult. As Butz puts it, 'The assertion of Delian control at the Archegesion with an inscription informing of the exclusivity of the cult would be in keeping with this renewal of authority and prestige for the indigenous population and their desire to secure their independence.'[108]

We can also *see* that the stakes were high because of the way in which (and the care with which) the ritual norm was published and made visible in the sanctuary. *ID* 68 is an exceptional case. It was unusual for a Greek to see such a text on a lintel, for inscribed doorways were not a common architectural feature in Greece.[109] The impression of an exceptional status is strengthened by what we learn from the formal features of the document: the physiology of the stone itself seems to reflect the value this rule must have had for the community. Lintel A is quite a large stone[110] with letters that were not only 'beautifully formed' but also 'cut on a monumental scale' (Butz 1994:71). The text on this large doorway would have been highly visible in the public domain in any case.[111]

If this analysis of *ID* 68a is correct, the explicit recording of this ritual norm and the usage of ὁσίη in it occur in a particular context in which the observance of the law was felt to be especially important. In the regulations discussed in the previous section of this chapter, religious disqualifications were added to a text that contained a sanction to bolster their persuasive force. But in the case of the Delian norm, this way of framing a regulation seems to be an alternative enforcement strategy intended to work on its own.[112]

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108 Butz 1996:80.

109 Butz 1994:98. Lintels are not unusual archaeological findings; therefore, the absence of other inscribed lintels among our findings is meaningful.

110 The dimensions of the two joined fragments together are 2.60 m length, 0.390 m height, 0.275 m depth.

111 Finally, the double publication of the text may have been significant. As was argued in the main text above, instances in which multiple stones communicate the same were not uncommon, but they may have occurred precisely in those cases where the norm in question carried special weight. Another interpretation is, of course, that the multiple set-up of the same ritual norm was simply a consequence of the practical circumstances, for example, if the sanctuary had multiple entrance points.

112 The only other epigraphic case in which the entrance of foreigners is perhaps forbidden (the crucial part has been restored), but here on the grounds that it is not θέμις, allows

One other classical inscription regulating access for ξένοι, but not employing any religious terms, is of a distinctly different nature. This is a fourth-century text from Amorgos.[113] The inscription probably states that 'it is not permitted for any foreigner to camp in the Heraion', without making a religious statement.[114] This document is an antique version of crowd management. The issue is not the principled exclusion of the outsider on ideological grounds, but the practical manageability of visitors, who might crowd the sanctuary if they use it as a camping site too long. Rather than threatening the visitors with the anger of the gods, the matter is treated in as down-to-earth and pragmatic a way as the problem itself: an official, appointed to enforce the norm, has to pay a fine if he fails to enforce it (ten drachmas per foreigner per day).[115]

6.2 *A Ban on Women*

A second group of inscriptions stipulating ritual norms contains prohibitions against women on religious grounds (again, οὐχ ὁσία or οὐ θέμις).[116] For example, a fourth-century text from Lindos, Rhodes, reads:[117]

for a similar analysis. This inscription (Paros IG XII, 5 225, *LSCG* 110) stipulates that the Dorian stranger is excluded from entering a sanctuary belonging to a local cult (perhaps that of Κόρη Ἀστός, Butz 1996:82, Sokolowski, *LSCG ad loc.*). The text reads: Χσένωι Δωριῆι οὐ θέμι[ς ἐσιέναι] | οὔτε δ.. ωια Κό(υ)ρηι ἀστῶι ε[- - - - -]. The inscription is cut in monumental letterforms, like *ID* 68 (cf. Butz 1996:84), and it may likewise have been drawn up in a significant political identity-building context (Sokolowski, *LSCG ad loc.*).

113 IG XII 7, 2, *LSCG* 101.

114 ll. 9–10: μὴ ἐξεῖναι κατά|[γ]εσθαι εἰς τὸ Ἡραῖ[ον] ξένωι μηδενί. The interpretation depends on reading κατά[γ]εσθαι as 'turn in and lodge', after a suggestion made by Ziehen (*LGS* II 96 p. 275).

115 ll. 12–13.

116 There are four relevant texts in the classical Classical period: 1. N. Suppl. Epig. Rodio 169 20a, *LSS* 88a. Rhodes (Lindos), fourth century, 'for women not ὁσία'; 2. Lindos II 26, *LSS* 89. Rhodes (Lindos), fourth century, 'for women not ὁσία'; 3. IG XII Suppl. 414, *LSS* 63. Thasos, fifth century, 'for a woman not θέμις'; 4. IG XII, 5 183, *LSCG* 109. Paros, fifth century, 'for a woman, not θέμις'. These texts are discussed in the main text of this section. Later inscriptions are: 5. Syll.^{3} 1024.8–9, *LSCG* 96. Mykonos, ca. 200, 'for a woman, not θέμις'; 6. *LSS* 88b. Rhodes (Lindos), second century, 'for women not ὁσία'. A prohibition against women without this formula is 7. Syll.^{3} 979, *LSCG* 82. Elateia, fifth century: ἐν τοι ϝα|νακείοι | θύοντα | σκανεν·| γυναῖκα | μὲ παρίμε[ν]. Later such prohibitions without ὁσία or θέμις: 8. *LSCG* 124, Eresos, second century (against women entering), 9. *LSS* 56, Delos, second century (against women entering). Sokolowski restores such a prohibition in *LSAM* 42.A.3 and *LSS* 66 and suggests that it was there in *LSS* 68. Cf. Osborne 1993:397.

117 In this section, I have quoted the complete text of inscriptions in all cases.

Vacat
[Ἀθάνα]ι Ἀποτροπαία[ι]
ὄ̣ις· θυέτω ἀρχιερο-
θύτας· τὰ θυθέντα̣
αὐτεῖ καταχρῆσθαι.
γυνα̣ιξὶ οὐχ *ὁσία vacat*
vacat[118]

To Athena Apotropaea
a sheep. The *achierothutâs* must sacri-
fice it. The offerings must be
consumed on the spot.
For women not *hosia*.

We do not know precisely what such inscriptions prohibited, but because of their general focus on aspects of the sacrificial ritual, it is likely that they regarded women's participation in rituals of animal sacrifice. As in the previous set of inscriptions, our interpretation of the usage of ὁσία depends crucially on the historical background of such texts: that is, our take on the role of women in Greek religion, more precisely, their participation in the sacrificial ritual and their share in the sacrificial meat. I have addressed this controversial question in more detail elsewhere.[119] My conclusion is that the surviving material gives us no good reason to believe that there was a widespread female exclusion from the ritual of blood sacrifice (or the meal afterwards), which would have been part and parcel of the religious fundament of Classical Greece, and expressed in terms of ὁσία. Given the wealth of positive evidence on the important roles of women in Greek religion, I will assume a situation of the normal inclusion of women with exceptional exclusions. Assuming this view, then, it is logical that the exclusion of women in this cult is made explicit.

What were the circumstances in which women were banned from the sacrificial practice, and in which their presence was explicitly labelled as being against the religious rules? For these texts we have no indication that they represent the installation of a new cult or that the targeted group, the women (insiders), were not aware of the rules and needed to be informed. I will argue, instead, that the persuasive force of the religious language is the most proba-

118 This is N. Suppl. Epig. Rodio 169 20a; *LSS* 88.

119 Peels (in preparation d.)

ble reason for the explicit statement that women's participation is οὐχ ὁσία or οὐ θέμις. The textual contexts around the prohibitions give an indication that these inscriptions represented special, marked cultic situations. Again, overtly adding religious terminology occurs in circumstances in which there is something at stake.[120]

A prohibition against women occurs along with the announcement that 'no ninth parts are cut' (οὐ|[δ']ἐνατεύεται, l. 4–5) in an early fifth-century ritual norm from Thasos, belonging to a cult of Heracles:[121]

[Ἡρα]κλεῖ θασίωι
[αἶγ]α οὐ *θέμις* οὐ-
[δὲ] χοῖρον· οὐδὲ γ-
[υ]ναικὶ *θέμις*· οὐ-
[δ']ἐνατεύεται· οὐ-
δὲ γέρα τέμνετα-
ι· οὐδ' ἀθλε̃ται.[122]

To Thasian Heracles
It is not *themis* [to sacrifice] a goat
or a young pig. And it is not
themis for a woman [to participate]. No
ninth parts are cut. No
gifts of honours are cut.
No contesting.

We do not know exactly what the rare rule against 'ninth-parting' entailed. Many scholars think that ἐνατεύειν referred to performing a moirocaust: a sacrificial ritual in which gods received a larger portion than normal of the sacrificial animal (here: one-ninth of the meat),[123] while the majority of the edible parts of the animal were still left for human consumption.[124] If this interpretation

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120 Our findings will also support a historical analysis of women normally being *in*cluded in the sacrificial ritual: the markedness of almost all other prohibitions surrounding the bans on women strongly implies that the exclusion of women is marked itself. Here I build on the brief point made by Osborne 1993:403 concerning *LSS* 63.

121 IG XII, Suppl 414, *LSS* 63.

122 ἀθλε̃ται is commonly interpreted as ἀθλεῖται.

123 Clinton 1996:170, following earlier scholars, explains that a ninth part would have been a substantial part of the victim.

124 The term 'moirocaust' was coined by Scullion 2000:165.

of ἐνατεύειν is correct,[125] the *prohibition* of the moirocaust stipulated in the inscription (the indicative statement οὐδ' ἐνατεύεται has the illocutionary force of a prohibition) pointed to one of two things: a holocaust (in which the entire victim was burnt) or a 'normal' sacrifice (in which humans ate all the meat and the gods received only their customary very small portion of the sacrificial animal). We lack the information to make a definite choice,[126] but note

125 The verb ἐνατεύειν occurs in three other inscriptions, but they do not clarify its meaning. In the sacrificial calendar of Mykonos (*LSCG* 96.23–24), it is prescribed: Σεμέληι ἐτήσιον· τοῦτο ἐνα-|τεύεται 'A yearling for Semele. This is cut in nine parts'. In a damaged inscription, IG XII Suppl. 353.10, the word [ἐ]νατευθῆι is preserved, too. These texts do not describe what is to be done with the ninth parts. Sokolowski (commentary to *LSS* 63) suggested that the ninth-sharing referred to cutting the victim into nine parts and putting them on the sacrificial table; one part would go to the cult officials as a tax. A fifth-century inscription from Selinus, Sicily, has shed potentially new light on the meaning of the verb ἐνατεύειν (SEG 43:630, *NGSL* 27.). Lines 11–12 of this inscription prescribe burning one of the ninth portions (τᾶν μοιρᾶν · τᾶν ἐνᾶταν· κατακα-|ίεν · μίαν) for the so-called polluted Tripatores. Various authors have tentatively connected the usage of the verb ἐνατεύειν in this Sicilian inscription to the Thasian text and suppose, on the basis of this connection, that the verb must refer to burning a ninth portion of a victim for a god. In other words: ἐνατεύειν refers to the practice of a moirocaust (Scullion 2000:164–166, Ekroth 2007:390. This meaning had already been proposed by Stengel 1910:132. On the basis of this new evidence, Bergquist 2005 has withdrawn her earlier view of ἐνατεύειν as a taxation term in Bergquist 1973:70–80). Whether the prohibition of 'ninth-sharing' in Thasos really refers to the same procedure as the burning of a ninth part in Sicily, at the other end of the Greek world, remains the question, but at the moment it is the best informed guess for the meaning of ἐνατεύειν on the market.

126 Most scholars think the prohibition is a downscaling of the ritual of moirocaust into a 'normal' sacrifice (Bergquist 2005:64, Lupu 2005:373, Parker 2011:144), but Scullion 2000:166, with Seyrig 1927:193–198, thinks the prohibition of a moirocaust means that a holocaust should be performed instead. None of the arguments that has been advanced is really persuasive. Against the idea that this rule prescribes a holocaust, one might say that it could have been phrased more straightforwardly with the term ὁλόκαυτος, as is done in the sacrificial calendar of Erchia (*LSCG* 18) and the sacrificial calendar of Thorikos (SEG 33:147, *NGSL* 1). I am grateful to Folkert van Straten for making this suggestion to me. But perhaps people in Thasos did not use this phrase. Who knows? The argument of Bergquist 1973:71–72, that it makes no sense to prohibit perquisites in the case of a holocaust because this is obvious (i.e. because no part of the animal remains to take perquisites from), does not hold. Ekroth 2008:89–90 explains that holocausts mostly involved the burning of a small victim (such as a piglet) entirely. This procedure would have been followed by an 'ordinary' *thysia* sacrifice of a larger animal, which was eaten by the worshippers (after the normal small share for the god had been burnt); perquisites and prizes in contests could come from this larger animal.

that both moirocausts and holocausts were rare, marginal features of Greek cult.[127] Even if the prescription against ninth-parting downscaled the ritual into a 'normal' sacrifice, this prohibition still functioned against a seemingly marked background, in which the worshipper apparently expected he might have to 'ninth-part'. Note that each of the *other* things this cult group did are also unusual: the prohibition against specific sacrificial animals;[128] the priest not receiving any perquisite (οὐδὲ γέρα τέμνεται);[129] and the prohibition against contesting (οὐδ'ἀθλεῦται). All of these provisions would have added to the special character of the ritual.

In the text from Lindos (quoted above and reprinted below), prescribing ritual practice for Athena Apotropaea, a prohibition against women on the grounds that their participation is οὐχ ὁσία occurs along with the requirement that the sacrificial meat must be consumed on the spot (expressed as τὰ θυθέντα̣ | αὐτεῖ καταχρῆσθαι, ll. 4–5):[130]

> *Vacat*
> [Ἀθάνα]ι Ἀποτροπαία[ι]
> ὄ̣ις· θυέτω ἀρχιερο-

127 Ekroth 2008:89–90.

128 Other gods on Thasos, too, are quite particular when it comes to types of animal they dislike. Cf. IG XII 8, 358, *LSCG* 114, found close to this sanctuary of Heracles (early fifth century).

129 This is highly exceptional, for normally the priest would receive one: ritual norms abound in detailed regulations about these perquisites (Van Straten 1995:154).

130 Ritual norms with the same gist occur elsewhere, although hardly a handful of similar prescriptions are known to us. I will give an inventory of the extant cases, assembled from examples in different authors. *LSS* 94, 13–14 (Kameiros, third cent., Poseidon): the sacrificial meat is consumed on the spot (κρῆ αὐτεῖ | ἀναλοῦται); SEG 35 923 A, *NGSL* 20 (Chios, Eileithuia, around 400): the priestess must consume her perquisites on the spot (τ̣ὰ̣δε ἀναλ̣[ί]σκεσθαι αὐτõ); *LSCG* 96, 26 (Mycene, around 200, Zeus Chthonios and Ge Chthoniê, δαινύσθων αὐτοῦ), perhaps l. 40, but the stone is poorly preserved at this point; SEG 38:786 (Rhodes, third cent.): the offerings are consumed on the spot, but note that one essential word (αὐτεῖ) was restored: τὰ θυθέντ[α αὐτεῖ] | καταχρῆ[σθαι]. In *LSAM* 34.7 (Magnesia, Sarapis, late third cent.) this crucial word is also restored: τὰ δὲ θυθέντα καταναλισκέ[τ]ω[σαν αὐτοῦ]. Cf. Pausanias 2.27.1, 10.4.10, 10.38.3. We find the same norm more often phrased as a prohibition against carrying away sacrificial meat. Some 35 cases of this are known to us, but 28 of them are from two calendars. Among the phrases that are used are: οὐκ ἀποφορά, οὐ φορά, μὴ εἶναι ἐκφορήν. Cf. Van Straten 1995:145 n. 93 for a list. SEG 43:630, *NGSL* 27, A 20 (Selinus, Zeus Meilichius, fifth cent.) belongs to this group as well. This type of norm was apparently well known enough in the classical period for Aristophanes to base a joke on it, discussed in section 2 above (Ar. *Pl.* 1138).

θύτας· τὰ θυθέντα̣
αὐτεῖ καταχρῆσθαι.
γυνα̣ιξὶ οὐχ *ὁσία vacat*
vacat[131]

To Athena Apotropaea[132]
a sheep. The *archierothutas* must sacrifice it. The offerings must be
consumed on the spot.
For women not *hosia*.

The 'on the spot' rule was also a special, marked, cultic feature. This prescription targeted the custom at public sacrifices of distributing meat among the participants so that they could consume it later, at home,[133] and stipulated its consumption in the sanctuary after the sacrifice instead.[134]

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131 Fourth century, N. Suppl. Epig. Rodio 169 20a; *LSS* 88. The stele was originally placed in front of the temple of Athena and Zeus and contains two cult regulations, one from the fourth and one from the second century BCE. The earlier text is quoted here in the main text.

132 The name of Athena is almost entirely restored, but we know this is the goddess involved because of a second-century text (*LSS* 88b) which reads: Σμινθίου τρίται ἐπὶ δέκα·| Ζηνὶ Ἀποτροπαίωι κριός, | Ἀθάναι Ἀποτροπαίαι οἶς· | θύει ἀρχιεροθύτας· τὰ θυ-|θέντα αὐτεῖ καταχρεῖσθα[ι].| γυναιξὶν οὐκ ὁσία. The second text was the result of a reform in which the two independent cults were united by a single priesthood (*LSS* 88, commentary).

133 Van Straten 1995:145.

134 Why would the 'on the spot' rule be marked? The frequent finding of archaeological remains of banqueting halls on Greek *temenoi* (cf. Sokolowksi, comm. on *LSS* 51) clearly shows that consuming the meat together, during a communal banquet after the sacrifice, was a common aspect of the ritual. Thus, one could argue that this rule only serves to highlight standard procedure and makes obligatory in particular cases what was common practice anyway. On the other hand, why would the Lindians—and others—have taken the trouble to carve in stone something they would do anyway? Rather, the available epigraphical evidence on this rule shows a conscious and deliberate differentiation between cases in which meat may and must not be carried away; and in this differentiation, prohibitions against taking meat are the marked case. The fact that the prohibitions are marked can be seen especially in the legislation of sacrificial calendars. In such a calendar from the deme Erchia (*LSCG* 18, first half of fourth century), it is explicitly stated that the meat cannot be carried out (οὐ φορά) after some of the public sacrifices (e.g. the sacrifices to Apollo Lykeius (A 3–4) and Hera Thelchinia (A 7–8)), while no prescription about consumption is made for other events in the same calendar (e.g. the sacrifices to Apollo Apotropaeus (A 32–33) or Athena Polias (A 62–63)). In the calendar of Cos (*LSCG* 151, middle of fourth

In a third inscription, the prohibition against women occurs in the context of an exclusive cult, which was also off-limits for the uninitiated. This fifth-century text originates from Paros:[135]

> [῞Ο]ρος Ὑπατο· ἀτ[ε]-
> [λ]έστοι οὐ *θέμ*-
> [*ι*]ς, οὐδὲ γυναι-
> [*κ*]ί.
>
> This is the boundary (of the sanctuary of Zeus) Hypatus.
> For an uninitiated person it is not *themis* [to enter]
> Nor for a woman.

Whatever kind of cult the law belonged to,[136] as Sokolowski has pointed out, the cult of Zeus Hypatus was associated elsewhere with a number of other non-standard rules such as the prescription for wineless offerings. The ritualistic context for the ban on women here, too, may have been part of such a special context, though it is not explicit in the text.

With respect to these inscriptions, this is all the information that we have, and we must try and make inferences on this scarce basis. What kind of historical context do these rules seem to have been part of? The stipulation of deviant and non-standard procedures, like those recurring in all of these short texts, could be part of a desire to create a special relationship between a local group of worshippers and their own god, and so promote the self-identity of the group as being tied to a particular god for whom a particular ritual is performed. In the case of the religious cult of Zeus Hypatus, the desire to create

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century), a young pig and a kid must be sacrificed to Dionysos Skyllitas, and it is expressly forbidden to carry away of the meat of the pig, but nothing is said about the consumption of the kid (ll. 44–45, and 57–58). The opposite, a φορά rule, stipulating that meat *can* be carried out, does not seem to occur. Scullion 1994:101 mentions two alleged such cases in *LSCG* 151 B 8, D 2 and D4, but the first of them regards the perquisite of the priest, and in the second and third case, 12 to 14 letters before ἀποφορά were restored, so the text could have been a prohibition against carrying away as well as the explicit permission it is taken for now. Finally, note that evidence for banquets (in the form of banqueting halls) is not necessarily evidence against meat being taken out. Probably, portions of meat were normally distributed for home consumption even *after* communal banquets (Parker 2011:284–285).

135 IG XII 5, 183, *LSCG* 109. NB: This inscription, a boundary stone, in contrast to (3–5) above, seems aimed at prohibiting the entrance of women to the sanctuary altogether.

136 Sokolowski (*LSCG* 109, commentary) has connected the law to a Pythagorean cult, due to the influence of the Pythagoreans on Paros.

an exclusive group identity based on the opposition between insider and outsider is evident. In the cult of Athena Apotropaea, consuming all the meat in the sanctuary had at least two goals: it gave greater significance to the ritual and strengthened social cohesion at the same time. Sitting down to the meal together in the presence of the god prolonged the ritual activity and may have been perceived as giving the ritual extra effectiveness; it also strengthened the ties between humans and the gods involved, as well as amongst the human participants themselves.[137] If the participants of the ritual did not return to their individual homes to eat privately, but instead sat down for a meal at the sanctuary premises, this must have had a positive community-building effect.[138]

The fourth inscription with a prohibition against women may be analysed in a similar way. This small marble *stele* found on Rhodes reads:

> Ὑ̣ακιν[θίο]υ̣ ἐνδε-
> κάται Διὶ Ἀμαλῶ[ι]
> κάπρος ἑξάμην[ος].
> θύει ἱαροθύτας
> Αἰγήλιο̣ς.[139] γυναιξὶ
> ὀκ (*sic*) ὁσία. *vacat*[140]

> On the eleventh day of the month
> Hyacinthius to Zeus Amalus
> a boar of six months old.
> The sacrificing priest makes the offering,

137 Jameson 1999:327 has a similar opinion: 'The occasional requirement of feasting on the spot points to a desire to continue the group's presence in the sanctuary, that is to prolong and complete the drama of delivering a gift to the gods and then feasting gratefully on the gods' bounty.'

138 cf. Ekroth 2002:324, *contra* Scullion 1994:101, who considered these enforced meals to make a 'gloomy contrast to the relaxation of a festive dinner at home'. Scullion said the οὐ φορά rule belonged to moirocaust rituals and supposed that people accepted such depressing dinners only because they were better than the holocaust (in which there was no food for the participants at all), which was the alternative to such moirocausts. But as was discussed above (n. 126 of this section), holocausts normally involved the burning of a smaller victim entirely, followed by the 'regular' sacrifice of a larger victim, from which the worshippers could eat the normal share.

139 Αἰγήλιος refers to the name of a Rhodian local division (called κτοίνα), which is similar to an Attic deme. Winand 1990:58–59.

140 Lindos II 26, *LSS* 89.

an Aegelian. For women
not *hosia*.

In this ritual norm, the prohibition against women occurs next to a provision for the sacrifice of a wild boar. Given our lack of knowledge about this cult, it is difficult to tell why Zeus Amalus specifically wants a 6-month-old boar,[141] but we do know that this is hardly the standard choice of a sacrificial animal: the evidence for the sacrifice of boars seems limited to a handful of cases, very much spread out in time.[142] The relatively rare provisions for, or prohibitions against, more particular types of animal such as a wild boar are marked, because such rules make the assumption that a particular god will be pleased with that highly specific type of animal over others. Articulating such knowledge of the god's special "favourite meal" could well be a strategy intended to consolidate a special bond between the god and his worshippers, and consequently strengthen the identity of the group itself.

To conclude, the prohibitions against women may have been part of sets of exceptional, cult-specific arrangements designed to construe a contrastive, special identity and to establish an individual relationship for the community in question with a god.[143] Women may have been excluded from these cults

141 The only thing we know is that this title of Zeus is connected with the young goat Amalthia, which suckled the young Zeus in Crete, but what (if anything) this has to do with the prescribed sacrificial animal is unclear. Cf. Craik 1980:155. In any case, it is likely that the meat of a half-year-old wild boar is especially good: this animal is born in the spring, its meat is fatty and most tasty in winter. Moreover, younger boars (until around 4 months old) have a striped and speckled coat (http://www.britishwildboar.org.uk/index.htm?Coats.html) which may have impaired their perceived ritual 'purity', and of course, being smaller, they provide less meat. I owe this observation to Folkert van Straten.

142 SEG 31.122 (Attica, to Heracles, second cent. CE), *LSCG* 65.34, 69 (Andania, to Apollo Carneius, 92), *LSCG* 96.17 (Mykonos, to Kore, ca. 200), *LSS* 85.20–30 (Lindos, to Enyalius, 440–420, but partially restored: [κα]||[π]ρος), plus the inscription discussed here. I owe this collection to Lupu 2005:188 n. 39. The word κάπρος can refer to a domestic pig, but in that case we would rather expect ὗς.

143 Sokolowksi gave an interpretation of the ritual norm concerning the cult of Heracles Thasios (*LSS* 63, discussed in main text above) along similar lines, pointing out that each of the prescribed rules (no perquisite, no contesting, no ninth-parts, no women) is not only marked but has the specific result of making available shares of the victim that were normally not destined for human consumption (of course the prohibition against women can only be interpreted in this way if we assume that women normally shared in the meat). The prohibition against 'contesting' would entail that no part of the sacrificial victim needs to be given to the prize winner of such a contest, a procedure described e.g. in *LSCG*

altogether or from some of the ritual activities (such as the ritual meal). The analysis suggests an interpretation of these texts as attempts at creating a special (religious) group-identity rather than informing the diligent worshipper who wanted to know about all the trivial minor details of the cult.

7 Conclusion

In inscriptions that express ritual norms, offences are hardly ever explicitly conceptualised as religiously undesirable behaviour (e.g. by means of the terms ἀσέβεια or 'not ὅσιον'). That is, even though following cultic rules and protecting the sanctuary and its surroundings would be considered ὅσιος, transgressions of regulations and threats to the sacred property or religious site itself were hardly ever explicitly framed as impieties. More generally, although many extant ritual norms in the epigraphical texts deal with the *who, what, where, when* and *how* of ritual practice, they do not refer to these rules in terms of ὁσιότης. These lexemes occur quite infrequently in fifth- and fourth-century inscriptions. Thus, many more texts could be claimed to concern ἡ ὁσία or τὸ ὅσιον than those that overtly designate rules as such. These observations beg the question of the weight that the terms '(not) ὅσιον' or '(not) ὁσία' were supposed to carry in these ritual norms.

To create a background for studying these questions, we first discussed the usage of *hosios & cognates* when they relate to cult in the literary sources. We investigated the functions of explicitly mentioning what is ὅσιος or ὁσία with respect to ritual practice in these literary sources, and isolated four reasons for doing so. Speakers mention that a particular ritual action is ὁσίη or ὅσιος (1) at the institution of a new cult or the custom in question; (2) when an insider explains a particular cult rule to an outsider; (3) when these notions are used for dramatic characterisation; and (4) to persuade someone of the reasonability and importance of a particular action. We then returned to the

98.32–36 and *LSS* 61.79–81. Thus, Sokolowski saw this inscription as an "advertisement" for a cult in which male worshippers were attracted by the exclusiveness of the ritual and the promise of larger shares of food. If that strategy was successful, these measures would certainly have given a boost to the cult in question and would thus have helped to forge a stronger collective identity for the cult group. The exclusion of women in these inscriptions on the grounds that it displeases the god (not ὁσία or θέμις) may have been part of such self-fashioning of identity of the relevant cult groups. Moreover, the measure would have been more than a mere symbolic marker of contrastiveness: we can imagine that men-only rituals would have given these cults a special atmosphere and uniqueness.

epigraphic sources in order to determine the function of explicitly mentioning that something is (not) ὁσία in the inscriptions in which this term appears.

The context of ritual norms from Rhodes and from Cos, in which a religious disqualification was *added to* another sanction, was studied first. Then we examined inscriptions *without* other explicit sanctions, in which either ξένοι or women were excluded from sanctuaries and/or the ritual activities, on the grounds that their presence or participation was not ὁσία. My conclusion is that employing the religious terms ἀσέβεια and οὐχ ὅσιον / ὁσία in ritual normative texts is an alternative or additional strategy, used occasionally in the classical period. When this strategy is used, the exceptional religious terminology seems to be a marker of the perceived importance of a situation.

When texts that stipulate ritual norms *add* the statement that a transgression is religiously undesirable to the imposition of a fine, it represents a serious attempt to strengthen their persuasive force. Such mechanisms were intended to add to the enforceability of a decree. Moreover, prohibitions in which the explicit formula οὐχ ὁσία / οὐ θέμις occurs, but no fine or other punishment, should not be considered to be 'sanction-free'. Rather, these texts contain a strong implicit sanction: the threat of divine retribution. Just like in the literary sources, the word is used with the intention to persuade and the reasonable expectation of doing so. The rituals described in this chapter sometimes included aspects that seemingly found their explanation in the social, political or practical context of the cult in question. As I have argued, these rules do not deal with trivial details, issues about which the Greeks did not feel the need to enforce them with secular sanctions. On the contrary: by calling the norms ὁσία, they were framed as essential to the relevant god(s) and to the cultic community that identified itself through such norms.

CHAPTER 7

The Semantic Paradox

1 'Sacred', 'Pious' and 'Profane'

In this chapter we will turn to a highly perplexing, alleged semantic characteristic of ὅσιος: the supposition that this term can express two opposite, and mutually exclusive, meanings: 'sacred' and 'profane', besides the core meaning 'pious'. The purported semantic paradox of ὅσιος was firmly established by the end of the 19th century.[1] The literature on this aspect of the semantics of ὅσιος has more recently been determined primarily by Van der Valk, who wrote two articles (1942 & 1951) on the usages of ὅσιος as 'sacred' and 'profane'. These influential articles formed the basis of many persistent modern misconceptions about the semantics of *hosios & cognates*.

Perhaps the best-known example of the supposed usage of ὅσιος as 'profane' involves money: in the fifth century, but more commonly in the fourth, public funds are referred to as ἱερά and ὅσια monies (χρήματα).[2] The former category denotes money that is the property of the gods. Van der Valk considered the second type as 'profane' money, i.e. money which humans could freely use because the gods laid no claim to it.[3] Another classic example occurs in Aristophanes's *Lysistrata*. In this comedy one of the women on strike claims she is about to give birth on the Acropolis (a place that is obviously holy, ἱερός). The woman expresses a wish to go to a ὅσιον χωρίον instead, a 'profane spot' according to Van der Valk.[4] Van der Valk also discusses three Herodotean cases in which he argues that the verb ἀφοσιοῦσθαι is used in the sense of 'freeing oneself of one's religious obligations'.[5] In the best-known passage, Herodotus narrates how every Babylonian woman has sex with a stranger once in her life

1 For example, as Blok 2010:62 points out, Buck 1889 already assumed that the ὅσιον money in IG I^3 253 (the first mention of such money) was 'secular'.

2 e.g. D. 24 e.g. 9, 11, 111, Pl. *Lg*. 857b5, [Arist]. *Ath.Pol.* 30.2.6.

3 Van der Valk 1942:114, 121. The formula ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια is used in other ways in fourth-century literary texts where, according to Van der Valk, the combination expresses a similar contrast.

4 Van der Valk 1942:120: 'ὅσιον steht hier gegenüber ἱερόν und wird synonym mit βέβηλον verwendet'. The other examples of ὅσιος as 'profane' from the classical period, as presented by Van der Valk are: X. *HG* 3.3.1, Hdt. 1.199.4, Hdt. 4.154, Aeschin. 1.23.

5 Van der Valk 1942:119–120.

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to serve Aphrodite. Afterwards, ἀποσιωσαμένη, 'having made herself ὅσιος, free with respect of her duties to the goddess', she can go home.[6]

As Van der Valk argues, ὅσιος was used in an exactly opposite sense, too, meaning 'holy' or 'consecrated', 'dedicated to the gods',[7] for example in the case of the ὅσιοι initiates (μύσται) in Aristophanes's *Frogs*, who are 'consecrated' or 'holy'.[8] A second alleged example of this usage is found in Euripides's *Iphigenia in Tauris*, where a messenger says that priestess Iphigenia 'consecrated' (καθωσιώσατο) a victim to the goddess Artemis.[9]

In his first article (1942), Van der Valk set out to *explain* the relationships in meaning between these apparently contradictory usages of ὅσιος as 'sacred', 'pious' and 'profane'.[10] The semantic link between the purported meanings is that they represent two points on a temporal line of a man's relationship to the gods.[11] Van der Valk argues that the man who is fulfilling his duties towards the gods is ὅσιος in the sense that he is 'pious', but he is also holy (ἱερός), because he is bound to the gods. When the worshipper has fulfilled his obligations towards the gods, he is ὅσιος in a different sense: he is free from the gods, the gods do not have any claims on him. In other words: he is 'profane'.[12] By analogy, objects or places that are ὅσιον are those that are at the free disposal

6 Hdt. 1.199.4.

7 Van der Valk 1942:125–126, e.g. '... fünf Bedeutungssphären ... wobei als merkwürdigste auffiel die Bedeutung nicht-heilig, profan, menschlich. Merkwürdiger jedoch wird der Sachverhalt, wenn wir ersehen, das ὅσιος auch in der entgegengesetzten Bedeutung verwendet wird. Es ist nämlich auffällig aber unanfechtbar, dass ὁσιοῦν mit seinen Komposita nicht nur bedeutet reinmachen, von Befleckung befreien, sondern auch heiligen, weihen und also synonym mit ἱεροῦν u.s.w. ist' (125).

8 Van der Valk 1942:128. Ar. *Ra.* 327, 335.

9 Van der Valk 1942:126. E. *IT* 1320. The other examples for this usage from the classical period given by Van der Valk are: Ar. *Pl.* 661, E. *Cret.* F 472.15 *TrGF*, E. *Ba.* 114, Pl. *Plt.* 363c.

10 In this antonymic pair, 'sacred' means set apart for, dedicated or exclusively appropriated to some religious purpose or a god/ the gods in general. Conversely, 'profane' is everything that does not relate to or is not devoted to gods. What is 'profane' is secular, unconsecrated, lay, civil. NB: in the scholarly discussion about ὅσιος, the term 'profane' is not used in the pejorative sense 'irreverent, blasphemous, impious', which is perhaps the common meaning of this word in modern English.

11 'Points on a temporal line': Maffi's paraphrase (1982:39), not Van der Valk's words.

12 Van der Valk 1942:119–121, e.g. 'ὅσιος ist der Mensch, der alle seine geforderten Pflichten den Göttern gegenüber erfüllt hat oder erfüllen will, an dem die Götter also nichts aussetzen können, einer der *frei ist den Göttern gegenüber*. ... Der ὅσιος [Mensch] hat sich von seinen Pflichten den Göttern gegenüber losgemacht, er ist frei von ihnen, nicht-ἱερός' (119).

of humans: they are 'profane' in the sense that they are not in the possession of the gods or dedicated to them, and accordingly the gods do lay any claim to them.[13] Van der Valk argues that the origin of the alleged meaning 'holy, sacred' lies in the usage of ὅσιος for initiands of special cults. While being ὅσιος always entailed being ritually 'pure', followers of these cults had their own, more stringent criteria of purity. A special purification separated these worshippers from all other people. According to Van der Valk such a purification (ὁσιότης) was at the same time a consecration, and this is how the meaning 'consecrated' arises.[14]

Shortly after the appearance of Van der Valk's article, Jeanmaire reinterpreted the usage of ὁσίη in the Homeric Hymns on the basis of this semantic description of ὅσιος.[15] Jeanmaire's argument was twofold. First, he argued that ὁσίη is a 'rite d'affranchissement' or 'rite de désacralisation' in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, that is, it is a rite that makes someone or something ὅσιος: 'free of obligations towards the gods', 'profane'. Furthermore, Jeanmaire argued that ὁσίη is the *result* of such a rite, namely, the desacralised part of sacrificial meat in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes*. Van der Valk (1951) responded to Jeanmaire's article with some adjustments and a more sophisticated version of Jeanmaire's proposal that suited his own views more closely. He proposed that ὁσίη in the Homeric Hymns refers in some cases to a 'rite de désacralisation', but in other passages describes the opposite, a 'rite sacré/solennel', 'usage religieux'.[16]

In later literature, Van der Valk's 1942/1951 reading of ὅσιος has been widely adopted. The reading 'profane' occurs in authoritative dictionaries,[17] and this view is found in the work of influential scholars of the 20th century, such as

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13 Maffi 1982:38–39 explains how Van der Valk may have arrived at this theory: it may have depended on a mistaken reading of Wilamowitz 1920:42–43 through Latte 1920 p. 55 n. 16.

14 Van der Valk 1942:128–129.

15 Jeanmaire 1945:72–74.

16 According to Van der Valk, this is similar to the way in which the verb ὁσιοῦν could signify 'to make something profane' but also 'to make something sacred' (1942:125).

17 Chantraine 1968–1980:831 mentions this usage; the reading profane also occurs in Montanari, the most important Italian dictionary (s.v. ὅσιος a) and in LSJ, the most important dictionary of Ancient Greek in the English language. According to the new (ninth) edition of LSJ (completed 1940), s.v. ὅσιος I 2 opp. ἱερός is '*permitted* or *not forbidden by divine law, profane, ἱερὰ καὶ ὅ.* things sacred and profane'. The New Supplement added to LSJ in 1996 does not change the 'profane' part, although other additions have been made to the lemma.

Benveniste, Burkert and Parker.[18] Very recent studies, such as an article by Scullion, still confidently embrace the semantic paradox.[19]

However, there are at least three reasons to cast doubt on this semantic paradox. First, if we accept Van der Valk's interpretation of these famous passages, the term ὅσιος expresses both a removal from and an approximation to the divine: ὅσιος means both 'bound to the gods' and 'free from the gods'. There are cross-linguistic examples of words that allegedly mean x and the opposite of x; this phenomenon would be a facet of polysemy and is commonly referred to as auto-antonymy or contranymy.[20] However, even if we accept the existence of such a phenomenon,[21] it is rare—obviously because it is an extremely uneconomic usage of language. Therefore, on linguistic grounds we should *a priori* assume that ὅσιος is not an auto-antonym.[22]

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18 Benveniste 1969:199, Burkert 1985:269–270: '*hosios* is to be understood from its contrast to *hieros*. If the money which belongs to the gods is *hieros*, then all the rest is *hosion*—one may dispose of it. If festival days bring duties and prohibitions, the normal days are *hosiai*. etc. … [in *h.Merc.* 130] *hosios* designates the desacralisation after sacralisation.' Burkert 2011:176: 'wer religiöse Pflichten absolviert hat, ist … *hosios*.' Parker 1996b:123: 'meetings of the assembly had a divided agenda, at which sacred matters (*hiera*) preceded profane (*hosia*)', with n. 9 on 123–124: 'ὅσια are "things which may be freely discussed or disposed of without offense to the gods" (cf. Parker, *Miasma* 330).'

19 Scullion 2005:113: '… the Greeks made both a conceptual and a linguistic distinction between sacred and profane …. Greek … *does* have a vocabulary of the profane. There is first of all the common phrase τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ τὰ ὅσια "sacred matters and secular (or profane) matters" … ὅσια "profane", varies in this polar pairing with ἴδια or δημόσια.'

20 Other terms for the same are: antagonym, Janus word. English examples include adjectives, nouns and verbs. For example, 'bound' can mean 'moving', e.g. 'bound for Amsterdam', but also 'tied up, unable to move'. 'Oversight' is watchful control, but an oversight is something that went unnoticed. The verb 'to sanction' means both 'to authorise, permit' and 'to punish, penalise'; and when putting seeds into a field, one 'seeds' it, but when 'seeding' tomatoes before using them in a salad, one removes the seeds (examples from Herman 2013).

21 Some examples in the previous note are not completely convincing cases of auto-antonymy. If we assume that 'to seed' means 'to do something with seeds', there is no semantic paradox in the verb, although it may refer to dissimilar actions. If someone is 'bound for Amsterdam', he or she is determined to go to Amsterdam, and we could say the person is 'unable to move' from that determination.

22 Rudhardt has also stated that we cannot admit two opposite meanings for ὅσιος and rejects the translation 'profane'. Still, he follows Van der Valk's article (Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:33–34). Mikalson 2010b states that 'the inclination to term the first [i.e. ἱερά] 'sacred' and the second [i.e. ὅσια] 'profane' is counter to all other uses of ὅσια'. However, he also follows Van der Valk's interpretation.

Second, strong objections have been made to Van der Valk's thesis on historical grounds. His interpretation of the opposition between ἱερά and ὅσια rests on literature that takes the distinction between 'sacred' and 'profane' as a fundamental organisational principle of religion. This contrast became firmly established as an organisational principle in religious studies from the early 20th century onwards.[23] Söderblom stated that 'there is no real religion without a distinction between holy and profane'; Durkheim that 'cette division des choses en sacrées et en profanes … on [la] trouve à la base de toutes les religions'.[24] In later scholarship, building on those views, it was proposed that the secularisation and rationalisation of the early *polis* and its laws caused religion to become isolated as a distinct domain. This is how the realm of the 'sacred' (state religion, everything to do with the gods) and the realm of the 'profane' (*polis* government and laws) became separated.[25]

Maffi and Connor are the most important early opponents of Van der Valk's work. Maffi has shown that the reading of ὅσιος as 'sacred' vs. 'profane' rests on a fundamentally mistaken perception of the classical Greek *polis*. According to Maffi, the Greeks saw their world as being permeated or suffused by the divine rather than dividing the world into two opposite realms. There *was* no non-religious or 'profane' sphere.[26] Connor reached the same conclusion.[27] And as Samons put it more recently, 'the modern concept of a "secular" sphere—sanctioned by men but from which the gods are excluded—probably would have seemed to be a ludicrous concept to Athenians of the fifth century.'[28]

Third, in our study of the semantics of ὅσιος, we observed that the sense of 'piety' captured by τὸ ὅσιον entails performing beneficial actions towards gods and fellow humans throughout one's life. This is because ὅσιος evaluates

23 As Bremmer (1998:24–28) explains, we find this contrast first in Smith's 1889 *Lectures on The Religion of the Semites*, with further consolidation of the idea in work by Söderblom and Durkheim (among others), see main text and n. 25 below.

24 Söderblom 1918, lemma 'holiness'; Durkheim 1914:217.

25 Most importantly, Vernant 1962, but he was influenced by a whole field of earlier scholars, such as Gernet 1951:21–119, Gernet 1968:175–260, Busolt, Swoboda & Jandebeur 1920–1926 and Paoli (his views are summarised in Biscardi-Cantarella 1974 [1961]:1–29, 151–169) and Fustel de Coulanges 1864:376. On this literature, cf. Maffi 1982:35–36.

26 In fact, Van der Valk observed in his own work (1942:121) that in the classical Greek world, everything was considered to be permeated by the divine. Maffi 1982:39 already noted this inconsistency in Van der Valk's argument.

27 Connor 1988. I will discuss the views of Maffi 1982 and Connor 1988 in more detail below. I will also explain how these authors interpret the relationship of τὰ ἱερά and τὰ ὅσια.

28 Samons 2000:327. Cf. Bruit-Zaidman & Schmitt-Pantel 1992:92.

the long-term reciprocal relationships with gods and between humans for a select group of themes. For example, gift-giving to gods and being respectful to and caring for one's parents are never-ending actions. ὅσιος (and εὐσεβής) refer to individual actions within these long-term relationships, and it is hard to disconnect the actions from the attitude of humans who are in the pious frame of mind that makes them carry out these continuous obligations (Chapters 3).[29] But it is not possible to 'pay off' all of one's obligations towards the gods or towards humans at any particular moment. People who say of themselves or others that they are ὅσιος do not mean that they are free of the gods, but rather express their action as part of an ongoing relationship with them (Chapter 2).[30] It is therefore difficult to imagine a person who is 'profane' or 'free from the gods'. Moreover, it was argued that the close similarities between ὅσιος and εὐσεβής make a translation of ὅσιος as 'profane' unlikely (Chapter 3).[31]

Thus, we have at least three reasons to assume a different explanation. Indeed, accepting the arguments of Maffi and Connor, many scholars are now convinced that there is no inherent semantic tension in ὅσιος of the type Van der Valk presupposes. Chadwick adequately summarised this view when he stated, 'the meaning *profane* [for ὅσιος] may be safely banished from our lexica'.[32] In this chapter we will revisit this issue in a text-based treatment.

2 Three Famous Cases of the Semantic Paradox

We will start by analysing three passages that have often been quoted as examples of the paradoxical semantics of ὅσιος. In these cases, it is possible to explain the usage of ὅσιος on the basis of prototypical applications of this term elsewhere.

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29 Chapter 3, section 2.7.

30 Chapter 2, section 4.

31 Chapter 3, section 2.7.

32 Chadwick 1996:226. The same view is taken by e.g. Rudhardt 1992 [1958]:36 (although Rudhardt still follows Van der Valk's reading of being 'free from the gods after fulfilling one's obligations towards them' on the same page), Samons 2000 (discussed in main text below), Samons 2004:221 n. 21, 270, Jay-Robert 2009:12, Blok 2009, 2010, 2011, 2014, *forthc.*

2.1 *The Athenian Plague*

In his description of the Athenian plague (430–428 BCE), Thucydides explains how the plague caused a complete disruption of the social order and the neglect of proper burial rituals (2.52.2–4). The author notes that

> νεκροὶ ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις ⟨καὶ⟩[33] ἀποθνῄσκοντες ἔκειντο καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐκαλινδοῦντο καὶ περὶ τὰς κρήνας ἁπάσας ἡμιθνῆτες τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπιθυμίᾳ. τά τε ἱερὰ ἐν οἷς ἐσκήνηντο νεκρῶν πλέα ἦν, αὐτοῦ ἐναποθνῃσκόντων· ὑπερβιαζομένου γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅτι γένωνται, ἐς ὀλιγωρίαν ἐτράποντο καὶ ***ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων*** ὁμοίως. νόμοι τε πάντες ξυνεταράχθησαν οἷς ἐχρῶντο πρότερον περὶ τὰς ταφάς, ἔθαπτον δὲ ὡς ἕκαστος ἐδύνατο.[34]

> corpses and dying men lay on top of one another and half dead men rolled about in the streets and around all the springs, in their desire for water. The sanctuaries in which people were camping were full of the dead, since they died right there. For when the disaster was oppressing them, humans, not knowing what would become of them, turned to contempt of *hiera* and *hosia* alike. All established customs which they had observed before that time with respect to burial were thrown into disorder, and they buried the dead in any way possible.

This is supposedly the first attested text in which the combination of τὰ ἱερά and τὰ ὅσια expresses a contrast between the 'sacred and profane', i.e. religious and non-religious matters. As Mikalson observed well, Thucydides's description reflects 'the depth of the breakdown of the social fabric and of religious practices' during this catastrophe.[35] Correspondingly, the phrase ἐς ὀλιγωρίαν ἐτράποντο καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων has been interpreted by commentators as a general description of the religious and the secular disintegration during the plague. It has been read as having a wide scope, expressing in general terms that, in this moral crisis, humans neglected every prescription, 'divine and humans laws',[36] 'the sacred and the secular/ profane'[37] alike.[38]

33 Gomme 1956.
34 Th. 2.52.2.
35 Mikalson 1984:218.
36 Classen & Steup 1914 [1862], Gomme 1956, ad loc.
37 Eatough 1971:243, Rhodes 1988, Rusten 1989, Hornblower 1991, ad loc.; LSJ s.v. ὅσιος I 2.
38 Connor 1988:167–168.

However, we may also interpret τὰ ἱερὰ and τὰ ὅσια separately, on the basis of the attested ranges of their usage in fifth-century texts. First, τὰ ἱερά are 'the things of the gods'. The expression, interpreted in a broad sense, refers to the collective of festivals and cults for the dead and the gods. Used in this way, τὰ ἱερά comes very close to our term 'religion'.[39] Furthermore, τὰ ἱερά also refers to individual concrete objects, designating those items that humans have offered to the gods by placing them in a sacred area (consecrating them by that act). τὰ ἱερά is also the plural of τὸ ἱερόν, and as such refers to 'sanctuaries'. I suggest that τὰ ἱερά is used in this sense here. By leaving the corpses in the temples, the Athenians definitely showed a 'contempt' (ὀλιγωρία) for the 'sanctuaries' (τὰ ἱερά). Birth and death in sacred areas were impieties because they caused a pollution (μίασμα) in the holy place.[40]

Moreover, by failing to perform the usual customs (νόμοι), here with respect to burial,[41] the Athenians neglected τὰ ὅσια. As we have seen in Chapter 2, the care for the dead—both during the funeral and by the rites performed for them regularly afterwards—was frequently evaluated in terms of *hosios & cognates*.[42] Thucydides states that people did not only fail to observe the ritual norms for their own relatives, they also interfered with other people's funerals by stealing the wood of their funeral pyres or heaping their own friends' bodies on top.[43] Thus, there is an explanation of ὅσια in the immediate context. People showed contempt of τὰ ὅσια by demonstrating a complete disrespect towards the dead and the established customs surrounding their burial and posthumous worship.

Read in this way, the combination ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια can be understood on the basis of the semantic knowledge we already have on these terms individually. We may interpret it as saying, 'people turned to equal contempt of sanctuaries and the care due to the dead'. It is not necessary to read a contrast between 'the sacred and the profane' into this passage.

39 Parker 2005a:61, Rudhardt 2008:132.

40 Cf. Parker 1984:33 n. 5. Moulinier 1952:205–212.

41 On the usage of the plural οἱ νόμοι as 'religious customs', cf. Rudhardt 2008:49–57.

42 Chapter 2, sections 1.6 and 1.7.

43 After the passage quoted, Thucydides explains how desperate people, 'lacking any friends still alive' (who could have helped them organise a proper burial, Rhodes 1988, ad loc.) turned to 'shameless funeral modes' (ἐς ἀναισχύντους θήκας), throwing their own dead on somebody else's prepared funeral pyre and lighting it or simply dumping the corpse in their care on someone else's already burning pyre.

2.2 *The Horse Ritual at Onchestus*

The interpretation 'profane' has also been given to an instance of ὁσίη in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* (l. 237). Since this passage has given rise to much debate, we will discuss it at some length here. The term ὁσίη occurs in the context of Apollo's search for a place to establish his cult. Before finally settling on Delphi, the god passes through the sanctuary of Poseidon at Onchestus. This well-known sanctuary lay on an elevation (ἐν ὕψει κείμενος) west of Thebes.[44] Here the poet describes, in a short digression, an enigmatic ritual, centring around horses and chariots:

ἔνθεν δὲ προτέρω ἔκιες ἑκατηβόλ' Ἄπολλον,
Ὀγχηστὸν δ' ἷξες Ποσιδήϊον ἀγλαὸν ἄλσος
ἔνθα νεοδμὴς πῶλος ἀναπνέει ἀχθόμενός περ
ἕλκων ἅρματα καλά, χαμαὶ δ' ἐλατὴρ ἀγαθός περ
ἐκ δίφροιο θορὼν ὁδὸν ἔρχεται· οἱ δὲ τέως μὲν
κείν' ὄχεα κροτέουσιν ἀνακτορίην ἀφιέντες.
εἰ δέ κεν ἅρματ' ἀγῇσιν[45] ἐν ἄλσεϊ δενδρήεντι,
ἵππους μὲν κομέουσι, τὰ δὲ κλίναντες ἐῶσιν·
ὣς γὰρ τὰ πρώτισθ' *ὁσίη* γένεθ'· οἱ δὲ ἄνακτι
εὔχονται, δίφρον δὲ θεοῦ τότε μοῖρα φυλάσσειν.[46]

From there you went further, far-shooting Apollo,
and came to Onchestus, Poseidon's splendid grove,
where the newly-yoked foal catches his breath, though he still has to work,
drawing the beautiful chariot. And the charioteer, though an excellent driver,
jumps down from the chariot on to the ground and goes his way.

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44 Str. 9.2.33.3. The sanctuary was situated on what is now called the Sténi Pass, which crosses a ridge separating two plains (Lake Copais on the west from the Teneric Plain on the east), and the temple was on the top of the ridge itself. Early literary references to this sanctuary at Onchestus: *Il.* 2.506, Hes. fr. 219, *h.Merc.* 185–187, Alc. fr. 7 (Edmonds 1963), Pi. *I.* 1.33, 4.21.

45 The manuscripts read ἄγησιν 'lead into' (Homeric form of the subjunctive); Barnes proposed the emendation ἄγωσιν. These readings are unlikely for reasons discussed below. I follow Cobet's emendation ἀγῇσιν 'break'.

46 The manuscripts read φυλάσσει, Roux 1964:18 emends this form to φυλάσσειν. The suggestion to add a final ν to φυλάσσειν makes the sentence more understandable. μοῖρα in the sense of 'lot' > 'appointed task': see LSJ s.v. μοῖρα II 2. This usage of μοῖρα occurs for example in A. *Eu.* 173, 476 for the Eumenides' task to pursue matricides.

Meanwhile,
they (i.e. the horses)[47] make the empty chariot rattle, being rid of guidance.
If the vehicle breaks in the tree-filled grove,
they take care of the horses, but prop the chariot and leave it.
This is how it was *hosiê* from the very beginning. They pray
to the Master, and then the protection of the vehicle falls to the god's lot.

It is clear that ὁσίη refers to some kind of prescribed ritual action, but the nature of that ritual action and thus the interpretation of ὁσίη is rather elusive. Three main kinds of explanations have been offered in the literature.

First, Sokolowski 1960 has argued that the actions reflect a *lex sacra* regulating the traffic in the grove of Poseidon's sanctuary. The expression 'not ὁσίη' is a religiously motivated prohibition, as in a group of inscriptions that dictate ritual norms by stating what is 'not ὁσίη' and especially discuss entrance into the sanctary.[48] According to Sokolowski, the grove would have been a pedestrian area, where chariots were not allowed.[49] The passage describes how normally a charioteer arriving at the grove would jump down from his car and proceed on foot (232–233), parking the chariot somewhere around the entrance (234).[50] However, if a charioteer broke this rule by taking the chariot inside (235),[51] there was a penalty. The transgressor had to dedicate the chariot to the god and leave it inside the sanctuary (236–238).[52] We can imagine an inscription expressing

47 We can tell that οἱ δέ (l. 233) are the horses, because a similar formula occurs twice in Homer's *Iliad*, in situations in which a charioteer falls from his chariot during battle (or multiple charioteers do), and then the horses are said to rattle the empty chariot along: πολλοὶ … ἵπποι | κείν'ὄχεα κροτάλιζον, *Il.* 11.159–160; οἱ ἵπποι | κείν'ὄχεα κροτέοντες, *Il.* 15.452–453. This reading is widely agreed upon by commentators, e.g. Jeanmaire 1945:75, Roux 1964:7, Schachter 1976:112, Richardson 2010:75.

48 This usage of ὁσίη is discussed at length in Chapter 6, section 6.

49 Sokolowski compares this supposed regulation to other inscriptions, namely those in which the presence of animals in sanctuaries was regulated because they caused damage to the environment of the sanctuary (cf. Chapter 6, section 1, n. 11). The entrance of chariots and horses into the grove of Poseidon would impede traffic, bother pedestrians and damage the greenery (1960:378–379).

50 Sokolowski 1960:380 argues that the rattling sound (when the horses κείν' ὄχεα κροτέουσιν) does not necessarily refer to a fast motion, but 'emphasizes rather the emptiness of the car'.

51 Sokolowski accepts Barnes's emendation ἀγῶσιν in l. 235.

52 Such a penalty is in line with regulations that appear in other inscriptions, where objects,

this rule being placed at the entrance: 'It is not ὁσίη to bring in chariots. Let the one who brings in a vehicle anyway leave it in the sanctuary as a payment to the god.'

This interpretation depends on a problematic reading of key aspects of the text. First of all, Sokolowski's interpretation depends on Barnes's emendation ἀγῶσιν 'lead into' for ἀγῆσιν 'break' in l. 235.[53] This textual suggestion is very awkward with the following ἐν ἄλσει, for we would expect ἄγω εἰς + accusative, not ἄγω ἐν + dative.[54] Second, the interpretation depends on taking φυλάσσω (l. 238) as 'keep': the god is said to keep the chariot (as a penalty).[55] However, as Roux showed, φυλάσσω in Homer and the Homeric Hymns never means 'to keep for oneself, to appropriate', but always something like 'to guard, protect'.[56] The verb ἐῶσιν in 236 does not help either: ἐάω means 'to leave something alone', either temporarily or permanently (out of some disinterest), but not necessarily to *give* it (as a present, as a compensation) to someone else.[57] All in all, it is unlikely that the text intends to convey the meaning that the chariot is left to the god as a gift/payment (ἐῶσιν, 236), who then keeps it for himself (φυλάσσειν, 238). Moreover, there does not seem to be any evidence for sanctuaries barring *chariots*.[58]

In the second interpretation, Schachter maintains that ὁσίη does not refer to the described actions, but only to the prayer itself, i.e. the phrase οἱ δὲ

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which are not allowed to be taken into the sanctuary but are brought in anyway, are confiscated and dedicated to the god (Sokolowski 1960:379).

53 Other interpreters depending on this emendation are: Böttiger (in Matthiae 1800), Bouché-LeClercq 1880:367–369 and Peppmüller 1894.

54 LSJ s.v. ἄγω I a; Schachter 1976:108. Sokolowski rightly dismisses the unlikely alternative, taking ἐν ἄλσει with the next phrase ἵππους μὲν κομέουσι.

55 Other interpreters who depend on reading φυλάσσω as 'to keep for oneself, to appropriate' are Allen & Sikes 1904:97; Allen, Halliday & Sikes 1936, Jeanmaire 1945, Van der Valk 1951 and Richardson 2010.

56 Roux 1964:19–20.

57 Roux 1964:16–18.

58 Dillon 1997:123 mentions that vehicles usually had to be left outside sanctuaries, but the only evidence he quotes for this type of rule, besides Sokolowski's interpretation of this passage in the *Hymn to Apollo*, is one first-century-BCE law from Eleusis (Oliver 1941, no. 31 ll. 37–40). These lines are rather fragmentary, but may convey such a message in 38–39, if we accept the restoration: κ̣[αταβ]αίνε[ι]ν̣ ἀπὸ τῶν [ὀχ]ημάτων [καὶ πεζῇ] | [ἄγεσθαι]. The motivation proposed by Oliver for this part of the restoration is 'common sense': 'Many of the restorations proposed in other passages of the inscription occur to one naturally enough when the extant letters are correctly read' (71).

ἄνακτι εὔχονται (l. 237–238).[59] The digression in 231–237 mainly describes the journey of an ordinary traveller (the sanctuary being on a main route from Delphi to Thebes).[60] In order to help his newly yoked and inexperienced horse with the ascent to the sanctuary, the charioteer jumps down from the chariot before they reach the summit (231–233). The chariot without a driver is slightly unstable as a result (234). Should the cart be overthrown (235), the charioteer should try and calm the horse first, then set the chariot straight (236). Because Poseidon is the patron of horses, such an accident on his premises would be particularly awkward, and be taken as a bad omen. So, it was ὁσίη, the religious custom, to pray to the god to avert the omen and protect the chariot later on (237–238).[61]

This interpretation cannot be correct, because ll. 232 onwards refer to what happens *at* (ἔνθα, l. 231) the sanctuary on top of the hill, *after* the ascent. The verb ἀναπνέει (l. 231) refers to the horse *recovering* his breath after climbing up (although he is still working hard, still drawing the wagon, 231–232); only then does the charioteer jump down from the chariot: this fact is presented as a new action (δ', l. 232, with a new main verb ἔρχεται). But if the charioteer does not jump down before the summit (to help the horse), and is not incompetent either (he is an excellent charioteer, ἀγαθός περ, l. 232), we must assume that the horse traversing the wood without a charioteer is a goal in itself. If so, it is probably part of the ὁσίη, the custom described. Under normal circumstances, in fact, it was not unusual for a horseman to jump down to help a horse make a steep ascent.[62]

Moreover, taking ὁσίη to refer only to the prayer, while the rest of the description refers to ordinary travelling, seems rather too minimalistic. Praying to a god after an awkward accident had happened on his premises involving the animals of which he was the patron would have been common sense to any Greek. By contrast, in our oldest (Homeric) evidence, ὁσίη referred to two of the most essential ethical-religious rules of the community (how to deal with supplication and the dead). Given the amount of space devoted to this digression and the emphasis on the antiquity of the rule (l. 237), it seems more likely that ὁσίη referred to some special ritual or custom rather than, as Schachter argues, a 'quick prayer on the road' (my paraphrase).

According to the third line of explanation, ὁσίη refers to all the actions mentioned in 231–238 and describes an elaborate *religious rite or ritual* specific

59 Schachter 1976.

60 Richardson 2010:117.

61 Schachter 1976:113.

62 x. *Eq.* 6.6.

to the cult of Poseidon. Various scholars have argued that the rite is a test to see how Poseidon felt about the horse being broken and subjected to the yoke. Since Poseidon was the god of horses, he could be offended by this. Allen & Sikes argued that the rite was performed to ascertain the god's decision.[63] If the horses drew the chariot through the sanctuary without causing an accident, it was a sign of the god's approval and they could remain yoked; conversely, if the chariot broke, it was a sign of the god's displeasure. In such a case, Poseidon claimed the chariot as a tribute; the horses could be kept by the charioteer, but not remain yoked.[64] Jeanmaire follows these interpretations, stressing that breaking horses means they are transferred to the sphere of human activity: τὸ ὅσιον.[65] According to him, the ritual is a rite of de-sacralisation: its goal is to make the horse ὅσιος, or 'profane'.[66]

This interpretation depends on a problematic reading of key aspects of the description. For the reasons discussed above, it is unlikely that the text intends to convey the meaning that the chariot is left to the god as a gift/payment (ἐῶσιν, 236), who then keeps it for himself (φυλάσσειν, 238). Van der Valk presented a more general critique of Allen & Sikes's and Jeanmaire's hypothesis that the ritual was connected to the breaking of horses. He rightly objected that the ritual makes no sense from a practical perspective: it would simply be far too expensive to jeopardise a chariot any time one wanted to break a young horse.[67] Moreover, Jeanmaire's assumption that this ritual (ὁσίη) is intended to make the *object* of the ritual, the newly yoked horse, ὅσιος (in which ὅσιος is 'profane, free for human usage, desacralised') would make this case of *hosios & cognates* a semantic outlier. In the examples discussed in this book, *agents*, the persons who carry out a religious ritual (observing ὁσίη) are ὅσιος, because ὁσίη is something humans must do in order to honour the gods. But it is not the case that the *objects* of a ritual *become* ὅσιος *as the result of humans carrying out the ritual*. It is not necessary to interpret the passage in such a way, either. We may simply say that ὁσίη here, as elsewhere, refers to a ritual. As we have seen,

63 Allen & Sikes 1904:97.

64 An alternative suggestion was made by Peppmüller (1894). This scholar accepted Barnes's emendation ἀγῶσιν and proposed that horses wanting to show their unwillingness to being yoked went into the sacred wood, found asylum there and remained the property of the god, having been freed of their obligation to serve. There is no good reason to assume that the horses remained in the sanctuary as the god's property.

65 Jeanmaire 1945:75–77. Note that Allen, Halliday & Sikes retracted this hypothesis in their later edition of this hymn (1936).

66 Jeanmaire 1945:77.

67 Van der Valk 1951:419–421.

ὁσίη, like ὅσιος, evaluates what humans must do in order to please the gods. The noun sometimes formalises this notion and then refers to a 'religious rite'.

Finally, let us briefly discuss the possible content of the ritual. According to Van der Valk, a charioteer traversing the sanctuary follows ὁσίη (behaves in a manner that is ὅσιος, pays Poseidon due respect) by handing over the reigns of a newly yoked horse to his 'old master' for the duration of the horse's stay in Poseidon's territory.[68] This cannot be the case. Although the idea that the god sits on a horse without a driver and conducts it (invisibly) is attested elsewhere,[69] the point of this passage is obviously *not* the transfer of the reins to Poseidon to let him guide the animal. On the contrary: the passage stresses the fact that the wagon is out of control, emphasizing that the animal rattles the wagon along, being rid of guidance (ἀνακτορίην ἀφιέντες, 234). It is unlikely that the ritual would target ordinary travelers with young horses entering Poseidon's sanctuary. This sanctuary would be a rather unpleasant and unsafe place to be in if one could expect to encounter young horses running around with rattling chariots and no driver at any time.[70]

It is more likely that the procedure relates to a special ritual performed during limited and pre-set timeslots. The snippets of secure information we have (the ritual is centred upon young and newly yoked horses and was connected to the nature of Poseidon, god of horses and associated with taming and training them)[71] lead to one hypothesis: that this was a ritual intended to round off the training of a young horse. Roux plausibly argued that the ritual relates somehow to the completion of the training of those young horses

68 Under this interpretation, a newly yoked horse has not completely transferred to the human sphere, and the ritual is a matter of the driver showing respect to the god. When in the wood of Poseidon, the newly yoked horse will not accept the authority of anyone except for that of his old master, i.e. the god. And so the charioteer steps down from the chariot, while it is the god who conducts the wagon through the woods. Should the chariot break, it means Poseidon intends to keep it.

69 Tac. *Ann.* 12.13 describes an Iranian ritual in a grove belonging to Heracles, in which priests are instructed by Heracles to equip horses for a nightly chase. On the instruction of the god, the horses are placed near the temple of Heracles. They scour the forest during the night, killing many animals with arrows, and return with empty quivers. Bernard (1980:323) has argued that the god is the one who rides on and guides the animals during this ritual.

70 Moreover, taking up Van der Valk's own point (main text above) about costs: it seems equally uneconomic to have a rule that entails putting a chariot at risk on every occasion anyone wanted to travel through this sanctuary with a newly yoked horse.

71 The god is called Ἵππιος 'of the horse' (A. *Th.* 130, Ar. *Eq.* 551, *Nu.* 83). Among his other epithets is Δαμαῖος 'the horse-tamer' (Pi. *O.* 13.69).

that would be used in the military (on the surrounding Boeotian fields).[72] On the battlefield, a horse might encounter a situation in which it has to proceed alone, without its charioteer, if the charioteer is killed or thrown off the chariot. If a horse was properly trained, it should be able to pull the empty chariot without breaking it; if not, it meant that the horse was not ready. If we follow this interpretation, the ὁσίη may have been as follows: 1. The animal must make the ascent with chariot and charioteer (i.e. to see if it is strong enough); 2. In the woods, it must pull the chariot without a driver. The god Poseidon oversees the ritual, and this is a rite in honour of him, the god being concerned with the breaking and training of horses. But the law also described *practical* aspects of the ritual: 3. Should the vehicle break,[73] one should calm down the horses first, prop up the chariot against the wall and pray to the god, so it will be his task to protect this chariot in the future. ὁσίη most probably refers to such a ritual, and has nothing to do with the sphere of the 'profane'.[74]

72 Roux 1964:6–22 (followed by Jay-Robert 1999:16–19 and Teffeteller 2001).

73 The verb ἄγνυμι indicates that it is somehow broken, not that it has simply fallen over.

74 Other interpretations are less plausible. Böttiger (in a letter quoted in Matthiae 1800:157–159) and Bouché-LeClercq (1879:150, 1880:367–369) assumed some kind of divination procedure or oracular practice. The interpretation depends on accepting Barnes's emendation ἄγωσιν 'lead into' for ἀγῇσιν 'break' in l. 235. The idea is that, if the horse goes into the ἄλσος, this is to be considered a favourable omen. There are no textual signals or other compelling reasons to follow this interpretation. Nor is there enough textual ground for supposing that the ritual has to do with the dedication of a chariot by the winner of a race (Allan, Halliday and Sikes 1936:236; the interpretation builds on the more general proposal of Nilsson 1906:70 who thinks the purpose of the ritual was to see whether the offering of a chariot was acceptable to Poseidon or not). Moreover, even if we assume that the ritual centres on the chariot and is really about the dedication of a chariot, why would the god receive a *broken* one? Finally, Teffeteller (2001:165–166) suggested that the passage perhaps reflects a Near Eastern religious ritual in the context of the Babylonian New Year's festival (the Akîtu festival). During this festival, in an episode called 'Marduk's ordeal', a chariot went to the temple of the god without a driver, and 'rocked about'. This proposal is in need of elaboration to gain credibility. What is the relationship between a static chariot in the Babylonian temple and the horses pulling a chariot through the Greek grove? What is the point of the Babylonian ritual, and how could it relate to the aim of the rite at Onchestus? What is the significance of the main correspondence between the two cases—the uncontrolled movement of the chariots, 'rocking about' in the one case, being 'rattled' in the other?

2.3 *A ‘Profane Spot’ to Give Birth*

A more straightforward interpretation may be provided for Aristophanes’s *Lysistrata* 743 without difficulty. The scene in which ὅσιος occurs is set halfway through this play, when various women involved in a strike on the Athenian Acropolis are fed up with the strike and start coming up with excuses to go back home to their husbands. One of these women pretends she is pregnant[75] and exclaims:

742 Γυ. ὦ πότνι’ Ἰλείθυ’, ἐπίσχες τοῦ τόκου
ἕως ἂν εἰς *ὅσιον* μόλω ’γὼ χωρίον.[76]

Wom. Reverend Eileithyia, hold back the child,
until I get to a *hosion* place.

Giving birth to a child on sacred ground (such as the Acropolis) is one of the most important taboos in Greek religion.[77] The term ὅσιος in this example obviously refers to this panhellenic idea, but precisely how should we interpret it? According to Van der Valk, ‘ὅσιον steht hier gegenüber ἱερόν und wird synonym mit βέβηλον verwendet … das ὅσιον χωρίον … ist … eine Stelle, worauf die Götter kein Anrecht haben, die nicht ihrer Weihe unterworfen ist, und nicht zu ihrem besonderen Eigentum gehört.’ Thus, he claims that the ὅσιον χωρίον is a spot to which the gods can lay no claim, it is ‘profane’, allowed to be trodden (βέβηλον). By extension, if a person does anything on this spot, this person is ‘free from obligations towards the gods’ with respect to his activities there: ‘Man kann es daher gewissermassen eine *menschliche* Stelle nennen, worüber die Menschen verfügen können.’[78]

It is questionable whether taking ὅσιον as a characteristic of χωρίον, part of Van der Valk’s reading, is an optimal interpretation of this passage. As I have shown in Chapter 2, ὅσιος is in the large majority of cases an evaluative rather than a descriptive term, dealing with moral issues and expressing a

75 The woman is not really pregnant, as the surprised reaction of someone on the scene—‘What nonsense are you talking? … You weren’t pregnant yesterday!’ (744–745)—clearly shows.

76 Ar. *Lys*. 742–743.

77 Bremmer 1994:71, Parker 1996a [1983]:33.

78 Van der Valk 1942:120. The interpretation of the ὅσιον χωρίον (in Aristophanes’s *Lysistrata*) as βέβηλον goes back to a comment in the Suda (s.v. ὅσιον χωρίον, Adler 688), which refers to this passage and states that such a place is: τὸ βέβηλον καὶ μὴ ἱερόν.

qualification of a human being or his behaviour.[79] In an argument based on the semantic similarity between ὅσιος and εὐσεβής in Chapter 3, I proposed that the adjective ὅσιος *semantically* refers to the person involved in the action (through metaphorical usage) in those cases in which it *syntactically* qualifies an object.[80] It was also shown in Chapter 2 that in the cases in which the nouns τὸ ὅσιον or ἡ ὁσία refer to cultic matters, they usually refer to how humans must behave, what they must do. The statement that '{activity X} is ὅσιον' means that 'the worshipper must do X (at a certain place, at a certain time …)'.[81] Given these characteristics of ὅσιος and ὁσία, I believe it is most likely that 'a ὅσιον χωρίον (to bear a child)' is 'a place where it is ὅσιον for the worshipper (to give birth)'.[82] Thus, ὅσιον does not semantically qualify χωρίον, and the passage implies no geographical contrast between two types of places, 'sacred' and 'non-sacred'/'profane'.[83]

A close parallel to the above passage also suggests that ὅσιον refers to the desirable conduct of the allegedly pregnant woman finding herself in these particular circumstances, rather than describing an inherent quality of the χωρίον. In Sophocles's *Oedipus at Colonus* 189, the term εὐσέβεια is used with respect to a similar acknowledgement of a spatial restriction in Greek religion, in this case: the all-out inaccessibility of certain sanctuaries. This is a useful parallel because, as I have shown in Chapter 3 for ὅσιος vs. εὐσεβής, these two

79 Chapter 2, section 1.3.

80 Chapter 3, section 2.7.

81 Chapter 2, sections 1.3 and 1.7.

82 In fact, Van der Valk already correctly characterised the ὅσιον χωρίον as a place 'wo ihnen freisteht (ὅσιον ist), was im ἱερόν verboten ist' (1942:120), but this description occurs as an unconnected element within a larger interpretation that in my view as a whole does not work.

83 Latte 1920:55 n. 16 translated a *horos* inscription (*IG* IX, 1 700, from Corcyra, text: ὄρβος ἰαροῦ καὶ ὁσίου) as the (geographical) 'boundary between *hieron* and *hosion*' in which *hieron* = *sacred* and *hosion* = profane. However, as Blok *forthc.* argues, this interpretation is wrong because this is not an expression of two opposite and mutually exclusive categories of land: 'in *horos*-inscriptions καί normally is not used to distinguish two items, but to join them as property marked by the *horos*, e.g. *IG* II^2 2657, 2679, 2724, *SEG* 44.82: the *horos* of houses and (καί) lands, etc. and 2747: the *horos* of a workshop and (καί) slaves. On this evidence, the *horos* in Corcyra marks both *hieros* and *hosios* properties off from other territory/property.' Thus, this *horos* inscription is not valid evidence for *hieros* and *hosios* separating two different geographical spaces, one called *hieros* and one called *hosios*. Instead, *hieron* and *hosion* together define the community when these terms refer to everything that is consecrated to the gods (*to hieron*) and everything its members do to please the gods (*to hosion*). Cp. my discussion in section 3 of this chapter.

terms have almost exactly the same semantic scope and can be expected to be used similarly in similar passages. In this Sophoclean passage, Oedipus has just found out that he is sitting in the holy grove of the Eumenides, which no one is allowed to enter,[84] and he needs to move elsewhere. Oedipus tells Antigone:

> Οι. ἄγε νυν σύ με, παῖς,
> ἵν' ἂν ***εὐσεβίας*** ἐπιβαίνοντες
> τὸ μὲν εἴποιμεν, τὸ δ' ἀκούσαιμεν[85]
>
> Oe. Now lead me child,
> to a place where we, setting foot on piety,
> may speak and listen.

Telling Antigone to lead him out of the untrodden grove and bring them to a place where they can 'set foot on piety' (εὐσεβίας ἐπιβαίνειν), Oedipus obviously means that he wants her to find a spot where they will be εὐσεβής, where their presence is in accordance with εὐσέβεια.[86] Since the term εὐσέβεια is unequivocally a description of a human attitude, and not a characteristic of objects,[87] we cannot interpret Oedipus's expression in any other way. Because of the semantic similarity of ὅσιος and εὐσεβής, it seems to me that we should interpret ὅσιον in the Lysistrata passage as a description of a human attitude, too. Thus, the 'pregnant' lady argues that, being aware of the spatial restriction on childbirth, she wants to go to a place where the restriction does not apply. The utterance of the woman, 'I want to go to a ὅσιον χώριον' means 'I want to go to a place where my presence is ὅσιον, i.e. where, by respecting the rules about places where childbirth is (not) permitted, I can follow ὁσία, the religious custom (and, consequently, behave in a way that is ὅσιος)'. This interpretation is much more in line with the rest of our data than assuming ὅσιον means 'profane'.[88]

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84 The grove is 'not to be trodden' (ἀστιβής, 120 and ἄβατος,167).

85 S. *OC*. 188–190.

86 Indeed, the scholia explain the phrase: 'wherever treading in a way that is pious' (ὅπου ἄν εὐσεβῶς πατοῦντες).

87 The semantics of the combination εὐ-σεβ (εὖ + σέβομαι 'I fearfully respect, venerate') itself entails this. Cf. my discussion on εὐσεβεία in Chapter 3, section 1.

88 Blok *forthc.* comments more extensively on another passage in which a place is called ὅσιον. This passage lends itself to an interpretation similar to our reading of Ar. *Lys*. In the lemma ὅσιον χωρίον of the Suda (referring to Ar. *Lys*. 743, cf. n. 78 above), it is stated that 'the Dionysion is also said [to be a ὅσιον χωρίον]'. Blok argues that this comment probably

This is also a case of persuasive language usage, as we have seen on various occasions. By framing her intended flight from the Acropolis in this way, the 'pregnant' lady in Aristophanes's *Lysistrata* intends to make a rhetorically stronger claim than her colleagues. In the lines directly preceding her speech, the other women did not successfully convey any sense of urgency with pragmatic excuses about wool and flax that needed to be taken care of.[89] By contrast, the 'pregnant' woman's flight, as she herself argues (by claiming it is ὅσιον) is not only urgent, but essential to her religious wellbeing and, indeed, that of the whole *polis*. She implies that giving birth on the Acropolis would occasion a ritual pollution and so disturb the *polis*'s relationship with the gods. In short, presenting her act as ὅσιος is an act of framing and an attempt to lend a special weight and dignity to it.

3 The Semantic Paradox in the Set Phrase ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια

Moving on to a more difficult group of cases, the 'profane' meaning of ὅσιος supposedly occurs most frequently in the set combination (τὰ) ἱερὰ καὶ (τὰ) ὅσια, for example in the reference to ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια χρήματα.[90] This is also the

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refers to the sanctuary of Dionysus in Limnais, and the usage of ὅσιος for this sanctuary is in line with our general interpretation of this term: 'On the second day of the Anthesteria (Choes), the only day every year when entrance into this sanctuary was allowed, a part of the *hieros gamos* of the Basilinna with the god took place there, in accordance with a *lex sacra* kept in the sanctuary. On this occasion, then, the sanctuary was the scene of actions normally not allowed in a *hieron*, but they were allowed on this single day as part of the ritual program of the festival. The Dionysion, therefore, although normally *hieros* (of the god), was used once a year by humans in an exceptional way that *was part of a ritual and followed the rules of this ritual laid down in* (*sacred*) *law*.'

89 Ar. *Lys*. 731–741.

90 'ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια' as a set combination occurs most frequently from the fourth century onwards, but was part of fifth-century discourse. The phrase occurs in two literary texts, besides Th. 2.52 discussed in section 2.1 above. In Antiphon 5, the speaker Euxitheus argues it is not likely that his friend Lycinus paid him to murder Herodes. Lycinus would have brought a legal charge against Herodes instead, rather than ordering this homicide that he knew would lead to Euxitheus's exile and to Lycinus being robbed 'of ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια and all other things that are most significant and important to humans' (Antipho 5.62). Moreover, just after the turn of the century, the phrase occurs in Lysias 30.25 where Nicomachus, an official who had been appointed to make modifications in the law, is accused because although 'he became ἀναγραφεύς of ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια, he made mistakes in the case of both'. The set combination ἱερά καὶ ὅσια may have occurred elsewhere. Pericles's citizenship law

type of usage on which most literature about the semantic paradox has focused. It has been convincingly argued by Maffi, Connor, Samons and Blok that these paired terms in fact do not express an opposition between 'sacred' and 'profane'. The explanation given by them is in line with my conclusion in Chapter 3 that ὅσιος, when used for objects, in fact refers to the piety of humans using these objects.[91] In these cases ὅσιος is used as a persuasive evaluative term, to strengthen an appeal (e.g. Chapter 6). I will discuss the usage of ὅσια χρήματα in the light of these findings.

Maffi argued that τὰ ἱερά and τὰ ὅσια combined in the same expression probably represented not two *opposite* but two *coordinated* realms, expressing two levels of sacrality.[92] According to him, τὰ ἱερά were possessions of the gods or things dedicated to them,[93] whereas τὰ ὅσια were institutions, buildings, objects or values, which the *polis* chose to present as having a divine sanction.[94] By doing so, the classical *polis* established a conscious integration of the sacred in its institutions and ideological machinery.[95] Thus, in Maffi's view, designating things as ὅσιος was a rhetorical move, for by doing so, the *polis* bestowed a

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may have stated that 'no male or female bastard has any claim based on kinship to ἱερά καὶ ὅσια as of the archonship of Eucleides (403/2)', as Is. 6.47, [Dem.] 47.51 tell us (cf. Blok 2009a). We cannot be certain that this phrase was part of the original law, for the text of the original decree is lost. Moreover, in the fifth-century wording of the Ephebic Oath, adolescent males may have sworn to fight 'in defence of *hiera* and *hosia*'. The ephebic oath was transmitted in a fourth-century inscription (SEG 21.519, *RO* 88), but its phraseology may predate that period by a long time, cf. Chapter 1, section 2 n. 72.

91 Chapter 3, section 2.7.

92 51: 'Anche in ambito pubblicistico *hosios* non significa dunque profano, non delimita la sfera del sacro identificata senza residui nello *hieron*; ciò che è definito *hosion* si colloca anch'esso in ambito sacrale.' 52: 'Ho sostenuto nel corso di questo studio: a) che *hieros* e *hosios* non costituiscano nel diritto e nell'ideologia dell'Atene classica una coppia di nozioni opposte bensì coordinate; b. che la sfera del sacro, articolata in questi due livelli, è stata resa dalla *polis* funzionale alla propria organizzazione pubblica e privata.' Note that the dictionary by Bailly 2000 [1894] s.v. ὅσιος I seems to express a similar view: '*en parl. de choses*: … p. opp. à ἱερός, pour désigner des choses humaines, mais toutefois consacrées et permises par la coutume, ἱερός au contr. désignant des choses divines.'

93 This interpretation of τὰ ἱερά is uncontroversial, cf. section 2.1 of this chapter.

94 34: 'essa [= la *polis*] si attribuisce addirittura un autonomo potere religioso che utilizza … per rafforzare la coesione delle proprie istituzioni pubbliche e private che vengono così proiettate tendenzialmente in blocco nella sfera dell'ordine divino (*hosion*).'

95 34: 'la *polis* ateniese, lungi dal respingere la sfera sacrale … realizza una integrazione di essa nell'ambito dell'amministrazione pubblica più propriamente ⟨⟨ politica ⟩⟩ … non si tratti tanto di esorcizzare residui irrazionali quanto piuttosto di una consapevole integrazione delle forze sopranaturali nell'edificio della *polis* stessa.'

special religious dignity on them.[96] Such acts of what we may call 'framing' were especially useful for activities or things that were not otherwise governed under the jurisdiction of the *polis*.[97] In this way, the *polis* made the sacred functional to the organisation of the *polis* itself.[98] One might say that Maffi attributed the 'pregnant' lady's rhetorical strategy in Aristophanes's *Lysistrata* (discussed above) to the Athenian *polis* at large.

Connor, apparently unaware of Maffi's work, likewise established that τὰ ἱερά and τὰ ὅσια expressed parallel and co-ordinate realms,[99] drawing a distinction between 'specifically sacred things, especially sacrifices and offerings to the gods (τὰ ἱερά)' and 'those of great importance to the order of society and the favour of the gods but not specifically sacral (τὰ ὅσια)'.[100] Together, τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ τὰ ὅσια encompassed anything essential in *polis* life and sometimes became a general expression for all those things that were most important in a man's life. But Connor is at times inexact, for example when he refers vaguely to τὸ ὅσιον as 'the other realm',[101] and he does not abandon the notion of a 'secular' or 'civil' realm, even though his argumentation implies such a conclusion. Moreover, Maffi made an important point Connor did not make, emphasizing that designating things as ὅσιος was an act of framing (though he does not call it framing): labelling things ὅσιος is to communicate that the gods find them important.

Samons and Blok reached the same conclusion as Connor and Maffi, but by taking a different argumentative route. These scholars investigated the case of ἱερά and ὅσια monies (χρήματα) and have posed more specific historical objections to the thesis that ὅσια can mean 'profane'.

Samons examined the labels ἱερά and ὅσια for money through the lens of his historical account of Athenian finance. In the early fifth century in Athens, there was no non-sacral public reserve but only the sacral treasury

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96 46: 'si afferma l'idea che la *polis* possa utilizzare la qualifica di *hosion* per rafforzare con una sanzione sacrale lo statuto ideologico-normativo delle sue istituzioni politiche.' Cp. 50, 51.

97 45 and 49: 'nello stesso tempo vengono posti sotto la garanzia di una qualificazione sacrale non più rapporti e comportamenti prescritti non altrimenti tutelati, bensì proprio quelli a cui la *polis* riconosce, tramite la qualifica di *hosios*, una rilevanza politica fondamentale.'

98 37: 'La *polis* ha dunque posto sotto controllo l'elemento religioso … rendendo così funzionale alla propria organizzazione quella che viene considerata la presenza diretta e immediata del sacro.'

99 Connor 1988:164.

100 Connor 1988:162.

101 Connor 1988:164.

of Athena. In this treasury the Athenians placed large amounts of imperial money, as a gift to the goddess. They borrowed this money from Athena to pay for military actions (among other things) and repaid the money later, with interest. However, due to the huge expenses for the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians accumulated debts until their liabilities to Athena became large and unpayable. Somewhere in the mid-420s BCE, the Athenians stopped donating all monies to Athena. Instead, they created a non-sacral reserve fund, a separate account that remained their own property and from which they could make expenditures as they pleased, without incurring debt to the goddess.[102] This was the beginning of the coexistence of two different types of funds: money that was ἱερός (the sacral treasury, in the possession of the god) and δημόσιος money (the non-sacral fund, in the possession of the *dêmos*). Note that the designations ἱερός and δημόσιος refer to *ownership*, not to the *source* or the *goal* of the money. As Samons explains, the sacral treasury received payments from clearly non-sacral sources (like public fines), and it was used for non-sacral purposes (like waging war); similarly, the δημόσιον fund was used for example to pay for the priestess of Athena Nike, obviously a religious purpose.[103]

But the δημόσιον fund was also called ὅσιος. What does this signify? Samons implies that by labelling the δημόσιον fund ὅσιος, the Athenians did exactly what Maffi described (although this author does not mention Maffi): they drew this fund into the religious sphere and communicated that the usage of this fund was divinely sanctioned.[104] The categories of ἱερός and ὅσιος then together define two levels of sacrality or 'express different levels of connection with the gods':[105] 'it seems that most (if not all) acceptable aspects of everyday Athenian society fell into one of two categories: those things that were actually owned by or closely associated with the gods (ἱερά), and those things that were sanctioned by or acceptable to the gods (ὅσια) but not owned by or consecrated to them.'[106]

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102 Samons 2000:21. NB: as Samons rightly points out, this development is not necessarily 'evidence for a creeping "secularisation" in Athenian society' (327). On the contrary: 'some Athenians perhaps wished to move away from direct sacral funding (at least in part) in order to prevent the impious accumulation of massive and unpayable debts to their gods. … That is, the change in Athenian financial practice could reflect Athenian piety and pragmatism as much as any nascent "secularism" (327–328).'

103 Samons 2000:325.

104 Samons 2000:21, 28. But Samons's paraphrase of ὅσιος as 'acceptable to the gods' (repeated in Samons 2004:270) is in my view an overly negative reading of the positive connotations of ὅσιος. Cf. Chapter 2, section 3.

105 Samons 2000:326 n. 117.

106 Samons 2000:326. It seems not unlikely that calling the δημόσιον ὅσιον was an attempt

A new and more precise reading of ὅσια χρήματα was given by Blok in her interpretation of the earliest Athenian documentary text that mentions ὅσιος money.[107] *IG* I³ 253 (450–425 BCE) presents the accounts for the deme Ikarion during six apparently successive years. The demarch accounts for the monies of the god Dionysos, of the eponymous hero Ikarion and for money labelled ὅσιον (ἀργυρίο *h*οσίο). Having compared the account for Ikarion to other Attic financial accounts, Blok concludes that the ὅσιον money in this account should be seen as a subcategory of the δημόσιον. It is that part of the δημόσιον money which is used for purposes that will be especially pleasing to gods, in this case the organisation of a festival for the god Dionysos.

Her conclusion is in line with two important observations in Samons's monograph: first of all, that the label ὅσιος when applied to money says something about the gods' supposed attitude towards the usage of this fund.[108] Second, that all Athenian accounts published in stone regarded money that somehow had 'a sacral connection'.[109] Blok combines these observations and takes the argument one step further, arguing that 'all *inscribed* public accounts concern monies to which the gods were somehow entitled: either as their own property (*hieros* money) … or money owned by humans (*dêmosios* money) destined to be used for *hiera*'[110] and 'only *dêmosios* = *hosios* money was accounted for in stone; the rest of the *dêmosios* money, to be spent on other purposes,

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to overcome the uneasiness felt by the *dêmos* about keeping the money for themselves (putting monies in a separate money box belonging to the *dêmos*) instead of giving all monies to Athena. Branding certain monies ὅσιον gave them a special dignity. Such a designation conveyed the message that these δημόσιον funds too, were sanctioned by the gods; that humans using them were in a good relationship to the divine world; that these monies had the gods' special interest.

107 Blok 2010. NB: IvO 16 and 27 from Elis, Olympia are presumably earlier non-Athenian counterparts mentioning ὅσιον money.

108 But note that a difference between Samons's and Blok's views is that the former considers ὅσιον as another designation of all δήμοσιον money [according to him, all monies are either owned by the gods (ἱερόν) or 'acceptable' (ὅσιον) to them], whereas Blok sees the ὅσιον as a subset of the δήμοσιον.

109 Samons 2000, Appendix 3, 312–317. Samons observed that 'no certain "inventories" or "accounts" of the amalgated demosion/imperial purse managed by the Hellenotamiai … have ever been discovered' (314) and that 'publication [in stone] of financial records in fifth-century documents depended to some degree … on the "sacral connections" of particular documents … Athenian piety obviously demanded careful accounting of funds that … technically belonged to the gods' (316).

110 Blok 2010:83–84. Cf. Chadwick 1996:225 who took ὅσιος money as 'money due for religious reasons' and gave IG I³ 253 as an example. This seems to mean the same.

was not, but probably recorded only on … ephemeral material'.[111] In the fourth century we see that the notion of ὅσιον money (used for purposes that pleased the gods) became more prominent. This was due to the expansion of sacrificial practices and the expenditures for Athenian festivals, notably the Dionysia. Moreover, speakers sometimes implied with respect to *other* expenditures that were less obviously 'religious' (such as expenses for the navy and cavalry) that they should be seen as ὅσια, too.[112] We could see such speech acts as examples of the type of 'rhetorical usage' of ὅσιος described in Maffi 1982. Labelling expenses as ὅσιος was a way of putting them in a favourable light, i.e. the designation was intended to convey the gods' assumed positive attitude towards them.

To summarise, the usage of ὅσιος in the juxtaposition ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια χρήματα provides no evidence of its reference to the 'profane', but is an instance of persuasive language usage and designates the piety of humans using this money.

4 The Semantic Paradox in Denominative Verb Forms

Another series of cases that is important in the scholarly discussion on the usage of ὅσιος as 'profane' and 'sacred' is the supposed manifestation of this paradox in the denominative verbs based on ὅσιος or ὁσία.

In interpreting these cases we should realise first of all that any occurrences of the verb ὁσιόω and composites (ἀφ-οσιόω, καθ-οσιόω, ἐξοσιόω) are rare in fifth-century texts and are almost exclusively dramatic.[113] One exception is the verb (ἀφ)οσιόομαι (Hdt. ἀπ-), used in the sense of 'to make ὅσιος, free from religious binding', according to Van der Valk. This verb is diachronically attested in different genres: in three Herodotean passages, in a fragment of Sophocles, in Xenophon's *Hellenica* and in later texts. For all we know, the other denominative verbs from ὅσιος and ὁσία are and remain dramatic neologisms. Because these forms are so rare but at the same time instrumental examples in our discussion, it will be helpful for us to look at the semantics of denominative verbs

111 Blok 2010:88.

112 Dem. 24.96–98. Blok *forthc.*

113 There are eleven cases of verb forms in the corpus: ἐξοσιόω (n = 1, Euripides), ὁσιόω (n = 3, Euripides), ἀφοσιόω (n = 4, Herodotus, Sophocles), καθοσιόω (n = 3, Euripides, Aristophanes). The cases are: E. *Cret.* F 472.15 *TrGF*, E. F 539.1 *TrGF*, E. *Ba.* 70, 114, E. *Or.* 515, E. *IT* 1320, S.F. 253.1 *TrGF*, Hdt. 1.199.4, 4.154.4, 4.203.1, Ar. *Pl.* 661. Note that the verbs are used especially in those texts in which the adjective ὅσιος occurs frequently, such as Euripides's *Bacchants, Orestes* and *Iphigenia in Tauris*. In these texts, the lemma ὅσιος is heavily primed, and the occurrence of derived verbs is less surprising.

more closely, not only by investigating the context in which these examples appear, but also by establishing the *possible* meanings of such derivations in general. We will start by examining the semantic operations at work in the systematic morphological conversion from a Greek noun or adjective to a denominative verb ending in -όω and composites.

4.1 *Denominative Verbs from ὅσιος or ὁσία*

Denominative verbs are well described in the literature.[114] Those ending in -οω may be derived from an adjective or a noun (of any stem). When derived from an adjective (x), they are usually transitive and have a factitive meaning: 'to cause x' or 'to make something x (predicative)'.[115] An alternative meaning for these verbs is 'to regard as x' or 'to treat in a way that is x'.[116] Verbs ending in -οω derived from a noun (y) are not necessarily transitive and tend to fall under the heading 'to do something using y', which is rather a broad semantic description with various interpretations.[117] We do not know, *prima facie*, whether for example ἀφοσιόομαι was derived from ὅσιος or ἡ ὁσία /τὸ ὅσιον (or perceived so). A verb ὁσιόω, derived from the adjective ὅσιος, may mean 'to make someone or something ὅσιος', 'to consider someone or something ὅσιος', 'to treat someone or something in a way that is ὅσιος'. A verb ὁσιόω from the noun ὁσία 'religious rule, custom, ritual' refers to 'doing something with ὁσία' and may denote, for example, 'to establish a religious rule or custom' or 'to observe a religious rule or custom'.

Each of the attested denominative verbs from ὅσιος / ὁσία may have been a neologism. Because the understanding of each of these verb forms may have

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114 Kühner-Gerth 1892:259–260; Fränkel 1906:67–86; Smyth 1956 [1920]:245; Debrunner 1917:99–103; Tucker 1990.

115 Tucker 1990:15. Some examples of the conversion *adj.* (*x*) > *verb* (*to make x*) are: δῆλος 'clear, manifest' > δηλόω 'to make visible or clear'; πυκνός 'close, compact' > πυκνόω 'to make close or solid, pack close'; ἀλαός 'blind' > ἀλαόω 'to make blind'; δίκαιος 'just' > δικαιόω 'to set right'; κακός 'bad' > κακόω 'to destroy, ruin'.

116 Debrunner 1917:99. Some examples of the conversion *adj.* (*x*) > *verb* (*to consider x*) are: ἄξιος 'worthy' > ἀξιόω 'to consider worthy'; δίκαιος 'just' > δικαιόω 'to consider just'; examples of the conversion *adj.* (*x*) > *verb* (*treat in a way that is x*): κακός 'bad' > κακόω 'to maltreat'; δόλιος 'treacherous' > δολιόω 'to deal treacherously with'.

117 Tucker 1990:16. Some examples of the conversion *noun* (*y*) > *verb* (*to do something using y*) are: ὁ πύργος 'tower' > πυργόω 'I fortify, I equip *with* towers'; ὁ οἶνος 'wine' > οἰνόω 'I make drunk, I cause to be affected by wine'; ἡ ζημία 'punishment' > ζημιόω 'punish, fine'; ἡ ῥίζα 'root' > ῥιζόω 'plant, fix firmly'. Note that a denominative verb ending in -οω can also be derived from a noun ending in -α.

been a matter of ad-hoc interpretative processes, we do not have to assume that all these verb forms were derived in the same way (or perceived as being so).

4.2 *ἀφοσιόω / ἀφοσιόομαι*

The verb ἀφοσιόομαι appears first of all when Herodotus describes 'the most despicable' of Babylonian customs (νόμοι). Once in her life, every Babylonian woman must go to the temple of Aphrodite to have intercourse with a complete stranger. Sitting about on the sanctuary grounds, she waits until some man comes to her. After the act, the woman, 'ἀποσιωσαμένη τῇ θεῷ', goes back home.[118] Van der Valk translates, 'nachdem sie sich ὁσία gemacht hat τῇ θεῷ, der Göttin gegenüber, ihre Pflicht ihr gegenüber nachgekommen is'.[119] In a second passage the author narrates the story of Themiso, who had sworn an oath to Etearchus that he would do whatever Etearchus asked of him, in return for guestfriendship (ξεινία). When Etearchus told Themiso to kill his (Etearchus's) daugher by throwing her into the sea, Themiso contrived a trick: 'ἀποσιούμενος τὴν ἐξόρκωσιν', he bound the daughter with ropes, let her down into the sea and drew her up again.[120] According to Van der Valk, 'Wenn man die Vereidigung und den Eid jedoch erfüllt, löst man die religiöse Bindung, man wird frei von den Göttern, man macht sich ὅσιος.'[121] In the third case, Herodotus explains that the Cyrenaeans let the Persians through their city, λόγιόν τι ἀποσιούμενοι.[122]

Van der Valk has clearly interpreted ἀποσιόω as a transitive, factitive verb 'to make ὅσιος', with ἀποσιόομαι being used in a direct-reflexive sense 'to make oneself ὅσιος' (free from the gods), and taking any direct objects as accusatives of respect. He assumes that the agent was previously ἱερός, 'bound to the gods'.[123] The prefix ἀπ(ο)- has several semantic functions, among which the sense of 'finishing off, completing' seems the most relevant in these cases.[124] Hence the prefix ἀπ- would signify the endpoint of the process of becoming ὅσιος from being ἱερός. Based on our analysis of the semantics of denominative verbs ending in -όω, this interpretation 'to make oneself ὅσιος' is not at all implausible. Indeed, other denominative verbs of the form ἀπ- … -οω seem to have the same semantic make-up.[125]

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118 Hdt 1.199.4.

119 1942:119.

120 Hdt 4.154.4; ἐξόρκωσις: 'binding by oath'.

121 1942:120.

122 Hdt 4.203.1, λόγιον: 'oracle' (especially one with antiquity).

123 Van der Valk 1942:127.

124 LSJ s.v. ἀπό D 2.

125 ἀνδρ-όω means 'change someone into a man', with ἀνδρόομαι 'become a man'. ἀπανδρόομαι

However, it is difficult to see how any human could make him/herself ὅσιος ('free' from the gods) at any particular point in time.[126] There seems to be no semantic parallel for this usage of ὅσιος in the corpus in which someone 'becomes ὅσιος' out of being ἱερός. In cases in which someone 'makes (a person) ὅσιος', or in which a person is urged to 'become ὅσιος', he or she starts as ἀνόσιος or ἀσεβής/δυσσεβής rather than ἱερός.[127] Or we may interpret the verb in a different way for which there *are* parallels: by considering ἀπ-οσιόομαι as deriving from ἡ ὁσία / τὸ ὅσιον instead.[128] Such a denominative verb may refer to 'observing (and completing, ἀφ-) ἡ ὁσία / τὸ ὅσιον'.[129] In this case, we may take the middle as indirect reflexive, denoting that the agent is the beneficiary; the accusatives are direct objects.

Such a reading of ἀφοσιόομαι does not necessarily change our translation much: 'observing and completing ἡ ὁσία / τὸ ὅσιον' may be rendered as 'fulfilling a religious obligation'. However, our understanding of the underlying semantic structure of the verb is different. Moreover, our interpretation is more transparent given the emphasis on ὁσία / ὅσιον in these texts. For example, Herodotus introduces the story of Etearchus and Themiso by stating that Etearchus contrived 'an impious act' (ἔργον οὐκ ὅσιον, 4.154.2). Etearchus's plan is ἀνόσιον for more than one reason. Not only did Etearchus contrive to have his own daughter killed, he also grossly transgressed the norms of ξενία and oath-keeping by compelling his ξένος, who had sworn an oath, to carry out the murder. Zeus Horkios and Zeus Xenios who guard over oaths and guestfriendship were now supposed to oversee an infanticide under their *aegis*. This is definitely not ὅσιον. Not surprisingly, Themiso was angry at the 'deceitfulness of the oath' (τῇ ἀπάτῃ τοῦ ὅρκου) and 'put an end to his friendship' (διαλυσάμενος τὴν ξεινίην) with Etearchus. Themiso's action at the conclusion of the story seems to have a

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is translated in the same way but with (presumably) more emphasis on the moment when that process is completed: 'become a man, come to maturity'. γλαυκόω means: 'to dye blue-grey'; ἀπογλαυκόομαι is 'to become grey-blue', and refers to the point in which the dyeing process is completed (LSJ).

126 Cf. section 1 of this chapter.

127 For example, Theonoe says she will do her villainous brother a service 'if I make him ὅσιος out of his impiety' (ἐκ δυσσεβείας ὅσιον εἰ τίθημί νιν, E. *Hel.* 1021).

128 Such a derivation is understandable also from the fact that Herodotus frequently uses ὁσία and ὅσιον to refer to cultic requirements: e.g., 2.45.2, 2.81.1, 8.37.1.

129 There are periphrastically expressed parallels for the first notion 'observing the religious custom', for example the passage in which Tyndareus says Orestes should have exiled his mother, thus 'following the custom' (ὁσίαν διώκοντα, E. *Or.* 501) or when people do something 'because of ὁσία' i.e. observing the ritual (*h.Cer* 211, E. *IT* 1461).

double meaning, being a verbal response to Etearchus's 'impious act'. Themiso 'observed τὸ ὅσιον, his religious obligation' fulfilling his promise (to the letter), but at the same time 'he observed what was (*true*) piety (τὸ ὅσιον) with respect to his binding by oath' (ἀποσιούμενος τὴν ἐξόρκωσιν), when saving the daughter with his trick.

As was argued above,[130] narrations of what is ὅσιον or ὁσία for particular groups serve to typify those groups: the traditional, authoritative and holy customs of a people tell us something about their collective character. In order to provide a negative characterisation of the Babylonians, Herodotus in his description at 1.199 emphasizes that this 'most shameful' (αἴσχιστος) practice at Aphrodite's temple is not just some custom followed by a few people but, in fact, a religious activity in the eyes of the entire group. Thus, Herodotus stresses that the man invites the woman 'in the name of Mylitta' (the Babylonian counterpart of Greek Aphrodite); it is 'not right' (οὐ θέμις) to refuse any man or any amount of money; the woman consecrates the sum to the goddess (it 'becomes ἱερόν'); ugly women cannot 'fulfil the (religious) custom' (νόμος ἐκπλῆσαι); and, finally, it is not until a woman has 'observed the ritual for the goddess' (ἀφοσιησάμενος) that she may return home again. The verb ἀποσιοῦμαι (from ὁσία) underscores the religious nature of these proceedings once more and as such helps to reinforce the characterisation of the Babylonians.

4.3 *ὁσιόω / ἐξοσιόω*

The second part of the semantic paradox of ὅσιος consists in the fact that this term is sometimes supposed to denote the opposite of 'profane': 'sacred, holy'. According to Van der Valk, the origin of the semantic development of ὅσιος used as ἱερός is found in the application of ὅσιος to initiands of special mystery cults. In an Euripidean fragment, a follower of Cretan Zeus says he 'became an initiand' (μύστης γενόμην, 10) of the god and 'was made ὅσιος' (ὁσιωθείς, 15).[131] In Aristophanes's *Frogs*, a chorus consisting of people who were initiated while they were alive on earth and now exist as happy souls close to the palace of Pluto say that 'Iacchus must come and dance for his ὁσίους θιασώτας' (327) and further on refer to themselves as ὅσιοι μύσται (336). In Van der Valk's view, we need to see these instances of ὅσιος as referring in the first place to ritual purity. The adjective ὅσιος is often connected to the notion of 'freeing oneself of pollution' in the mainstream religious language of the *polis*; but these cults

130 Chapter 6, section 3.

131 E. *Cret.* F 472.15 *TrGF*.

take the notion of purity especially seriously and prescribe special rites and purifications. As Van der Valk argues, 'Bald konnte man sodann einen Schritt weiter gehen und meinen, dass der Mensch, der so besonders gereinigt wurde, hierdurch auch von den anderen unterschieden und infolgedessen geheiligt ist.'[132] In this way, then, ὅσιος assumes a 'religiös schwerere Bedeutung' and becomes synonymous with ἱερός.[133] This is because the special purification is at the same time a consecration.

In my view, it is wrong to translate ὅσιος as 'ritually pure'.[134] In the corpus ὅσιος most often refers to a limited set of actions, expressing what humans must do to please the gods and fulfil their obligations towards them. If we take this knowledge as a starting point, it seems more likely that these worshippers are giving a new interpretation to what piety, ὁσιότης entails. According to them, in order to be truly pious, what the *polis* considers to be sufficient does not suffice. To be ὅσιος still signifies 'to do that which pleases the gods', but these special cults have developed their own set of associated behaviours and thus have created a new definition of ὁσιότης within their group. What we see here is the literary reflection of such a mechanism.[135]

The meaning 'sacred' for ὅσιος has also been read into the usage of the verbs ὁσιόω and ἐξοσιόω in Euripides's *Bacchants*.[136] These verbs have been taken to mean 'to make (an object) sacred'.[137]

Euripides's *Bacchants* presents the opposition between King Pentheus of Thebes, who does not accept Dionysus as a god in his city, and a chorus of women who already worship Dionysus. They explain to others in what way one should serve and honour this god. In the parodos, the denominative verb ὁσιόω is used in the context of instruction to the Thebans on how to act in connection with the religious service for Dionysus:

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132 Van der Valk 1942:129.

133 Van der Valk 1942:130.

134 The semantic relationship between ὅσιος, ἁγνός and καθαρός is explored further in Peels (in preparation b).

135 Little is known about the use of the religious language of the *polis* by mystery cults in the classical period, but Steinhauer 2014 described how religious associations in the post-classical Greek *poleis* used the mainstream religious language of the *polis* for their own purposes, and showed how such use of religious terminology paved the way for communicating with individuals and *polis* officials.

136 E. *Ba.* 70, 114.

137 Besides Van der Valk's article, this interpretation occurs in the commentaries by Dodds 1960, Roux 1972 and Seaford 1996, ad loc., as will be discussed below.

Χο. ὦ Σεμέλας τροφοὶ Θῆ-
βαι, στεφανοῦσθε κισσῶι·
βρύετε βρύετε χλοήρει
μίλακι καλλικάρπωι
καὶ καταβακχιοῦσθε δρυὸς
ἢ ἐλάτας κλάδοισι,
στικτῶν τ' ἐνδυτὰ νεβρίδων
στέφετε λευκοτρίχων πλοκάμων
μαλλοῖς· ἀμφὶ δὲ νάρθηκας ὑβριστὰς
ὁσιοῦσθ'· αὐτίκα γᾶ πᾶσα χορεύσει[138]

Ch. Oh nurse of Semele, Thebes,
crown yourself with ivy,
abound with the fresh holm-oak
that bears fine fruit,
dedicate yourself completely to Dionysos
with twigs of oak or fir,
and gird your cloaks
of dappled fawn skin with tresses of white wool.
… …
Immediately all [the people of] this land will dance.

I leave the phrase ἀμφὶ δὲ νάρθηκας ὑβριστὰς ὁσιοῦσθ' (113–114) untranslated while we examine its meaning. Roux takes the verb ὁσιόω as describing a process in which an object (νάρθηξ) is 'made ὅσιος', that is, 'consecrated'.[139] She explains that the θύρσος, an attribute in the Dionysiac cult, was actually a rod of fennel which was in itself not a holy object at all.[140] In order to turn the νάρθηξ into a θύρσος, one had to wrap ivy leaves around it. Roux holds that the verb ὁσιόω ('to make ὅσιος') refers here to this act of consecration: turning a profane object (νάρθηξ) into a holy object (θύρσος) that is part of the cult. In this reading we should, by extension, interpret ὅσιος as 'holy', 'set apart for religious usage'.[141] Roux interprets the preposition ἀμφὶ δέ adverbially, meaning 'all around', and referring to the wrapping of the ivy leaves *around* the rod of fennel. ὑβριστάς is interpreted proleptically. Thus, according to Roux, the phrase means 'sanctifie pour toi … un thyrse *en entourant* de guirlandes un

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138 E. *Ba.* 105–114.

139 Roux 1972, ad loc.

140 Roux 1972, ad loc. It could be used for other purposes, too.

141 Seaford 1996, ad loc. has a similar reading.

narthex'. This action 'transformera les batons profanes en thyrses doués d'une violence magique et irrésistible (ὑβριστάς)'.

The most important reason why this interpretation does not work relates to the manner in which the audience would have made sense of the passage. Occurrences of the verb ὁσιόω and composites are rare in fifth-century texts, and for all we know these forms are tragic neologisms. This means that the audience in the Athenian theatre would have had to try to make sense *on the spot* of this highly poetic phrase (with an internal clash of ὅσιος and ὑβριστής) in this highly poetic text, with ὁσιόω as an ad-hoc invention of the poet. To interpret the novel verb, the audience would have built on contextual knowledge and linguistic knowledge (awareness of the patterns of morphological conversion between adjective or noun and corresponding verb ending in -οω).

This part of the maenads' song revolves around putting on the attire appropriate for the worship of Dionysus, such as a crown of ivy and a fawn skin. These activities are not insignificant: on the contrary, throughout the play, acknowledging Dionysus and worshipping him have been explicitly associated with and even described in terms of putting on the required outfit, both by the god himself and by other characters in the play. For example, when Cadmus urges Pentheus to see Dionysus as a god or at least call him that, he says, 'but come on, I will crown your head | with ivy: honour the god together with us' (δεῦρό σου στέψω κάρα | κισσῷ· μεθ'ἡμῶν τῷ θεῷ τιμὴν δίδου').[142] That is, the transition to honouring Dionysus as god and becoming included in his cult-group (μεθ' ἡμῶν) is marked by dressing up with these attributes.[143]

Lines 109–110 in this passage, 'dedicate yourself to Dionysus with twigs or oak or fir' (καὶ καταβακχιοῦσθε δρυὸς | ἢ ἐλάτας κλάδοισι), likewise express the crucial connection between worshipping the god (mental attitude) and dressing in the proper attire (physical actions). In other words, in order to dedicate oneself completely to Dionysus (καταβακχιόεσθαι), it is necessary to adorn oneself with these twigs.[144] Note that this verb—also a neologism as far as we know[145]—shows a slightly unusual usage of the middle voice. The Greek direct reflexive middle is most typically used with actions that are normally performed on oneself, often 'verbs of grooming', like λούεσθαι 'wash oneself', κοσμέεσθαι 'adorn oneself', or στεφανόεσθαι 'crown oneself' (as in l. 106). But the idea of direct

142 E. *Ba*. 341–342.

143 E. *Ba*. 24–25, 248–254, 312–313.

144 i.e. use them in a garland (Dodds 1960, ad loc.) or carry them in one's hand (Seaford 1996, ad loc.).

145 The verbs καταβακχιόω/καταβακχιόομαι do not occur anywhere else until the seventh cent. CE, and where βακχιόω and βακχεύω do occur, these verbs are used in the active form.

reflexivity is far more commonly expressed by means of an active construction with a reflexive pronoun. This mode is by far the most customary one for all verbs other than the 'grooming verbs' described above.[146] Perhaps Euripides coined the uncustomary direct reflexive middle form καταβακχιοῦσθε precisely to symbolise and stress the main point that the maenads are trying to make: that there is an essential link between performing these specific self-reflexive grooming activities and becoming a true worshipper of Dionysus.

I interpret l. 114, the phrase ἀμφὶ δὲ νάρθηκας ὑβριστὰς ὁσιοῦσθε, as an extension of this thought and take ὁσιοῦσθε as a direct-reflexive form, like the preceding direct-reflexive middle forms στεφανοῦσθε and καταβακχιοῦσθε. The fact that this is a rare verb (most probably), or even an invention, makes it likely that the listener's interpretation of the middle will hinge on context, too. The direct-reflexive interpretation of the previous middles almost forces the same reading on the verb form ὁσιοῦσθε, and a perceived change to indirect reflexive (as in Roux's reading) is unlikely.[147]

I argued above that in those situations in which an individual wants to 'make someone else ὅσιος' or someone is urged 'to become (make oneself) ὅσιος' that person is currently ἀνόσιος, δυσσεβής or ἀσεβής.[148] In the present case, the addressee is literally ἀ-σεβής because he does not recognise Dionysus as a god. Here, in line with the rest of this passage, 'making oneself ὅσιος' probably means 'perform a self-reflexive activity so as to become a worshipper of Dionysus, acknowledging him as a god'. This grooming activity is expressed in ἀμφὶ δὲ νάρθηκας ὑβριστάς, which I take as a prepositional phrase denoting 'with respect to the violent *thyrsus*-staff', i.e. by carrying or brandishing it.[149]

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146 Smyth 1984 [1920]:390–391, Rijksbaron 2002:144–145, Allan 2003:90–95.

147 Another reason why Roux's interpretation does not work is that there seems to be no semantic distinction between νάρθηξ (rod of fennel) and θύρσος (the same thing as a holy cult object) in *Bacchants*. When there are close alternations between these terms, they seem to be motivated by a desire for stylistic variation (251/254, 704/706). The term νάρθηξ does not immediately signal to the internal and external audience an object that needs modification before it can serve in the context of the cult. Moreover, given the preciseness of the other instructions, the command to wrap leaves of ivy around a rod of fennel conveyed by a rather vague instruction, the one word 'around' (ἀμφί), seems slightly incongruous. Cf. also Verdenius 1981:305–306: 'this would be a rather cryptic command sounding strange after the preceding instructions which are clear and explicit'.

148 Section 4.2.

149 Here I go with Verdenius 1981:305, who translates 'make yourselves holy by handling …' and Dodds 1960 who takes the phrase to mean, 'be reverent in your handling of the violent wands', giving various parallels for a prepositional meaning of ἀμφί as 'with respect to', e.g. E. *Hipp*. 145–147 ἀμφὶ Δίκτυνναν ἀνίερος 'failing in your religious duty towards Dictynna'.

At this point, the chorus also makes clear that they are proposing a new interpretation of piety: piety is what an unknowing person would perhaps see as ὕβρις.[150]

In short, ὁσιόω does not mean 'I consecrate'. Rather, the novel verb draws on the first requirement of being ὅσιος: acknowledging a god as a god. The phrase ἀμφὶ δὲ νάρθηκας ὑβριστὰς ὁσιοῦσθε describes in what way the aspiring worshipper can give the god the τιμή he deserves.[151] We may interpret it as saying, 'take up pious attire and carry the violent *thyrsus*'.

4.4 *καθοσιόομαι*

A final case of a denominative verb (καθοσιόομαι) that supposedly means 'to consecrate' is found in Euripides's *Iphigenia in Tauris*. In this play, Iphigenia finds herself in the far-away land of the Taurians, serving as a priestess of Artemis, to whom all human foreigners landing in the region are sacrificed.[152] When Orestes, pursued by the Erinyes, washes ashore in Tauris, Iphigenia discovers in the nick of time that the shipwrecked man is actually her brother. Iphigenia avoids having to sacrifice him to the goddess by means of a trick, and the two siblings manage to get away on a ship. A messenger reports their flight to the local ruler, Thoas. He wants to know why Iphigenia ran away, and when he receives the answer, 'to save Orestes', he wants to know who Orestes is:

150 The violent nature of this cult of Dionysus, in which the thyrsos is literally used as a weapon, is thematized throughout the play. Compare Dionysus's description of the thyrsos as a κίσσινον βέλος (a 'weapon of ivy', l. 25), Agave's assertion that the women are θύρσοις ὡπλισμέναι ('armed with thyrsoi', l. 733), and the women's use of the thyrsoi to attack Pentheus (ll. 1099–1100).

151 We may interpret the occurrence of the verb ἐξοσιόω (a *hapax legomenon*) some 40 lines back in the same play, along the same lines. The verb appears in the parodos of the chorus, who urges everyone στόμα τ' εὔφημον ἅπας ἐξοσιούσθω (70). The phrase must be a variant of a frequently occurring and customary instruction at the outset of a ritual utterance or performance to maintain a respectful speech (εὐφημία), a 'gute Rede' (Gödde 2011). In practice, εὐφημία often implied keeping silent altogether. The instruction in this play seems to be some poetical variation on such invocations. I suggest taking ἐξοσιούσθω as a direct-reflexive form, in line with our interpretation of ὁσιοῦσθε in l. 110, with στόμα as a second object and εὔφημον as the object-predicative, and the prefix ἐξ- as an intensifier. The sentence now reads, 'let everyone make himself completely ὅσιος (making the transition to committing to the service of Dionysus) with respect to the mouth, making it speak fairly'. The neologism ἐξοσιόω may have been coined by Euripides in order to invoke an extra pious atmosphere and to say a familiar thing in a new, especially solemn way.

152 E. *IT* 35–41.

Θο. τὸν ποῖον; ἆρ' ὃν Τυνδαρὶς τίκτει κόρη;
Αγ. ὃν τοῖσδε βωμοῖς θεᾷ *καθωσιώσατο*[153]

Th. To save *whom*? The one whom the daughter of Tyndareus bore?
Mess. The one whom she *kathôsiôsato* to the goddess at this altar.

The verb καθοσιόομαι in this passage has been interpreted as 'to consecrate, to make ἱερός, sacred'.[154] But note that, for all we know, this verb is an Euripidean neologism.[155] The original audience had to try and make sense of it as much as we do and understood the verb form καθωσιώσατο only by means of an ad-hoc interpretative process. Therefore, this is a particularly bad example to postulate a 'meaning' or 'usage' *to consecrate* for the denominative verb καθοσιόω, depending on a meaning 'sacred' for ὅσιος. In order to interpret this verb form, the audience would have drawn on their general knowledge of denominative verbs, the semantics of ὅσιος and related terms, and on what had happened previously in the play.

The verb form seems to be modelled on the verbs *καθ*ιερόω and *καθ*αγίζω, both meaning, 'to consecrate'. The similarity with these other verb forms is one of the reasons why the novel compound verb καθοσιόω can make any sense here at all.[156] But that does not entail that καθοσιόω was interpreted as having the same semantic content as these other verbs. Rather, starting out from our knowledge of the meaning of ὅσιος and ἡ ὁσία, 'making a sacrificial victim ὅσιον' should mean something like 'preparing the victim so that he is fit for the ritual (ὁσία)'.

Why did Euripides invent this novel verb? More precisely: what effect was he trying to achieve with it? In my view this is a joke, based on the sustained irony in the play concerning the Taurians' dealings with ὁσία. The storyline of *Iphigenia in Tauris* hinges on the characterisation of the Taurians as barbarian others who do not understand anything about religion. As was discussed above,

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153 E. *IT* 1319–1320. I follow Musurus's emendation of θεά to θεαῖ. Diggle (1981:89–91) argued that this emendation is necessary on account of the following line (1321). Usually τὰ ὅσια and ἡ ὁσία refer to *human* actions, which is why it may be more likely that Iphigeneia is the agent (but since this verb is a neologism, we do not know for certain).

154 Van der Valk 1942:125–126: 'es ist nämlich auffällig aber unanfechtbar, dass ὁσιοῦν mit seinen Komposita nicht nur bedeutet reinmachen, von Befleckung befreien, sondern auch heiligen, weihen und also synonym mit ἱεροῦν u.s.w. ist ... Ähnlich Eur. *I. T.* 1320.'

155 It occurs in one other Euripidean fragment (F 539.1 *TrGF*) without context and in a few later texts: Ar. *Pl.* 661 (cf. n. 161 below), Thphr. fr. 13 l. 21 (from Porph. *Abst.* II 26).

156 i.e. the newly coined verb is understandable from the analogy with existing verbs.

in a 'normal' religious setting in Greece, if a mortal had had contact with bloodshed or childbirth or had been in touch with a corpse, he/she would be kept from the altars as he/she was polluted. The Taurian ritual of regular human bloodshed on the altar for the sake of a god would make no sense from the divine perspective as perceived by the Greek internal and external audience. Consequently, Iphigenia does not believe that this religious custom is in accordance with the goddess's will (380–391). Likewise, the chorus of Greek women (attendants of the priestess) in this play explicitly describes these human sacrifices as 'not ὅσια'.[157]

The irony in the characterisation of the Taurians is that they genuinely think their rituals do please the gods, and that they do give serious contemplation to what they should do to honour τὸ ὅσιον. For example, when Iphigenia announces she wants to wash the foreigners before sacrificing them, Thoas asks, 'so that they will fall to the goddess in a more ὅσιον manner?'[158] The passage under consideration here continues that irony. When the Taurian messenger loftily says the priestess 'laid the victim out in a ὅσιον manner on the altar' (1320), this is highly paradoxical: according to the Greek characters in the play, this is absolutely *not* ὅσιος. Thus, this choice of words underlines once more what barbarians the Taurians and their ruler really are.[159]

Summarising the above, the verb καθοσιόω in this passage is not a mere synonym of καθιερόω.[160] The former is modelled on the latter but does not *mean* the same, on the contrary: Euripides deliberately uses an invented verb that acquires its meaning during the interpretative process, and he coined it to achieve an effect. The utterance would have been ironic if Euripides had used the verb καθιερόω, but this verb would not have had the same attention-grabbing effect. The marked usage of language plays out the sustained irony in the play even better.[161]

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157 E. *IT* 463–466: ὦ πότνι', εἴ σοι τάδ' ἀρεσκόντως | πόλις ἥδε τελεῖ, δέξαι θυσίας, | ἃς ὁ παρ' ἡμῖν νόμος οὐχ ὁσίας | ἀναφαίνει. 'Reverent goddess, if these things are pleasing to you | that the city does this, receive the sacrifices, | which are impious according to the custom in our country (i.e. Greece).' I follow the editions by Collard (2000) and Kyriakou (2006), both deleting, with Bergk, Ἕλλησι διδοὺς in 466.

158 E. *IT* 1194. Similarly, Iphigenia invokes a goddess Ὁσία to persuade Thoas (1161) of her actions.

159 An extra level of irony is achieved through the fact that Iphigenia is about to sacrifice her brother: violence against siblings is also typically ἀνόσιος. Perhaps the irony lies in line with the general tone of the scene. Cropp 2000:252 thinks this scene is humorous, although Kyriakou 2006:408–411 takes a different view.

160 Van der Valk 1942:125–126.

161 This verb occurs with a similar usage on one other occasion, in Aristophanes's *Wealth*,

5 Semantic Paradox or Marked Language? Hermes Confused

Finally, the cases of ὁσίη occurring in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* may be analysed in terms of markedness. As was discussed in Chapter 5, the usage of ὅσιος for a god is marked, in the sense that the lexeme is employed in these cases in a marginal way, in defiance of other available and better-fitting lexical options. Before we can turn to the crucial passage in l. 129, in which Hermes is said to long for ὁσίη κρεάων, often interpreted as 'the profane part of meat', we will discuss the two other passages in this Homeric Hymn in which the term ὁσίη occurs.[162]

After the "sacrifice" of Apollo's immortal cows, Hermes returns to the far-off cave where he lives with his mother Maia. When she is upset with her infant son because he was out getting into mischief instead of lying in his cradle, Hermes tells her that their present situation is not as it should be: he and his mother should not remain here, being the only ones among the gods that are without gifts and prayer (ἀδώρητοι καὶ ἄλιστοι, 168). No, Hermes says, it is

βέλτερον ἤματα πάντα μετ' ἀθανάτοις ὀαρίζειν
πλούσιον ἀφνειὸν πολυλήϊον ἢ κατὰ δῶμα
ἄντρῳ ἐν ἠερόεντι θαασσέμεν· ἀμφὶ δὲ τιμῆς
κἀγὼ τῆς *ὁσίης* ἐπιβήσομαι ἧς περ Ἀπόλλων.
εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώῃσι πατὴρ ἐμός, ἦ τοι ἔγωγε
πειρήσω, δύναμαι, φηλητέων ὄρχαμος εἶναι.[163]

better to be always conversing among the immortals,
rich, wealthy, and rich in land, than to sit about in our "palace"[164]

in a scene in which the slave Carion describes the arrival at the temple of Asclepius and explains 'once the cakes and the preparatory offerings had been καθωσιώθη (661) on the altar … we made Plutus lie on a couch'. Here the scholion explain, 'before the dedication barleycorns and frankincense were set up as votive gift in a ὅσιον manner' (ὁσίως ἀνετέθη). As was explained earlier (Chapter 6, section 2, n. 22), the slave intersperses his language with paratragic elements of speech throughout this comedy, and they occur in the speech in which this utterance takes place (Sommerstein 2001 ad loc.; also Silk 2000:25). Perhaps Aristophanes deliberately inserted the 'difficult', poetic word καθοσιώθη, having remembered it from Euripides's play.

162 In my analysis of ὁσίη in the *Homeric hymn to Hermes*, I am heavily endebted to V. Pirenne-Delforge for illuminating discussions on this topic.

163 *h.Merc.* 170–175.

164 For the sarcastic interpretation of κατὰ δῶμα, which I follow, cf. Vergados 2013, ad loc.

—a gloomy cave. As far as honour is concerned,
I will enter upon the same *hosiê* that Apollo has.
But if my father will not give it to me, mark my words: I will
definitely go and try myself—and I am able to—to be a leader of thieves.

The *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* can be seen as a description of how Hermes became an Olympian god. In contrast to Apollo (whose mother Leto ensured his placement on Olympus from birth), Hermes lives in a cave and has to earn his accession to Olympus. This passage shows that Hermes is worried about his and his mother's geographical, and thus hierarchical, position: he, too, wants to be an Olympian god and receive corresponding honours.

In the crucial phrase in this passage, ἀμφὶ δὲ τιμῆς | κἀγὼ τῆς ὁσίης ἐπιβήσομαι ἧς περ Ἀπόλλων (172–173) 'as far as honour is concerned, I will also enter upon the same *hosiê* that Apollo has', ἐπιβαίνω is used in a metaphorical sense. The verb is used elsewhere to describe a figurative 'path' (of morality, of activity) that a person takes or intends to take.[165] What could 'to enter upon a ὁσίη' mean? When concerning direct interaction with a god, the term ὁσίη describes a specific rite or ritual: 'it is ὁσίη to do X' means 'it is the religious custom to do X'. More generally, ὁσίη is the set of rules that humans follow to sustain the reciprocal relationship with the gods (Chapter 2). When Hermes says that 'as far as τιμή is concerned' he intends to 'set foot on (ἐπιβήσομαι) the same ὁσίη that Apollo enjoys', he seems to mean, 'I want to achieve having the same (or a similar) set of rules operative for me that also characterises the reciprocal relationship between Apollo and his worshippers, so that I will be honoured as he is.' Concretely, Hermes is thinking at this point of the benefits for himself: he no longer wants to be ἀδώρητος (168) 'without gifts'.[166]

165 For example, in *Od.* 22.424 Eurykleia tells Odysseus that in his absence, twelve female servants 'went in the way of shamelessness' (ἀναιδείης ἐπέβησαν); Penelope in *Od.* 23.13 remarks that the gods have sometimes 'set a thoughtless man on the path of prudence' (χαλιφρονέοντα σαοφροσύνης ἐπέβησαν; on ἐπιβαίνω used in causative sense, cf. LSJ ἐπιβαίνω s.v. B), and previously in this passage (*h.Merc* 166) Hermes says 'I will turn on the path of *technê*, the one that is the best' (τέχνης ἐπιβήσομαι ἥ τις ἀρίστη; on the metaphorical usage of ἐπιβαίνω cf. LSJ s.v. A I 4).

166 Thus, the *intention* of Hermes's speech probably boils down to the translation by Jeanmaire 1945:83: 'Quant aux privilèges, dirons-nous donc, j'entends, moi, que mon *casuel* égale celui d'Apollon'. But I reject Jeanmaire's semantic description of ὁσίη in this passage as a 'lucrative rite'. ὁσίη may refer to a religious rite, but describes the perspective of humans (what they must do regarding the who, what, where, when and how), not the

Hermes's utterance should be seen against the background of the Hesiodic epic. The expression surely reminded the audience of Hesiod's *Theogony* 392–396 where Zeus declares that he will not rob a god who will fight with him against the Titans of any of his privileges (γεράων), but rather each will have the τιμή he had before (392–394). And to one who is ἄτιμος and ἀγέραστος under Cronus, he promises to 'set him on the path of honours and privileges, as is right and proper' (τιμῆς καὶ γεράων ἐπιβησέμεν, ἣ θέμις ἐστίν, 395–396). Hermes's phrase ἀμφὶ δὲ τιμῆς κἀγὼ τῆς ὁσίης ἐπιβήσομαι seems a clear echo of these Hesiodic lines. But note that Hermes's expression is most definitely unusual, although we can understand its sense. The usage of the definite article with ὁσίη is rare: other texts do not refer to individual identifiable ὁσίαι. The definite article here might focus on "the *specific* ὁσίη" expected by Hermes: he wants the same as Apollo, his Olympian brother.[167] Moreover, the term ὁσίη may concern the τιμή of the gods, but looks at it from the human perspective. The conscious twist of the Hesiodic passage, with its marked usage of ὁσίη (in the face of the more obvious alternatives τιμή and γέραι) alerts the reader.[168] The point seems to be to force the human perspective onto the narrative. While the *Theogony* describes the organisation of the divine world, the relationships of gods among themselves in it, and their respective τιμαί, the Homeric hymns in addition take into account the place of humans in this whole. Hermes's utterance concerns his honours, but considers the issue also from a human point of view.[169]

A similar interpretation may hold for the case in which Hermes tells his brother Apollo:

πρῶτος γὰρ Διὸς υἱὲ μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θαάσσεις
ἠΰς τε κρατερός τε· φιλεῖ δέ σε μητίετα Ζεὺς
ἐκ πάσης *ὁσίης*, ἔπορεν δέ τοι ἀγλαὰ δῶρα·[170]

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perspective of the gods (what they will get out of it). ὁσίη describes the specifics of ritual rather than gods' profits.

167 Cf. my comments on the expression ἐκ πάσης ὁσίης below.

168 There is no parallel, between Homer and the end of the fourth century, for Jay-Robert's 2009:34–35 (= 1999:12–13) reading of ὁσίη in this passage as a referential equivalent of 'τιμή of the gods', a right that a god can possess. ὁσίη is not something that is elsewhere 'possessed' by gods.

169 Cf. Rudhardt 1981 and Strauss Clay 1989 on the function of Greek mythology in explaining the τιμαί of the Olympian gods and defining the place of gods and humans in the universe. The *Homeric Hymns* further elaborate on the position of humans *vis-à-vis* the divine world after their separation as the result of Prometheus's "sacrifice" in *Theogony*.

170 *h.Merc.* 468–470.

> you sit foremost among the immortal gods, son of Zeus,
> and are good and strong. And all-wise Zeus loves you
> on the basis of every *hosiê* and has given you splendid gifts.

Again, Hermes's comment seems to concern his position as a divinity as opposed to Apollo's. Geographical distinctions defined a god's place in the divine hierarchy. Apollo is already a "first-rank god", sitting on Olympus. This position ensures him of gifts among the gods and of ὁσίη—which should be interpreted as an established reciprocal relationship between the god and humans providing him with τιμή.[171] Apollo is respected ('loved') by Zeus on the basis of this position in the pantheon. Note that the usage of ὁσίη here is again bizarre. The qualification ἐκ πάσης is unexpected, for constructions with ὁσίη do not occur in the plural, and ὁσίη does not take a quantifier like 'much' or 'little' or 'all' elsewhere.[172] A similar usage of ὁσίη only occurs in one other context, in which the odd formulation seems deliberate.[173] The passage reiterates the double perspective taken in the previous passages: it forces the human point of view onto the scene, focusing not only on the position of an Olympic god among his fellow-gods, but also on where humans come into the picture.

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171 Alternatively, different commentators have interpreted ὁσίη in this passage as 'what is divinely sanctioned' and translated ἐκ πασῆς ὁσίης with an extended meaning 'as is right and proper' (Chadwick 1996:222 'as is wholly proper'; Richardson 2010 ad loc.: 'as is wholly right and proper … here ὁσίη refers to what is divinely sanctioned'; Vergados 2013 ad loc.: 'according to every divine law'). It is difficult to make sense of the passage in this way. ὁσίη is normally what is divinely sanctioned about human activities, attitudes, etc., and does not concern Zeus's activities and attitudes. The proposed interpretation seems to be more in line with the usage of ὁσίη in ll. 173 (discussed above). By contrast, Jeanmaire 1945:84 wrongly takes this usage to be a semantic extension of the notion that a ὅσιος human is 'free' from obligations towards the gods: by extension, Zeus loves Apollo because that is 'parfaitement libre à lui' (Jeanmaire argues we should interpret the passage as such, rather than translating it 'ce n'est que justice'). I do not support Jeanmaire's and Jay-Robert's (2009:35 = 1999:13–14) readings of this passage because in my view they are based on a misunderstanding of the semantics of ὁσίη.

172 As we have already seen, rules state that a particular action 'is ὁσίη' (or not) (e.g. *Od.* 16.423, *Od.* 22.412, Hdt. 2.171.2, 2.45.2, Pi. *P.* 9.36; *h.Ap.* 237; and cf. the epigraphic material discussed in Chapter 6); or that humans should 'follow ὁσίη' (E. *Or.* 501); or cultic actions are performed in a particular way 'because of ὁσίη' (E. *IT* 1461, *h.Cer.* 211). In any case, things either are ὁσίη or not. In this respect, the word ὁσίη is comparable to, for example, the English word 'custom'. Something is 'the custom' or not, but one cannot say one does something 'on the grounds of every custom' or 'there is much custom in it'.

173 Ar. *Pl.* 682. A discussion of this passage in Chapter 6, section 2.

But the most difficult and notorious passage in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* occurs near the beginning of the story. Here it is recounted how baby Hermes invented the art of making a fire and stole the immortal cows of Apollo. He took two of the cows to perform a ritual. First, he killed them by piercing their spine, even though they were immortal (118–119). He flayed them (124–126), cut up the meat (120) and roasted it together with the innards (122–123). He divided it into twelve portions (126–129), adding a token of honour to each (129). Then Hermes was tempted:

ἔνθ’ *ὁσίης* κρεάων ἠράσσατο κύδιμος Ἑρμῆς·
ὀδμὴ γάρ μιν ἔτειρε καὶ ἀθάνατόν περ ἐόντα
ἡδεῖ’· ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὧς οἱ ἐπείθετο θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ
καί τε μάλ’ ἱμείροντι περᾶν ἱερῆς κατὰ δειρῆς.[174]

Then glorious Hermes desired *hosiê* of pieces of meat,
for the smell, a sweet one, tormented him, even though he was immortal.
But even so his heroic spirit did not yield to him,
even though he greatly desired to swallow (it) down his holy throat.

Having thus overcome his desire, Hermes put away the meat (133–135) and burnt the hoofs and the heads (135–136). This episode has been the topic of much scholarly debate. Discussions have focused on the nature of the sacrificial ritual and on the meaning of ὁσίης κρεάων (i.e. on what it is that Hermes desires).

The passage has been interpreted by some as a *thysia* sacrifice, perhaps marking the foundation of the cult of the Twelve Gods at Olympia. As Jeanmaire argued, during a *thysia* all the meat would be consecrated to the gods, but part of the meat was afterwards de-sacralised (conceded by the gods to humans): this is the meat that humans ate. According to Jeanmaire, the ὁσίη κρεάων that Hermes longs for refers to precisely this 'desacralised' share of the meat.[175] Van der Valk and Burkert subscribed to this view.[176] Thus, according to

174 *h.Merc.* 130–133.

175 Jeanmaire 1945:82: 'Ce n'est pas que toute la victime ne soit consacrée par le rite même du sacrifice, dont le propre est de la faire passer dans la catégorie des *hiera*, mais l'usage comportant, pour les sacrifices ordinaires, partage entre les dieux et les hommes, la part qui revient à ces derniers est par définition et en vertu du rite qui implique ici une désacralisation, ὅσια, profane.'

176 Van der Valk 1951:418, 421; Burkert 1985:270.

these scholars ἡ ὁσία designates the 'profane' share, and the passage is used to support this supposed meaning of ὁσία. However, we have no reason to believe that the entire sacrificial animal was first transferred to the divine sphere during a *thysia* offering, according to the Ancient Greek conceptualisation, after which part of the animal was 'desacralised' again for human consumption.[177] It has also been realised that the ritual Hermes performs is very far from being an ordinary *thysia* offering. If interpreted as an Olympian sacrifice, practically every aspect of the sacrifice is abnormal, as scholars have often pointed out. Therefore, such an interpretation of the ritual actions, and consequently of ὁσίη, is problematic.[178]

Perhaps the most strikingly odd feature of Hermes's actions is the fact that he *roasts* the meat for the gods. In a standard *thysia* sacrifice, the offerings to the gods (the *mêria*, wrapped in fat) were transferred to the divine sphere *by burning them*: what the gods received was the smoke, the *knisê*. As such, the sacrificial practice emphasized the difference and the distance between humans, who actually needed to eat, and the immortal gods, for whom the smoke sufficed.[179] Versnel concludes that 'Hermes seems to be completely unaware of the prevailing dietary code, mixing them up by treating the Olympian gods to a *human* dinner'.[180] In an alternative explanation, Jaillard interpreted the events in the light of religious rituals in which gods were *actually* offered meat. Two

177 There seems to be no evidence for such a conceptualisation (F.T. van Straten, V. Pirenne-Delforge, personal communication). Instead, it seems that worshippers assumed a division from the start between the part allocated to the gods and the part allocated to humans.

178 Abnormal elements of this 'sacrifice' include: the fact that Hermes lights the fire with the candlesticks he invented (instead of taking them from an altar), the manner of killing the animals, piercing their spinal cords (instead of cutting their throats), and the fact that the gods receive the same share of the victim as humans do, i.e. portions of roasted meat (instead of *knisê*, product of the burnt *mêria* wrapped in fat). Moreover, common and expected elements of a usual sacrifice are missing in the description, such as the customary preliminary actions (libations, οὐλοχύται) and the roasting of the entrails to be consumed on the spot. For a complete inventory of unusual elements of the 'ritual' and elements missing compared to a normal Olympian sacrifice, with references to other scholarship: Vergados 2013:324–329. An attempt by Burkert 1984: esp. 837–838 to save the interpretation of this passage as a *thysia* sacrifice, by adducing parallels for all ritual features in cults in different parts of Greece, is flawed. As Strauss Clay 1989:118 rightly objected, the *conjunction* of all these elements in one ritual remains odd, and Versnel 2011:313 and Vergados 2013:327 agree.

179 Ekroth 2011:17 with references to earlier scholarship.

180 Versnel 2011:372.

types of such ceremonies are known in the archaic and classical periods. First, raw meat was sometimes placed on a table near the altar or inside the temple as a present for gods (offerings usually labelled '*trapezômata*'). Second, in a ritual usually termed '*theoxenia*', gods were invited to join the humans' banquet and were seated on a special throne as guests of honour. Then cooked meat was offered to them. Jaillard proposed that the ὁσίη κρεάων which Hermes desires are honorific gifts of meat to gods in a ritual resembling *theoxenia* or *trapezômata*.[181] He translates ὁσίη κρεάων correspondingly as: 'la part qui, dans le sacrifice, constitue la timé des dieux'. What is especially attractive about Jaillard's interpretation is that it gives us a perspective on Hermes's initial offer of roasted meat.[182] But note that in the interpretation of the passage as a *theoxenia*, different aspects of the ritual remain opaque. Hermes's actions cannot be straightforwardly mapped on one of these rituals. For example, as Ekroth has shown, whereas *trapezômata* rituals typically featured pieces of raw meat, the *theoxenia* rituals featured cooked meat. However, the rituals in this Hymn resemble the *trapezômata* ritual more, although the meat is prepared.[183]

In short, there is a 'bewildering confusion in the scholarly literature' on this passage, as Versnel has recently called it.[184] Versnel's probably deliberate vagueness, when he argues that the passage 'betrays features' of the rituals

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181 These cultic phenomena already occur in Homer but seem to become more widespread during the archaic and esepcially the classical period. Cf. Ekroth 2011 for a more complete description of these rituals, their motivation, origin and significance. Ekroth is convinced by Jaillard's characterisation of Hermes's actions in the *Hymn to Hermes* in these terms (p. 21).

182 Note that the passage is thus not necessarily, as Versnel 2011:311, 324, 371–372 supposes, a 'hermeneutic nightmare', containing an irresolvable 'inconsistency' (i.e. Hermes understands that he should not desire the meat because he is a god, at the same time he has served them a 'chateaubriand' (p. 371) apparently assuming that they would like to eat it). Hermes may have offered the roasted meat, not because he assumed they also wanted to eat it and was 'projecting his own predilection for a steak *à la humaine* onto the world of gods', but to provide the gods with τιμή in a ritual such as *theoxenia* or as a kind of *trapezômeta*. For yet another possible interpretation of the offering of roasted meat (as re-enacting the primitive commensality of gods and humans), cf. the main text below.

183 Ekroth 2011:26.

184 Versnel 2011:314. For references to other views, cf. Versnel 2011:309–377. Versnel investigated the depiction of Hermes in literary sources (this hymn, fables, Aristophanic comedy), archaeological evidence (herms, vase paintings) and the cultic/ritual sphere (Hermaic aspects of sacrifice). He has argued that throughout these different media and over a long period of time the most typical feature of Hermes is 'his thoroughly human nature' (p. 318, cf. the extensive survey in Versnel 2011:319–370). Notably, for Versnel, Hermes's

discussed above though it 'represents neither',[185] is perhaps indicative of our general poor understanding of this passage. It is not unlikely that the author of the Homeric hymn did not intend to describe a coherent ritual in the first place.

Indeed, we may interpret the sacrificial proceedings as a poetic play of the author who is looking back at the mythical events in *Theogony*. Perhaps we see Hermes preparing a roast dinner for the gods, as if in the time before Prometheus's deceitful 'sacrifice', when humans and gods feasted together. At the same time, in the reference to ὁσίη and Hermes's refusal to eat, the passage's setting is the state of affairs *after* the dispute at Mecone. This dispute marked a definite separation between the two worlds, after which the immortals only received the smoke from the burnt bones, while humans ate. Rather than representing any actual type of sacrificial ritual, the scene in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* may be re-enacting this moment of separation, and considering the perspectives of humans and gods in the single figure of Hermes.

The marked usage of ὁσίη is part of the play on this Hesiodic event. Elsewhere, the noun ὁσία is used predominantly in the syntactic construction '(to do) X is (not) ὁσίη'. Thus, the expression ὁσίης κρεάων ἠράσσατο 'he desired for an ὁσίη of meat' probably means: 'Hermes desired a part of (the) meat which (in his view) was ὁσίη'. That way of thinking crucially introduces the human perspective of the world after Prometheus's trickery. Hermes is staged as *if he were a human sacrificing*. We know that when ὁσία and ὅσιος refer to ritual practice, they concern the 'who, what, where, when and how' of ritual actions.[186] When humans worry about 'what is ὁσία' in cult, they wonder what they should offer, when, how, how much, for which god, and what they are allowed to eat. Doing what is ὁσίη—in this case, respecting the proper divi-

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humanity shows especially clearly in his culinary preferences. This might explain part of Hermes's behaviour here (though Versnel pays due attention to the extreme complexity of the scene) and his usage of ὁσίη: 'Hermes, besides craving a human meal, also refers to it with a term typically in use for the 'human's portion' of the sacrificial meat' (Versnel 2011:323). Versnel's theory is highly interesting, but it is not clear to me whether and in what way the diachronic evidence on Hermes in different modalities of his depiction can bear on the interpretation of Hermes in his Homeric Hymn. While noting the possibilities this interpretative route opens up, in the following we will try to explain the passage and the usage of ὁσίη in it, without referring to Hermes's more general cultic character in Greek theology throughout time.

185 Versnel 2011:372.

186 Chapter 2, section 1.7.

sion of the parts of the animal by humans between ordinary human participants, special participants (such as the priest) and the relevant god(s)—was a crucial aspect of any sacrificial ritual, and guaranteed the successful continuation of a positive reciprocal relationship with the god(s).[187] At the same time, Hermes is presented as a god. He finally overcomes his desire to eat, *because he is an immortal* (ἀθάνατόν περ ἐόντα), and in the post-Promethean universe, an effective commensality no longer existed.[188] When Hermes is longing for ὁσίης κρεάων, from his *divine* perspective it means he wants to achieve having a set of rules operative for him that characterises a reciprocal relationship between himself and worshippers sacrificing to him.[189] Thus, I would propose that the author consciously conflates multiple perspectives, that of humans who eat and of divinities who do not, in a poetic restaging of the Hesiodic Promethean crisis 'in Hermaic key'.[190] The wordplay, consisting of the paradoxical and thus marked usage of ὁσίη for a god, contributes strongly to this poetic effort.

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187 Cf. Vergagos 2013 who briefly characterises ὁσίης κρεάων as "his rightful share of meat," i.e. what Hermes perceived to be his rightful share.

188 Greek gods are not conceptualised as intending or wanting to eat human food after the primitive stage of commensality, even in the above-mentioned rituals in which raw or cooked meat was offered. Such offerings did not aim to feed the gods, but offered them τιμή. Gods were merely *honoured* by the gifts of meat or entire meals deposited on a table (*trapezômata*) or by the invitation to a banquet (*theoxenia*). But no one ever thought they actually wanted to eat their presents (Ekroth 2011:34–36; Versnel 2011:361). After the ritual, the portion of the god was consumed by humans (it was often the priest's perquisite), as was sometimes also explicitly laid down in the sacred law (Ekroth 2011: 37).

189 The *result* of that would be τιμή. Cf. Jaillard's special meaning of ὁσίη as 'τιμή of the gods' (2007:108). This interpretation of ὁσίη conforms with Jay-Robert's reading of ὁσίη in the Homeric Hymns as 'τιμή of the gods' (2009:33–38 = 1999:12–16). Note that Jaillard does not base his theory on Jay-Robert's work, although he mentions that his views coincide with Jay-Robert's explanation of ὁσίη in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* (p. 89 n. 171). These readings cannot do full justice to the passage. ὁσίη and τιμή are not referential equivalents. The narrator *could* have said that Hermes wanted the honour (τιμή) of the meat being sacrificed to him, so as to be among the Twelve Gods for whom he cut up the pieces, and the term ὁσίη is marked.

190 This expression has been used by Jaillard in an oral presentation during the conference "Figura XV" at Paris in 2012 (as pointed out by V. Pirenne-Delforge).

6 Conclusion

In this chapter we turned to a puzzling alleged semantic characteristic of ὅσιος: the fact that this lexeme could have two opposite meanings, 'sacred' and 'profane'. I have argued that an alternative explanation can be found for all supposed examples of this semantic paradox.

Some frequently quoted examples of ὅσιος as 'sacred' and 'profane' can in fact straightforwardly be explained as prototypical cases of ὅσιος (section 2). The set combination ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια has convincingly been reinterpreted by Maffi and Connor, whose analyses were complemented by Samons and Blok's work on the ἱερά and ὅσια money. As these authors have shown, the reference to monies as ὅσια was an attempt at communication by the *polis*. Choosing this term, the *polis* expressed that the usage of a particular fund in a particular way was pleasing to the gods. In other words, labelling monies as ὅσια was an act of persuasive language usage, of 'framing'. Such an explanation accords well with our impression of the persuasive usage of ὅσιος in the fifth-century literature and inscriptions (section 3). Denominative verb forms derived from ὅσιος were discussed in section 4. In three key passages in Herodotus, it was shown that we can interpret these verbs without resorting to a meaning 'profane'. The Euripidean verb forms should primarily be seen as instances of Euripides's inventive language use, who coined or at least cleverly used these rare verb forms in each case to produce particular effects, but not to express that something is made 'sacred' or 'profane'. Initiands of mystery cults applied mainstream religious language of the *polis* when they used ὅσιος and derived denominative verb vorms, but these cases are again not evidence for a 'sacred' meaning. Finally, in section 5, we analysed three passages in which the god Hermes applied the rules of ὁσίη to himself. Although these scenes have provoked much scholarly discussion, we can actually see the same pattern here as in similar cases in Chapter 5. These utterances are marked and contribute to the introduction of a 'human perspective' in the Hymn.

We must conclude that the semantic paradox of *hosios & cognates* does not exist.

Conclusion

In this book we set out to understand the meaning and usage of *hosios & cognates*. The study of the semantics and pragmatics of these terms is surrounded by many controversies: *hosios & cognates* are considered notoriously difficult to understand.

The starting point of our analysis was a fundamental insight from the field of conceptual semantics, namely that lexical selection is competitive. A language user (speaker) always chooses a lexeme after considering alternatives (consciously or unconsciously). A listener realizes that alternatives were available to the speaker, but apparently the selected lexeme expressed the message he or she wished to convey the best. Based on this view of semantics, we examined the competition between *hosios & cognates* and near-synonymous semantic 'rivals'. Using insights from the field of cognitive semantics, it was argued that the representation of 'meaning' of a lexeme in the mental lexicon consists of a structured inventory of usages and an awareness of the lexeme's cultural framework.

Consequently, we set out to study the distribution pattern and the associations linked to *hosios & cognates* and its near-synonyms. It was necessary to confine the research to a short period in time. The usages, associations and cultural frames connected with lexemes change over time as the historical and textual contexts in which they are used and the mentality of their users change. Studying 'the semantics and pragmatics' of a term can only be done by taking a slice of history and making an analysis for that period (or possibly taking multiple slices and making multiple consecutive analyses). Our focus was the fifth century BCE.

Chapter 2 provided an initial analysis of the distribution of *hosios & cognates*, of the internal structure of the semantic network (prototypical and less prototypical usages) and the associated cultural frame(s). We found that *hosios & cognates* may be used to evaluate a wide variety of actions, attitudes and individuals. In a large majority of occurrences (80%), however, these lexemes are in fact limited to a very small group of applications. Confirming previous scholarly views, it was argued that *hosios & cognates* evaluate conduct towards the gods *directly* (discussing whether humans acknowledge gods as gods, keep a proper relationship to them, and honour them in cultic service) and *indirectly*, by evaluating conduct in those interhuman relationships that the gods are especially interested in (between parents and children and other members of the *oikos*, between guest and host, towards suppliants and the dead, and keeping oaths).

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An analysis of the earliest attestations of *hosios & cognates* and of situations in which this evaluation is activated without much contextual preparation showed that *hosios & cognates* are essentially and primarily ethical *and* religious, and that there is a crucial connection between these aspects. These evaluations access different cultural frames (of the long-term relationship with one's parents, of receiving and honouring guests, for example), but they are all subsumed under one larger frame: that of sustaining the reciprocal bond with the divine world. It was argued that *hosios & cognates* refer to what humans do to keep up this relationship. To 'do ὅσια' is to perform the human part in the exchange: to present the gods with gifts, the most important gift being τιμή. This characterisation of 'doing ὅσια' implies that ὅσιος (with positive argumentative orientation) articulates a positive value, not 'what is religiously neutral'. In the final part of Chapter 2, we investigated whether the way of thinking articulated by *hosios & cognates* was present in the pre-classical literature, and concluded that it was. It is not the case that *hosios, eusebês & cognates* in the fifth century came to express a previously absent or uncommon mentality.

Chapters 3 and 4 provided analyses of competitive pairs, focusing on the two most central terms to which *hosios & cognates* relate: εὐσέβεια 'piety' and δικαιοσύνη 'justice'. Chapter 3 examined the distinct semantics of lexemes when the network of usage and the internal structure of the semantic network of one lexeme differ from those of other lexemes. Having studied the distribution of *eusebês & cognates* and compared the data to the distribution of *hosios & cognates*, only one significant difference between these two sets of lexemes could be determined. Whereas *eusebês & cognates* are used more often with a positive argumentative orientation, *hosios & cognates* are more frequently negatively oriented. In all other respects, the two sets of lexemes were largely comparable. We concluded that ὅσιος and εὐσεβής had the same meaning for the language user (as far as we can tell). The assumption of previous scholars that *hosios & cognates* did not express attitudes or mental states, while *eusebês & cognates* did, cannot be supported by our findings. Moreover, the extremely close similarities in the usage of both terms when they refer to *objects* helped us understand those cases in which ὅσιος qualifies an object. Given the semantics of εὐσέβεια, it is clear that an object is not itself εὐσεβές, rather the term refers to the person who handles it or is otherwise involved. The highly analogous distribution of ὅσιος for objects (and its generally extremely similar distribution pattern) may lead us to the inference that an object is not ὅσιον either, but a ὅσιον object is used in a way that is ὅσιον by its ὅσιος owner. It was argued that there is potentially one semantic difference between the two sets of lexemes. The disqualification ἀνόσιος may be affectively more charged than δυσσεβής and

ἀσεβής, as it seems to appear in more emotional or aggressive contexts. Thus, these lexemes may differ in their emotive meaning.

In Chapter 4, we examined the way in which different lexemes may *frame* a situation in different ways, focusing on *hosios & cognates* vs. *dikaios & cognates*. In a case study (supplication scenes in tragedy), it was shown that these two sets of lexemes in practice often frame the same situation in a different way, even though both may express what is 'just in the eyes of the gods'. Even in those cases in which *dikaios & cognates* did refer to what 'pleases the gods', the usage of *dikaios & cognates* would access the other associations of this lexeme on the part of the listener. This would remind him or her of other aspects of 'justice' (such as a proper distribution or referring to what individuals have legally committed to). Based on this analysis, a tentative answer was given to a puzzle posed in Chapter 1 regarding the diachronic distribution of *hosios & cognates*. It was suggested that *hosios & cognates* (and *eusebês* & *cognates*) in the fifth century answered the users' need for more dedicated, specific terms to express morality from the imagined perspective of gods when *dikaios & cognates* became more specialized for other usages.

We moved on to discussing clearly *non*-prototypical cases of *hosios & cognates* in Chapter 5. It was argued previously that semantic networks in the mental lexicon are essentially open and flexible. They can include any definition that a speaker can convince us belongs to this category. The usage of *hosios & cognates* for gods may seem a good example at first sight, but in fact it is not. We argued that the analysis of such non-prototypical cases does not stop with the realization that they are marginal examples, perhaps even extensions of the semantic network. To understand this, we needed to take into account two general principles of communication: the social basis of language and the principle of least effort. It was argued that using a term in a highly marginal way is *marked* when lexical alternatives are available that could have prototypically expressed the same meaning. The listener is struck by such usage and tries to find an explanation for the unexpected choice of words. The result is that such usage has an *effect* on the listener. This effect does not emerge from an analysis of 'more and less prototypical' usage alone, and the notion of competition *between* lexemes is essential to explain it.

In Chapter 6, we moved from semantics to a historical question and examined the weight of religious evaluation in the public sphere. Knowing what ὅσιος and ὁσία *mean* is not enough; we also need to understand their persuasive value in contexts of debate. How *relevant* was it to a fifth-century Greek speaker to learn that something is or is not ὅσιον or ὁσία? How much impact would such an evaluation have had? This query ties in with broader scholarly discussions on the role of religion in Greek *poleis* in the Classical period and

their supposed 'rationalisation'. We addressed this complex research question in a case study of the epigraphic material. Some inscriptions stipulating the ritual norm tell the worshipper that a particular action is 'not ὅσιον' or 'not ὁσία'. We cannot determine *directly* to what extent a typical worshipper would have cared about such a message. However, we can study this question in a roundabout way, focussing on situations in which the authorities decided to include such an explicit appeal to piety. Most ritual norms do not contain any religious evaluations at all. In other words, we examined another competitive pair: ὅσιος vs. ∅. Were ritual norms containing ὅσιον / ὁσία the kinds of rules on which the survival of the community depended or, in contrast, regulations about unimportant details of cultic practice? Having studied the historical contexts of the relevant inscriptions, we concluded that explicit appeals to piety were made when obeying the rule mattered, and when the rule was quite significant to the community in question. We may infer that ὅσιον and ὁσία were important values in fifth-century Greece, confirming our impression from the literary sources.

Finally, in Chapter 7, a contentious and longstanding issue about *hosios & cognates* was solved. This is the supposition that these lexemes have two opposite meanings, referring to the 'sacred' and to the 'profane', in addition to their core significance in the realm of 'piety'. Based on our previous analyses, it became possible to see that none of the alleged examples actually provided evidence for such a paradox. Some cases were in fact clearly explicable as prototypical applications of various kinds. The historical dossier of ὅσια χρήματα was explained by scholars before me. Their analyses showed that the application of ὅσιος to monies is an example of 'framing': claiming that the usage of such monies is pleasing to the gods. As we may infer from the conclusions in Chapter 6, such a claim would have been understandable to others and had a good chance of being convincing, too. The remaining—literary—cases were *ad hoc* poetic inventions, and in some cases marked language usage. There was no need remaining to postulate a meaning of sacred or profane for *hosios & cognate*s.

Our conclusion is twofold. First, while the adjective ὅσιος and the noun ὁσία have been considered semantically opaque and extremely polysemous lexemes, we found that their semantics are not complex at all. These terms are no more 'polysemous' than other typical evaluative terms, and there is no semantic paradox. The attested occurrences of these lexemes in the fifth century and earlier can be understood if we take as a starting point a small number of prototypical usages in a focused semantic network. ὅσιος is what humans do to please the gods and to give them the τιμή they deserve, and whatever action or attitude the speaker can convince others that it belongs to

that category. All seemingly different cases were explained as cases of framing, as marked language usage, as *ad hoc* poetic inventions with an intended effect.

Second, with regard to studying the semantics of evaluative terms in a dead language, this study proposes a method for carrying out such research, showing that isolating a short period of time and then analysing the usage of a lexeme in its semantic field are informative and productive techniques. Lexical selection is always based on competition. When studying the meaning and usage of a lexeme, we need to ask in which semantic/pragmatic situations the studied lexeme wins synchronically over its near-synonymous lexical rivals, and why these competitors are selected on other occasions. A diachronic study should be the accumulation of different case studies of individual periods in time.

Let us finish by revisiting the question asked in the preface. Why precisely is Polyphemus ἀνόσιος? Now we can safely say: Euripides's Polyphemus is ἀνόσιος in virtually all possible respects. His speech is marked by a total failure to honour the gods (Zeus and Poseidon), parents (again, Poseidon), and his suppliants and guests (Odysseus and his companions). Moreover, his victims are bound to him in a bond of φιλία (according to Odysseus), and he would deny them proper funeral rituals because they would end up in his stomach. The Cyclops transgresses not only against the gods themselves, but also against almost all of the interhuman relationships that are most important to them. This is how the Greeks imagine a monster, the complete opposite to Greek culture and civilisation.

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